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i ABSTRACT 
This  study  provides  evidence  on  accounting  conservatism  based  on  a  large 
sample  of  publicly-quoted  UK  companies  over  the  period  1969-2001.  The  effects  of 
conservative  accounting  are  studied  both  indirectly  and  directly  by  using  earnings 
measures  containing  varying  levels  of  accruals  and  by  further  decomposing  earnings 
into  its  operating  cash  flows  and  distinct  accruals  components.  The  analyses  are  also 
separated  according  to  the  sign  of  earnings  and  earnings  components,  and  account 
for  the  effects  of  asset-recognition  rules.  Even  though  conservatism  is  an  accruals 
phenomenon,  this  is  the  first  study  to  provide  direct  empirical  evidence  on  the  role  of 
accruals  in  accounting  conservatism. 
The  thesis  addresses  the  following  issues.  First,  under  conservative 
accounting,  earnings-decreasing  changes  in  performance  measures  (reflecting 
economic  losses)  that  contain  more  accruals  mean-revert  more  and  earnings- 
increasing  changes  (reflecting  economic  gains)  are  persistent.  Working  capital 
accruals  and  special  items  are  particularly  strongly  mean-reverting  when  they  are 
eamings-decreasing.  Depreciation  accruals  are  persistent. 
Second,  direct  tests  by  earnings  components  show  that  operating  cash  flows 
exhibit  low  timeliness  overall  and,  given  that  they  contain  no  accruals,  no  asymmetry 
in  reflecting  bad  news.  Earnings  figures  with  more  accruals  exhibit  more  asymmetry 
in  reflecting  bad  news.  Working  capital  accruals  and  special  items  are  important  in 
this  asymmetry,  but  depreciation  is  not.  Interestingly,  good  news  results  in  a  small 
eamings-decreasing  charge,  consistent  with  smoothing.  Lagged  tests  on  accruals 
reveal  that  bad  news  from  as  much  as  three  previous  periods  is  reflected  in  current 
ii earnings  through  special  items,  -;  inconsistent  with  conservatism.  Evidence  indicates 
that  conservatism  is  increasing  through  time.  The  sensitivity  to  good  news  has 
decreased  over  time.  To  capture  these  changes,  higher-moments  measures  are 
developed. 
Third,  the  analysis  by  the  sign  of  "bottom-line"  earnings  does  not  reveal  any 
differences  in  reflecting  good/bad  news  for  the  profit/loss  finns.  Separating  earnings 
observations  by  sign  of  cash  flow  also  reveals  no  differences.  In  contrast,  separating 
observations  by  the  sign  of  accruals  (other  than  depreciation)  reliably  shows  that  the 
asymmetric  timeliness  is  significantly  higher  in  the  negative-accruals  groups,  as 
expected.  The  accruals  components  determine  this  asymmetry,  rather  than  the 
operating  cash  flow  (or,  earnings  by  itselo. 
Finally,  less  conservative  recognition  rules  lead  to  stronger  responsiveness  of 
earnings  to  bad  news,  as  reflected  in  working  capital  accruals  and  special  items. 
Asset-specific  measures  of  conservative  recognition  rules  reinforce  these  findings.  A 
puzzling  result  is  that  operating  cash  flows  reveal  a  significant  asymmetric  response 
to  bad  news  in  the  group  of  observations  where  it  is  least-likely  to  be  observed  (low 
book  to  market). 
A  selection  of  other  results  by  size,  industry,  extremity  of  news,  methods, 
accounting  year-ends,  market-wide  returns,  yields,  method  of  estimation,  ctc.,  not 
only  corroborates,  but  generally  strengthens  the  results  obtained. 
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ix 1  INTRODUCTION  AND  MOTIVATION 
In  almost  forty  years  of  capital  market-based  empirical  accounting  research 
since  the  seminal  Ball  and  Brown  (1968)  and  Beaver  (1968)  studies,  accounting 
conservatism  has  emerged  as  a  dominant  explanation  of  observed  differences 
between  share  prices  and  accounting  figures,  in  particular  accounting  earnings.  The 
essence  of  conservatism  is  often  referred  to  by  the  phrase  "anticipate  all  losses,  but 
recognise  only  realised  profits".  While  accounting  conservatism  has  been  discussed 
occasionally  in  early  papers  (e.  g.,  Scott,  1926;  Brock,  1958;  Devine,  1963;  Sterling, 
1967)  and  historical  reviews  (e.  g.,  Edwards,  pp.  109-110)  and  proposed  as  an 
alternative  explanation  of  observed  results  (e.  g.,  Hayn,  1995),  it  was  not  until  the 
important  empirical  paper  by  Basu  (1997)  that  it  has  become  a  central  issue  in  the 
capital  market-based  research.  '  Basu's  (1997)  paper  has  been  "amended"  by  a 
theoretical  model  two  years  later  by  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  and  its  analyses 
extended  both  in  time  and  in  an  international  context.  Both  these  two  influential 
papers,  along  with  several  other  papers  that  followed  later,  define  accounting 
conservatism  in  terms  of  the  asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings.  Good  economic 
news,  as  evidenced  in  an  efficient  capital  market  by  increases  in  share  prices 
(positive  returns  in  period),  is  recognised  in  earnings  only  when  the  good  news  is 
realised.  This  would  generally  happen  gradually  over  a  number  of  accounting 
periods.  On  the  other  hand,  bad  economic  news,  as  evidenced  by  decreases  in  share 
prices  (negative  periodic  returns),  should  be  immediately  and  fully  recognised  in 
1  Nobes  (1981)  cautions  that  there  are  two  very  different  types  of  conservatism: 
"...  German  or  French  conservatism  is  of  a  wholly  different  order  than  Anglo-Saxon 
prudence.  "  (p.  268) 
I earnings  in  the  period  it  becomes  known,  in  some  instances  already  at  the  time  it  is 
only  anticipated  and  thus  before  it  is  realised. 
In  the  period  1999-2004,  several  papers  have  explored  Basu's  (1997) 
intuition  and  Pope  and  Walker's  (1999)  theoretical  model  to  study  either  the 
accounting  conservatism  itself  in  various  settings,  or  have  used  this  model  to  infer 
properties  of/variations  in  accounting  rules  across  time,  regulatory  regimes  and 
influences  of  conservatism  on  other  (contractual)  questions.  For  example,  variants  of 
the  model  have  been  used  to  infer  the  changing  value-relevance  of  financial 
statements  over  time  (e.  g.,  Ryan  and  Zarowin,  2003;  Klein  and  Marquardt,  2002; 
Holthausen  and  Watts,  2001;  Givoly  and  Hayn,  2000).  The  model  has  been  used  to 
study  international  variation  in  accounting  rules.  Besides  Pope  and  Walker's  (1999) 
empirical  UK/US  comparison,  some  of  the  related  studies  include  Raonic,  McLeay 
and  Asimakopoulos  (2004)  who  study  the  effects  of  cross-listings  on  conservatism, 
and  Giner  and  Rees  (2001)  who  study  conservatism  in  four  European  countries 
characterised  by  different  institutional  properties.  Ball,  Kothari  and  Wu  (2000)  study 
four  Asian  countries  and  the  interaction  of  accounting  standards  and  managers'  and 
auditors'  incentives  on  conservatism.  Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin  (2000)  study 
influences  resulting  from  institutional  differences  between  code-law  and  common 
law  countries.  Beekes,  Pope  and  Young  (2003)  study  the  influence  of  board 
composition  -  in  particular,  the  number  of  outside  directors  -  on  the  asymmetric 
timeliness  of  earnings,  while  Bushman  et  aL  (2004)  study  the  influence  of  earnings 
timeliness  on  ownership  concentration,  directors'  incentives  and  executives' 
incentives.  Other  issues  studied  in  this  context  include  quarterly-eamings 
conservatism  and  auditors'  incentives  (Basu,  Hwang  and  Jan,  2001),  type  of  auditor 
2 (Basu,  Hwang,  Jan,  2000),  cost  of  equity  issues  (Francis  et  al.  2003,  who  show  that 
timeliness  and  conservatism  -  they  distinguish  between  the  two  terms  -  have 
relatively  small  influences  on  the  cost  of  capital),  emerging  market  issues  (e.  g., 
Jindrichovska  and  Kuo,  2002),  issues  regarding  dividend  policies  and  debt  costs 
(e.  g.,  Ahmed  et  al.,  2002)  -  albeit  not  directly  in  the  Basu  (1997)  sense,  and  others 
(general  review  papers  include  Watts,  2003  and  2003b;  Kothari,  2001;  Holthausen 
and  Watts,  2001).  The  list  of  topics  researched  is  not  exhaustive,  but  at  best 
indicative  on  the  richness  of  the  research  area.  Moreover,  the  list  of  topics  related  to 
accounting  conservatism  is  likely  to  increase  in  the  future.  Beginning  in  2005,  the 
European  Union  is  introducing  the  International  Financial  Reporting  Standards,  an 
important  feature  of  which  is  expected  to  be  high(er)  timeliness.  High  timeliness  is  a 
characteristic  of  accounting  being  conservative  in  respect  to  treatment  of  economic 
losses  but  not  economic  gains  and  is  one  of  the  two  important  or  desired  properties 
or  determinants  of  quality  of  accounting  earnings  (European  Commission,  2002; 
Levitt,  1998),  the  other  "desirable"  property  being  the  comparability  of  financial 
statements. 
Surprisingly,  although  accounting  conservatism  is  by  definition  an  accruals 
phenomenon,  existing  empirical  studies  have  not  explored  the  details  regarding  the 
particular  ways  in  which  accounting  conservatism  manifests  itself  in  the  relation 
between  accounting  earnings  (and,  more  generally,  other  performance  measures)  and 
share  prices  through  accruals  in  these  contexts.  While  the  central  role  of  accruals  is 
stressed  and  commented  upon  in  a  large  number  of  research  papers  cited  elsewhere 
in  this  chapter,  the  actual  inferences  regarding  the  precise  role(s)  of  accruals  in  the 
asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings  to  good  and  bad  news  have  been  made  only 
3 indirectly  and  using  "aggregated"  measures.  For  example,  Basu  (1997)  regresses  two 
cash  flows  figures  (from  operations  and  from  operating  and  financial  activities) 
presumably  containing  increasingly  "less  accruals"  on  goodibad  economic  news  and 
compares  these  results  with  results  obtained  byý  regressing  earnings  before 
extraordinary  items  on  news.  The  cash  flow  and  earnings  figures  contain  different 
amounts  of  accruals.  By  comparing  the  results  from  one  set  of  figures  relative  to  the 
other,  he  is  able  to  comment  upon  the  relative  merits of  accruals  in  the  observed 
asymmetric  timeliness  of  accounting  earnings  and  good  and  bad  economic  news.  A 
similar  approach  is  taken  in  other  existing  studies  as  well:  Pope  and  Walker  (1999) 
compare  ordinary  earnings  and  earnings  after  extraordinary  items  and  Ball,  Kothari 
and  Robin  (2000)  compare  operating  cash  flows  with  earnings  before  extraordinary 
items.  They  also  explore  dividends  as  an  alternative  measure  of  company 
perfonnance. 
Most  visible  applications  of  accounting  conservatism  that  result  in  large, 
transitory  one-time  items  include,  for  example,  large  losses  on  disposals  and 
restructuring  costs  and  it  is  thus  not  surprising  that  the  primary  focus  of  the  studies 
quoted  above  has  been  on  accruals  items  that  fall  under  the  general  descriptive  term 
d6special  items"  (e.  g.,  Kinney  and  Trezevant,  1997).  However,  literature  related  to, 
but  not  directly  concerned  with,  accounting  conservatism  has  shown  that  the  links 
between  other  types  of  more  "ordinary"  accruals,  examples  of  which  include 
working  capital  accruals'and  the  depreciation  charge,  and  future  cash  flows  are 
(potentially)  important.  One  question  that  emerges  is  whether  these  "ordinary"  types 
of  accruals  have  an  important  role  in  the  observed  asymmetric  timeliness  of 
4 accounting  earnings.  Moreover,  the  precise  nature  of  "special  items"  has  often  not 
been  clarified  in  (non-US)  empirical  literature. 
If  the  application  of  accounting  conservatism  does  cause  large  one-time 
transitory  items  to  appear  in  accounting  earnings,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  expect  that 
at  least  in  some  cases  these  items  would  cause  (one-time)  bottom-line  accounting 
losses,  a  decrease  in  accounting  earnings  or  accounting  earnings  that  are  lower  than 
they  would  otherwise  be.  Empirical  literature  has  shown  that  both  losses  and 
earnings  decreases  mean-revert  fast  and  are  thus  by  and  large  transitory  (e.  g.,  Das 
and  Lev,  1994;  Freeman  and  Tse,  1992),  which  is  consistent  with  predictions  under 
accounting  conservatism.  Moreover,  there  is  a  notable  body  of  empirical  literature 
that  shows  from  several  different  aspects  that  the  relation  between  share  prices  and 
accounting  earnings  (and  book  values  of  equity)  relate  in  ways  that  are  not 
characteristic  of  "normal"  firms  (e.  g.,  Donnelly,  2002;  Collins,  Pincus  and  Xie, 
1999;  Lipe,  Bryant  and  Widener,  1998;  Berger,  Ofek  and  Swary,  1997;  Beaver, 
McAnally  and  Stinson,  1997;  Ali  and  Pope,  1995;  Jan  and  Ou,  1995;  Hayn,  1995; 
Martikainen,  1997).  In  relating  these  findings  to  the  accounting  conservatism 
literature,  an  important  question  emerges.  Are  these  "different"  relations  a  result  of 
differences  in  applications  of  the  conservatism  principle?  Or,  for  example,  can  the 
application  of  conservative  accounting  practises  that  results  in  an  accounting  loss  be 
treated  as  a  mere  manifestation  of  the  appearance  of  (extreme)  bad  news  that  must 
then  be  recognised  in  financial  statement  immediately  due  -  to  accounting 
conservatism? 
5 Finally,  Pope  and  Walker  (2003),  building  on  Feltharn  and  OhIson  (1995, 
1996)  and  other  (e.  g.,  Beaver  and  Ryan,  1996)  literature,  place  an  asset-recognition 
restriction  on  these  relations.  Firms  that  write-off  as  an  expense  the  entire  amount 
invested  in  an  asset  at  the  time  the  investment  expenditure  occurs,  should  not  exhibit 
asymmetric  timeliness  in  accounting  earnings  in  reflecting  bad  news  in  later 
accounting  periods,  given  that  the  assets  to  which  the  investment  expenditures  relate, 
would  not  have  been  recorded  as  an  asset  in  the  balance  sheet.  However,  analogously 
to  the  literature  on  conservative  treatment  of  economic  gains  and  economic  losses, 
no  distinction  is  made  about  the  precise  sources  of  these  restrictions.  For  example, 
firms  that  exhibit  relatively  large  amounts  of  net  working  capital  are  more  likely  to 
recognise  the  effects  of  conservative  treatment  of  economic  gains  and  losses  through 
changes  in  net  working  capital  accounts  than  through  other  accounting  items. 
This  thesis  empirically  explores  these  research  issues.  It  uses  a  large  and 
comprehensive  UK  sample  of  publicly-quoted  companies  in  a  contextually  very  long 
time-series  spanning  firms  with  financial  year-ends  ending  in  years  1969-2001.  The 
sample  includes  failed  companies,  but  excludes,  as  is  conventional,  financial  and 
related  firms  -  see,  e.  g.,  Danbolt  and  Rees  (2001).  The  thesis  starts  with  a  general 
observation  resulting  from  different  treatment  of  economic  gains  (increases  in 
market  value)  and  economic  losses  (decreases  in  market  value)  under  conservative 
accounting  -  namely,  that  economic  gains  are  recognised  in  financial  statements 
gradually,  as  they  are  realised  and  the  realisation  can  be  appropriately  verified,  while 
economic  losses  are  recognised  in  financial  statements  immediately  and  fully  in  the 
period  they  are  realised  (or,  anticipated,  specifically  in  the  case  of  decreases  in 
market  value).  In  other  words,  gains  tend  to  persist  in  different  performance 
6 measures  affected,  while  losses  tend  to  be  transitory.  While  either  empirical  results 
or  theoretical  predictions  for  some  accounting  figures  -  in  a  great  majority  of  cases 
this  would  be  the  earnings  figure  -  have  already  been  shown  in  other  related  studies 
(e.  g.,  Barth,  Cram  and  Nelson,  2001;  Fama  and  French,  2000;  Dechow,  Kothari  and 
Watts,  1998;  Basu,  1997;  Sloan,  1996;  Dechow,  1994;  Albrecht,  Lookabill  and 
McKeown,  1977;  Ball  and  Watts,  1972;  Beaver,  1970),  this  study  extends  the 
literature  in  the  UK  context  and  construct  and  study  the  persistence  behaviour  of 
three  earnings  figures,  designed  to  be  comparable,  to  the  maximum  extent  possible, 
across  the  entire  time-period  studied.  Moreover,  the  existing  literature  is  extended,  in 
particular  the  Basu  (1997)  results  by  examining  relative  persistence  properties  of 
some  of  the  main  components  of  earnings  -  operating  cash  flows  and  accruals,  of 
which  the  main  components  are  working  capital  accruals  (and  its  components),  the 
depreciation  and  amortisation  charge  and  "special  items"  (appendices  contain 
additional  accounting  figures)  under  conservative  accounting.  The  distinction 
between  earnings-increasing  and  eamings-decreasing  changes  in  these  figures  is 
made,  as  well  as  an  allowance  for  any  possible  differences  between  profit  firms  and 
accounting  loss  firms  as  well  as  firms  affected  by  bad  and  good  news.  Apart  from 
providing  some  additional  insights  related  to  consequences  of  conservative  treatment 
of  economic  gains/losses  on  time-series  properties  of  these  "performance"  measures, 
the  analysis  also  helps  in  fonning  expectations  about  direct  relations  between  various 
accounting  performance  measures  and  share  prices  as  well  as  indications  regarding 
any  differential  effects  between  accounting-profit  and  accounting-loss  firms. 
Next,  using  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  models,  direct  tests  of  accounting 
conservatism  are  performed  separately  by  various  accounting  earnings  measures  and 
7 the  aforementioned  main  earnings  components.  The  role  of  accruals  in  the 
asymmetric  relation  can  be  infer-red  in  two  ways:  indirectly,  via  a  comparison  of 
accounting  earnings  and  operating  cash  flow  regressions,  and  directly,  by  perfonning 
direct  conservatism  tests  on  the  main  accruals  components.  The  study  allows  for  the 
different  roles  working  capital  accruals,  its  components,  the  depreciation  and 
amortisation  charge  and  special  items  might  have  in  the  asymmetric  timeliness  of 
earnings  reflecting  the  application  of  accounting  conservatism  to  treatment  of 
economic  gains  and  losses.  All  accounting  measures  containing  accruals  components 
should  exhibit  asymmetric  timeliness  in  reflecting  bad  economic  news  (economic 
losses)  albeit  not  in  a  uniform  way.  Economic  gains,  on  the  other  hand,  should  be 
reflected  in  accounting  figures  only  gradually,  i.  e.,  not  the  entire  capitalised  amount 
of  an  economic  gain  would  usually  be  recognised  within  the  same  accounting  period. 
To  study  these  relations,  both  the  contemporaneous  (i.  e.,  current-period  accounting 
figure  regressed  on  current-period  returns  inferring  the  general  relation)  and  the 
lagged  (i.  e.,  current-period  accounting  figure  regressed  on  current  and  previous- 
period(s)  returns  reflecting  the  speed  of  recognition  of  news)  are  employed.  Given 
that  several  US-based  research  papers  indicate  that  the  nature  of  the  relation  between 
financial  statements  relative  to  market  values  might  have  changed  over  the  last  few 
decades  (e.  g.,  Ryan  and  Zarowin,  2003;  Givoly  and  Hayn,  2000;  Francis  and 
Schipper,  1999;  Collins,  Maydew  and  Weiss,  1997),  \a  time-series  analysis  of 
changes  in  accounting  conservatism  is  provided  as  well.  Regarding  the  UK  context 
and  regarding  the  methods  used  in  this  research  to  make  inferences,  a  time-series 
analysis  requires  the  use  of  some  complementary  measures  of  the  time-series 
changes  in  accounting  conservatism  that  differ  from  those  employed  in  the  existing 
literature. 
8 Following  the  indications  that  accounting-conservatism  and  accounting- 
losses  phenomena  are  related,  descriptive  properties  of  accounting  loss  and  profit 
observations  are  provided  separately  in  addition  to  the  accounting  loss  and  profit 
distinction  in  terms  of  time-series  properties  of  earnings  and  its  main  components. 
The  descriptive  statistics  and  correlations  between  pairs  of  accounting  variables  are 
very  different  for  the  two  groups  of  firms.  However,  in  terms  of  accounting 
regulation  and  in  particular  the  application  of  accounting  conservatism,  differences 
between  the  two  groups  of  observations  are  not  expected.  Accounting  conservatism 
should  be  applied  equally  in  all  firins  regardless  of  the  sign  (of  the 
contemporaneous)  "bottom-line"  earnings.  In  an  attempt  to  capture  any  potential 
differences  in  asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings,  an  absolute-value  model  is 
constructed  and  an  attempt  to  empirically  estimate  it  provided.  Further,  an 
interaction  with  persistence  properties  is  attempted  via  Giner  and  Rees's  (2001) 
augmented  model  where  lagged  accounting-performance  measures  are  used  as 
models  of  the  effects  of  previous  periods'  conservatism  both  generally  via  earnings 
and  specifically  via  earnings  component-specific  measures  as  an  extension  of  their 
models. 
Finally,  the  ex-ante  restriction  is  placed  on  these  relations  using  Pope  and 
Walker's  (2003)  model  as  well  as  expanding  on  these  relations  to  accommodate 
asset-specific  controls  of  sources  of  ex-ante  conservatism. 
A  particular  set  of  challenges  originates  from  the  empirical  context  in  which 
the  study  is  made.  First,  from  a  time-series  perspective,  the  data  on  companies 
9 operating  in  the  United  Kingdom  is  -much  more  scarce  than  the  data  on  US 
companies,  to  which  results  from  this  study  would  often  be  compared  to.  -  Issues 
regarding  the  construction  of  the  sample  are  challenging  and  are  described  in  detail 
in  the  appropriate  section.  On  the  other  hand,  the  time-series  required  to  apply  the 
Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  procedure  in  comparable  research  must  be  relatively 
long.  In  this  study  a  sample  that  includes  33  yearly  cross-sections  is  constructed,  a 
number  deemed  to  be  large  for  statistical  purposes.  Thus,  such  long  time-series  of 
accounting  figures  immediately  raises  issues  regarding  the  comparability  of  these 
figure§  across  time.  Important  issues  emerge  already  at  the  earnings  level,  the 
accounting  figure  most  thoroughly  researched.  For  example,  a  clear  switch  from 
extraordinary  to  exceptional  items  is  apparent  after  the  introduction  of  FRS  3- 
Reporting  Financial  Performance  effective  for  financial  year  ends  on  or  after  22  nd 
June  1993.  Issues  related  to  other  accounting  figures  pose  similar  challenges. 
Moreover,  as  new  (changing)  regulatory  requirements  have  produced  conceptually 
different  numbers,  questions  regarding  the  "representativeness"  of  these  constructed 
figures  emerge.  In  terms  of  the  inference  methods  used,  a  particularly  challenging 
factor  is  a  large  proportion  (approximately  two  thirds)  of  UK  companies  with  non- 
December  3l't  fiscal  year-end  balance  sheet  dates.  This  implies  some  correlation  of 
results  across  adjacent  years  is  to  be  expected  and  the  yields  from  Fama-MacBeth 
(1973)  method  decrease. 
The  thesis  is  formally  organised  as  follows.  Chapter  2  presents  a  selection  of 
important  elements  of  capital  market-based  accounting  research,  including  the 
seminal  studies  of  Ball  and  Brown  (1968)  and  Beaver  (1968),  that  have  served  as 
important  precursors  to  accounting-conservatism  explanations  of  low 
10 contemporaneous  relation  between  share  prices  and  accounting  figures  (most 
notably,  earnings).  It  also  presents  two  crucial  econometric  problems  that  have 
affected  early  studies  (i.  e.,  studies  preceding  Basu,  1997,  and  Pope  and  Walker, 
1999),  but  that  are,  to  the  extent  discussed  in  the  related  literature,  solved  by  the 
method  of  empirical  estimation  used  in  this  thesis.  The  chapter  concludes  with  a 
summary  of  various  regulatory,  legislative  and  academic  definitions  of  accounting 
conservatism,  including  the  distinctions  between  two  different  fon-ns  of  accounting 
conservatism,  and  discusses  the  relative  importance  of  these  definitions  that  form  the 
basis  for  empirical  models  and  appropriate  constraints. 
Chapter  3  presents  theoretical  models  used  later  in  the  empirical  part  of  the 
thesis.  In  particular,  it  formalises  the  persistence  property  of  accounting  figures  and 
determines  the  form  of  study,  provides  a  slightly  modified  derivation  and  a  summary 
of  Pope  and  Walker's  (1999)  contemporaneous  and  lagged  models.  It  also  presents 
certain  augmentations/additional  explanations  of  these  models.  The  chapter 
concludes  with  a  formulation  of  the  main  hypotheses  (other,  less  crucial  or  additional 
hypotheses  are  relegated  to  appropriate  sections  in  the  empirical  part). 
Chapter  4  represents  the  main  part  of  this  thesis.  First,  it  presents  in  detail  the 
data  collection,  sample-selection  procedures  and  descriptive  properties  of  the 
sample.  Included  is  a  summary  of  the  econometric  procedures  followed  in  the  thesis, 
namely  the  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  procedure,  and  the  way  the  results  are 
presented.  It  is  then  followed  by  persistence  tests,  direct  contemporaneous  tests, 
direct  lagged  tests,  time-series  analysis  of  results,  expansions  of  the  models  and 
results  affected  by  ex-ante  conservative  restrictions.  Finally,  a  separate  section  shows 
it in  detail  both  the  properties  and  direct  tests  on  loss  observations  and  discusses  a 
serious  limitation  of  such  an  analysis. 
Chapter  5  deals  with  the  main  sensitivity-analyses  issues.  The  influence  of 
size,  industry  groups,  the  issue  of  non-December  fiscal-year  ends,  proxies  for  bad 
news,  methods  of  estimation,  outliers-removal  procedures  and  some  issues  regarding 
the  use  of  published  versus  constructed  figures  are  presented.  All  are  given  particular 
attention  in  terms  of  the  UK  context  in  which  the  methods  are  applied.  Some 
additional  issues  and  analyses  are  relegated  to  the  Appendices. 
12 LITERATURE  REVIEW 
2.1  XNTRODUCTXON 
This  chapter  presents  an  overview  of  existing  literature  on  capital  market- 
based  accounting  research  that  preceded  the  development  of  fonnal  models  of 
accounting  conservatism.  It  thus  represents  the  literature  that  preceded  Basu  (1997), 
Pope  and  Walker  (1999),  Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin  (2000),  Giner  and  Rees  (2001), 
Pope  and  Walker  (2003)  and  others.  The  chapter  is  divided  into  three  broad  sections. 
The  first  section  presents  the  foundations  of  capital  market-based  accounting 
research:  the  early  findings  that  accounting  numbers  contain  value-relevant 
information  and  therefore  set  the  motivation  to  study  the  link  between  accounting 
and  market  values,  the  economic  nature  of  this  information  and  an  overview  of 
explanations  as  to  why  do  accounting  values  differ  from  market  values.  From  this 
presentation,  transitory  components  caused  by  accounting  conservatism  emerge  as 
one  of  the  possible  explanations  of  these  differences. 
To  account  for  the  econometric  consequences  of  transitory  earnings,  the 
errors-in-variables  problem  is  described  in  detail.  This  presentation  is  important  in 
that  it  represents  the  technical  reason  why  the  models  of  accounting  conservatism  are 
estimated  in  the  so-called  "reverse"  form.  Another  concept  that  influences  the 
particular  ways  of  empirically  estimating  models  of  conservatism  is  the  concept  of  s 
scale  or  size.  The  particular  forms  of  the  models  used  in  the  empirical  part  of  the 
13 thesis  are,  at  least  in  part,  a  consequence  of  dealing  with  these  two  econometric 
problems. 
Finally,  the  last  section  'presents  a  comprehensive  review  of  existing 
definitions  of  accounting  conservatism.  These  definitions  fall  into  two  broad  groups: 
regulatory  texts  (standards,  frameworks,  legal  sources,  etc.  )  and  academic 
definitions.  These  definitions  are  necessary  to  distinguish  between  two  types  of 
conservatism:  the  news-related  conservatism,  which  is  studied  in  this  thesis,  and 
pervasive  conservatism,  which  places  a  limit  on  the  main  results  on,  news-related 
conservatism.  As  an  additional  motivation  to  research  these  definitions  thoroughly,  it 
must  be  noted  that  from  various  texts  it  is  not  always  clear  to  which  of  the  two  forins 
the  use  of  the  term  "conservatism"  relates  to. 
2.2  CAPXTAL-MARKET  BASED'EMPXRXCAL  ACCOUNTXNG 
RESEARCH  AND  LINKS  WITH  CONSERVATISM 
2.2.1  Information  content  of  accounting  numbers 
The  research  presented  in  this  thesis  is  part  of  the  capital  market-based 
empirical  accounting  research.  The  capital  market-based  empirical  accounting 
research  examines  the  relations  between  financial  statements  and  share  prices  (and 
other  market-based  metrics)  (Kothari  2001;  Lev  and  OhIson,  1982).  The  discipline 
has  evolved  from  two  seminal  studies  that  examined  these  relations  (Ball  and  Brown, 
1968;  Beaver,  1968).  They  demonstrated  for  the  first  time  that  accounting  numbers 
14 have  information  content,  i.  e.,  that  they  are  associated  with  market  values  of  owners' 
equity. 
The  following  discussion  presents  a  comprehensive  general  framework  that 
can  be  used  to  illustrate  the  link  between  financial  statements  -  in  particular 
accounting  earnings  -  and  share  prices.  The  link  can  be  described  in  the  following 
manner  (e.  g.,  Pope  and  Inyangete,  1992,  in  surnmarising  Beaver,  Lambert  and 
Morse,  1980).  Three  assumptions  are  necessary  to  establish  the  link  between 
accounting  earnings  and  market  values.  The  first  assumption  is  that  price  equals  the 
present  value  of  future  cash  flows.  For  example,  the  dividend  discount  model 
provides  one  such  model  that  links  future  cash  flows  (dividends)  with  the  current 
share  price.  An  equivalent  "accounting"-based  model  is  the  residual  income  model 
(Preinreich,  1937;  Peasnell,  1982)  reintroduced  and  extended  in  the  accounting 
literature  by  OhIson  (1995)  (Lo  and  Lys,  2000).  The  second  assumption  is  that  there 
is  a  link  between  future  earnings  and  future  dividends.  For  example,  this  assumption 
is  met  if  some  fixed  proportion  of  earnings  is  paid  out  as  dividends  every  year.  The 
third  assumption  is  that  current  accounting  earnings  are  linked  with  future 
accounting  earnings.  Thus,  unexpected  revisions  of  current  earnings  should  influence 
investors'  assessment  of  future  earnings,  which  are  then  directly  linked  with  future 
cash  flows  (dividends)  and,  by  discounting  these  future  dividends  with  some  known 
(fixed,  non-stochastic)  discount  rate,  with  current  share  prices.  2  It  is  assumed  here 
that  the  accounting  figures  in  general  are  represented  by  accounting  earnings. 
However,  this  assumption  is  not  necessary  and  other  accounting  measures  may  be 
2  The  role  of  risk  and  stochastic  interest  rates  is  presented  in  Feltham  and  OhIson  (1999). 
15 (and  are)  used  instead  of  earnings  and  some  studies  have  attempted  to  establish 
precisely  this  link  (e.  g.,  Ou,  1990).  3 
A  generic  empirical  formulation  of  this  link  between  accounting  earnings  and 
share  prices  may  be  the  following  (e.  g.,  Joos,  2000;  Lipe,  Bryant  and  Widener,  1998; 
Collins  and  Kothari,  1989;  Brown  et  aL,  1987  and  several  other  papers): 
CARit  =a+  ßUXI,  +  e￿  (2-1) 
where  CARit  is  a  measure  of  the  risk-adjusted  return  for  security  i  cumulated  over  the 
period  (t,  t-1)  (i.  e.,  unexpected  or  abnormal  or  above-average  return),  UXil  is  a 
measure  of  unexpected  earnings  for  firm  i  over  the  period  (t,  t-1)  and  eit  is  a 
disturbance  term  assumed  to  be  distributed  normally  with  parameters  eit-N(O,  4) 
and  cov(eit,  ejt+k)=  0  for  all  k  and  iýj.  The  calculation  of  both  CARit  and  UXj,  requires 
a  method  of  calculating  the  expected  components  of  returns  and  earnings 
respectively.  4  Various  methods  of  specifying  unexpected  earnings  (UX)  are 
presented  in  a  number  of  papers.  For  example,  Beaver  and  Dukes  (1972)  derive 
expected  earnings  by  five  different  models:  by  forming  a  model  analogous  to  the 
market  model  in  market  returns,  by  assuming  earnings  follow  a  random  walk,  by 
assuming  current  earnings  are  a  simple  average  of  a  limited  number  of  past  earnings, 
and  two  more  complex  models  involving  moving  averages  of  pure  mean-reverting 
5 
processes.  A  further  paper  is  Beaver,  Clarke  and  Wright  (1979),  who  use,  inter  alia, 
a  relatively  complex  model  of  market-adjusted  earnings,  a  concept  related  later  to 
3  Historically,  however,  earnings  were  the  first  accounting  figure  explored  in  this  context. 
4  The  econometric  consequences  of  misspecifying  either  of  the  two  metrics/expectations  as  used  in 
equation  (2-  1)  are,  however,  significantly  different,  as  is  shown  later  in  section  2.3.1. 
5  The  framework  that  includes  some  of  these  processes  is  formally  presented  later  in  section  3.2. 
16 adjustments  in  Basu  (1997).  Unexpected  returns  (CAR)  would  usually  be  estimated 
by  employing  some  form  of  the  market  model  (e.  g.,  Parkash,  1995;  Pope  and 
Inyangete,  1992;  Mendenhall  and  Nichols,  1988)  or  by  directly  subtracting  the  return 
on  a  well-diversified  index  from  the  firm-specific  return  in  the  same  time-period,  as 
for  example  in  Lipe,  Bryant  and  Widener  (1998). 
The  expected  value  of  the  estimated  regression  constant  in  model  (2-1)  is 
zero,  E  [a]=  0.  The  constant  would,  however,  usually  be  included  in  empirical 
estimations  to  account  for  any  systematic  influences  not  accounted  for  by  the 
unexpected  earnings  variable.  The  estimated  regression  parameter  ft  is  the  estimated 
earnings  response  coefficient.  The  earnings  response  coefficient  represents  the 
magnitude  of  share  price  reaction  due  to  a  one  unit  of  unexpected  earnings  in  current 
earnings.  If  the  earnings  number  contains  an  earnings  innovation,  a  surprise  for  the 
investors  (i.  e.,  when  unexpected  earnings  are  not  zero  [UX14  0]),  then  the  expected 
value  of  the  coefficient  is  E[,  8  ]>O.  The  absence  of  any  annotation  of  the  estimated 
regression  coefficient  8  in  equation  (2-1)  suggests  that  the  earnings  response 
coefficient  is  assumed  to  be  a  temporal  and  cross-sectional  constant.  The  reaction  to 
unexpected  earnings  is  thus  assumed  to  be  constant  through  time  and  equal  across 
firms  at  any  given  point  in  time. 
The  generic  relationship  in  equation  (2-1)  serves  to  investigate  two  related, 
but  conceptually  different  questions  about  the  relationship  between  financial 
statements  and  market  values  (Kothari,  2001).  The  first  question  is  whether  an 
eamings  announcement  per  se  has  any  infonnation  content  -  i.  e.,  if  the 
announcement  per  se  causes  investors  to  revise  their  expectations  about  future 
17 benefits.  If  they  do,  the  revision  will  be  observed  as  a  change  in  some  market  metric 
(price  level,  price  variability  and/or  trading  volume  (Lev  and  OhIson,  1982)  in  the 
short  period  of  time  surrounding  the  announcement  -  typically,  but  not  necessarily,  a 
few  days  (Biddle  and  Seow,  1991).  These  studies  are  performed  with  an  event  study 
(e.  g.,  Farna  et  al.,  1969).  The  internal  validity  of  this  type  of  studies  depends  on  the 
existence  of  any  confounding  events  surrounding  the  earnings  announcement  (e.  g., 
dividend  changes)  and  the  ability  of  the  researcher  to  disentangle  the  effects  of  these 
other  events  from  the  earnings  announcement  itself  The  second  question  is  whether 
accounting  earnings  are  consistent  with  the  infonnation  about  -underlying  value- 
generating  events  as  reflected  in  share  prices.  These  issues  are  studied  with  an 
association  study.  Unexpected  returns  are  accumulated  over  long  periods  of  time  - 
typically  a  year  or  a  quarter  that  correspond,  to  the  fiscal  period  over  which 
unexpected  earnings  are  accumulated.  Causality  is  -not  inferred  in  this  type  of  studies 
and  they  do  not  assume  that  accounting  earnings  are  the  only  source  of  information 
to  market  participants.  The  only  relevant  question  is  the  existence  of  association 
6  (correlation).  The  early  infonnation  content  studies  cited  above  typically  belong  in* 
the  first  group,  i.  e.,  causality  is  assumed  from  unexpected  earnings  to  changes  in 
share  prices. 
Ball  and  Brown  (1968)  and  Beaver  (1968),  provide  early  evidence  that  the 
earnings  numbers  provide  a  source  of  value-relevant  information  to  financial 
markets.  The  key  finding  by  Ball  and  Brown  (1968)  is  that  the  earnings  number  is 
useful  to  investors  in  that  it  conveys  new,  economically  significant  information 
"U "'Out  future  cash  flows.  If  actual  eamings  are  higher  (lower)  than  expected  earnings 
6  In  this  respect,  see  Muller  and  Riedl  (2001)  critique. 
18 -  the  expected  earnings  being  measured  with  three  different  models  in  their  study  - 
the  share  price  will  increase  (decrease),  on  average.  Moreover,  accounting  earnings 
do  not  represent  a  very  timely  source  of  information.  Ball  and  Brown  estimate  that 
most  (85%-90%)  of  the  information  content  of  earnings  is  already  captured  by  other, 
more  timely  sources,  including  interim  reports,  by  the  month  of  publication  of  the 
earnings  figure.  7 
Beaver's  (1968)  study  takes  an  altemative  approach  and  avoids  the  exact 
specification  of  expected  earnings  by  correlating  trading  volume  rather  than 
abnormal  returns  with  earnings  announcements.  The  basic  idea  is  that  at  the  time  of 
the  announcement  of  earnings,  investors  will  re-assess  their  estimates  of  future 
returns  or  prices  and  act  on  the  basis  of  this  assessment.  While  it  is  not  possible  to 
predict  the  direction  and/or  magnitude  of  investors'  reaction  without  an  expectations' 
model,  the  variability  of  price  changes  will  be  higher  during  these  periods  of 
"adjustments"  relative  to  periods  when  no  such  announcements  occur  (Kwon  and 
Wild,  1994).  Beaver  finds  significantly  higher  trading  volume  in  the  week  of 
earnings  announcement  compared  to  ±8  weeks  prior  to/after  the  announcement,  re- 
confirming  Ball  and  Brown's  (1968)  finding  that  earnings  announcements  convey 
economically  significant  information  about  future  cash  flows.  A  necessary  condition 
for  Beaver's  (1968)  approach  is  that  the  changes  in  the  present  value  of  the  changes 
in  expected  future  cash  flows  must  be  sufficiently  large  to  compensate  for 
transaction  costs  (Lev,  1989).  - 
7  In  an  UK  contextý  Opong  (1995)  shows  that  that  interim  financial  reports  contain  value-relevant 
information  as  evidenced  by  increased  variability  of  share  prices  on  the  release  day. 
19 Subsequent  studies  have  re-confirmed  these  findings  in  a  number  of  different 
settings  and  time  periods.  For  example,  May  (1971)  finds  that  price  changes  are 
larger  in  the  week  of  quarterly  earnings  announcements  relative  to  average  price 
changes  during  the  year,  but  that  quarterly  earnings  are  treated  equivalently  to  annual 
earnings.  Beaver  and  Dukes  (1972)  examine  the  influences  of  various  specifications 
of  expected  earnings  and  different  measures  of  perforinance,  including  the  operating 
cash  flow.  Jordan  (1973)  further  reports  that  the  market  values  the,  first  and  fourth 
quarter  earnings  differently  from  third  quarter  and  final  earnings.  Other  extensions 
include  Smith-Bamber  (1986)  who  finds  that  the  greater  the  unexpected  quarterly 
earnings,  the  greater  the  magnitude  and  the  longer  the  duration  of  investors' 
adjustments  to  infori-nation  in  quarterly  earnings  announcements.  Moreover,  she 
hypothesizes  and  finds  that  the  smaller  the  firm,  the  more  pronounced  are  these  two 
effects,  since  for  smaller  firms,  the  earnings  announcements  are  expected  to 
constitute  a  more  important  source  of  information  to  the  capital  markets  than  for 
larger  firms.  Kross  and  Schroeder  (1989)  'extend  these  findings  further  to 
differentiate  between  "Prominenf'  and  "obscure"  firms  as  measured  by  colunin- 
inches  in  the  Wall  Street  Journal.  They  hypothesise  that  earnings  disclosure  is  a 
more  important  source  of  information  for  smaller  than  for  larger  firms,  given  that  the 
former  receive  less  coverage  in  the  financial  -press  and  less  information  is  thus 
available  -for  them.  The  expected  reaction  to  earnings  announcement  is  thus  expected 
to  be  larger  for  smaller  firms.  There  are  many  other  empirical  studies  in  this  area. 
The  example  of  Kross  and  Schroeder  (1989)  might  perhaps  be  taken  as  indicative  of 
the  thoroughness  with  which  this  area  has  been  researched. 
20 While  this  body  of  literature  studied  the  response  of  returns  to  earnings  in 
some  detail  and  a  number  of  those  studies  cited  above  presented  alternative  sets  of 
results  for  operating  cash  flow  figures  as  well,  none  of  them  considered  explicitly  the 
role  of  accruals  in  these  relations.  There  were  three  important  studies  published  in 
the  mid-eighties  that  specifically  examined  the  role  of  accruals.  Using  a  long 
window  (12  months)  event  study,  Rayburn  (1986)  finds  that  both  the  cash  flow  and 
total  and  current  accruals  arc  associated  with  information  impounded  in  market 
values.  The  association  of  particular  components  of  accruals  is  less  strong  and 
sensitive  to  the  specification  of  expected  values  of  these  components.  While  working 
capital  accruals  are  associated  with  returns  in  all  specifications,  there  is  some  doubt 
regarding  the  depreciation  charge  and  deferred  taxes.  Wilson  (1987)  finds  that  cash 
from  operations  and  the  total  accruals  components  of  earnings,  when  taken  together, 
have  incremental  infonnation  content  over  earnings.  Additionally,  Wilson  (1986) 
finds  that  accruals  have  incremental  information  content  over  funds  from  operations. 
Taken  together,  these  studies  have  demonstrated  that  (some  oo  the  accrual 
components  also  have  information  content. 
Firth  (1976)  conducted  the  first  study  employing  these  techniques  using  UK 
data.  In  addition  to  re-confirming  the  Ball  and  Brown  (1968)  results  in  the  UK 
context,  he  also  finds  that  investors  evaluate  future  prospects  not  only  of  the 
announcing  firm  itself,  but  also  of  "similar-type"  companies  (i.  e.,  competitors).  Firth 
(1981)  later  extends  the  study  to  different  events  and  finds  that  preliminary 
announcements,  earnings  announcements  and  interim  reports  convey  information  to 
markets,  while  annual  general  meetings  do  not.  A  similar  study  is  by  Brookfield  and 
Morris  (1992)  using  daily  data.  In  contrast  to  annual  and  interim  earnings 
announcements,  they  find  that  announcements  of  items  like  new  contracts, 
21 management  changes  and  even  publications  of  earnings  forecasts  are  largely  pre- 
empted  by  the  time  they  are  published.  Pope  and  Inyangete  (1992)  find  that  the 
variability  of  stock  returns  increases  sharply  in  the  week  of  the  annual  earnings 
announcement  compared  to  pre-announcement  periods  (and  post-announcement 
periods,  although  slightly  less  pronounced).  This  increase  is  more  pronounced  for 
small  firms  and  less  pronounced  for  larger  firms,  consistent  with  Smith-Barnber 
(1986).  There  is  also  some  indication  of  importance  of  the  frequencies  of  news  and 
comments  appearing  in  the  databases,  consistent  with  Kross  and  Schroeder  (1989). 
Taken  collectively,  these  studies  have  shown  that  accounting  numbers  in 
general  contain  information  that  is  useful  to  investors  to  assess  the  size  and/or  the 
timing  and/or  the  riskiness  of  future  cash  flows.  In  particular,  if  accounting  earnings 
differ  from  expected  values,  the  share  prices  adjust  accordingly  in  the  same 
direction.  Both  of  the  main  components  of  earnings,  (operating)  cash  flows  and 
accruals,  have  been  found,  or  at  least  indicated,  to  contain  value-relevant 
information. 
2.2.2  Economic  determinants  of  the  link  between 
financial  statements  and  market  values 
Empirical  evidence  presented  in  the  previous  section  is  consistent  with 
accounting  earnings  containing  information  that  is  useful  to  capital  markets  in  that 
this  information  is  able  to  influence  investors'  expectations  (assessments)  of  future 
cash  flows.  Also,  these  studies  have  shown  at  least  some  accounting  numbers  other 
22 than  earnings  (i.  e.,  operating  cash  flows  and  certain  types  of  accruals)  convey  value- 
relevant  information  to  capital  markets.  However,  while  demonstrating  the 
information  content  of  various  accounting  numbers,  these  studies  did  not  explore  the 
nature  of  accounting  numbers  and  their  relation  to  the  market  value  of  the  firm 
(Mande,  1994;  Kormendi  and  Lipe,  1987).  Research  that  studies  the  economic 
determinants  of  earnings  response  coefficients  followed. 
An  early  comprehensive  study  of  economic  determinants  of  earnings 
response  coefficients  is  Collins  and  Kothari  (1989).  They  hypothesize  and  find 
empirical  support  for  four  economic  determinants  of  earnings  response  coefficients: 
persistence  of  earnings,  risk,  growth  and  the  risk-free  rate  of  return.  In  the  general 
equation  (2-1)  in  the  preceding  section,  the  estimated  regression  coefficient 
represents  the  estimated  earnings  response  coefficient.  Formally,  the  earnings 
response  coefficient  can  be  defined  as 
"...  the  present  value  of  the  perpetuity  of  the  earnings  innovation  calculated  by  discounting 
the  perpetuity  at  the  risk-adj  usted  rate  of  return  on  equity.  "  (Kothari,  200  1,  p.  124) 
The  expected  theoretical  value  of  the  earnings  response  coefficient  is 
fi  =1  (1  /  E[ri,  b  where  E  [ril]  is  the  expected  rate  of  return  on  equity.  The  earnings 
response  coefficient  thus  equals  the  one  unit  change  in  current  period's  earnings  plus 
the  present  value  of  all  expected  future  changes  in  dividends  resulting  from  this 
innovation  (Kothari,  2001;  Kothari  and  Sloan,  1992;  Collins  and  Kothari,  1989). 
The  first  economic  determinant  of  earnings  response  coefficients  is  earnings 
persistence.  Highly  persistent  earnings  mean  that  a  change  in  current  period's 
earnings  will  repeat  itself  in  future  reporting  periods  thereby  affecting  future 
23 earnings  (the  third  assumption  from  the  previous  section).  Under  the  second 
assumption  from  above  -  that  there  is  a  known  link  between  future  earnings  and 
future  dividends  -a  change  in  earnings  today  will  affect  expectations  about  future 
dividends.  If  today's  change  is  likely  to  repeat  itself,  this  will  affect  today's 
expectations  about  future  dividends  more  and  the  earnings  response  coefficient  will 
be  large  (Collins  and  Kothari,  1989;  Easton  and  Zmijewski,  1989).  Using  an  inverse 
regression  approach,  Collins  and  Kothari  (1989)  find  empirical  support  for  this 
hypothesis.  O'Hanlon,  Poon  and  Yaansah  (1992)  find  empirical  support  for  this 
hypothesis  in  an  UK  context.  Donnelly  and  Walker  (1995),  also  using  a  UK  sample, 
also  report  that  the  higher  the  earnings  persistence,  the  higher  the  estimated  earnings 
response  coefficient  after  controlling  for  firm  size  and  alternative  time-series 
estimators  of  earnings  response  coefficients.  Donnelly  (2002)  is  a  recent  study  that 
re-confirms  these  findings  by  estimating  earnings  response  coefficients  separately 
for  profit  and  loss  firms.  8  Harikumar  and  Harter  (1995),  also  using  the  reverse- 
regression  technique,  show  that  firms  with  higher  Tobin's  q  ratios  exhibit  higher 
persistence  of  earnings.  Persistence  itself  is  a  function  of  economic  factors.  For 
example,  Baginski  et  al.  (1999)  find  that  persistence  is  positively  related  to  barriers 
to  entry,  negatively  to  capital  intensity  and  is  higher  for  durable  goods  versus  non- 
durable  goods. 
Second,  the  higher  the  systematic  risk  of  a  firm,  the  lower  the  earnings 
response  coefficient.  As  discussed  above,  to  estimate  the  present  value  of  expected 
future  benefits,  shareholders  must  discount  these  future  benefits  to  present  time  in 
order  to  evaluate  them.  One  way  to  calculate  the  expected  rate  of  return  on  an 
8  Section  4.8.1  contains  a  more  complete  presentation  of  the  literature  that  distinguishes  these 
properties  between  profit  and  loss  observations. 
24 investment  is  to  use  the  CAPM  model  (summarised  in,  for  example,  Bodie,  Kane 
and  Marcus,  1999,  pp.  250-280;  and  different  variants  in  Elton  and  Gruber,  1995,  pp. 
294-340):  -- 
E[r,,  r  +  (E[r  (2-2) 
. ft  is  the  risk-  where  E[rj,  ]  is  the  expected  return  on  share  i  over  the  period  (t,  t-1),  r 
free  rate  of  return  allowed  to  vary  through  time,  but  not,  by  definition,  cross- 
sectionally,  r,,,  is  the  return  on  market  in  period  t  andflit  is  the  firm-specific  measure 
of  that  firm's  equity  exposure  to  market  risk,  assumed  to  be  constant  or  highly 
autocorrelated  for  any  particular  firm  -  i.  e.,  the  process  generating  8j,  is  known. 
Other  things  equal,  the  higher  the  systematic  risk,  the  higher  the  discount  rate  and  the 
lower  the  present  value  of  expected  future  benefits  accruing  to  shareholders.  More 
recently,  the  Farna  and  French  (1993,1995)  three-factor  model  is  used  (e.  g.,  Farna 
and  French,  1997).  In  the  UK,  the  three-factor  model  is  used  recently  by  Liu,  Strong 
and  Xu  (2003)  in  their  study  of  the  post-eamings  announcement  drift. 
Third,  Collins  and  Kothari  (1989)  hypothesize  that  the  higher  the  present 
value  of  growth  opportunities,  the  higher  the  earnings  response  coefficient.  Higher 
growth  opportunities  imply  higher  future  earnings,  higher  future  dividends  and  a 
higher  value  of  the  firm.  All  other  things  equal,  a  revision  in  earnings  for  a  firm  with 
more  growth  options  will  affeci  market  values  more  compared  to  a  firm  with  less 
growth  options.  Martikainen  (1997)  finds  that  the  earnings  response  coefficient  of 
firms  in  the  portfolio  of  firms  with  the  lowest  growth  opportunities  measured  by  the 
industry-relative  market-to-book  ratio  is  0.473  (with  a  statistically  insignificant 
25 White  (1980)-adjusted  t-statistic  of  1.790),  while  for  the  portfolio  of  firms  with  the 
highest  growth  opportunities  the  earnings  response  coefficient  is  6.605  and  highly 
statistically  significant.  The  analysis  controls  for  differences  in  growth  opportunities 
that  might  result  from  any  systematic  differences  between  profit  and  loss  firms. 
Finally,  given  a  model  of  expected  returns  like,  for  example,  the  CAPM 
model  in  equation  (2-2),  the  expected  rate  of  return  depends  on  the  risk-free  rate  of 
return,  the  expected  return  on  the  market  and  the  firm's  exposure  to  market  risk, 
measured  by  the  P-coefficient.  The  risk-free  rate  of  return  cannot,  by  definition,  vary 
cross-sectionally,  but  it  does  vary  through  time.  Therefore,  through  time,  the  higher 
the  general  level  of  interest  rates  and  thus  the  higher  the  risk-free  rate  of  return,  the 
lower  the  earnings  response  coefficient.  Similarly,  the  expected  rate  of  return  on  the 
market,  r,,,  cannot  explain  cross-sectional  variation  in  earnings  response  coefficients, 
given  that  it  only  varies  through  time  but  again  not  cross-sectionally.  This  variation 
through  time  of  r,,,  (or  perhaps  more  precisely  the  market  risk  premium  rnr-rf)  might 
in  itself  constitute  another  deten-ninant  of  the  average  earnings  response  coefficient 
in  an  economy. 
Taken  together,  the  four  determinants  of  the  earnings  response  coefficients 
studied  by  Collins  and  Kothari  (1989)  indicate  that'the  generic  form  of  the 
relationship  between  earnings  and  returns  presented  in  equation  (2-1)  is  very  general. 
A  more  complete  analysis  of  the  returns-earnings  relationship  should  thus  take  into 
account  the  fact  that  the  earnings  response  coefficient  (the  estimated  parameter  in 
equation  (2-1)),  is  not  a  cross-sectional  and/or  an  inter-temporal  constant.  This 
conclusion  also  implies  that  the  method  of  estimation  of  models  derived  from 
26 equation  (2-1)  becomes  important.  Teets  and  Wasley  (1996)  show  that  short-window 
earnings  response  coefficients  are  significantly  higher  if  estimated  separately  for 
each  firm  as  a  time-series  average  rather  than  cross-sectionally  or  pooled.  More 
recently,  Lipe,  Bryant  and  Widener  (1998)  re-confinn  that  allowing  cross-sectional 
variation  in  earnings  response  coefficients  provides  an  important  improvement  of  the 
estimation  of  the  returti-earnings  relation.  For  example,  in  one  of  their  tests  they  find 
that  the  median  earnings  response  coefficient  of  30  random  sub-samples  is  only 
1.253  if  cross-sectional  estimation  is  used,  but  the  median  more  than  doubles  to 
2.735  if  firm-specific  estimation  is  used  (ibid.,  p.  208,  Table  2). 
There  are  several  other  economic  determinants  of  ,  earnings  response 
coefficients.  These  either  result  from  decompositions  of  the  above  factors  into  more 
elementary  factors  or  represent  new,  distinct  determinants  derived  from  economic 
analysis.  For  example,  the  influence  of  systematic  risk  can  be  decomposed  into 
operating  risk  and  additional  financial  risk  resulting  from  leverage  (Hamada,  1972). 
Mandelker  and  Rhee  (1984)  develop  further  this  concept  and  introduce  directly  the 
degree  of  operating  leverage  and  the  degree  of  financial  leverage  as  determinants  of 
systematic  risk  in  the  returns-earnings  relationship.  Martikainen  (1997)  shows  that 
the  earnings  response  coefficient  decreases  monotonically  from  low-debt  to  high- 
debt  portfolios  after  controlling  for  the  sign  of  earnings.  Burgstahler,  Jiambalvo  and 
Noreen  (1989)  find  that  the  a  priori  probability  of  bankruptcy  is  negatively  related  to 
the  earnings  response  coefficients.  Teets  (1992)  finds  that  the  earnings  response 
coefficient  is  smaller  for  regulated  electric  utilities  than  for  non-regulated  industries. 
27 Dividend  payout  policy  also  affects  the'eamings  response  coefficient.  The 
theoretical  upper  limit  is  reduced  by  the  proportion  of  earnings  not  reinvested  and 
therefore  unable  to  earn  future  dividends,  so  that  the  theoretical  upper  limit  becomes 
P=I-d+  (I  /  E[r,,  b  where  d  is  the  dividend  payout  ratio  (Kothari  and  Sloan,  1992). 
Biddle  and  Seow  (1991)  find  that  earnings  response  coefficients  vary  across 
industries  and  in  particular  that  they  are  lower  in  industries  characterised  by  a  higher 
degree  of  operating  and  financial  leverage  and  are  higher  in  industries  characterised 
by  higher  growth,  higher  barriers  to  entry  and  higher  growth  opportunities.  9 
Billings  (1999)  re-confirms  the  previously  observed  negative  relation 
between  earnings  response  coefficients  and  debt  to  equity  ratios,  but  remains 
inconclusive  about  whether  the  default  risk  proxied  for  by  bond  ratings  has  an 
incremental  impact  over  the  impact  of  systematic  risk  or  not.  He  also  indicates  that 
expected  growth  should  be'included  in  empirical  studies  of  this  relationship.  The 
length  of  the  time-series  of  previous  earnings  also  affects  the  earnings  response 
coefficients.  Lang  (199  1)  finds  that  the  more  quarterly  earnings  announcements  have 
been  issued  since  the  initial  public  offering,  the  smaller  the  earnings  response 
coefficient.  Thus  the  length  of  the  "public-quotation  period"  may  also  be  viewed  as  a 
determinant  of  the  earnings  response  coefficient,  similarly  to  the  importance  of  firm 
age  in  survival  studies  (e.  g.,,  Altman,  1993;  also  Anthony  and  Ramesh,  1992) 
The  list  of  determinants  of  earnings  response  coefficients  is  not  exhaustive.  It 
is,  however,  indicative  of  the  richness  of  studies  developed  in  this  area  of  capital 
market  based  accounting  research.  They  constitute  the  body  of  knowledge  that  has 
9  They  measure  growth  opportunities  essentially  with  the  book-to-market  ratio.  This  impacts  some  of 
the  results  presented  in  this  thesis. 
28 led  to  later,  more  economics-based  models  of  the  link  between  financial  statements 
and  market  values.  These  models  include  models  that  capture  the  effects  of  two 
different  forms  of  accounting  conservatism. 
2.2.3  Variability  in  earnings  versus 
variability  in  returns 
Early  empirical  studies  of  earnings  response  coefficients  have  found  that 
accounting  earnings  (levels  or  changes)  explain  only  a  small  proportion  of  the  total 
variability  in  returns.  Moreover,  the  observed  relation  between  returns  and  earnings 
reported  in  these  studies  is  often  not  in  line  with  theoretical  expectations.  Several 
studies  have  shown  that  the  R  2S  in  empirical  applications  of  the  model  in  (2-1)  above 
are  low  and  the  values  of  the  estimated  earnings  response  coefficients  (ft)  are  very 
low  (close  to  zero)  compared  to  values  predicted  theoretically,  or  even  negative  (e.  g., 
Collins,  Pincus  and  Xie,  1999;  Jan  and  Ou,  1995;  Schroeder,  1995).  Moreover,  some 
studies  find  that  the  value-relevance  of  accounting  numbers  is  declining  over  time 
(e.  g.,  Francis  and  Schipper,  1999;  Ryan  and  Zarowin,  2003).  As  a  retrospective 
illustration,  Ryan  and  Zarowin  (2003)  show  in  their  basic  models,  where  returns  are 
regressed  on  deflated  earnings,  that  from  the  period  1966-1970  to  1996-2000,  the 
2f 
OM  earnings  response  coefficient  has  decreased  from  2.816  to  0.563  and  the  Rr 
0.13  to  0.05.  Somewhat  contrary,  Collins,  Maydew  and  Weiss  (1997)  find  that  the 
combined  value-relevance  of  both  earnings  and  book  values  has  not  changed  in  the 
period  1953-1993.  They  do,  however,  find  that  the  value-relevance  of  earnings  alone 
has  decreased  almost  monotonically  in  this  period.  Several  hypotheses  that  attempt 
29 to  explain  why  this  occurs  have  been  proposed  in  the  literature.  These  hypotheses  are 
not  mutually  exclusive  and  in  certain  cases  partially  overlap  with  one  another.  The 
following  presentation  of  these  hypotheses  is  based  on  Kothari's  (2001)  review 
article  and  the  framework  developed  there,  although  it  is  modified  to  accommodate 
in  more  detail  the  parts  relevant  to  this  study  and  to  omit  parts  that  are  less 
immediately  relevant  to  models  used  later  in  this  thesis. 
Generally,  the  findings  that  empirical  estimates  of  earnings  response 
coefficients  and/or  R2s  are  low  compared  to  expected  values  can  result  from  either 
side  of  equation  (2-1).  Starting  on  the  left-hand  side  of  equation  (2-1),  errors  in 
measurement  of  the  dependent  variable  and/or  misspecification  of  the  expected  part 
of  CAR  would  result  in  low  R  2S  -but  would  not  affect  the  earnings  response 
coefficient.  Notwithstanding  the  problems  in  estimating  the  expected  part  of  total 
returns  o.  na  secunty,  the  reliance  on  the  concept  of  market  efficiency  is  I emphasiozed 
(e.  g.,  Fama,  1970).  The  efficient  markets  hypothesis  is  a  maintained  hypothesis  of 
this  type  of  accounting  research  and  a  number  of  metrics  used  to  make  inferences 
rely  on  it.  However,  this  assumption  could,  in  principle,  be  violated  -  Capital  markets 
might  in  reality  not  be  efficient.  Thus,  share  prices  would  not  reflect  the  underlying 
economic  reality  of  the  firm  fully  and  in  a  timely  manner'.  There  are  a  number  of 
studies  that  conclude  that  in  some  aspects  capital  markets  are  not  efficient.  For 
example,  several  studies  suggest  that  the  stock  market  does  not  incorporate 
immediately/fully  the  information  contained  in  accounting  earnings  and  that  it 
recognises  the  full  impact  of  earnings  only  gradually  over  time.  This  notion  is  known 
under  the  term'post-eamings  announcement  drift,  documented  as  early  as  in  Ball  and 
Brown's  (1968)  study.  A  recent  example  of  a  study  that  concludes  in  favour  of 
30 violations  of  market  efficiency  is  Collins  and  Hribar  (2000).  However,  other  recent 
studies  ascribe  the  existence  of  this  "anomaly"  to  econometric  problems  related  to 
methods  used  in  previous  research  (e.  g.,  Jacob,  Lys  and  Sabino,  2000)  or  find  that 
observed  violations  are  too  small  to  be  profitable  after  transaction  costs  (e.  g.,  Choi, 
2000).  However,  in  an  UK  context,  Liu,  Strong  and  Xu  (2003)  make  a  particularly 
strong  conclusion  regarding  the  existence  of  one  such  violation  of  market  efficiency 
-  the  post-earnings  announcement  drift: 
"The  fact  that  the  evidence  of  post-eamings  announcement  drift  reported  in  this  paper  for  the 
UK  ...  reinforces  the  view  that  the  PAD  phenomenon  constitutes  a  clear  rejection  of  the 
efficient  markets  hypothesis.  "  (p.  23,  emphasis  added) 
Given  the  voluminous  body  of  research  that  concludes  in  favour  of  market 
efficiency  (reviewed  at  two  time  periods  relatively  distant  from  one  another  in  Fama, 
1991  and  1970),  the  assumption  of  (semi-strong)  market  efficiency  is  maintained 
throughout  the  empirical  part  of  this  thesis.  Given  the  models  employed,  the 
consequence  of  severe  violations  of  this  assumption  would  be  that  it  would  no  longer 
be  possible  to  use  the  change  in  market  value  as  a  valid  indicator  of  the  impact  of 
economic  news.  Given  the  form  of  these  models,  violations  of  market  efficiency 
would  cause  the  errors-in-variables  problem  in  the  independent  variable  (discussed 
below  in  detail  in  section  2.3.1)  and  the  resulting  attenuation  bias  of  the  main 
accounting  conservatism  measures.  '  0 
On  the  other  hand,  assuming  that  capital  markets  are  reasonably  efficient,  the 
second  group  of  reasons  for  the  low  observed  adjusted  R2s  and  empirical  estimates  of 
earnings  response  coefficients  must  lie  in  the  issues  surrounding  the  measurement  of 
'0  This  observation  follows,  conceptually,  from  models  that  are  "reverse"  compared  to  models  such  as 
in  equation  (2-1).  All  models  presented  in  sections  3.3  and  3.4  are  of  the  "reverse"  type  compared  to 
(2-1). 
31 unexpected  earnings  (UX).  If  this  is  the  'case,  the  independent  variable  that 
determines  the  earnings  response  coefficient  is  measured  with  error  (e.  g.,  Machuga, 
2000).  Econometrically,  this  causes  the  attenuation  bias  in  the  value  of  the 
coefficient  on  earnings  (explained  in  detail  in  section  2.3.1).  Possible  causes  for  the 
errors  in  variables  problem  in  the  UX  variable  are  the  following:  i)  prices  lead 
earnings,  ii)  earnings  containing  a  value-irrelevant  component,  iii)  (value-)deficiency 
of  accounting  measures  and  iv)  earnings  persistence/existence  of  transitory 
components  of  earnings.  This  last  explanation  includes  both  the  effects  of  accounting 
conservatism  and  the  effects  described  in  the  literature  on  losses,  and  it  is  suggested 
that  the  latter  might  be  a  consequence  of  the  former. 
The  first  cause  of  the  errors  in  variables  problem  in  the  independent  (UX) 
variable  is  the  prices  lead  earnings  hypothesis.  If  earnings  do  not  reflect  underlying 
economic  events  in  a  timely  manner,  as  opposed  to  (changes  in)  market  values,  then 
market  prices  will  reflect  a  larger  information  set  than  earnings.  This  notion  is 
termed'as  prices  lead  earnings  (Beaver,  Lambert  and  Morse,  1980).  The  "lack"  of 
earnings  timeliness  originates  from  at  least  two  sources  (Collins  et  A,  1994).  First, 
delayed  accounting  recognition  of  events  affecting  the  value  of  net  assets  of  a  firm 
that  do  not  meet  the  criteria  for  accounting  recognition  in  the  current  period,  but  that 
alter  investors'  current  expectations  about  future  cash  flows  and  hence  bear  on  the 
share  price.  The  second  source  is  the  tendency  of  accrual  accounting  to  delay  the 
recognition  of  future  benefits  originating  from  currently  recognised  cash  outlays  - 
e.  g.,  research  and  development  expenses  and  advertising  expenses  (Kothari  and 
Sloan,  1992).  Consequently,  the  effects  of  value-relevant  events  are  not  fully 
recognised  in  current  financial  statements  (or,  more  specifically,  in  the  UX  variable), 
32 but,  again,  are  fully  reflected  in  current  prices,  assuming  market  -  efficiency.  -  Hence 
the  low  observed  strength  of  relationship  between  current  earnings  and  current  share 
prices.  Since  both  types  of  events  eventually  meet  the  criteria  necessary  for  their 
inclusion  in  financial  statements,  a  strong  relationship  between  current  share  prices 
andfuture  earnings  is  to  be  expected.,  This  also'suggests  that  the  generic  form  of  the 
returns-on-earnings  regression  is  misspecified  -  at  least  one  variable  containing 
relevant  available  information  --  the  current  share  price  -ý  is  not  included  in  the 
generic  model  in  equation  (2-1)  above.  Econometrically,  this  is  an  occurrence  of  the 
correlated  omitted  variable  problem  (e.  g.,  Greene,  2000,  pp.  334-337),  discussed 
below  in  section  2.3.2.  'Empirical  studies  find  support  for  this  hypothesis.  For 
example,  apart  from  Beaver,  Lambert  and  Morse  (1980),  Kothari  and  Sloan  (1992) 
among  others  find  that  prices  lead  earnings  by  about  three  accounting  periods.  They 
consider  up  to  nine  years'  leading  earnings,  but  conclude  that  the  gains  from  these 
inclusions  are  small  (and  possibly  counter-productiVe).  In  the  UK  context,  Donnelly 
and  Walker  (1995)  find  that  prices  lead  earnings  less  in  the  UK  than  in  the  US. 
These  finding  directly  bear  upon  the  way  in  which  models  used  in'this  thesis  are 
constructed. 
The  second  reason  for  the  low  observed  adjusted  R2s  and  empirical  estimates 
of  earnings  response  coefficients  related  to  the  right-hand  side  of  equation  (2-1)  is 
that  earnings  contain  a  value-irrelevant  component.  This  value-irrelevant  component 
(6  garbles"  what  would  otherwise  be  a  value-relevant  or  "true"  accounting  earnings 
figure.  Beaver,  Lambert  and  Morse  (1980)  view  the  accounting  earnings-generating 
process  as  a  mixture  of  the  two  processes.  The  first  is  a  "true"  earnings  series  that 
affects  price  -  i.  e.,  a  value-relevant  process,  while  the  second  process  represents 
33 events  that  have  no  impact  on  security  prices  and  can  be  econometrically  treated  as 
noise.  Since  noise  is  by  definition  uncorrelated  with  past,  current  or  future  earnings 
(Collins  et  al.,  1994)  the  actual  (observed  or  reported)  earnings  are  garbled,  i.  e.,  they 
contain  measurement  error.  It  is  this  definition  that  separates  this  explanation  of  low 
observed  earnings  response  coefficients  from  the  prices-lead-earnings  explanation. 
There,  current  market  price  is  related  to  future  earnings.  Econometrically,  value- 
irrelevant  noise  induces  the  errors-in-variables  problem  in  the  independent  variable, 
attenuating  empirical  estimates  of  the  earnings  response  coefficient. 
The  third  explanation  of  low  observed  earnings  response  coefficients  and  R  2S 
is  termed  by  Kothari  (2001)  as  the  "deficient  GAAP  argurnent!  ':  if  the  generally 
accepted  accounting  principles  (GAAP)  were  to  be  designed  with  the  major 
objective  of  providing  equity  investors  with  information  relevant  in  estimating  the 
present  value  of  future  cash  flows,  then  there  should  be  a  strong  relationship  between 
market  values  and  accounting  earnings  (and  possibly  other  accounting  figures). 
Indeed,  the  strength  and  nature  of  these  relationships  themselves  could  be  used  as  a 
criterion  to  judge  the  efficiency  of  the  GAAP  in  providing  value-relevant 
information  to  investors  (Lev  and  Zarowin,  1999).  If,  however,  as  stated  above,  this 
was  not  the  case  and  the  observed  relationship  was  weak,  this  would  be  treated  as  an 
indication  of  the  "inappropriateness"  of  accounting  figures  to  provide  investors  with 
value-relevant  information  (e.  g.,  in  the  case  of  software  capitalisation  -  Aboody  and 
Lev,  1998)  and  treated  as  a  deficiency  of  GAAP.  Lev  (1989)  specifically  states  that: 
if  price  revisions  are  found  to  be  largely  unrelated  to  earnings,  the  information 
contribution  (usefulness)  of  earnings  to  investors  cannot  be  large.  "  (p.  156) 
34 Lev  also  emphasises  the  importance  of  metrics  such  as  the  R  2S  rather  than  just  the 
earnings  response  coefficients  (i.  e.,  estimated  regression  coefficients).  parts  of  the 
evidence  consistent  with  this  argument  appear  also  in  other  studies,  in  particular 
regarding  the  decline  in  value-relevance.  However,  the  decline,  if  present,  relates 
more  to  the  earnings  figure  itself  than  to  the  general  concept  of  financial  statements. 
Once  certain  balance-sheet  items  are  included  in  the  relation,  the  R2s  do  not  appear 
to  decline  unequivocally  (e.  g.,  Francis  and  Schipper,  1999). 
The  fourth  explanation  of  low  observed  earnings  response  coefficients  is  the 
existence  of  transitory  earnings.  Given  the  generic  model  presented  in  equation'(2-1) 
above,  the  long-term  effect  of  an  earnings  change  depends  on  the  persistence  of 
earnings.  Ahmed  (1994),  among  several  other  studies  presented/mentioned-  earlier, 
defines  persistence  of  earnings  as  the  magnitude  of  revisions  in  current  expectations 
of  future  earnings  that  result  from  a  cuffent  earnings  innovation  (change).  If  earnings 
changes  were  purely  permanent,  the  full  value  of  this  change  would  be  capitalised  to 
infinity  and  reflected  in  current  market  values.  Simplifying  earlier  definitions  of  the 
earnings  response  coefficient  and  annotation,  the  effect  of  one  unit  of  change  in 
earnings  on  market  values  would  equal  the  earnings  response  coefficient,  i.  e., 
(1+1/r)-units,  where  r  is  an  inter-temporally  and  cross-sectionally  constant  discount 
rate  (the  required  return  on  equity).  Econometrically,  purely  pen-nanent  earnings  can 
be  described  by  a  random  walk'process  (see  section  3.2.1).  A  number  of  empirical 
studies  show  that  (positive)  earnings  and  earnings  changes  have  properties  broadly 
consistent  with  an  underlying  random  walk  process,  albeit  it  must  be  noted  that  with 
some  deviations  from  it,  depending  on  industry,  the  precise  type  of  estimation, 
undeflated  versus  deflated  variables  and  similar  issues  (e.  g.  Dechow,  Kothari  and 
35 Watts,  1998;  Albrecht,  Lookabill  and  McKeown,  1977;  Lookabill,  1976;  Beaver, 
1970). 
On  the  other  hand,  earnings  might  contain  components  that  are  transitory  in 
nature  -  i.  e.,  they  are  not  expected  to  persist  into  the  indefinite  future,  in  which  case 
the  strength  of  the  response  to  earnings  announcements  is  expected  to  be  small(er). 
Indeed,  in  the  case  of  purely  transitory  earnings,  the  earnings  response  coefficient 
would  equal  unity.  A  unit  of  unexpected  earnings  would  affect  the  share  price  by  just 
that  one  unit.  Empirical  research  shows  that  negative  earnings  and  earnings  changes 
are  transitory,  i.  e.,  they  reverse  in  a  major  part  within  one  accounting  period.  For 
example,  Basu  (1997,  Table  3)  reports  a  regression  coefficient  on  negative  earnings- 
levels  close  to  -0.500,  which  implies  that  negative  earnings  mean-revert  to  the  non'n 
within  two  accounting  periods. 
There  are  several  possible  explanations  for  the  transitory  nature  of  earnings 
and  negative  earnings  in  particular.  First,  exogenous  one-time  activities  such  as 
disposals  of  assets,  restructurings,  write-offs  and  similar  activities  result  in  one-time, 
I 
transitory  gains  or  losses.  "  These  events  are,  almost-by  definition,  not  expected  to 
recur,  assuming  a  going-concem  firm  in  either  direction.  Furthermore,  the  limited 
liability  of  public  companies  and  possible  existence  of  abandonment  options  (Berger, 
Ofek  and  Swary,  4996;  Hayn  1995;  also  see  section  4.8.1)  limit  the  time  and/or  the 
extent  to  which  substantial  losses  can  be  incurred.  The  presence  of  gains  or  losses 
"  Exogenuous  activities  are  activities  triggered  or caused  by  the  economic  environment  which  is 
external  to  the  fmiL  Endogenous  activities  result  from  activities  induced  by  managers'  incentives.  The 
difference  between  exogenuous  and  endogenouos  activities  is  econometrically  important.  In  the  case 
of  endogenous  activities,  the  incentive  will  likely  represent  an  omitted  variable  and  thus  produce  an 
upward  bias  in  the  estimated  earnings  response  coefficient  (see  section  2.3.2  and  Kothari  and 
Zimmerman,  1995,  Appendix). 
36 resulting  from  such  activities  is  thus  only  temporary  and  earnings  containing  these 
elements  are  transitory. 
Second,  these  transitory  elements  might  be  induced  ý  endogenously  for 
contractual  reasons  -  managers  might  have  their  own  incentives  to  create  transitory 
earnings  components.  For  example,  they  can  influence  earnings  either  by  selling 
assets  to  realise  gains  or  by  delaying,  to  -the  extent  possible,  the  recognition  of 
unrealised  losses  (Black,  Sellers  and  Manly,  1998).  Poitras,  Wilkins  and  Kwan 
(2002)  find  that  asset  sales  are  determined  jointly  by  the  economic  environment  of 
the  firm  as  well  as  managerial  incentives,  i.  e.,  that  asset  sales  are  a  result  of  a 
mixture  of  exogenous  and  endogenous  factors.  Maksimovic  and  Phillips  (2001), 
using  longitudinal  data,  are  unable,  to  rule  out  discretionary  value-reducing  asset 
sales.  Earlier,  Bartov  (1993)  describes  and  finds  evidence  consistent  with  two 
discretionary  types  of  managerial  behaviour  -  earnings  smoothing  and  debt  to  equity 
ratio  manipulation  by  means  of  timing  of  long-term  fixed  assets  sales  to  confon'n  to 
debt  covenants.  If  managers  attempt  to  time  asset  sales  to  manipulate  earnings  or  the 
debt-to-equity  ratios,  they  must  perceive  frictions  in  some  information  markets,  and 
whether  or  not  these  activities  are  successful  depends  on  the  existence  of  such 
frictions  (Fields,  Lys  and  Vincent,  2000).  In  a  capital  market  that  processes 
infonnation  efficiently,  investors  are,  expected  to  see  through  such  endogenous 
attempts  to  increase  or  decrease  earnings  and  treat  these  activities  as  transitory.  The 
components  of  earnings  that  reflect  these  activities  are  therefore  also  expected  to  be 
transitory. 
37 The  third  possible  explanation  for  the  existence  of  transitory  items  is  that 
there  is  demand  for  conservative  accounting  numbers.  Some  groups  of  financial 
statements'  users  will,  at  least  in  some  circumstances,  prefer  understated  assets 
and/or  revenue  figures  (e.  g.,  Anwer  et  A  2002).  For  example,  creditors  might  view 
understated  assets  as  giving,  them  a  greater  margin  when  setting  debt  covenants 
(Cotter,  1999).  -  If  the  accounting  system  induces  such  a  property  on  accounting 
figures,  then  upward  adjustments  must  be  made  to  reconcile  accounting  estimates  of 
value  and  market  values.  For  example,  the  Feltham  and  OhIson  (1995,1996)  include 
such  adjustments  in  their  model  to  reconcile  market  and  book  values  of  operating 
assets.  Pope  and  Walker  (2003)  present  a  model  that  captures  this  type  of  accounting 
conservatism.  Basu  (1997),  on  the  other  hand,  defines  conservatism  as  a  tendency  of 
accountants  to  require  a  higher  degree  of  verification  for  recognising  gains  than 
losses  in  financial  statements.  Therefore,  in  order  to  record  a  gain,  accountants 
require  a  greater  degree  of  certainty  than  they  do  for  losses.  The  traditional  view  is 
(was)  that  acCOuntants  should,  when  in  doubt,  tend  to  understate  'assets  and  revenue 
and  overstate  liabilities  and  expenses  (Lewis  and  Pendrill,  1996,  pp.  17-18;  see'also 
SFAC  2  and  SSAP  2  pronouncements  and  Davies,  Paterson  and  Wilson,  1999,  pp. 
64-70).  ' 
Conservative  accounting  as  described  above  thus  represents  one  possible 
cause  of  low  observed  on-average  relationships  (earnings  response  -coefficients  and 
R2  s)  between  market  values  and  accounting  earnings.  Regardless  of  the  'precise 
definition  of  this  type  of  accounting'  conservatism,  one  of  the  consequences  is  that 
38 market  values  relate  to  accounting  earnings  in  an  asymmetric  manner.  12  Anticipated 
losses  are  recognised  both  more  often  and  more  quickly  than  anticipated  gains 
(Kothari,  2001)  and  increased  frequency  or  probability  of  litigation  in  some 
jurisdictions  contribute  and  strengthen  this  tendency  (e.  g.,  Ball,  Kothari,  Robin, 
2000;  Pope  and  Walker,  1999;  Basu,  1997).  They  result  in  transitory  components  of 
earnings  and/or  other  performance  measures  that  are  used  as  explanatory  variables  in 
models  such  as  the  model  in  equation  (2-1).  These  transitory  components  then  cause 
low  response  coefficients  and  low  R  2S. 
2.2.4  Other  properties  of  the  earnings-return 
relationship 
Hayn  (1995)  introduces  the  notion  that  losses  are  transitory  because  investors 
have  an  abandonment  option  to  discontinue  operations  in  a  firm  that  generates 
negative  returns  or  returns  that  are  not  commensurate  to  the  riskiness  of  the  firm. 
Losses  cannot  persist  indefinitely  -  they  are  either  reversed,  in  which  case  they  were 
by  definition  transitory,  or  the  shareholders  exercise  their  put  option  to  discontinue 
firm  operations.  This  discontinuation  of  operations  may  take  the  form  of  liquidation 
of  assets,  reorganisation  of  the  firm,  assets  can  be  sold  or  merged  with  another  firm 
or  group  of  assets  (Jan  and  Ou,  1995).  A  further  exploration  of  the  abandomnent 
option  is  presented  in  detail  in  Berger  of,  ek  and  Swary  (1996).  The  concept  of 
transitory  negative  earnings  also  applies  in  cases  where  accounting  earnings  are 
positive  at  face  value,  but  are  either  low  enough  to  cause  the  abandonment  option  to 
12  This  presentation  relates  principally  to  ex-post  accounting  conservatism.  More  exact  definitions  of 
accounting  conservatism  are  presented  below  in  section  2.4.  Precise  definitions  are  required  to 
differentiate  between  the  effects  of  different  types  of  conservatism. 
39 become  "in  the  money"13  or  are  essentially  negative,  but  the  management  has 
adopted  some  eamings-increasing  accounting  policies  (Burgstahler  and  Dichev, 
1997;  also  see  Easton,  1999).  These  earnings  are  not  expected  to  persist  indefinitely 
but  rather  to  reverse  toward  normal  levels.  The  existence  of  abandonment  options 
introduces  non-linearity  in  the  return-earnings  relation  in  the  same  manner  as  payoffs 
are  defined  asymmetrically  for  a  financial  option.  Further  research  in  this  area 
includes  Chambers  (1996)  who  distinguishes  between  one-time  losses  and 
66persistenf'  losses.  14  He  finds  that  losses  that  extend  beyond  the  current  accounting 
period  convey  significantly  less  information  to  the  market  than  the  initial  loss  for 
firms  where  the  accounting  losses  extend  over  a  number  of  subsequent  accounting 
periods.  The  implication  is  that  investors  -  gain  -most  information  about  future 
accounting  prospects  of  the  firm  from  the  initial  loss.  Martikainen  (1998)  makes 
similar  distinctions  between  temporary  and  "permanent'  'losses.  15 
Most  empirical  literature  employs  linear  regression  models  -as  the  method  to 
study  empirically  the  relationship  between  earnings  and  -  returns.  -Imposing  the 
linearity  assumption  on  an  essentially  non-linear  relationship  might  account  in  part 
for  the  observed  low  strength  of  relationship  between  earnings  and  returns  in  that  the 
functional  form  might  be  inadequate.  Existing  research  shows  that  extreme  earnings 
changes,  both  positive  and  negative,  are  more  likely  to  contain  more  transitory  items. 
Freeman  and  Tse  (1992)  as  well  as  Ali  and  Pope  (1995)  on  UK  data  use  an  arctan 
transfonnation  that  produces  an  S-shaped  curve  description  of  the  relationship 
13  Hayn  terms  such  earnings  as  "temporarily  depressed  earnings",  defined  as  earnings  that,  when 
capitalisid  appropriately,  are  lower  than  the  liquidation  value.  14  The  term  "persistent  losses"  is  included  in  inverted  commas  to  diffrentiate  the  use  of  the  term  from 
other  uses  in  this  thesis.  Losses  by  the  very  same  reasons  described  earlier  in  this  section  cannot 
Ve  t  indefinitely. 
term  "Permanent"  is  included  in  inverted  commas  again  for  the  same  reasons  as  in  footnote  14. 
40 between  returns  and  earnings  -  convex  for  bad  news  and  concave  for  good  news. 
Therefore,  the  marginal  response  of  prices  to  earnings  is  allowed  to  vary  with  the 
magnitude  of  the  earnings  measure.  The  earnings  response  coefficient  is  smaller 
when  earnings  changes  are  extreme  and  more  likely  contain  more  transitory 
components  and  is  bigger  when  earnings  changes  are  smaller  and  contain  more 
permanent  (less  transitory)  components.  Das  and  Lev  (1994)  report  similar  findings 
for  a  more  general  class  of  transformations  and  involving  alternative  non-parametric 
methods  of  estimation  (locally  weighted  regression).  They  also  find  that  special 
items  increase  non-linearity  in  their  returns-earnings  relationship,  that  the 
relationship  is  non-linear  even  when  one  adjusts  -for  the  levels  of  cash  flow  or 
accruals  contained  in  earnings  and  that  the  returns-cash  flow  relation  itself  is  also 
non-linear.  These  are  all  findings  that  bear  upon  the  findings  presented  later  in  this 
thesis.  However,  Beneish  and  Harvey  (1998)  caution  that  the  non-linearities 
observed  in  previous  research  are,  at  least  in  part,  due  to  measurement  errors  rather 
than  to  a  non-linear  relationship  between  (abnormal)  returns  and  (unexpected) 
earnings  and  that  the  gains  of  accounting  for  potential  non-linearities  are  likely  to  be 
small.  Lipe,  Bryant  and  Widener.  (1998)  use  an  absolute-value  quadratic 
transfomiation  that  allows  preserving  the  sign  of  earnings  surprise.  They  find  that 
non-linearity,  losses  and  firm-specific  factors  are  economically  distinct  factors 
affecting  the  returns-earnings  relationship.  Cheng,  Hopwood  and  McKeown  (1992) 
observe  that  the  effects  of  non-linearity  may  be  severe.  The  R  2S  in  their  empirical 
estimations  increase  by  a  factor  of  two  to  three  when  they  control  for  non-linear 
relationships  between  cumulative  abnormal  returns  and  unexpected  earnings. 
Subramanyarn  (1996)  provides  a  theoretical  framework  for  the  observed  non- 
linearities.  There  are  other  factors  that  might  affect  the  retums-eamings  relationship. 
41 For  example,  Choi  and  Jeter  (1992)  find  that  the  earnings  response  coefficients 
decrease  in  the  period  after  the  issuance  of  a  qualified  audit  opinion.  They  ascribe 
this  finding  either  to*  increasing  noise  in  earnings  or  to  the  changes  in  earnings 
persistence  or  both. 
The  empirical  research  presented  in  this  thesis  expands  upon  the  transitory- 
earnings  explanation,  in  particular  the  effects  of  accounting  conservatism.  To  the 
extent  possible,  it  conditions  some  of  the  results  on  the  sign  of  accounting  earnings 
and  its  two  main  components  (cash  flows  and,  accruals)  with  the  observation  that 
negative  earnings  in  particular  are  transitory.  The  particular  methods  used  later  in 
this  thesis  are  a  result,  at  least  in  part,  of  different  resolutions  of,,  the  main 
econometric  problems  presented  below  in  section  2.3.  These  problems  prevent 
correct  inferences  regarding  the  nature  of  the  relation  between  market  values  and 
accounting  numbers  to  be  made.  They  are  presented  next. 
2.3  MAIN  ECONOMETRIC  ISSUES 
2.3.1  The  errors-in-variables  problem 
The  presentation  of  econometric  problems  resulting  from  transitory  earnings 
is  based  on  Kothari  and  Zimmerman  (1995)  and  Kothari  (2001),  while,  the 
econometric  derivations  are  combined  from  Greene  (2000,  pp.  375-380)  and 
Johnston  and  DiNardo  (1997,  pp.  153-156).  Reported  accounting  earnings  At  can  be 
viewed,  in  general,  as  a  linear  combination  of  two  components:  a  permanent,  value- 
42 relevant  component  (i.  e.,  a  component  perfectly  positively  correlated  with  the  market 
values),  x,,  and  a  transitory,  value-irrelevant  component,  ul,  which  has  no  impact  on 
the  share  price  (Beaver,  Lambert  and  Morse,  1980): 
xt  =X  t+U  t  (2-3) 
Econometrically,  xt  is  represented  by  a  random  walk  model:  '  xi=  xj-j+cj  and 
E[xt]=  xt-1,  where  el  is  a  random,  normally-distributed  error  term  with  parameters 
N-(O,  cý,,  ).  Also,  el  and  ul  are  assumed  to  be  uncorrelated,  cov(et,  ut)=  0.  If  the  two 
components  of  the  earnings  process  in  equation  (2-3)  could  be  identified,  they  could 
be  used  as  separate  independent  variables  in  a  regression  model,  two  separate 
estimated  regression  coefficients  and  thus  two  "partial"  earnings  response 
coefficients  would  result.  The  theoretical  earnings  response  coefficient  on  the 
transitory  component  u,  equals  unity  -  the  transitory  component  affects  reported 
accounting  earnings  only  in  the  period  in  which  it  occurs  and  does  not  occur  again. 
On  the  other  hand,  as  shown  earlier,  the  theoretical  earnings  response  coefficient  on 
the  permanent  'component  x,  is  (1+11r)  -  the  permanent  component  of 
reported  earnings  repeats  itself  in  all  future  accounting  periods  and  is  capitalised  into 
the  current  market  value.  The  earnings  response  coefficient  on  the  permanent 
component  therefore  represents  one  plus  the  average  price-earnings,  ratio,  or  the 
earnings  multiplier.  To  obtain  the  "total"  earnings  response  coefficient,  these  two 
estimated  regression  coefficients  would  have  to  be  summed.  In  terms  of  estimating 
some  particular  form  of  the  model  in  equation 
(2-1),  the  following  limits  on  the  value  of  the  estimated  earnings  coefficients  would 
43 thus  be  expected:  1:  5  ft:  5  (,  8,,.  =(I+Ilr))  if  accounting  earnings  comprise  of  the  two 
separately-identifiable  components. 
If,  however,  the  two  components  of  reported  accounting  earnings  Xj,  were  not 
separately  identifiable,  then  the  transitory,  value-irrelevant  component  u,  would  act 
as  a  measurement  error  in  the  independent  variable.  The  consequences  of  the  errors- 
in-variables  problem  are  illustrated  below. 
One  specific  empirical  model  derived  from  the  generic  model  in  (2-1)  is  the 
deflated  price-levels  model  (Kothari  and  Zimmerman,  1995):  16 
P't 
a+p 
Xt 
+  co,,  Pi'l-I  Pi't-I 
(2-4) 
In  terms  of  the  notation  presented  above  and  equation  (2-3),  the  estimated 
value  of  ft  will  fall  in  the  interval  between  1,  if  observed  accounting  earnings  X,  is 
constituted  of  purely  transitory  earnings  ui,,  and  (1+11r)  if  observed  accounting 
earnings  Xit  is  constituted  of  entirely  permanent  earnings  xii,  given  that  8  is  a  sum  of 
two  independent  variables  with  their  own  "true"  regression  coefficients.  In  an 
alternative  nomenclature,  Xil  may  be  termed  as  observed  earnings,  xi,  "true"  earnings 
and  uit  the  measurement  error. 
16  This  particular  form  has  been  selected  to  separate  out  the  second  serious  problem  of  empirical 
versions  of  equation  (1),  namely  the  scale  effects.  Also,  under  the  assumption  that  earnings  consitute 
the  only  value-relevant  information  to  the  market,  deflated-eamings  (i.  e.,  earnings  yield)  models  are 
equivalent  to  deflated-eamings  changes  models  (Donnelly  and  Walker,  1995).  Thus,  this  particular 
form  is  not  limiting.  Some  variants  of  this  model  are  also  used  in  an  emerging-market  context 
Pindrichovska,  1995). 
44 However,  in  the  earnings  response  coefficient/permanent-transitory  earnings 
context,  the  interest  lies  not  in  the  relationship  between  published  earnings  measures 
that  include  transitory  (i.  e.,  value-irrelevant)  items,  as  in  equation  (2-4),  but  rather  in 
the  relationship  between  prices  and  earnings  measures  that  contain  only  those 
components  that  are  value-relevant: 
P't 
=a  +,  B  'it  + 
1.  R  pla-1 
It 
Substituting  (2-4)  into  (2-5)  yields: 
(2-5) 
P't 
a+p 
Xit  u,,  +a+,  8  X"  u,,  +  Pi't-I  pla-I  Pi.  t-I  pla-I  Pi't-I 
(2-6) 
a  +,  B  Xit 
+  o),,  u,, 
Pi't-I  Pi, 
l-l 
The  estimate  of  the  true  regression  coefficient,  ft,  equals: 
xi,  juý-it 
'6  =,  B  + 
xilt 
and 
22 
plim 
cr 
x 
or2  +  a. 
2  #6  +2 
x 
or 
u 
(2-7) 
(2-8) 
45 Equations  (2-6)  to  (2-8)  show  that  when  the  true  underlying  relationship 
between  market  value  and  accounting  earnings  is  represented  by  equation  (2-5),  but 
one  attempts  in  practice  to  estimate  model  (2-4)  because  the  only  available  earnings 
figure  is  the  published  or  the  observed  accounting  earnings  rather  than  permanent 
earnings,  the  error  term  in  such  a  regression  is  not  independent  of  the  regressor  (the 
A  independent  variable).  The  consequence  is  that  the  estimator  8  of  the  true  8  is 
biased  downwards.  If  the  variable  of  interest  -  in  this  case  permanent  earnings,  was 
measured  without  error  (or,  equivalently,  the  earnings  figure  used  was  entirely  value- 
relevant)  so  that  Xjj=  xit,  the  second  tenn  in  equation  (2-7)  would  equal  zero,  since 
the  measurement  error  ul,  would  equal  uji=  0  for  all  firms  i  and  time  periods  t. 
Alternatively,  the  variance  of  such  a  (non-existent)  error  tenn  would  equal  o2u=  0 
and  the  term  in  brackets  on  the  right-hand  side  of  equation  (2-8)  would  thus  equal 
o2.,  I(  cý,  +o2,,  )=  1.  In  other  words,  had  the  reported  accounting  earnings  figure 
consisted  only  of  the  value-relevant  permanent  earnings  component,  the  empirical 
earnings  response  coefficient  would  equal  the  theoretically-expected  earnings 
response  coefficient,  that  is  ft  =  (I  +I  1r).  " 
At  the  other  extreme,  if  the  reported  earnings  figure  consisted  only  of  a 
transitory  element  so  that  Xji=  ui,,  the  term  in  brackets  in  equation  (2-8)  would  equal 
zero,  since  the  numerator  cý.,  =  0  and  the  denominator  strictly  cý,,  >O.  The  empirical 
estimate  of  the  earnings  response  cocfficient  would  then  equal  1  +0=  I- 
17  In  this  exposition,  the  cross-sectional  and  intertemporal  independence  of  all  observations,  as  shown 
by  the  absence  of  either  index  i  or  I  in  regression  coefficients,  is  assumed. 
46 At  any  point  in  the  interval  between  these  two  extremes  the  empirical 
estimate  of  the  earnings  response  coefficient  will  be  biased.  It  follows  from  equation 
(2-8)  that  regardless  of  the  sign  of  the  observed  relation  between  market  value  and 
accounting  earnings,  the  estimated  regression  coefficient  will  be  biased  towards  zero. 
This  bias  is  termed  the  attenuation  bias.  The  magnitude  of  the  bias  depends  on  the 
term  in  brackets  in  equation  (2-8)  -  i.  e.,  on  the  relative  sizes  of  the  variances  of 
permanent  earnings  and  transitory  earnings  that  act  as  the  measurement  error.  It  must 
be  noted  that  the  magnitude  of  this  bias  is  not  observable,  since  neither  the  variance 
of  the  value-relevant  portion  (4)  nor  the  variance  of  the  value-irrelevant  portion 
(o2,,  )  is  in  practice  observable  to  the  researcher. 
Moreover,  such  estimates  of  the  earnings  response  coefficient  will  be 
inconsistent.  A  consistent  estimator  should  approach  the  true  value  of  the 
parameter  plim  0.  =0  as  the  sample  size  n  increases  indefinitely.  From  equation 
(2-8)  above  it  is  apparent  that  in  the  case  of  the  errors-in-variables  problem,  the 
estimated  earnings  response  coefficient  will  not  only  be  biased,  but  that  this  bias  will 
not  tend  to  zero  as  the  sainple  size  increases  indefinitely.  Thus,  in  the  presence  of 
transitory  earnings,  the  estimated  earnings  response  coefficient  is  inconsistent  as 
well  as  attenuated. 
In  cases  when  only  one  regressor  is  measured  with  error,  a  relatively  simple 
solution  to  the  errors-in-variables  problem  is  available.  For  example,  in  accounting 
contexts,  the  "reverse"  regression  is  often  applied  (e.  g.,  Beaver,  Lambert  and  Morse, 
1980;  Collins  and  Kothari,  1992;  Basu,  1997;  Pope  and  Walker,  1999):  the 
accounting  earnings  variable  measured  with  error  serves  as  the  dependent  variable, 
47 while  the  market  value  variable,  assumed  to  be  measured  without  error  in  an  efficient 
capital  market,  serves  as  the  independent  variable.  When  the  dependent  variable  is 
measured  with  error,  but  (all  of)  the  independent  variables  are  effor-free,  the 
regression  coefficient  is  unbiased.  However,  since  the  random  measurement  error 
and  the  true  regression  errors  are  merged  in  the  empirical  error  estimate,  the  usual 
consequence  is  a  lower  explanatory  power  of  such  regressions  evidenced  by  lower 
R  2S  (Greene,  2000,  p.  376).  In  terms  of  the  generic  model,  represented  in  equation 
(2-1),  a  simple  generic  reverse  regression  model  designated  to  deal  with  the 
measurement  error  might  be  the  following: 
UXi,  =y+  5CARj,  +  vi,  (2-9) 
where  8  is  the  return  response  coefficient.  The  return  response  coefficient  is  the 
inverse  of  the  earnings  response  coefficient  (&IIA  and  this  inverse  represents  the 
theoretical  upper  limit  of  the  return  response  coefficient.  All  interpretations  of 
economic  determinants,  discussed  above,  must  therefore  be  inverted  when  the 
subject  of  interpretation  is  the  return  response  coefficient.  Collins  and  Kothari  (1989) 
employ  just  such  a  model  to  study  the  economic  determinants  of  the  earnings 
(return)  response  coefficients. 
However,  the  solution  to  the  effors-in-variables  problem  is  not  readily 
available  in  cases  where  there  are  more  regressors  measured  with  error.  One  such 
context  is  in  the  Feltham  and  OhIson's  (1996)  linear-dynarnics  model  in  a  multiple- 
equation  setting  (e.  g.  Dechow,  Hutton  and  Sloan,  1999;  Barth  et  aL,  1999).  Another 
setting  represents  cases  where  reported  accounting  earnings  are  negative.  In  the  case 
48 of  loss  firms  the  need  is  often  to  include  additional  variables  in  regressions  that 
attempt  to  measure  the  underlying  -true  value-relevant  variables  with  error.  For 
example,  Collins,  Pincus  and  Me  (1999)  find  that  including  the  book  value  serves  as 
a  proxy  for  i)  future  normal  earnings,  ii)  the  value  of  the  abandonment  option  if  a 
firm  is  to  be  liquidated,  and  iii)  as  a  proxy  for  scale.  The  book  value  included  in 
these  regressions  almost  inevitably  measures  these  three  constructs  with  error. 
Another  application  where  this  problem  might  arise  is  the  use  of  the  deflated  book 
value  (the  book-to-market  ratio)  or  any  other  "stock"  variable  as  a  control  for  the 
level  of  pervasive  conservatism  in  accounting  (e.  g.,  Pope  and  Walker,  2003).  While 
Pope  and  Walker  (2003)  avoid  including  the  book-to-market  ratio  directly  in  their 
regressions  and  re-estimate  their  models  by  book-to-market  deciles  instead, 
including  the  ratio  directly  would  represent  an  alternative  effors-in-variables  method 
of  estimation. 
While  no  general  solution  to  the  problem  of  measurement  error  in  multiple 
independent  variables  is  available,  some  special  cases  have  been  solved  with 
different  approaches.  Black,  Berger  and  Scott  (2000)  relax  the  assumption  that  the 
true  independent  variable  and  the  measurement  error  ten'n  are  un-correlated;  Klepper 
(1994),  develops  regression  diagnostics  when  all  independent  variables  might  be 
measured  with  error  and  assuming  the  error  is  not  correlated  with  the  true  variable  of 
interest.  Other  approaches  have  been  developed  (e.  g.,  Machuga,  2000;  Dagenais  and 
Dagenais,  1997;  Lewbell,  1997;  Dagenais;  1994;  Klepper,  1988;  Klepper  and 
Leamer,  1984).  Some  of  these  have  been  applied  specifically.  in  the  capital  market- 
based  accounting  research  context  in  estimating  the  earnings  response  coefficient. 
For  example,  Cready,  Hurtt  and  Seida  (2000)  apply  the  method  developed  in  Klepper 
49 and  Leamer  (1984).  The  technique  essentially  involves  regressing  every  variable 
entering  the  model  (both  dependent  and  independent)  on  all  other  variables  and 
establishing  bounds  on  the  estimated  regression  coefficients. 
None  of  the  works  cited  above  have  been  used  explicitly  in  this  thesis,  given 
that  the  "reverse"  form  of  empirical  models  "automatically"  precludes  (pre-empts) 
the  errors-in-variables  problem  to  affect  the  main  conservatism  measures  that  are 
based  on  estimated  regression  coefficients.  However,  the  acknowledgement  of  the 
errors-in-variables  has  directly  contributed  to  the  development  of  the  "reverse" 
regression  technique  generally  used  in  the  ex-post  conservatism  literature  as  well  as 
in  this  thesis  and  is  presented  here  accordingly. 
2.3.2  Scale  (size)  effects 
The  second  principal  econometric  problem  that  affects  the  models  used  in 
related  literature  as  well  as  in  this  study  is  related  to  scale  effects.  Empirical 
estimations  of  the  generic  model  in  the  form  of  price-level  regressions,  such  as  the 
undeflated  version  of  the  model  presented  in  (2-5)  above,  as  set  out  in  equation  (2- 
10)  below,  with  or  without  book  value  often  yield  models  with  high  R2s.  For 
example,  Garrod  and  Valentincic  (2005)  report  A  resulting  from  estimations  of 
their  valuation  models  on  a  long  UK  sample  (196-2001)  to  be  in  the  range  from  41% 
to  56%  which  is  much  higher  than  the  more  common  range  5%-15%  in  such 
empirical  investigations  (e.  g.,  Lipe,  Bryant  and  Widener,  1998).  Although  Garrod 
and  Valentincic  (2005)  deflate  their  variant  of  the  residual  income  model  with  three 
50 different  deflators  (i.  e.,  scale  measures)  -  book  value,  earnings  and  sales,  some  scale 
effects  might  still  be  present  because  they  do  not  deflate  the  accounting  variables 
with  lagged  price  (Easton,  1999;  also  1998),  thus  causing  higher  A  than  they  would 
otherwise  be.  The  following  illustration  represents  an  attempt  to  illustrate  the  effects 
of  scale  following  the  exposition  in  Barth  and  Kallapur  (1996). 
Assume,  first,  that  the  true  relationship  between  price  (Pit)  and  reported 
accounting  earnings  (Xi,  )  is  described  by  the  following  undeflated  levels-model 
(Kothari  and  Zimmennan,  1995): 
Pit  =a+  I 
At  (2-10) 
where  gi,  is  a  random  error  distributed  normally  N-(O,  cý,  ).  Note  that  the  distribution 
of  this  error  term  ej,  is  homoscedastic,  i.  e.,  its  value  does  not  increase  with  the  value 
of  the  independent  variable  Xit.  In  practice,  however,  because  scale  effects  are 
present  in  accounting  and/or  possibly  in  the  market  variables,  the  observed  (as 
opposed  to  the  underlying  or  "true")  relationship  between  price  and  accounting 
eamings  is: 
(aSi,  )  +  (,  6XiSi,  )  +  (e,,  Si,  )  (2-11) 
where  SI,  is  a  measure  of  scale  for  a  particular  firm  i  in  period  t.  Several  empirical 
measures  of  scale  (S)  have  been  proposed  in  the  literature.  The  most  common 
measures  of  size  include  the  opening  market  capitalisation  (share  price)  (e.  g.,  Easton, 
1999)  and  accounting  earnings,  book  values  or  sales  (e.  g.,  Garrod  and  Valentincic, 
51 2004).  Less-often  used  measures  used  in  empirical  applications  include  the  amount 
originally  invested  in  the  firm  (Barth  and  Kallapur,  1996)  and  the  amount  of  the 
depreciation  charge  (Christie,  1987).  Both  of  these  measures  are  expected  to  be  large 
for  large  firms  while  at  the  same  time  bearing  no  relationship  with  the  determinants 
of  the  current  value  of  the  firm.  18  The  underlying  assumption  is  that  scale,  Sit,  is  not 
correlated  with  either  Pit  or  Xt. 
In  empirical  applications,  models  based  on  equation  (2-10)  would  generally 
take  the  following  form: 
(Pit  Sit)  =r+  8(xilsil)  +  wit 
(2-12) 
Assuming  (2-12)  could  be  estimated  (which  would  require  the  knowledge  of  the 
scale  factor  S),  the  estimated  regression  coefficient  8  will  generally  differ  from  the  4 
A 
estimated  regression  coefficient  6  from  equations  (2-10)  and  (2-11)  because: 
-  the  model  in  equation  (2-12)  omits  the  scale  factor  S11,  an  independent  variable 
correlated  with  the  independent  variable  (XjSjj)  included  in  the  regression; 
-  the  model  in  equation  (2-12)  has  an  intercept,  while  the  equation  (2-11)  does  not; 
-  since  the  error  term  is  defined  as  cA.,  ==  Silgil,  the  model  in  (2-12)  violates  the 
contemporaneous  ordinary  least  squares  assumption  of  homoscedasticitiy  (Le, 
the  error  term  w  is  a  function  of  the  scale  factor  S  and  thus  varies  with  S). 
18  This  study  shows  explicitly  the  properties  of  the  depreciation  expense  regarding  the  prediction  of 
future  cash  flows. 
52 Barth  and  Kallapur  (1996)  show  that  under  the  assumptions  and 
circumstances  presented  above,  the  estimated  coefficient  S  in  equation  (2-12)  -  the 
estimated  earnings  response  coefficient  -  will  be  biased  in  the  following  manner: 
E((5)  =,  8  + 
alaX2 
1+ 
E2  Y2 
-j  +- 
s 
ýX-2 
(2-13) 
where  the  second  term  on  the  right  hand  side  of  equation  (2-13)  represents  the  bias 
term.  Since  the  denominator  of  the  bias  term  is  always  positive  (only  squared  terms 
are  included),  and  since  negative  intercepts  (a)  are  not  common  in  accounting 
models  such  as  (2-10)  (however,  see,  for  example,  Collins,  Pincus  and  Xie,  1999), 
the  direction  of  the  bias  will  depend  on  the  sign  of  the  mean  of  the  variable  X11,  T. 
Generally,  one  would  expect  the  mean  of  accounting  earnings  T  to  be  positive  on 
average,  since  there  are  usually  many  more  profitable  than  loss-making  firms.  19 
Alternatively,  negative  book  values  as  a  stock  variable  are  sometimes  observed, 
however  such  cases  are  almost  always  excluded  from  empirical  analyses.  20 
Generally,  the  observed  earnings  response  coefficients  in  the  presence  of  scale 
effects  should  thus  be  biased  upwards.  In  other  words,  the  estimated  earnings 
response  coefficients  from  such  regressions  without  appropriate  controls  for  scale 
will  be  overstated  -  the  effect  of  a  unit  change  in  (unexpected)  earnings  will 
overestimate  the  significance  of  this  change  for  future  earnings  and  thus  for  future 
cash  flows  and,  consequently,  their  present  value  and  thus  the  market  values. 
19  For  example,  there  are  12,5%  loss  observations  (firm-years)  in  the  main  contemporaneous  sample 
used  in  in  this  research.  20  This  study  too  excludes  firms  with  non-positive  book  values  (see  section  4.2  for  details  on  sample 
selection). 
53 If  a  relevant  variable  that  is  correlated  with  the  variable  included  in  the  model 
is  excluded  from  the  model,  this  results  in  the  correlated  omitted  variables  problem. 
The  consequences  of  this  problem  are  that  both  the  estimated  regression  constant  and 
the  estimated  regression  coefficient  in  models  like  (2-10)  are  biased  and  inconsistent 
and,  moreover,  the  disturbance  term  is  estimated  incorrectly  -  it  is  biased  upwardly 
(Gujarati,  2003,  pp.  510-513;  Greene,  2000,  pp.  334-337).  This  last  property  is  less 
problematic  in  the  present  context  given  that  it  reduces  only  the  explanatory  power 
of  models.  Even  if  an  omitted  variable  is  orthogonal  on  the  included  variable,  the 
error  term  is still  biased  and  correct  inferences  based  on  the  estimated  R2  are  difficult 
(albeit,  again,  in  a  direction  that  is  usually  not  an  issUe'in  capital  market-based 
accounting  research). 
Easton  and  Sommers  (2003,2000)  emphasize  that  scale  effects  are  more  than 
just  the  notion  that  large  firms  will  have  large  values  of  accounting  variables.  The 
relationship  between  market  and  accounting  variables  might  be  different  for  smaller 
than  for  large  firms,  inducing  a  non-linear  relationship  analogous'to,  for  example, 
Freeman  and  Tse's  (1992)  differences  in  earnings  response  coefficients  for  large  and 
small  unexpected  earnings. 
There  are  two  possible  approaches  to  solve  the  scale  effects  -  deflation'of 
variables  affected  by  scale  and  the  direct  inclusion  of  a  scale  proxy  as  an 
independent  variable.  Barth  and  Kallapur  (1996)  advocate  the  latter  approach  and 
argue  that  deflation  may  have  unpredictable  effects  on  coefficient  bias, 
heteroscedasticity  and  efficiency  of  estimation.  Lev  and  Thiagarajan  (1993)  also 
54 include  market  capitalisation  as  an  independent  variable  in  their  sensitivity  analyses. 
Scale  proxies  used  in  the  empirical  literature  include:  total  sales,  book  value  and 
market  value  of  equity,  total  assets,  net  income,  number  of  shares  and  lagged 
(opening)  price,  effectively  changing  the  modelling,  to  returns-earnings,  yield 
formulation  of  the  generic  model'in  (2-1)  (Easton,  1999)  of  the  type  presented  above 
in  equation  (2-5).  The  inclusion  of  scale  directly  as  a  proxy  may  have  other  roles  - 
e.  g.,  in  examinations  of  the  effects  of  political  costs  (Christie,,  1987).  Also,  Garrod 
and  Valentincic  (2005),  among  others,  caution  that  deflation  by  the  number  of  shares 
does  not  eliminate  the  scale  effect,  given  that  the  number  of  shares  is  a  variable  at 
the  discretion  of  managers.  A  small  number  of  shares  will  result  in  large  per  share 
values  while  a  large  number  of  shares  will  result  in  smaller  per  share  values  for  an 
otherwise  economically  identical  firm.  Recent  papers  that  explore  further  the  effect 
of  scale  on  price-level  models  include  Barth  and  Clinch  (1999),  Easton  and  Sommers 
(2003)  and  Akbar  and  Stark  (2003). 
In  this  research,  Easton's  (1999)  recommendation  is  followed 
"automatically"  given  that  deflation  by  lagged  price  follows  from  Pope  and  Walker 
(1999).  Accounting  variables  and  current  prices  are  deflated  by  opening  prices  P1,1-i 
(or  Pi,, 
-4in  lagged  models)  thus  eliminating,  to  a  large  extent,  the  effects  of  scale.  If, 
however,  opening  prices  were  only  an  imperfect  measure  of  scale,  the  problems 
described  above  would  arise.  Also,  note  that  apart  from  the  errors-in-variables 
problem,  correlated  omitted  variables  and  scale  effects,  there  are  other  possible 
methodological  issues  in  estimating  the  earnings  response  coefficients.  For  example, 
a  series  of  studies  discuss  the  eamings-levels  versus  earnings-changes  form  of 
models  such  as  (2-4)  and  (2-10)  above  (e.  g.,  Easton  and  Harris,  1991;  Kothari,  1992; 
55 Ali  and  Zarowin,  1992;  OhIson  and  Shroff,  1992;  Watts  and  Zimmerman,  1995). 
The  precise  mechanics  of  these  various  forms  of  models  are  not  explored  here  in 
detail,  given  that  they  are  not  directly  used  in  this  study.  However,  it  must  be  noted 
that  authors  reduce  the  econometric  consequences  of  various  specifications  of  these 
models  either  to  the  errors-in-variables  problem  (e.  g.,  Ali  and  Zarowin,  1992)  or  to  a 
correlated  omitted  variables  problem  (Brown,  Lo  and  Lys,  1999).  Thus  the  above 
presentation  represents  a  framework  to  consider  other  possible  problems  that  arise  in 
studies  such  as  the  present  study. 
2.4  ACCOUNTXNG  CONSERVATXSM 
Definitions  of  accounting  conservatism  originate  from  two  broad  sources: 
accounting  standards/legal  framework  literature  and  academic  literature.  In  this 
section  the  various  definitions  of  accounting  conservatism  are  presented,  starting  by 
presenting  the  relevant  "official"  definitions  from  regulatory  texts  in  a  way  similar  to 
Giner  and  Rees  (2001)  and  Givoly  and  Hayn  (2000).  21  These  definitions  are  then 
followed  by  definitions  used  in  academic  empirical  research,  where  certain  conflicts 
and  interactions  between  two  different  types  of  accounting  conservatism  are  exposed 
and  linked  to  regulatory  definitions. 
There  are  three  important  regulatory  definitions  of  conservatism  from  three 
major  regulatory  bodies.  First,  in  the  Accounting  Standards  Board's  Statement  of 
21  The  term  "official"  is  in  inverted  commas  already  in  Givoly  and  Hayn  (2000). 
56 Principles  for  Financial  Reporting  (ICAEW,  2001)  issued  in  December,  1999,  the 
term  "prudence"  is  defined  as: 
"...  the  inclusion  of  a  degree  of  caution  in  the  exercise  of  the  judgements  needed  in  making 
the  estimates  required  under  conditions  of  uncertainty,  such  that  gains  and  assets  are  not 
overstated  and  losses  and  liabilities  are  not  understated.  In  particular,  under  such  conditions 
it  requires  more  confin-matory  evidence  about  the  existence  of,  and  a  greater  reliability  of 
measurement  for,  assets  and  gains  than  is  required  for  liabilities  and  losses.  "  (quoted  in 
ICAEW,  2001,  p.  35,  para.  3.19) 
Thus,  the  recognition  of  liabilities  and  losses  requires  less  verifiability  than 
22 
the  recognition  of  assets  and  gains  (Watts,  2003).  It  also  specifies  that  prudence  is 
only  necessary  in  conditions  of  uncertainty,  which  is  stressed  again  in  para.  3.20 
(ibid.,  p.  35).  Also,  further  explanation  is  given  that  prudence  may  interfere  with 
unbiasedness  and  warning  is  given  that  the  application  of  prudence  should  not  result 
in  deliberate  understatement  of  assets  and  gains  and  overstatement  of  liabilities  and 
losses  (ibid.,  p.  89,  para.  21-23).  Already  as  early  as  in  Scott  (1926)  and  Devine 
(1963)  the  case  is  put  forward  against  a  deliberate  understatement  of  assets 
(inventory,  in  this  case).  Sterling  (1967)  provides  several  examples  of  the  different 
views  on  accounting  conservatism  prevalent  at  the  time. 
The  second  regulatory  source  is  the  Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  in 
the  US,  which  refers  to  prudence  at  several  points  in  different  documents.  First,  both 
the  Statement  of  Financial  Accounting  Standards  No.  5-  Accounting  for 
Contingencies  and  the  Statement  of  Financial  Accounting  Concepts  No.  2- 
22  Verifiability  implies  that  a  number  of  measurers  are  likely  to  obtain  the  same  (accounting)  measure 
(Delaney  et  aL,  2003,  p.  26;  FASB,  1980,  p.  33). 
57 Qualitative  Characteristics  of  Accounting  Information,  refer  to  the  APB  Statement 
No.  4,  para.  171,  where  conservatism  is  referred  to  in  the  following  manner:  23 
"Frequently,  assets  and  liabilities  are  measured  in  a  context  of  significant  uncertainties. 
Historically,  managers,  investors,  and  accountants  have  generally  preferred  that  possible 
errors  in  measurement  be  in  the  direction  of  understatement  rather  than  overstatement  of  net 
income  and  net  assets.  This  has  led  to  the  convention  of  conservatism...  "  (FASB,  1975,  p. 
22,  para.  83;  FASB,  1980,  p.  35,  para.  91) 
This  statement  would  represent  a  scaled-down  version  of  a  more  extreme 
stance  compared  to  the  one  in  Ball  and  Shivakurnar  (2004).  They  quote  Watts  and 
Zimmerman's  (1983,  pp.  205-206)  definition  of  conservatism  that  states  assets 
should  be  reported  at  the  lowest  value  available,  liabilities  at  the  highest,  revenue 
recognised  later  and  expenses  sooner.  Thus,  at  the  extreme,  Ball  and  Shivakumar 
(2004,  p.  9)  comment  that: 
46  ...  accounting  is  conservative  if  it  simply  delays  revenue  recognition'by  one  period,  or 
subtracts  a  constant  from  earnings  every  period  independent  of  current  economic  gains  and 
losses.  " 
However,  the  following  quote  from  SFAS  5  (FASB,  1975)  again  quoting  the 
APB  Statement  No.  4,  para.  35,  is  similar  and  yet  it  represents  an  important  concept 
that  relates  conservatism  to  economic  events: 
"The  uncertainties  that  surround  the  preparation  of  financial  statements  are  reflected  in  a 
general  tendency  toward  early  recognition  of  unfavourable  events  and  minimization  of  the 
amount  of  net  assets  and  net  income.  "  (FASB,  1975,  p.  22) 
Following  the  first  part  of  this  statement,  "unfavourable  [economic]  events" 
must  happen  first,  then  it  is  decided  when  to  include  them  in  financial  statements 
23  The  terms  "prudence"  and  "conservatisrre'  are  intended  to  mean  the  same  phenomenon.  The 
Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  explicitly  acknowledges  this  in  SFAC  2  (1980): 
"There  is  a  place  for  a  convention  such  as  conservatism  -  meaning  prudence  -  in  financial 
accounting  and  reporting...  "  (p.  35,  para.  92,  emphasis  added). 
58 (Elliott  and  Shaw,  1988),  and,  finally,  the  preference  or  tendency  is  for  an  early 
recognition.  This  may  be  taken  as  an  indication  of  the  asymmetric  timeliness  concept 
introduced  later  by  Basu  (1997)  that  bad  economic  news  are  recognised  more  timely 
than  good  economic  news.  This  also  differs  from  the  extreme  stance  presented  in 
(criticised  by)  Ball  and  Shivakumar  (2004)  that  relates  to  mere  minimisation  of 
assets/maximisation  of  liabilities  and  delayed  recognition  of  revenue/earlier 
recognition  of  expenses.  The  increased  timeliness  referred  to  above  cannot  be 
achieved  by  expensing  early,  because  there  must  first  be  an  unfavourable  economic 
event  and  only  then  it  is  being  recognised  in  financial  statements  (i.  e.,  causality  is 
implied).  However,  the  ending  of  this  statement  again  returns  to  Ball  and 
Shivakumar  (2004)  example  of  "subtracting  a  constant". 
Further,  conservatism  is  also  defined  by  FASB  (1980)  explicitly  in  para.  95: 
"Conservatism  is  a  prudent  reaction  to  uncertainty  to  try  to  ensure  that  uncertainties  and  risks 
inherent  in  business  situations  are  adequately  considered.  "  (FASB,  1980,  p.  36,  para.  95) 
This  does  not  imply  deliberate  and  consistent  understatement  of  net  assets  and 
profits  and  this  is  explicitly  acknowledged  in  para.  93  (ibid.  ).  Conservatism 
introduces  bias  in  financial  reporting  and  as  such  it  conflicts  with  a  number  of 
qualitative  characteristics  of  financial  reporting  (e.  g.,  neutrality,  comparability,  etc.  ). 
Moreover,  the  Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  notes  that  understated  assets 
often  lead  to  overstated  net  income  in  subsequent  years  (ibid.,  para.  94),  so  the  bias 
introduced  by  conservative  accounting  will  more  likely  influence  the  timing,  rather 
than  the  amounts  of  income  over  the  lifetime  of  an  economic  asset  (ibid.,  para.  96). 
This  position  remains  unchanged  to  date  (e.  g.,  Delaney  et  aL,  2003,  p.  27).  Also, 
Givoly  and  Hayn  (2000)  cite  several  sources  that  emphasise  that  minimisation  of 
59 assets,  maximisation  of  liabilities,  delaying  revenue  and  recognising  expenses  early 
should  be  viewed  cumulatively  through  time  rather  than  only  within  one  accounting 
period. 
At  the  limiting  point,  the  following  statement  from  SFAS  No.  '5  -Accounting 
for  Contingencies  (FASB,  1975)  that  discusses  comments  received  from  an  earlier 
Exposure  draft  and  Discussion  memorandum  is  interesting: 
"On  the  grounds  of  conservatism,  some  respondents  supported  accrual  of  estimated  losses 
from  loss  contingencies  before  available  information  indicates  that  it  is  probable  that  an  asset 
has  been  impaired  or  a  liability  incurred.  "  (p.  22,  para.  82). 
Therefore,  there  might  be  situations  where  losses  are  accrued,  but  as  time  passes, 
some  conditions  that  had  originally  lead  to  the  accrual  of  losses  might  not  materialise 
and  so  the  original  accrual  would  represent  an  "overreaction".  This  is  an  extremely 
important  point  in  that  it  facilitates  the  explanation  of  a  part  of  the  Pope  and  Walker 
(1999)  modelling  of  asymmetric  timeliness  -  they  explicitly  allow  in  their  model  for 
overreaction  to  bad  news,  not  just  the  mere  reaction. 
The  third  source  of  "official"  definitions  of  prudence  can  be  found  in  the  4h 
EEC  Directive  (1978)  and  subsequent  amendments  (CONSLEG  1978LO660  - 
17/07/2003)  in  Section  7  (Valuation  rules),  Article  3  1: 
"...  items  shown  in  the  annual  accounts  are  valued  in  accordance  with  the  following  general 
principles... 
(c)  valuation  must  be  made  on  a  prudent  basis,  and  in  particular: 
(aa)  only  profits  made  at  the  balance  sheet  date  may  be  included, 
(bb)  account  must  be  taken  of  all  liabilities  arising  in  the  course  of  the  financial  year 
concerned  or  of  a  previous  one,  even  if  such  liabilities  become  apparent  only  between  the 
60 date  of  the  balance  sheet  and  the  date  on  which  it  is  drawn  up...  "  (CONSLEG,  2003,  PP-  18- 
19) 
Giner  and  Rees  (2001)  observe  that  there  is  no  explicit  distinction  between  the 
balance-sheet  conservatism  and  income  statement  conservatism  in  the  definition  of 
prudence  in  the  4h  EEC  Directive,  but  that  the  two  types  of  conservatism  are  related 
if  clean  surplus  accounting  is  used.  Even  when  there  are  no  specific  requirements 
from  either  an  International  Accounting  Standard  (now  termed  International 
Financial  Reporting  Standard)  or  interpretations  from  the  Standing  Interpretations 
Committee  (SIC),  management  should,  according  to  IAS  I-  Presentation  of 
Financial  Statements  (Revised  1997),  produce  financial  statements  that  include 
infonnation  that  is: 
24 
"...  (b)  reliable  in  that  they  [the  information]...  (iv)  are  prudent.  ...  "  (EC,  2003,  IAS  1,  para. 
20) 
To  sum  up  this  presentation  of  "official"  references:  the  concept  of  prudence 
or  conservatism  is  included  in  several  regulatory  statements,  albeit  not  in  a  consistent 
manner.  There  are  two  broad  groups  of  conservatism  that  are  apparent  from  these 
definitions.  Using  the  first  definition  based  on  the  statements  above,  a  firm  would  be 
considered  conservative  if  it  tended  to  show  assets  in  the  balance  sheet  at  lower 
rather  than  at  higher  valuations,  show  liabilities  at  higher  rather  than  at  lower 
valuations,  recognise  revenue  later  rather  than  sooner  and  recognise  expenses  sooner 
rather  than  later.  These  decisions  are  not  related  to  economic  news. 
24  International  accounting  standards  (with  the  exception  of  IAS  32  -  Financial  instruments: 
disclosure  and  presentation  and  IAS  39  -  Financial  instruments:  recognition  and  measurement)  were 
endorsed  by  the  European  Commission  on  the  29h  September  2003  in  Commission  Regulation  (EQ 
No.  1727/2003  (Official  Journal  of  the  European  Union,  2003)  in  accordance  with  an  earlier 
regulation  (EQ  1606/2002.  International  accounting  standards  are  now  termed  International  Financial 
Reporting  Standards. 
61 Giner  and  Rees  (2001)  present  the  case  of  a  zero  net  present  value  project 
that  is  expected  to  generate  profits  over  the  years  and  where'the  firm  has  to  make 
choices  regarding  the  recognition  of  these  profits.  The  firm  can  be  more  or  less 
conservative  (or  prudent)  in  this  recognition  of  profits.  However,  given  that  the 
project  is  a  zero  net  present  value  project,  there  is  no  change  in  market  value  of 
equity  that  is  precisely  the  proxy  that  Giner  and  Rees  (2001)  and  most  other 
conservatism  studies  cited  below  use  to  infer  the  arrival  of  and  the  effect  of 
economic  news.  Therefore,  by  definition,  the  conservatism  of  this  type  is  not  related 
to  economic  news.  Second,  there  is  reference  at  some  points  in  these  statements  that 
bad  economic  events  should  be  recognised  earlier  rather  than  later.  This  implies  that 
economic  events  trigger  decisions  related  to  this  second  type  of  conservatism. 
Therefore,  if  a  firm  recognises  a  bad  economic  event  sooner  rather  than  later,  it  is 
considered  to  be  more  conservative. 
-,  These  two  types  of  conservatism  are  connected  with  two  distinct  types 
of  theoretical  and  empirical  research  in  this  area.  Regarding  the  latter  type  of 
conservatism,  the  influential  empirical  paper  by  Basu.  (1997)  and  subsequent 
theoretical  work/explanation  of  his  results  by  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  as  well  as 
other  empirical  applications  (e.  g.,  Ball  and  Shivakumar,  2004;  Beekes,  Pope  and 
Young;  2003;  Giner  and  Rees,  2001;  Kothari,  2001;  Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin,  2000; 
Givoly  and  Hayn,  2000;  Basu,  Hwang  and  Jan,  2000)  define  accounting 
conservatism  in  terms  of  asymmetric  earnings  timeliness.  Earnings  timeliness  is  the 
degree  to  which  current-period  accounting  earnings  reflect  current-period  value- 
relevant  information  -  economic  income.  Economic  income  is  proxied  for  by  the 
changes  in  market  value  of  the  firm  (i.  e.,  returns,  usually  excluding  dividends). 
62 Positive  changes  in  the  market  value  of  the  firm  are  termed  "good  news"  and 
negative  (non-positive)  changes  in  market  value  are  termed  "bad  news".  Easton 
(1999)  denotes  this  definition  of  timeliness  as  the  timeliness  of  the  accounting 
summary  and  he  distinguishes  it  from  timeliness  of  accounting  information  that 
focuses  on  investors'  use  of  accounting  information  in  decision-making.  - 
:  Based  on  this  concept,  accounting  conservatism  is  then  defined  to  be  the 
degree  of  asymmetry  with  which  current-period  accounting  earnings  respond 
asymmetrically  to  good  and  bad  economic  news.  Stated  somewhat  differently, 
conservatism  requires  a  higher  degree  of  verification  to  recognise  good  economic 
news  than  to  recognise  bad  economic  news  in  financial  statements  or,  alternatively, 
the  probability  of  timely  recognition  of  bad  news  in  accounting  earnings  is  higher 
than  for  good  news  (Basu,  1997).  Similarly,  Holthausen  and  Watts'(2001)  define 
"conservatism  of  the  earnings  number"  as  a  form  of  conservatism  that  anticipates 
losses  but  not  gains  so  that  market  values  reflect  gains  earlier  than  accounting 
earnings,  while  losses  are  incorporated  contemporaneously  in  both  market  values 
and  accounting  earnings.  This  definition  also  rests  on  the  premise  of  asymmetric 
recognition  of  good  and  bad  news.  Also,  the  changes  in  the  market  value  of  equity 
and  accounting  income  are  viewed  as  two  distinct  measures  of  performance.  Kothari 
(2001)  adds  that  economic  losses  are  recognised  not  only  more  quickly,  but  also 
more  often.  At  the  extreme,  Watts  (2003)  defines  this  type  of  conservatism  as 
"the  degree  to  which  profits  are  not  anticipated.  "  (p.  10) 
This  type  of  conservatism  is  termed  differently  in  the  literature.  Some 
examples  are:  ex-post  conservatism  (indicating  that  economic  events  must  Occur 
63 first),  news-related  conservatism,  income  statement  conservatism  (a  consequence  of 
the  fact  that  the  primary  focus  of  existing  research  is  the  different  earnings  figures) 
(e.  g.,  Pope  and  Walker,  2003)  and  conditional  conservatism.  This  latter  term  is  due 
to  -Ball  and  Shivakumar  (2004)  and  Beaver  and  Ryan  (2004)  who  explicitly  define 
conservatism  as  the  asymmetric  reaction  to  good  and  bad  economic  news,  i.  e.,  a 
reaction  conditional  on  the  arrival  of  news.  Finally,  Pope  and  Walker  (2003)  indicate 
an  alternative  term  -  event-driven  conservatism.  Thus,  these  alternative  terms  stress 
the  asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings  relative  to  (conditional  on)  good  and  bad 
economic  news. 
The  other  type  of  conservatism  is  defined  in,  or  is  the  focus  of,  or  is  used  in 
papers  by  Pope  and  Walker  (2003),  Watts  (2003),  Penman  and  Zhang  (2002),  Zhang 
(2000),  Beaver  and  Ryan  (2004,2000),  Hayn  and  Givoly  (2000),  Myers  (1999), 
Dechow,  Hutton  and  Sloan  (1999),  Feltham  and  Ohlson  (1995,1996).  Following  the 
exposition  in  Pope  and  Walker  (2003),  accounting  is  conservative  if  the  applied 
accounting  depreciation  rate  is  higher  than  the  economic  rate  of  depreciation,  the 
economic  rate  of  depreciation  being  the  rate  at  which  operating  cash  flows  resulting 
from  investment  decay  through  time.  If  the  accounting  depreciation  rate  is  higher 
than  the  economic  rate  of  depreciation,  this  indicates  that  operating  cash  flows 
resulting  from  a  particular  asset  decay  less  quickly  (i.  e.,  they  are  more  persistent) 
than  the  accounting  process  records  the  decay  of  the  originating  operating  asset.  This 
results  in  the  market  value  of  shareholders'  equity  being  on  average  higher  than  the 
book  value  of  equity.  Equivalently,  unrecorded  goodwill  does  not,  on  average  (i.  e., 
over  sufficiently  lo  ng  periods  of  time),  equal  zero. 
64 This  kind  of  accounting  conservatism  is  not  related  to  economic  news.  On  a 
time-line,  it  is  applied  earlier  than  ex-post  conservatism  and  is  related  to  the  upfront 
choices  among  different  accounting  (asset-recognition)  methods  (Basu,  2001).  At  the 
time  the  firm  makes  an  investment  and  before  any  economic  event  affects  the  asset, 
the  finn: 
"...  pre-commits  the  firm  to  accounting  for  the  asset  on  the  basis  of  a  pessimistic  prognosis  of 
future  cash  flows  that  the  asset  is  expected  to  generate.  "  (Pope  and  Walker,  2003,  p.  2) 
- 
Only  later  may  (or,  indeed,  may  not)  economic  events  arise  and  their 
economic  effects  be  recognised  in  financial  statements  in  general  and  in  accounting 
earnings  and  components  in  particular.  Because  varying  degrees  of  conservatism  do 
not  depend  on  (are  not  conditional  on)  economic  news,  it  is  also  termed 
unconditional  conservatism  (Ball  and  Shivakumar,  2004;  Beaver  and  Ryan,  2004). 
Another  term  used  is  pervasive  conservatism  (e.  g.,  Giner  and  Rees,  2001). 
Different  assumptions  about  the  ability  of  an  asset  to  generate  future  cash 
flows  denote  varying  levels  of  ex-ante  conservatism.  Two  limiting  points  can  be 
identified.  On  the  one  side,  an  extremely  pessimistic  expectation  of  the  ability  of  the 
asset  to  generate  future  cash  flows  would  lead  the  firm  to  completely  expense  an 
investment  in  an  operating  asset  through  the  profit  and  loss  account,  rather  than 
capitalise  it.  25  The  amount  invested  would  thus  never  appear  on  the  balance  sheet. 
This  is  equivalent  to  applying  immediately  an  accounting  depreciation  rate  of  100%. 
This  also  implies  that  the  accounting  depreciation  charge  would  be  fully  transitory 
and  evolve  entirely  within  the  current  accounting  period.  Thus,  unless  the  asset  does 
"  Zhang  (2000)  notes  that  accounting  conservatism  relates  primarily  to  operating  assets,  and  less  (or 
not  at  all)  to  financial  assets,  following  Modigliani  and  Miller  (1961)  assumption  that  borrowing  and 
lending  are  zero  net  present  value  activities. 
65 not  generate  a  single  monetary  unit  of  cash  flows,  the  accounting  depreciation  rate 
would  exceed  the  economic  rate  of  depreciation.  Such  an  accounting  policy  is 
denoted  as  extremely  ex-ante  conservative  in  that  this  is  the  most  "pessimistic 
prognosis"  of  future  cash  flows  a  firm  can  make.  26  Nevertheless,  Zhang  (2000)  notes 
that  if  a  particular  investment  -  he  uses  the  example  of  R&D  -  does  in  fact  not 
produce  any  future  cash  flows,  the  accounting  policy  is,  in  that  particular  case, 
unbiased  and  not  conservative.  These  relations  must  thus  be  considered  on  average 
(asymptotically). 
On  the  other  side,  in  an  extremely  ex-ante  aggressive,  un-conservative  or 
imprudent,  as  termed  in  SFAC  No.  2  (FASB,  1980,  p.  37)  or  liberal  accounting 
system,  as  termed  in  Penman  (2003,  pp.  562-581),  the  firm  would  capitalise  an 
investment  on  the  balance  sheet  as  an  operating  asset  and  then,  at  the  extreme,  -  never 
depreciate  it  at  all.  In  less  extreme  versions,  the  accounting  depreciation  rate  would 
merely  not  exceed  the  rate  of  decay  of  operating  cash  flows  the  asset  is  expected  to 
generate  (i.  e.,  the  economic  rate  of  depreciation).  In  the  extreme  case,  the  investment 
would  always  be  shown  on  the  balance  sheet  as  an  asset  at  its  original  (historic  cost) 
value.  27  With  the  passage  of  time,  the  asset  would  be  economically  consumed  -  the 
sum  of  cash  flows  still  expected  to  be  generated  by  the  asset  would  diminish.  It  is 
likely  that  the  market  value  of  such  an  asset  would  tend  toward  zero  over  time  as  the 
asset  is  economically  depreciated  while  its  book  value  would  remain  unchanged  at 
26  It  is  assumed  firms  would  not  invest  in  projects  expected  to  generate  no  cash  inflows  but  that  would 
create  only  liabilities  for  the  firm.  The  term  "pessimistic  prognosir  is  due  to  Pope  and  Walker 
(2003). 
2'  The  literature  does  not  discuss  the  case  of  a  liberal  accounting  system  where,  in  addition  to  keeping 
the  assets  in  the  balance  sheet  at  historic  cost  with  upward  revaluations  would  be  allowed  or  even 
required. 
66 the  historic  cost  or  at  least  decrease  at  a  slower  rate  than  the  rate  of  decay  of  cash 
flows. 
Somewhat  differently,  Watts  (2003)  states  that  if  a  firm  is  ex-ante 
conservative,  asset  increases  (gains)  that  are  not  verifiable  are  not  recorded  in 
financial  statements,  while  decreases  of  a  similar  degree  of  verifiability  are.  This 
results  in  net  assets  being  "understated",  i.  e.,  recorded  in  financial  statements  at 
below  their  market  value  and  the  book-to-market  ratio  will  be  above  zero.  Penman 
and  Zhang  (2002)  define  accounting  to  be  conservative  if  firms  choose: 
"...  accounting  methods  that  keep  the  book  values  of  net  assets  relatively  low.  "  (p.  238) 
They  also  provide  a  few  typical  examples  of  (US)  conservative  practices:  LIFO 
rather  than  FIFO  inventory  valuation  method  in  circumstances  of  rising  inventory 
costs,  expensing  R&D  expenditures  instead  of  capitalising  them  in  the  balance  sheet 
and  amortise  them  later,  using  "too  short"  estimates  of  assets  lives  and 
overestimation  of  bad  debtors'  accounts,  warranty  liabilities  and  other. 
A  final  important  point  emphasised  in  Pope  and  Walker  (2003)  as  well  as 
Beaver  and  Ryan  (2004)  is  the  interaction  between  ex-ante  and  ex-post  accounting 
conservatism.  The  likelihood  of  observing  an  asymmetric  relation  of  earnings  to  the 
arrival  of  bad  news  decreases  with  increasing  levels  of  ex-ante  conservatism  applied 
to  investment  projects  in  a  firm.  At  the  extreme,  if  a  firm  has  already  written-off  the 
entire  amount  of  an  investment  at  the  time  the  investmentwas  made,  the  arrival  of 
bad  news  will  not  be  recognised  in  financial  statements,  given  that  there  is  no  asset 
recorded  in  the  balance  sheet  to  which  this  bad  news  relate.  Moving  away  from  the 
67 extreme,  the  more  un-recognised  assets  a  firm  has,  the  less  likely  it  is  to  observe 
asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings  with  respect  to  bad  news. 
2.5  CONCLUDXNG  REMARKS 
Early  studies  in  the  capital  market-based  accounting  research  have 
established  that  accounting  numbers  convey  value-relevant  information  to  investors 
regarding  the  present  value  of  future  cash  flows.  Share  prices  tend  to  move  in  the 
same  direction  as  the  unexpected  earnings  -  if  they  are  positive,  prices  increase 
(returns  are  positive)  and  if  they  are  negative  prices  decrease  (returns  are  negative). 
Moreover,  there  is  significant  volatility  price  and  trade  volume  in  days  surrounding 
the  earnings  announcements,  consistent  with  the  arrival  of  new  information. 
Importantly,  several  studies  have  also  shown  that  'changes  in  share  prices  are 
(incrementally)  associated  with  operating  cash  flow  'and  accruals  components  of 
earnings.  The  economic  nature  of  this  response  is  determined  by  factors  such  as 
persistence  of  accounting  numbers,  risk,  growth  and  general  level  of  interest  rates. 
Despite  strong  evidence  of  the  ability  of  accounting  figures  to  influence 
investors'  estimates  of  the  present  value  of  future  cash  flows,  the  empirical  estimates 
of  this  response  have  been  fount  too  small  and  only  explained  a  small  fraction  of  the 
variability  in  share  prices.  This  has  been  ascribed  to  prices  containing  a  richer 
information  set  than  accounting  numbers  (prices-lead-earning's  hypothesis),  earnings 
containing  a  value-irrelevant  component,  deficiency  of  accounting  measures  and 
existence  of  transitory  items.  Conservative  accounting  has  been  identified  as  a 
68 possible  source  of  transitory  items  in  earnings,  (and,  by  extension,  in  other 
accounting  measures,  too). 
The  existence  of  these  differences  between  market  and  accounting  values 
created  a  demand  for  econometric  model  that  would  be  able  to  account  for  these 
explanations.  In  particular,  this  has  to  the  development  of  the  "reverse"  regression, 
whereby  earnings  act  as  a  dependent,  rather  than  an  independent  variable,  thus 
forcing  the  errors-in-variables  into  the  error  term  rather  than  in  the  coefficient. 
Moreover,  there  has  been  a  need  to  control  the  results  for  scale,  as  the  relationship 
has  been  hypothesized  to  be  different  for  small  and  for  large  firms. 
Defining  the  term  of  conservative  accounting  is  also  not  a  clear-cut  problem. 
This  chapter  shows  that  there  are  two  different  types  of  conservatism:  the  ex-post 
conservatism,  where  economic  news  originate  first  and  their  effect  is  then  reflected 
in  accounting  earnings  (or,  in  principle,  any  other  accounting  measure),  and  the  ex- 
ante  conservatism,  whereby  a  firm  decides  up-front  on  the  degree  of  conservatism  in 
recognising  the  assets  in  the  balance  sheet.  The  literature  also  indicates  that  any 
model  of  the  link  between  market  values  and  financial  statements  would  have  to 
account  for  the  asymmetric  treatment  of  good  and  bad  news  in  financial  statements: 
bad  economic  news  are  recognised  more  often  and  in  large,  capitalised  amounts 
compared  to  good  economic  news,  which  are  only  recognised  when  they  are  (close 
to  being)  realised.  Existing  theoretical  models  of  this  asymmetric  relationship  are 
presented  in  the  next  chapter  together  with  their  extension,  limits,  interpretations  and 
the  main  research  hypotheses  studied  in  the  empirical  part  of  this  thesis. 
69 THEORETICAL  MODELS  OF  ACCOUNTING 
CONSERVATISM 
3.1  XNTRODUCTXON 
This  chapter  presents  the  main  theoretical  models  of  accounting 
conservatism.  There  are  two  principal  ways  in  which  the  effects  of  ex-post 
accounting  conservatism  can  be  modelled.  First,  the  effects  of  conservatism 
influence  the  time-series  properties  of  various  accounting  figures.  Therefore,  by 
properly  modelling  the  time-series  of  various  accounting  figures,  the  effect  of 
conservative  accounting  can  be  observed.  Second,  the  effects  of  conservatism  on 
financial  statements  can  be  observed  directly  by  using  the  Pope  and  Walker  (1999) 
model  where  the  original  dependent  variable  (accounting  earnings)  is  substituted 
with  operating  cash  flow,  various  earnings  and  various  accruals  measures.  These  two 
models  that  capture  the  accounting  conservatism  are  presented  first  in  the  chapter. 
Because  one  of  the  effects  of  conservative  accounting  is  to  extend  the 
recognition  of  good  news  over  a  number  of  accounting  periods,  an  extended,  version 
of  the  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  model  covering  any  number  of  periods  is  presented. 
This  generalisation,  while  retaining  the  same  basic  properties  as  the  basic  model,  is 
shown  separately.  An  alternative  interpretation  of  Pope  and  Walker's  (1999) 
theoretical  model  is  also  presented. 
The  decomposition  of  earnings  into  its  main  components  is  crucial.  in 
studying  the  effects  of  conservative  accounting  both  by  observing  the  time-series 
70 properties  of  these  components  and  in  using  them  directly  as  dependent  variables  in 
the  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  models  of  conservatism.  Moreover,  the  effects  of 
conservative  accounting  may  be  inferred  by  comparing  direct  tests  on  various 
accounting  measures  among  themselves.  28 
Ex-ante  conservatism  represents  a  limit  on  studying  the  effects  of  ex-post 
conservatism.  If  all  firms  were  ex-ante  extremely  conservative,  the  asymmetric 
timeliness  of  earnings  and  the  relevant  components  would  not  be  observed. 
Therefore,  the  ex-ante  conservatism  interacts  with  and  represents  a  limiting  factor  in 
this  study.  Accordingly,  the  main  conclusions  of  Pope  and  Walker's  (2003) 
modelling  of  this  type  of  accounting  conservatism  that  affect  this  study  is  presented 
in  a  separate  section. 
Giner  and  Rees  (2001)  model  the  effects  of  conservative  accounting 
originating  from  previous'  accounting  periods.  At  least  two  aspects  motivate  the 
inclusion  of  the  their  model  in  this  study.  First,  they  incorporate  lagged  earnings, 
which  had  been  subjected  to  conservative  accounting  practices  in  previous 
accounting  periods.  This  model  thus  represents  an  alternative  to  lagged  models  of 
conservatism  and  complements  other  results  in  the  study.  Second,  the  model 
differentiates  between  profit  and  loss  firms,  an  issue  that  is  explored  further  Chapter 
2'  This  would  represent  a  similar  interpretation  as  in  Basu  (1997)  and  Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin  (2000), 
where  the  role  of  accruals  is  inferred  indirectly  by  comparing  direct  tests  using  the  (operating)  cash 
flow  and  earnings  figures. 
71 4.  In  combining  the  two  motives,  the  difference  between  profit  and  loss  firms  may  be 
due  to  (past)  stock  of  conservative  accounting.  29 
The  chapter  concludes  with  the  formulation  of  hypotheses  to  be  tested  using 
the  models  of  conservatism,  their  extension  and  construction  of  variables. 
3.2  THE  PERSISTENCE  PROPERTY  OF  EARNINGS  AND 
EARNXNGS  COMPONENTS 
3.2.1  Persistence  of  generic  accounting  earnings 
Timeliness  of  accounting  earnings  can  be  defined  as  the  extent  to  which 
current  period  accounting  earnings  reflect  current  period  value-relevant  information 
(Beekes,  Pope  and  Young,  2003).  Under  conservative  (ex-post)  accounting,  bad 
economic  news  is  recognised  in  accounting  earnings  more  timely  than  good 
economic  news.  Increases  in  market  value  of  assets  (economic  gains)  are  typically 
not  recognised  fully  in  the  period  they  occur.  In  part,  current  period  increases  in 
market  value  are  included  in  future  periods'  earnings  as  the  underlying  events  that 
have  lead  to  these  gains  are  gradually  realised  or  at  least  when  they  can  be 
reasonably  verified  (Watts,  2003;  Basu,  1997).  This  implies  that  the  effects  of  gains 
tend  to  persist  e'repeat"  itself)  in  the  earnings  figure.  At  the  extreme  earnings 
permanently  increase  to  a  higher  level  as  a  result  of  a  current  period  gain. 
29  The  actual  differentiation  of  profit  and  loss  firms  is  not  presented  in  this  chapter,  but  in  Chapter  4  as 
part  of  empirical  analyses.  The  reason  for  this  is  that,  theoretically,  in  terms  of  conservative 
accounting  there  should  be  no  differences  between  the  two  groups  of  firms.  Moreover,  there  are  no 
existing  models  of  conservatism  that  would  allow  for  the  differences. 
72 On  the  other  hand,  decreases  in  market  value  (economic  losses)  should  be 
recognised  entirely  in  the  period  they  occur,  even  if  these  decreases  have  not  yet 
been  actually  realised.  In  other  words,  the  degree  of  verifiability  required  is  less  for 
the  recognition  of  economic  losses  than  for  the  recognition  of  economic  gains  in 
financial  statements.  Losses  tend  to  be  recognised  in  large,  complete  and  capitalised 
amounts  of  future  expected  cash  flow  decreases  rather  than  gradually  over  time.  The 
recognition  of  losses  in  earnings  leads  to  a  temporary  decrease  in  earnings  level  and 
a  reversal  in  the  subsequent  period  of  this  decrease  (Watts,  2003;  Basu,  1997). 
Econometrically,  these  two  differential  treatments  of  gains  and  losses  can'be 
modelled  on  a  continuum  defined  by  two  limiting  processes.  A  persistent  change  in  a 
time-series  of  earnings  levels,  denoted  as  y,  reflecting  gains  can  be  described  by  a 
random-walk  (R-NY)  process.  30  A  temporary  change  in  a  time-series  of  earnings 
levels  yj  reflecting  economic  losses  can  be  described  by  a  first-order  (ARM) 
autoregressive  process.  A  general  AR(l)  process  is  defined  as  (e.  g.,  DeFusco  et  al., 
2001,  pp.  498-500;  Greene,  2000,  pp.  530-533;  Johnston  and  DiNardo,  1997,  pp. 
207-209):  31 
bo  +  bly, 
-,  +  e,  (3-1) 
30  The  term  earnings  relates  to  generic  earnings  figures  and  does  not  relate  exclusively  to  any  of  the 
emprical  alternatives  used  in  this  study  nor  does  it  exclude  specifically  any  other  performance 
measure. 
31  Given  the  method  of  estimation  used  in  this  study  (i.  e.,  using  yearly  cross-sections),  this  section 
attempts  only  to  provide  a  theoretical  framework  for  the  empirical  model  used  in  several  sections 
within  Chapter  4  and  does  not  necessarily  imply  a  time-series  estimation. 
73 where  el  is  a  disturbance  term  with  the  following  properties:  E[e,  1=  0,  var(ei)=  cý  and 
cov(e,,  e,  )=  0  for  any  two  different  time  periods  t  and  s,  t#s.  The  series  yt  itself  has  the 
following  properties:  E[yt]=  bol(l-bi)=  g,  varLvtl=  o2l(l-b  2  1)  and  cov(ytys)=  0  if  t*s. 
To  derive  these  results,  the  assumption  that  Jbil<  is  necessary  or  the  series  would  be 
explosive.  The  mean,  variance  and  covariances  are  all  time-invariant  constants  and 
the  time  series  of  yt  is  weakly  stationary.  Such  a  series  will  tend  to  revert  to  its  mean 
g  and  fluctuations  around  this  mean  will  be  broadly  of  the  same  amplitude  (Gujarati, 
p.  798).  The  expected  mean-reversion  level  is  bol(l-bi)  (DeFusco  et  aL,  p.  487). 
At  the  other  end  of  the  continuum,  the  R-W  process  (generally  with  drift)  can 
be  viewed  as  a  special  case  of  the  AR(l)  process  in  (3-1)  where  bl=  I  (Johnston  and 
DiNardo,  p.  59): 
b,,  +  y,  -, 
(3-2) 
where  et  has  the  saine  properties  as  the  error  term  e  in  (3-  1).  However,  the  variable  yt 
itself  now  has  the  following  properties:  E[ytýo]=  bot+yo  and  var(ytý@=  ch.  The  mean 
and  variance  of  such  a  time-series  is  not  constant  through  time  and  the  variable  yj 
follows  a  non-stationary  stochastic  process.  In  time-series  estimations,  non- 
stationarity  may  result  in  a  rejection  of  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  relationship 
between  the  two  variables  even  when  they  are  in  reality  truly  independent  (Greene, 
2000,  p.  780;  Finger,  1994)  thus  causing  a  severe  error  in  inference.  32  Some  other 
32  In  this  study,  a  cross-sectional,  rather  than  a  time-series,  approach  is  generally  employed  to  make 
inferences  based  on  the  results  of  estimated  empirical  verisons  of  these  models  presented  below 
(Fama  and  MacBeth,  1973;  Fama  and  French,  2000;  also  see  bottom  of  section  4.2). 
74 more  advanced  processes,  including  the  exponentially-weighted  moving  average,  are 
presented  and  used  in  McLeay,  Kassab  and  Helan  (1997). 
In  this  study,  first  differences  Ayi=  yr-yi-i  will  be  employed  as  variables  rather 
than  the  levels  as  in  several  recent  studies  (e.  g.,  Basu,  1997,  in  additional  analyses). 
In  principle,  using  first  differences  rather  than  levels  solves  the  problem  of  non- 
stationarity  if  the  original  series  yt  is  non-stationary  in  time-series  estimations.  If  the 
underlying  series  y,  follows  an  AR(l)  process,  then  corr(Ayl,  Ayi-i)=  -0.5  and  if  it 
follows  an  R-W  process  corr(Ays,  Ayt-,  )=  0  (e.  g.,  Dechow,  Kothari  and  Watts,  1998; 
Lookabill,  1976;  Hagerman  and  Richmond,  1973;  Beaver,  1970). 
Generally,  to  distinguish  between  the  general  AR(l)-  process  and  an  R-W 
with-  drift  process  in  changes  in  any  variable  y,,  Ay,  ,  the  following  first-differences 
modification  of  the  model  in  equation  (3-1)  can  be  estimated: 
Ayt  ý  ir,  +  o7lAyt-I  +  ilt  (3-3) 
It  follows  from  the  introduction  to  this  section  that  this  model  likely  would  not  be  a 
complete  description  of  the  properties  of  an  earnings  variable.  Earnings  and  earnings 
changes  as  well  as  changes  in  other  variables  are  likely  to  be  a  mixture  of  both  the 
AR(l)  and  R-W  processes  (e.  g.,  Freeman,  OhIson  and  Penman,  1992;  also  see 
Bleaney  and  Mizen,  1995)  because  of  different  accounting  rules  that  relate  to  the 
treatment  of  economic  gains  and  economic  losses.  To  allow  for  the  asymmetric 
persistence  in  earnings-increases  and  earnings-decreases  within  the  same  regression 
75 model,  the  model  must  allow  for  both  an  AR(l)  and  a  general  R-W  processes  in 
changes  of  a  variable  Ayt.  The  following  model  could  be  employed: 
AYt  rl  +  7r2  Ct-I  +  r'7,  Ay, 
-, 
+  472Ct-lAyt-I  +  17t  (3-4) 
If  a  time-series  inAyt  follows  an  R-W  process  then  E[Ql=  0.33  if  a  time- 
series  in  Ayt  follows  a  mean-reverting  (AR)  process,  then  -0.50:  5E[ctý]<O.  An 
indicator  variable  Ct-I  is  employed  that  serves  to  differentiate  between  positive  and 
negative  changes  in  earnings  (yj):  Ct-,  =  11  if  Ayj:  50  and  0  otherwise).  The  parameter 
c92  captures  the  differential  persistence  of  negative  lagged  changes  Ays-I  and  the  total 
persistence  of  negative  lagged  changes  is  given  by  the  sum  of  the  two  slope 
coefficients  (co,  +cv-2).  Expected  values  of  parameters  r,  and  m  are  E[ml=  E[;  r2l=  0 
for  both  processes.  Elgers  and  Lo  (1994)  estimate  a  restricted  version  (;  r2=  at=  0)  of 
the  model  in  (3-4)  for  positive  and  negative  earnings  changes  separately  (i.  e.,  they 
estimate  (3-3)).  For  both  sub-samples,  the  two  estimated  ;r  parameters  corresponding 
here  to  ;  r2and  w2are  statistically  insignificantly  different  from  zero.  Finn  subscripts 
in  (3-4)  are  omitted  for  parsimony.  Also,  the  model  in  equation  (3-4)  can  be 
estimated,  provided  the  variables  are  properly  operationalised.  The  operationalisation 
has  to,  at  the  very  least,  resolve  econometric  issues  like  the  scale  effect  (see  section 
2.3.2). 
The  characterisation  of  the  processes  in  accounting  earnings  yj  presented 
alk 
, bove  are  of  a  general  nature  and  apply  to  any  variable,  accounting  or  otherwise. 
33  If  the  levels  model  such  as  the  model  in  equation  (3-2)  was  employed,  then  E[ah]=  I  (e.  g.,  Caird 
and  Emanuel,  198  1).  This  also  implies  that  the  best  forecast  of  next  period's  level  in  variable  yt+l  is 
the  current  period's  level  in  y, 
76 This  brings  at  least  two  important  benefits.  'First,  the  AR(l)  and  R-W  represent  two 
limiting  processes  of  a  continuum  (Beaver,  1970).  In  the  former,  innovations  el  in  the 
time  series  have  no  implications  for  the  values  of  yt  in  future  periods,  while  in  the 
latter  innovations  fully  determine  the  future  values  of  the  underlying  series  yj.  This 
latter  property  of  an  R-W  is  frequently  termed  the  "infinite  memory""of  an  R-W 
process  (e.  g.,  Gujarati,  2003,  p.  799).  Second,  given  that  these  characterizations  can 
be  extended  to  other  accounting  items,  they  can  be  used  to  form  limiting 
expectations  of  the  behaviour  of  these  items.  Thus,  the  change  in  an  accounting  item 
that  reflects  bad  news  is  expected  to  be  large,  more  eamings-reducing  and  more 
transitory  than  an  accounting  item  that  reflects  good  news  gradually  over  time  in 
small  increments  and  tends  to  be  more  permanent.  These  predictions  are  used  in 
empirical  parts  of  this  thesis. 
3.2.2  Persistence  of  the  main  earnings 
components 
On  a  generic  and  simplified  level,  accounting  earnings  (E)  can  be 
decomposed  into  (operating)  accruals  (A)  and  (operating)  cash  flows  (CF).  Given  the 
model  in  (3-4)  is  of  a  very  general  nature,  it  can  be  employed  to  study  time-series 
behaviour  of  these  components  as  well.  Regardless  of  the  difficulties  associated  with 
actual  definitions  of  these  variables,  some  existing  predictions  about  the  values  of 
the  parameters  in  (3-4)  are  the  following. 
Dechow,  Kothari  and  Watts  (1998)  construct  a  simplified  accounting  system 
starting  from  the  assumption  that  sales-levels  follow  an  R-W  process  as  described 
77 above  in  (3-2).  Modelling  the  operating  cash  flows,  major  components  of  working 
capital  accruals  (debtors,  stock  and  work  in  process  and  creditors)  and  earnings 
allows  them  to  make  predictions  about  the  time-series  properties  of  changes  in  these 
accounting  variables.  At  least  three  of  their  predictions  serve  as  initial  benchmarks  in 
the  empirical  counterpart  of  this  section  (see  section  4.4).  Under  certain  additional 
assumptions,  the  preliminary  expectations  are  as  follows  (Dechow,  Kothari  and 
Watts,  1998,  Table  1,  p.  143): 
-  corr(Mt,  AAt-,  )=  -0.500,  i.  e.,  (working  capital)  accruals  overall  are  expected  to 
fully  mean-revert  within  one  accounting  period;  34 
-  -0.500<corr(,  dCFt,,  dCFj-j)<O  and,  based  on  the  average  values  of  parameters  of 
this  correlation  in  their  paper,  it  is  predicted  to  be  corr(,  dCF,,  dCFt-l)=  -0.3  5  0.  It 
does  not  equal  to  -0.500  as  would  be  expected  if  cash  inflows  were  being 
followed  directly  by  cash  outflows  and  vice  versa.  Countering  this  process  is  the 
"profit-spread  effect"  -a  portion  of  current-period  shock  to  sales  will  be  realised 
in  cash  in  the  current  period  and  the  rest  in  future  period(s),  which  would  induce 
positiveserial  coffelation  in  successive  cash  flow  changes  -  high  cash  inflow  in 
the  current  period  implies  a  higher-than-Otherwise  cash  inflow  in  the  following 
period; 
for  completeness,  they  predict  that  corr(AEI,  AEI-,  )=  0,  i.  e.,  earnings  overall 
35  follow  a  random  walk  process. 
34  The  term  "working  capitar'  is  included  in  brackets  because  in  Dechow,  Kothari  and  Watts  (1998) 
these  are  the  only  type  of  accruals  allowed  in  the  model.  33  This  expecation  would  hold  under  ex-post  unbiased  accounting. 
78 Dechow,  Kothari  and  Watts  (1998)  do  not  model  the  (time-series)  behaviour 
of  other  types  of  accruals.  In  terms  of  operations  of  a  firm,  at  least  one  more  type  of 
the  accruals  component  of  earnings  is  important.  Barth,  Cram  and  Nelson  (2001), 
Sloan  (1996)  and  Dechow  (1994)  include  the  depreciation  and/or  amortisation 
expense  as  a  separate  variable  in  their  research,  but  do  not  discuss  explicitly  its 
properties.  Barth,  Cram  and  Nelson  (2001)  find  that  both  depreciation  and 
amortisation.  expenses  are  useful  in  predicting  future  cash  flows.  One  way  of 
interpreting  the  importance  of  the  depreciation  expense  is  that  it  represents  a  measure 
of  the  value  of  services  the  fixed  assets  provide  in  an  average  accounting  period 
given  the  current  stock  of  fixed  assets.  Therefore,  if  the  composition  of  fixed  assets 
does  not  change  over  time,  the  value  of  future  fixed  assets'  services  can  be  inferred 
from  the  current  depreciation  expense  (Chambers,  Jennings  and  Thompson  11,1999). 
In  addition,  Sloan  (1996)  reports  that  the  depreciation  charge  is  much  less  variable 
than  the  current  asset  accruals,  underscoring,  the  reliability  of  this  measure. 
Furthermore,  assuming  a  firm  with  no  net  growth  in  fixed  tangible  and  intangible 
assets,  where  all  investments  are  replacement  investments  financed  by  these  funds, 
then  the  expected  value  of  changes  in  depreciation  and  amortisation  charges  equal 
zero.  One-time  new  net  investment  or  disinvestment  opportunities  cause  one-time 
shifts  in  the  level  of  the  charge.  The  lagged  life  example  in  Basu  (1997)  also  means  a 
one-time  increase  in  the  level  of  depreciation  charge.  Therefore,  from  both  these 
statements,  a  time-series  of  changes  in  depreciation  and  amortisation  charge  is 
expected  to  follow  an  R-W  process.  0 
In  this  research,  several  empirical  measures  of  the  variables  discussed  in  the 
abbove  two  subsections  are  used.  Additional  (empirical)  expectations  are  formed  in 
79 the  empirical  part  as  well  as  certain  additional  explanations'of  observed  results. 
However,  the  concepts  presented  here  serve  as  useful  reference  points  to  empirical 
results  obtained  later  and  represent  part  of  the  theoretical  modelling  of  the  concepts 
presented  in  earlier  section  2.4. 
3.3  THE  POPE  AND  WALKER  (1999)  CONTEMPORANEOUS 
MODEL  OF  ACCOEWTXNG  CONSERVATXSM 
To  generate  the  theoretical  model  of  accounting  conservatism,  Pope  and 
36 
Walker  (1999)  assume  that  the  capital  markets  are  informationally  efficient.  Share 
prices  on  such  markets  reflect  the  expectations  of  market  participants  and  thus  of  all 
(publicly)  available  information.  On  such  markets  share  prices  follow  a  random  walk 
(R-W)  process.  Pennanent  earnings  xt  in  time  period  t  are  derived  from  the  current 
share  price  pt  by  reversing  the  discounting  process  that  assumes  constant  and  full 
(100%)  payouts  in  every  future  time  period:  x,  =  (Ilk)pl,  where  (Ilk)  is  the  cost  of 
equity  capital.  Hence,  dividends  equal  permanent  earnings.  Alternatively,  permanent 
earnings  equal  the  maximum  dividend  that  can  be  paid  out  of  the  firm  without 
lowering  the  market  value  of  equity  (Pope  and  Walker,  2003). 
If  share  prices  in  xj=  (Ilk)-pt  follow  a  R-W  process,  then  any  linear 
combination  of  that  R-W  process  also  follows  a  R-W  process  (e.  g.,  Ramakrishnan 
and  Thomas,  1992).  Permanent  earnings  x,  follow  a  random  walk  process: 
x,  =  xt-,  +et.  The  expected  value  at  time  t-I  of  next  period's  permanent  earnings  is 
36The  term  "informationally  efficient  markef'  is  distinct  from  an  allocationally  efficient  market 
(Pareto  efficient)  (Campbell,  Lo  and  MacKinlay,  1997,  p.  20). 
80 EI-1  [xj=  x1-1.  Permanent  earnings  x,  in  time  period  t  would  equal  permanent  earnings 
at  time  t-1,  except  for  the  random  shock  ej  to  permanent  earnings  during  the  time 
period  from  t-1  to  t.  The  random  shock  represents  the  effects  of  (or,  is  a 
consequence  of)  the  arrival  of  economic  news  on  the  market.  Economic  news  is 
information  that  affects  the  present  value  of  future  expected  cash  flows:  the  size  of 
future  expected  cash  flows  and/or  the  distribution  of  these  cash  flows  in  time  and/or 
the  riskiness  of  these  cash  flows.  37  By  definition  of  news,  E[el]=  0.  If  the  shock  to 
permanent  earnings  is  positive,  then  the  economic  news  is  assumed  to  be  good,  i.  e., 
the  expected  size  of  future  cash  flows  has  increased  and/or  the  cash  flows  are 
expected  to  occur  earlier  and/or  the  riskiness  of  these  cash  flows  has  decreased.  If 
the  shock  to  permanent  earnings  is  negative,  the  economic  news  is  assumed  to  be 
bad,  i.  e.,  the  expected  size  of  future  cash  flows  has  decreased  and/or  the  cash  flows 
are  expected  to  occur  later  in  time  and/or  the  riskiness  of  these  cash  flows  has 
increased. 
Reported  earnings  Xt  are  assumed  to  differ  from  permanent  earnings  x,  due  to 
two  and  only  two  factors: 
1.  the  effects  of  conservative  accounting  in  the  current  period  t,  allowing  for 
differences  in  good  news  (et>O  or  e,  *  =max[O,  e,  ])  and  bad  news  (et:  50  or 
e,  =  min[e,,  01); 
2.  the  cumulative  effects  of  past  conservative  accounting 
V,  =  V,  Vr  H)  ,  where  H  denotes  the  maximum  length  of  lagged 
3'  This  assumes  that  the  risk  adjustment  is  passed  into  the  relation  via  the  required  rate  of  return  in  the 
denominator.  Feltham  and  OhIson  (1999)  adjust  the  expected  cash  flows  for  risk  (i.  e.,  they  adjust  the 
nominator)  and  discount  these  adjusted  cash  flows  at  the  risk-free  rate  of  return. 
81 time  period  from  which  economic  news  still  flows  through  to  current  period's 
earnings  (financial  statements). 
The  reported  or  accounting  earnings  can  thus  be  defined  as  in  the  following 
equation: 
x,  + 
[-  0,,  e,  "  +  y,,  e,  -  ]  (3-5) 
where  the  parameter  6b  captures  the  under-recognition  of  contemporaneous  good 
news  in  current  period  t  and  parameter  ;t  captures  the  over-recognition  of 
contemporaneous  bad  news  in  current  period  t.  k  is  the  earnings  multiple  and  (Ilk)  is 
the  cost  of  equity  capital.  In  this  model,  there  are  no  other  deviations  of  reported 
earnings  m  permanent  earnings. 
In  a  neutral  (unbiased)  and  perfectly  timely  accounting  system  (GAAP 
regime),  a  random  shock  in  the  current  period  that  caused  permanent  earnings  to 
depart  from  previous  period's  permanent  earnings  xi-I  would  be  fully  impounded 
into  current  reported  earnings  X,.  Assuming  the  accounting  regime  has  not  changed 
at  any  point  in  time  the  firm  was  operating,  the  ten'n  that,  captures  the  cumulative 
effect  of  past  conservative  accounting  would  also  be  Vi=  0.  Reported  earnings  would 
then  equal  permanent  earnings  Xj=  xs  at  any  time  period  t.  If  an  accounting  system  is 
conservative,  however,  then  a  positive  shock  to  pennanent  earnings  is  not  fully 
incorporated  in  current  reported  earnings  -  i.  e.,  reported  earnings  are  lower  than 
permanent  earnings.  Accounting  rules  prevent  the  incorporation  of  these  shocks  until 
they  are  realised.  Permanent  earnings  must  thus  be  reduced  by  the  part  of  the  random 
82 shock,  -Ooe,,  that  does  not  yet  meet  the  criteria  for  recognition.  The  part  that  is 
recognised  in  current  reported  earnings  equals  (1-0o)e,  ' 
-  Negative  shocks  to 
peimanent  earnings  in  a  conservative  accounting  system  should  be  at  least,  fully 
(A=  0)  and  possibly  over-recognised  (;  t>O)  in  current  period  reported  earnings. 
Generally,  a  negative  random  shock  is  incorporated  in  current  period  earnings  with  a 
multiple  (I+A)'2:  1.  Previous  period  permanent  earnings  xj-1  are  reduced  by  a  multiple 
of  the  contemporaneous  random  shock  (I+A)e,  -:  50  to  arrive  at  the  current  period 
reported  earnings  Xt.  Current  period  reported  earnings  are  lower  than  or  (at  most) 
equal  to  permanent  earnings  in  the  same  period  Xt:!  ý  xt. 
The  term  V,  captures  cumulatively  the  yet-unrecognised  proportions  of  past 
positive  random  shocks  to  permanent  earnings  e,  *-,;  Vr=l  ...  H  and  possible 
reversals  of  over-recognised  proportions  of  past  negative  random  shocks  to 
permanent  earnings  e,  --,;  Vr=I...  H.  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  assume,  reasonably, 
that  cov(ej,  ej)=O  Vij  =0...  H.  By  definition,  the  shocks  (news)  et  in  every  time  period 
is  random  and  as  such  uncorrelated  across  different  time  periods,  earlier  or  later,  If 
the  assumption  cov(ej,  ej)=  0  Vij  did  not  hold,  past  values  of  shocks  could  be  used  to 
predict  current  shocks  and  thus  partially  the  values  of  earnings  xt  (Beaver,  1970).  In 
other  words,  part  of  the  current-period  change  in  permanent  earnings  would  not  be 
due  to  current-period  news. 
To  arrive  at  an  empirical  version  of  the  model,  equation  (3-5)  is  deflated  by 
lagged  market  price  ps-1: 
83 Xt 
= 
xt  y,,  -  et-  v 
+++  (3-6) 
I- 
PI-I  pt-I  pl-I  ps-I  pt-I 
Defining  Ri=  (P-Pt-i)lPt-1,  noting  that  the  definition  of  permanent  earnings 
and  the  random  walk  assumption  about  permanent  earnings  imply  the  following 
relation  (shown  in  deflated  fonn): 
e, 
=,  .(P,  -, 
) 
(3-7) 
pl-I  k  p,  -, 
and  expanding  equation  (3-6)  yields: 
x11v  t=+  (-O(,.  max[O,  R,  ]+yo-min[R,,  O]+R,  )+  1  (3-8) 
pt-I  kk  pt-I 
The  model  in  equation  (3-8)  can  be  empirically  estimated  via  a  dummy 
variable  Dt  defined  as  Di=  (I  if  Rj:  S  0  and  0  otherwise)  that  allows  the  asymmetric 
response  of  contemporaneous  reported  earnings  to  good  and  bad  news: 
xt  1  1-00  +.  Rt  +  ro  +  00 
-  R,  D,  + 
Vt  (3-9) 
kkk  Pt-I 
Simplifying  the  annotation,  (3-9)  reduces  to  the  following  model: 
Xt 
=al+a2D,  +AR,  +  yRD,  +  (3-10) 
PI-I 
84 The  coefficient  A=  (1-0o)lk  captures  the  proportion  of  current-period  good 
economic  news  captured  by  current-period  accounting  earnings  Xt.  Under 
conservative  accounting  that  delays  the  recognition  of  good  news,  this  coefficient  is 
expected  to  be  less  than  the  cost  of  equity  capital  (1'-Oo)lk  <  (Ilk).  The  incremental 
coefficient  Yi=  (Yo+Oo)/k  captures  the  incremental  proportion  of  current-period  bad 
economic  news  captured  by  current  period  accounting  earnings.  Under  conservative 
accounting,  the  incremental  yj  coefficient  is  expected  to  be  greater  than  0.  The 
magnitude  of  the  incremental  ij  coefficient  represents  a  primary  indicator  of 
asymmetric  timeliness  in  deflated  earnings  (XilPt.  1)  and  thus  of  ex-post  accounting 
conservatism. 
The  term  Vilp,  j  is  a  function  of  past  shocks  to  permanent  earnings, 
themselves  by  definition  random.  Therefore,  it  is  unlikely  that  they  will  be  correlated 
with  current  period's  news  ct  effect  on  current  earnings.  The  term  is  assumed  to  be  a 
part  of  the  regression  constant  ao  in  any  regression  analysis  employing  equation 
(3-9).  The  coefficient  al  is  expected  not  to  differ  significantly  from  zero. 
The  model  in  equation  (3-10)  can  be,  in  principle,  empirically  estimated,  as 
soon  as  the  returns  Rt  and  the  indicator  Dt  variables  are  operationalised.  There  are 
several  ways  in  which  this  operationalisation  can  be  done.  A  detailed  explanation  of 
the  method  used  in  this  thesis  is  presented  below  in  section  4.2.  Regarding  the  form 
of  the  model  and  the  form  of  the  independent  variable,  note  that  the  model  is  a 
levels-model  (Kothari  and  Zimmerman,  1995)  and  several  studies  conclude  that  the 
appropriate  deflator  is  the  lagged  market  value  (e.  g.  Christie,  1987,  Easton,  1999  and 
others).  In  the  models  used  in  this  study  and  regardless  of  the  definition  of  Rt  (i.  e., 
85 cum-  or  ex-dividend),  lagged  market  value  (P,.,  )  appears  in  the  models  as  a  deflator 
and  thus  mitigates  the  scale  problem. 
For  completeness  of  the  presentation  of  the  Pope  and  Walker  (1999) 
contemporaneous  model,  note  that  an  aggressive  accounting  system  might  also  be 
characterised  by  an  immediate  and  full  recognition  or  even  over-recognition  of 
current  period  good  news  in  accounting  earnings  such  that  (1-66)lk  exceeds  the  cost 
of  equity  (1-66)lk  ý--  (Ilk)  and/or  under-recognition  of  contemporaneous  bad  news 
such  that  (I+A)lk  <  (Ilk).  The  properties  of  aggressive  or  liberal  accounting  are 
discussed  briefly  in  Penman  (2001,  pp.  561-562)  and,  for  example,  as  early  as  in 
Bernstein  and  Siegel  (1979),  but  the  empirical  research  is  scarce  in  this  area.  The 
issue  is  not  explored  further  theoretically  or  empirically  in  this  study. 
3.4  LAGGED  MODEL  OF  ACCOETNTXNG  CONSERVATXSM 
There  are  at  least  two  reasons  that  motivate  the  development  of  the  lagged 
version  of  the  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  model  of  accounting  conservatism  in 
equations  (3-8)  and  (3-9)  above.  First,  extending  the  model  with  lagged  news  can  be 
used  to  study  the  speed  with  which  previous  periods'  economic  news  flow  through  to 
reported  earnings  (or  any  other  accounting  variable  that  may  serve  as  a  proxy  for 
permanent  earnings).  Second,  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  assume  in  the  derivation  of 
the  contemporaneous  model  that  cov(ej,  ei)=  0  Vij  =0...  H,  i.  e.,  they  assume  that 
news  is  uncorrelated  across  past,  present  or  future  time  periods.  This  assumption  is 
reasonable,  since  news  from  different  time  periods  cannot  be  correlated  across  time 
86 by  definition.  However,  extending  the  contemporaneous  model  by  incorporating  the 
current  period  accounting  effects  of  economic  news  originating  from  previous 
periods  might  help  to  control  for  any  effects  that  might  arise  should,  for  any  reason, 
the  correlations  cov(ej,  ei)=  0  Vij  =0...  H  not  all  be  equal  to  zero  at  any  point  in  time. 
If  this  were  the  case,  the  correlated  omitted  variable  problem  in  (3-8)  would  arise, 
attenuating  the  coefficients  on  all  variables  included  in  the  model. 
The  theoretical  model  in  equation  (3-6)  can  be  expanded  by  any  number  H  of 
time  periods  for  which  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  that  economic  news  originating 
from  those  periods  will  affect  the  contemporaneous  reported  earnings.  The  time 
period  therefore  spans  the  interval  Q,  t-H)  as  follows: 
H-1  H-1 
(1-0,  ).  e+,  +E(I+y￿)  -  e- 
T-o  T.  0 
(3-11) 
Defining  further  a  series  of  price-relative  variables  Qj_,.  j_r_i=  (Pt-r-pt-r-01A-u 
where  r--  0,...,  (H-1),  that  separate  good  and  bad  news  in  different  time  periods,  and 
then  substituting  these  definitions  into  (3-11),  expanding  and  rearranging  yields  the 
following  lagged  model: 
xt  I 
p,  -,, 
k 
I  (H-I(,  H-1 
-0  r.  max1o,  D+  min[Q,  -,,,  -,  -,  90D  +I+ 
(3-12) 
k 
T-0  r-O  r.  0 
+ 
Vt 
PI-H 
87 Empirically,  the  model  in  equation  (3-12)  can  be  estimated  via  a  set  of 
't 
dummy  variables  Dl-,.  t-,  l  defined  as  Dt-, 
_,,  =  (I  if  (p  t-,,  -pt-,,  ):  50  and  0  otherwise) 
that  allow  for  the  asymmetric  recognition  of  good  and  bad  news  in  each  time  period 
(t--r,  1--r-1)  where  r--  0,...,  (H-1): 
xt 
=1+ 
H-1  1-  o￿  H-1  y  -0 
-v 
(3-13)  1-,  Qt-T,  t-t-,  +1f'ý"--+  Pt-H  k 
r-o  k 
T-o  k 
Pt-H 
The  coefficients  (1-0,  )Ik  show  the  proportion  of  period  Q-r,  t--r-1)  good 
economic  news  captured  by  current  period  accounting  earnings  Xt.  Under 
conservative  accounting,  these  coefficients  are  expected  to  be  less  than  the  cost  of 
equity  capital  (1-0,  )Ik<(Ilk).  The  effect  of  good  economic  news  from  periods  farther 
back  in  time  is  more  likely  to  be  already  captured  by  accounting  earnings.  Therefore, 
the  coefficients  (1-0,  )Ik  are  expected  to  monotonically  increase  until  the  full  effect 
recognised  by  the  capital  market  in  the  past  is  incorporated  in  accounting  earnings. 
Under  the  assumptions  of  the  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  model,  this  implies  that  the 
total  good  news  coefficients  have  to  approach  the  cost  of  equity  capital  Ilk  as  the  lag 
is  increased  further  back  in  time.  The  total  coefficients  (I+y,  )Ik  capture  the  multiples 
of  (t-r,  t-r-1)  period  bad  economic  news  captured  by  current  period  accounting 
earnings.  Under  conservative  accounting,  only  the  first  coefficient  (1+;  t)lk  is 
expected  to  be  greater  than  or  equal  to  the  cost  of  equity  (I+A)lk>-(Ilk).  The 
conservatism  property  of  accounting  earnings  implies  that  bad  economic  news 
should  have  been  immediately  incorporated  in  accounting  earnings  in  the  period  it 
has  occurred.  There  sho  I 
uld  not  be  any  incremental  relation  between  current 
accounting  earnings  and  past  economic  news  and  the  incremental  coefficients  should 
88 all  equal  zero  as  a  consequence  of  the  fact  that  everything  the  market  has  anticipated 
should  already  have  been  incorporated  in  accounting  earnings  as  well. 
Assuming  prices  lead  earnings  by  up  to  three  periods  (e.  g.,  Donnelly  and 
Walker,  1995),  allowing  a  further  lag  so  that  H=  4  and  simplifying  the  annotation  in 
(3-13),  the  model  reduces  to: 
33  Xt 
=a,  +a2D, 
-,,,  -,  -, 
+  1)6r+,  Q, 
-rj-r-l  +  2ý;  +  e,  (3-14) 
PI-4 
r-O  r.  0 
In  the  case  of  reported  accounting  earnings,  the  coefficients  on  good  news  are 
expected  to  increase  monotonically  towards  the  cost  of  equity  capital 
j8j<fl2<fl3<, 
84<-<(l/k),  the  incremental  coefficient  on  current  period  bad  news  ýj  is 
expected  to  be  greater  than  0,  and  the  lagged  coefficients  on  bad  news  are  all 
expected  to  equal  zero  ;  t=7t=y4=  0,  given  that  under  conservative  accounting  bad 
news  is  expected  to  be  impounded  immediately  in  accounting  earnings.  The  term 
Vt1p, 
-4 
is  a  function  of  past  shocks  to  permanent  earnings  resulting  from  periods  prior 
to  (t-3,  t-4).  It  is  unlikely  that  they  will  be  correlated  with  current  period's  news  r, 
effect  on  current  earnings.  The  term  is  assumed  to  be  a  part  of  the  regression 
constant  a,.  The  coefficient  q2  is  expected  not  to  differ  significantly  from  zero  -  if 
equations  (3-13)  and  (3-14)  are  compared,  it  can  be  seen  that  the  term  does  not 
follow  frorn'the  theoretical  derivations,  but  is  included  in  practice  to  avoid  potential 
correlated  omitted  variables  problem  and  the  resulting  biases.  As  with  the 
contemporaneous  versions,  the  model  in  equation  (3-14)  could  be,  in  principle, 
89 empirically  estimated,  provided  retums  and  the  dummy  variables  Dt-,,  t-,  l  are 
operationalised. 
3.5  BALL,  KOTHARX  AND  ROBIN  (2000) 
XNTERPRETATXON  OF  BASU  (1997) 
Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin  (2000,2000b)  note  three  contemporaneous 
properties  of  accounting  earnings.  First,  the  recognition  principle  causes  economic 
income  to  be  incorporated  in  accounting  earnings  with  a  lag,  generally  close  to  the 
point  when  actual  cash  flows  are  realised.  This  property  implies  that  accounting 
earnings  are  a  weighted  average  of  past  economic  earnings.  The  second  property  is 
that  accruals  are  constructed  so  that  they  remove  the  negative  serial  correlation  in 
operating  cash  flows,  i.  e.,  they  smooth  the  time-series  of  operating  cash  flows 
through  time.  Third,  while  the  recognition  principle  generally  causes  economic  gains 
to  be  incorporated  in  accounting  earnings  at  points  close  to  cash  flow  realisations, 
expectations  about  lower  future  cash  flows  lead  to  some  economic  income  to  be 
incorporated  in  accounting  earnings  immediately  rather  than  when  these  (lower)  cash 
flows  are  realised.  This  is  a  consequence  of  the  conservatism  property  of  accounting 
eamings. 
Based  on  these  properties,  they  define  accounting  earnings  X1,  of  firm  i  in 
period  t  as  a  function  of  current  period  economic  income  AVj,  and  a  "disturbance" 
tenn  qij: 
90 Xit  =9  (A  Vit,  17it)  (3-15) 
The  difference  (the  "disturbance)  Uft  =A  Vil-I 
0& 
Vit-2  AV,, 
-3,...,  a,,  between 
current  period  accounting  earnings  and  current  period  economic  earnings  is  due, 
first,  to  the  effects  of  the  recognition  principle  being  applied  on  previous  periods' 
economic  earnings  AVil-1,  dVit-2,  ...  '  and,  as  in  Pope  and  Walker  (1999), 
cov(AVit-,,  AVj, 
-,  n)=  0  for  all  m;  &n  and  m,  n  >1.  Rules  regarding  the  recognition 
prevent  the  full  amount  of  economic  income  being  immediately  incorporated  in 
accounting  earnings.  The  second  part  of  the  difference  between  accounting  and 
economic  earnings  is  due  to  imperfect  removal  of  negative  serial  correlation  from  the 
time-series  of  operating  cash  flows,  ail. 
Empirically,  the  measure  of  economic  income  employed  by  Ball,  Kothari  and 
Robin  (2000)  follows  the  Hicksian  theoretical  definition  of  economic  income.  38 
Economic  income  is  defined  as  the  cum-dividend  fiscal-year  return,  adjusted  for 
capital  splits  and  capital  contributions.  By  allowing  for  the  difference  between 
positive  and  negative  returns  (economic  income)  via  a  dummy  variable,  they 
incorporate  the  third  contemporaneous  property  of  accounting  earnings  -  the 
accounting  conservatism  in  their  model.  This  yields  the  same  empirical  model  as  in 
Pope  and  Walker  (1999),  shown  in  equation  (3-10)  in  section  3.3  above.  Although 
Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin  (2000)  do  not  provide  explicitly  a  theoretical  structure  of 
these  coefficients,  the  empirical  interpretation  of  the  expected  values  of  the 
coefficients  is  the  same  as  in  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  model. 
38  An  early  discussion  regarding  different  concepts  of  income  in  accounting  is  Bangs  (1940). 
91 There  are  at  least  two  other  important  points  to  note.  First,  Ball,  Kothari  and 
Robin  (2000),  view  operating  cash  flows  as  an  alternative  measure  of  firm 
performance.  This  measure  is  less  timely  and  noisier  than  accounting  earnings  itself 
It  is  less  timely  because  operating  cash  flows  do  not  anticipate  (contain,  incorporate) 
any  cash  flows  before  they  occur.  The  anticipation  of  some  of  the  cash  flows  is  a 
feature  of  accounting  earnings  attributable  to  accruals.  Operating  cash  flow  is  a 
noisier  measure  of  performance  because,  absent  any  accruals,  the  disturbance  term 
i7j,  in  equation  (3-15)  above  would  be  relatively  high  due  to  the  component  all.  This 
component  is  higher  when  less  negative  serial  correlation  is  being  removed  from  the 
performance  number  (e.  g.,  the  operating  cash  flow).  The  view  that  operating  cash 
flows  are  a  less  timely  and  noisier  measure  of  performance  is  consistent  with  studies 
as  early  as  Ball  and  Brown  (1968)  who  re-estimate  their  basic  set  of  results  using  an 
approximation  of  the  operating  cash  flow  figure  and  conclude  that  this  measure  is 
not  as  successful  as  the  (bottom-line)  net  income  in  predicting  the  signs  of 
unexpected  returns.  Beaver  and  Dukes  (1972)  is  an  example  of  an  early  study  that 
finds  the  cash  flow  figure  to  be  less  associated  with  returns  than  earnings.  Finger 
(1994,  p.  210)  also  takes  a  consistent  view  that  operating  cash  flows  and  earnings 
represent  two  "future  benefits  of  equity  investment",  i.  e.,  that  both  figures  represent 
a  measure  of  (future)  performance. 
These  observations  are  important  to  the  research  in  this  thesis  in  that  to  study 
the  impact  of  accounting  conservatism  on  the  relationship  between  permanent 
earnings  and  accounting  earnings,  different  proxies  for  permanent  earnings  may  be 
employed.  Basu  (1997)  has  in  fact  used  this  approach  to  indirectly  observe  the 
effects  of  conservatism  on  the  link  between  market  values  and  financial  statements 
92 by  comparing  the  coefficients  resulting  from  the  estimation  of  different  earnings  and 
operating  cash  flows  regressions.  The  difference  is  ascribed  to  the  accruals 
component  of  earnings. 
Second,  given  the  structure  of  the  disturbance  term  i7it  in  equation  (3-15) 
above,  the  model  explicitly  shows  the  underlying  logic  of  incorporating  lagged 
periods'  economic  news  to  determine  current  period  accounting  earnings  -  that  is  to 
model  the  effects  of  recognition  rules  applied  in  previous  accounting  periods. 
3.6  THE  EFFECT  OF  ASSET  RECOGNXTXON  RULES 
As  presented  in  section  2.4  above,  the  effects  of  asset  recognition  rules  on  the 
link  between  financial  statements  and  market  values  is  the  subject  of  several  papers, 
among  them  in  Pope  and  Walker  (2003),  Watts  (2003),  Zhang  (2000),  Beaver  and 
Ryan  (2000),  Hayn  and  Givoly  (2000),  Ahmed,  Morton  and  Schaefer  (2000)  Myers 
(1999),  Dechow,  Hutton  and  Sloan  (1999),  Feltharn  and  Ohlson  (1995,1996).  In 
variants,  ese  papers  define  a  firm  to  be  ex-ante  conservative  if  the  applied 
accounting  depreciation  rate  is  higher  than  the  economic  rate  of  depreciation.  This 
results  in  market  value  of  shareholders'  equity  being  on  average  higher  than  the  book 
value  of  equity.  Therefore,  one  possible  measure  of  the  level  of  ex-ante  conservatism 
is  the  book-to-market  ratio. 
93 Pope  and  Walker  (2003)  provide  a  framework  using  a  downward  revaluation 
charge  in  which  they  relate  this  ex-ante  form  of  conservatism  with  the  ex-post 
conservatism.  In  their  Proposition  I  they  state  that: 
"Given  the  assumptions  of  the  Feltharn  and  OhIson  (1996)  model,  and  assuming  all  the 
parameters  except  8  are  constant  the  difference  between  market  value  and  book  value  is 
strictly  negatively  related  to  the  accounting  parameter  A"  (p.  6) 
The  level  of  ex-ante  conservatism  is  determined  by  the  accounting  policy 
parameter  15  such  that  (1-6)  is  the  accounting  rate  of  depreciation.  The  higher  the 
accounting  rate  of  depreciation,  the  higher  the  proportion  of  the  initial  investment 
that  is  treated  as  an  expense  instead  ofbeing  capitalised  as  an  asset,  and  the  lower  is 
the  probability  that  the  book  value  will  exceed  market  value.  Typically,  this  would, 
in  turn,  trigger  a  downward  revaluation  charge  in  the  full,  capitalised  amount  through 
income.  These  requirements  are  part  of  national  and  international  standards.  For 
example,  FRS  II-  Impaiment  offixed  Assets  and  Goodwill  deals  with  this  issue  in 
the  UK  and  generally  the  International  accounting  standard  IAS  36  -  Impairment  of 
assets  (European  Commission,  2003). 
Typically,  the  converse  will  not  apply  -  if  market  value  exceeds  book  value 
the  difference  will  increase  reserves  and  will  not  be  treated  as  income  until 
realised  . 
39Therefore,  the  probability  of  observing  an  asymmetric  relation  between 
accounting  income  and  market  values  decreases  with  the  depreciation  rate  (1-6) 
(Pope  and  Walker,  2003).  In  other  words,  the  more  ex-ante  conservative  the  firm  is, 
39  Some  of  the  different  issues  regarding  the  revaluation  of  fixed  assets  are  presented  in  Easton,  Eddey 
and  Harris  (1993);  Ghicas,  Hevas  and  Papadaki  (1996);  Barth  and  Clinch  (1998),  Cotter  (1999),  Lin 
and  Peasnell  (2000)  among  others. 
94 the  smaller  the  probability  of  observing  an  asymmetric  relationship  between  earnings 
and  retums. 
In  this  research,  the  intuition  presented  above  is  further  extended.  First, 
accounting  earnings  are  decomposed  into  its  operating  cash  flows  and  accruals 
components.  The  book-to-market  ratio  should  reflect  the  on-average  ex-ante 
conservative  accounting  policy  for  all  operating  assets.  However,  the  ex-ante 
conservative  policy  might  be  applied  differently  to  different  classes  of  assets  such 
that  there  would  be  a  class  of  accounting  depreciation  (1-b)  parameters,  one  for  each 
different  type  of  operating  assets,  based  on  differential  expectations  about  future 
cash  flows  resulting  from  investments  in  these  assets.  Therefore,  the  many  different 
downward  revaluation  charges  (irrespective  of  their  actual  accounting  forni)  are 
correlated  to  the  type  of  asset  they  originate  from:  the  more  ex-ante  conservative  the 
firm  is  regarding  a  particular  asset,  the  smaller  the  amount  of  this  particular  asset  on 
the  balance  sheet  and  the  smaller  the  probability  of  observing  an  asymmetric 
relationship  between  the  accruals  originating  from  this  particular  asset  and  returns. 
The  term  "accruals"  is  used  here  explicitly  to  stress  that  downward  asset  revaluations 
relate  only  to  the  accruals  component  of  earnings.  Any  such  revaluation  is  due  in 
large  part  to  accounting  rules,  not  to  realised  cash  flows,  so  it  must  be  reflected  in 
earnings  via  accruals. 
95 3.7  THE  DECOMPOSXTXON  OF  EARNXNGS 
In  this  study,  current  period  accounting  earnings  X,  is  decomposed  in  a 
number  of  different  accounting  flow  variables.  Conceptually,  and  also  by  the  way  it 
is  constructed,  it  is  possible  to  divide  accounting  earnings  in  its  two  main  constituent 
parts:  (operating)  cash  flows  and  accruals  . 
40  The  relative  scarceness  of  clear 
guidelines,  either  theoretical  or  empirical,  as  to  the  precise  way  of  this 
decomposition,  following  conceptual  decomposition  is  proposed: 
EARNINGS  CASH  FLOWS  +  ACCRUALS 
OPERATING  CASH  FLOWS  +  WORKING  CAPITAL  ACCRUALS 
DEPRECIATION  AND  AMORTISATION  +  SPECIAL  ITEMS 
(OTHER  CASH  FLOWS  +  OTHER  ACCRUALS) 
The  motivation  to  decompose  accounting  earnings  into  its  main  components 
stems  from  at  least  three  sources.  First,  accounting  conservatism  is  an  accruals, 
rather  than  a  purely  earnings  or  even  a  cash  flow  phenomenon.  Accruals  are 
essentially  all  adjustments  to  operating  cash  flows  to  arrive  at  the  earnings  figure 
(Barth,  Cram  and  Nelson,  2001).  Therefore,  the  effects  of  accounting  conservatism 
should  be  most  apparent  in  analyses  where  accounting  measures  containing  more 
accruals  are  used  as  dependent  variables,  whether  different  types  of  earnings  or 
otherwise.  This  compares  with  measures  containing  little  or  no  accruals  (e.  g., 
operating  cash  flows).  Basu  (1997)  and  Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin  (2000)  employ  both 
operating  cash  flow  and  earnings  variables  to  analyse  the  effects  of  conservatism.  By 
40  The  term  "earnings  component"  is  used  in  this  study  to  denote  any  component  of  earnings:  cash 
flows,  accruals  or  any  particular  form  of  accruals  (e.  g.,  depreciation  expense,  change  in  stock  and 
work  in  process,  etc.  ). 
96 comparing  the  regression  coefficients  and  adjusted  R  2S  from,  for  example,  pairs  of 
regressions  using  either  cash  flows  or  earnings  as  dependent  variables,  inferences  are 
drawn  about  the  role  of  different  earnings  components  -  accruals  in  particular  -  in 
reflecting  economic  news.  Similarly,  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  employ  two  different 
measures  of  earnings  containing  different  "amounts"  of  accruals  to  infer  the 
properties  of  the  accruals  components.  The  idea  of  comparing  the  relative  roles  of 
various  performance  measures  containing  different  -levels  of  accruals  has  been 
employed  already  as  early  as  in  Ball  and  Brown  (1968).  They  used  bottom-line  net 
income  as  the  main  variable,  but  also  re-estimated  their  basic  results  using  two 
additional  performance  measures  containing  less  accruals  (net  income  before  non- 
recurring  items  and  operating  cash  flow  approximated  by  operating  income).  Garrod, 
Giner  and  Larran  (2003)  disaggregate  earnings  into  cash  flows  and  several  (detailed) 
accruals  components  and  study  the  value-relevance  of  these  items.  McLeay,  Kassab 
and  Helan  (1997)  disaggregate  cash  flow  into  earnings,  current  accruals  and  non- 
current  accruals  (the  latter  represents  a  counterpart  to  "other  accruals"  in  the  above 
decomposition). 
Second,  separating  regressions  with  earnings  and  operating  cash  flows  as 
dependent  variables  should  help  to  distinguish  between  factors  that  can  be  attributed 
to  changes  in  the  accounting  regime  (i.  e.,  the  accruals  component  of  earnings)  and 
factors  that  reflect  changes  in  the  economic  situation  of  the  firm  (i.  e.,  the  cash  flow 
component  of  earnings)  (Ryan  and  Zarowin,  2003). 
Third,  the  properties  of  these  groups  of  accounting  numbers  within  the 
conservatism  framework  are  not  thoroughly  researched,  either  theoretically  or 
97 empirically.  For  example,  as  noted  in  section  3.2.2,  the  accounting  literature  does 
generally  not  deal  in  detail  empirically  with  the  time-series  behaviour  of  accounting 
depreciation  charge  so  these  properties  must  be  inferred  directly  from  accounting 
standards  or  assumed  properties  -  the  depreciation  charge  represents  a  reversal  of  a 
positive  accrual  in  the  period  when  an  asset  is  acquired  and  recorded  on  the  balance 
sheet;  in  this  period,  net  income  will  on  average  exceed  (net)  cash  flows  (Ahmed  et 
aL,  2002).  Existing  literature  suggests  that  the  components  of  earnings  presented  in 
the  conceptual  decomposition  above  may  have  different  properties.  For  example,  in 
the  context  of  this  study,  Basu  (1997)  predicts  and  finds  current-period  operating 
cash  flows  are  weakly  correlated  with  both  good  and  bad  news,  while  earnings  are 
strongly  correlated  with  bad  news  and  weakly  correlated  with  good  news.  Dechow, 
Kothari  and  Watts  (1998)  model  theoretically  the  time-series  behaviour  of  different 
components  and  show  that  these  components  are  indeed  expected  to  exhibit  different 
time-series  properties  at  the  theoretical  level. 
This  conceptual  decomposition  is  followed  in  the  main  empirical  analysis  in 
this  study  in  some  cases  by  several  empirical  counterparts  of  these  groups  of 
variables,  such  as  different  measures  of  earnings  and cash  flows.  In  part,  this 
represents  an  attempt  to  capture  fully  any  additional  insights  that  might  arise  due  to 
the  discrepancy  between  the  conceptual  decomposition  and  the  empirical  measures 
that  attempt  to  follow  it.  41  At  the  same  time  such  an  approach  also  ensures  a  high 
degree  of  comparability  with  the  existing  literature.  Moreover,  in  the  Appendices, 
some  of  these  empirical  measures  are  extended  even  further  to  gain  additional  insight 
or  to  enhance  comparability  with  existing  literature. 
41  Empirical  measures  of  these  "conceptual"  variables  are  described  in  detail  in  section  4.2  below. 
98 3.8  PERSXSTENCE  WXTHXN  THE  GXNER  AND  REES 
(2  001)  MODEL  OF  THE  VT  TERM 
Giner  and  Rees  (2001)  extend  the  contemporaneous  Pope  and  Walker  (1999) 
model  of  accounting  conservatism  with  regression  terms  that  capture  the  persistence 
of  the  dependent  variable  (reported  accounting  earnings  in  their  case).  In  the 
empirical  version  of  the  contemporaneous  model  presented  in  equation  (3-10),  they 
introduce,  empirically,  additional  regression  terms  that  control  for  the  persistence  of 
the  dependent  variable  (earnings  in  their  case)  so  that  the  resulting  model  is  te 
following  extension  of  Pope  and  Walker  (1999): 
Xt 
=al+a2D+AR,  +  yR,  D,  +  8,  L, 
-, 
+  82 
Lt-I 
+  i53L,  -, 
1--l 
+  el  (3-16) 
Pt-I  Pt-I  Pt-I 
where  Xt  is  the  generic  reported  accounting  earnings  for  the  accounting  period  t,  Lt-I 
is  a  dummy  variable  defined  as  Lt-,  =  (I  if  X-1:  50  and  0  otherwise).  The  regression 
coefficient  (ý  captures  the  reversal  of  deviations  from  above  the  normal  earnings-to- 
price  ratio  and  J3  captures  the  incremental/differential  reversal  of  deviations  from 
below  the  normal  earnings-to-price  ratio.  These  two  controls  represent  an  attempt  to 
model  the  effects  of  previous'  periods  conservative  accounting  on  current  reported 
earnings,  which  is  captured  by  the  VlPt-,  tenn  in  equation  (3-9)  above.  It  is  worth 
noting  that  the  deviation  of  reported  earnings  Xt  from  permanent  earnings  x,  within 
the  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  model  is  allowed  to  originate  from  two  sources  only:  a) 
current  conservative  accounting  (captured  in  parameters  61  and  yj  in  the  equation  (3- 
10)  above)  and  b)  past  accounting  conservative  practices  (captured  in  the  regression 
constant  a,  together  with  the  cost  of  capital  and  any  other  on-average  effects  not 
99 captured  by  the  independent  variables  in  equation  (3-16)).  Because  Giner  and  Rees's 
(2001)  model  includes  lag-one  earnings  XI-I  that  was  also  subject  to  effects  of 
conservative  accounting  in  previous  periods  (in  this  case  up  to  lag  one  relative  to  the 
current  period),  the  regression  constant  in  a,  should  be  cleaned  of  this  effect  and  is 
thus  expected  to  be  lower  than  in  the  basic  contemporaneous  model  in  (3-10). 
Therefore,  as  Giner  and  Rees  (2001)  note,  their  extension  should  represent  an 
alternative  modelling  of  the  VIP, 
-,  term  that  captures  the  effects  of  past  conservative 
accounting  on  current  reported  earnings.  This  is  because  the  terms  81,  J2  and  53 
capture  the  deviation  from  the  average  eamings-to-priCe  ratio  in  the  previous 
accounting  period  (t-1,  t-2).  The  separation  by  the  sign  of  earnings  proxies  for 
whether  the  term  is  more  likely  to  reflect  past  economic  gains  (and  thus  persist)  or 
past  economic  losses  (and  thus  reverse  fast  to  the  norm).  The  other  method  of 
modelling  the  VýPj-j  term  is  by  introducing  previous'  periods  news  into  the 
contemporaneous  models  (Giner  and  Rees,  2001),  as  presented  above  in  section  3.4. 
Their  study  is  extended  in  two  ways.  First,  earnings  are  decomposed  into  its 
operating  cash  flow  and  various  accruals  components  as  presented  above  in  section 
3.7.  Second,  the  generic  earnings  are  substituted  empirically  with  three  different 
empirical  earnings  measures  as  presented  in  section  4.2. 
However,  unlike  in  the  Giner  and  Rees  (2001)  paper,  thereýare  now  at  least 
two  different  possibilities  regarding  the  definition  of  the  L1.1  dummy  variable  as  well 
100 as  the  definition  of  the  persistence  variables  Xt-,  on  the  right  hand  side  of  equation 
(3-16):  42 
-  L,,  -,  takes  the  value  of  I  if  reported  accounting  earnings  X, 
-,  are  negative.  The 
indicator  variable  Lt-I  is  thus  independent  of  the  actual  accounting  variable  used 
as  the  dependent  variable  Xt  in  the  model  in  equation-(3-16).  This  definition  of 
the  indicator  variable  appears  to  be  more  consistent  with  Pope  and  Walker  (1999) 
and  Giner  and  Rees  (2001)  and  with  other  existing  literature  in  that  positive 
earnings  are  generally  more  likely  to  reflect  persistent  economic  gains,  while 
negative  earnings  are  more  likely  to  reflect  economic  losses.  This  definition 
would  also  be  in  line  with  one  of  the  proxy  indicators  of  good  and  bad  news  in 
section  4.4  that  studies  the  persistence  property  of  various  accounting  items 
where  one  of  the  indicator  variables  is  the  sign  of  bottom-line  earnings  in  all 
models  regardless  of  which  accounting  variable  is  used  as  the  dependent  variable 
in  the  model.  In  this  variant,  the  independent  variable  X1.1  associated  with  terms 
52  and  (ý  would  thus  be  the  smne  earnings  variable  used  to  define  the  Lt-i 
indicator  (i.  e.,  earnings); 
-  LI-I  takes  the  value  of  I  if  the  lagged  values  XI-I  of  the  actual  accounting 
variables  used  as  the  dependent  variables  Xt  in  models  of  conservative  accounting 
are  negative  (the  variable  X  can,  conceptually,  be  earnings  or  operating  cash 
flows  or  any  of  the  accruals).  According  to  the  conceptual  division  of  earnings 
into  its  two  main  components  (operating  cash  flows  and  accruals)  and  the  sign 
42  Given  the  other  models  employed  in  this  thesis,  there  are  in  fact  several  possibilites,  most  obvious 
by  positive/negative  operating  cash  flows  or  by  positive/negative  types  of  accruals,  apart  from  those 
presented  here. 
101 convention  employed  in  this  study,  a  negative  variable  XI-1  indicates  an  earnings- 
decreasing  value.  It  is  thus  more  likely  to  reflect  an  economic  loss  than  an 
economic  gain  and,  accordingly,  revert  faster  to  the  norm.  This  definition  of  the 
indicator  variable  is  also  consistent  (although  not  equivalent  to)  with  sections 
studying  the  persistence  property  of  various  accounting  items,  where  one  of  the 
indicator  variables  for  bad  news  is,  defined  in  terms  of  the  earnings-decreasing 
changes  of  various  accounting  items  rather  than  earnings  as  a  composite  figure 
(issues  regarding  differences  in  empirical  estimations  due  to  different  deflators 
are  assumed  away  in  this  theoretical  section).  In  this  variant,  the  independent 
variable  Xj.,  associated  with  terms  82and  93would  thus  be  the  same  accounting 
variable  used  to  define  the  Ll-I  indicator  as  well  as  the  variable  used  as  the 
dependent  variable  Xt. 
Both  variations  are  interesting  within  the  context  of  this  study.  The  first 
variation  allows  differentiating  between  the  asymmetric  incorporation  of  good  and 
bad  news  into  various  current  accounting  measures  conditional  on  whether  the  firm 
shows  a  (lagged)  bottom-line  profit  or  a  loss.  Earnings  of  firms  showing  a  profit  are 
more  likely  to  reflect  economic  gains,  while  earnings  of  firms  showing  a  loss  are 
more  likely  to  reflect  (current)  economic  losses.  The  second  variant  allows  studying 
the  incorporation  of  good  and  bad  news  into  various  earnings  components  given  the 
(lagged)  sign  of  these  components  and  thus  their  direct  role  in  forming  current 
reported  earnings,  either  by  increasing  it  or  by  decreasing  it.  "  As  generally  with 
earnings,  earnings-increasing  changes  in  earnings  components  are  more  likely  to 
reflect  economic  gains  than  economic  losses.  This  second  variant  might  also  be 
43  There  are  some  accounting  items  that  by  definition  cannot  be  conditioned  on  their  sign  in  this 
manner  -  sales  and  depreciation  expense,  for  example,  represent  two  such  items. 
102 viewed  as  a  refinement  of  the  first  variant  in  that  it  allows  for  the  role  of  specific 
earnings  components  that  revert  the  departure  from  the  normal  eamings-to-price 
ratio  back  to  the  norm  (rather  than  the  "all-inclusive"  earnings  figure).  Moreover, 
such  a  division  allows  a  comparison  of  empirical  results  with  the  results  on  time- 
series  properties  of  different  accounting  variables.  Because  of  these  two 
complementary  views  of  the  Giner  and  Rees  (2001)  model,  both  variants  will  be 
explored  in  the  empirical  part  of  this  thesis.  Moreover,  both  variants  tie  in  with  the 
distinction  between  profit  and  loss  firms  made  in  section  4.8  below. 
If 
3  0'9  HYPOTHESES  FORMULATXON 
In  this  thesis  several  hypotheses  based  on  the  above  theoretical 
models/constructs  are  formed  and  empirically  tested  using  different  methods, 
whether  unconditional  or  conditional  on  certain  cross-sectional  properties  of  the 
firms  studied.  Whilst  some  of  these  hypotheses  have  been  the  subject  of  earlier 
studies,  they  are  reproduced  here  as  such  earlier  studies  have  not  been  undertaken 
using  UK  data,  extending  over  such  a  long  time  series  and/or  with  the  .  supporting 
sensitivity  analyses  that  are  reported  below  in  a  separate  chapter.  The  main 
hypotheses  are  summarised  below  in  alternative  forms. 
The  order  in  which  the  hypotheses  are  presented,  is  the  following. 
Hypotheses  are  grouped  by  the  four  main  research  issues:  the  persistence  property, 
direct  tests  based  on  Pope  and  Walker  (1999),  separation  of  profit  and  loss  firms  and, 
finally,  the  effects  of  asset-recognition  rules.  Within  these  groups,  sub-divisions 
103 relate  to  the  operating  cash  flow  component  of  earnings,  earnings  themselves  and, 
finally,  the  accruals  component.  The  order  of  these  sub-divisions  follows  stems  from 
the  expectation  that  accounting  conservatism  is  not  reflected  in  the  operating  cash 
flow  figure,  but  that  it  is  reflected  in  the  earnings  figures  and  the  specific  component 
that  reflects  conservatism  is  the  accruals  component.  Therefore,  the  order  serves  to 
highlight  the  relative  roles  of  the  cash  flow  and  accruals  components.  Because  the 
accruals  component  is  a  collection  of  potentially  very  different  types  of  accruals,  the 
accruals  component  is  further  sub-divided,  where  necessary.  ý  Finally,  because 
conservatism  is  defined  above  in  terms  of  asymmetric  timeliness  of  accounting 
performance  measures  in  respect  to  good  and  bad  economic  news,  different 
expectations  about  the  reflection  of  good  and  bad  are  made. 
The  time-series  behaviour  of  earnings,  operating  cash  flows  and  accruals  (and 
its  components)  is  studied  first.  Under  conservative  accounting,  earnings-increasing 
changes  (a  consequence  of  gains)  in  accounting  variables  that  are  affected  by 
conservatism  are  expected  to  persist,  while  earnings-decreasing  changes  (a 
consequence  of  losses  -  decreases  in  market  value)  are  expected  to  mean-revert. 
Stated  in  alternative  form,  the  persistence  hypothesis  HI,  broken  down  by  operating 
cash  flows,  earnings  and  accruals  subsections,  is: 
H'4i,  a:  i.  Operating  cash  flows  mean-revert. 
ii.  There  is  no  asymmetric  persistence  between  earnings-increasing  and 
earnings-decreasing  operating  cashflow  changes.  , 
Ib:  i.  Earnings-increases  are  permanea 
104 ii.  Earn  ings-decreases  are  transitory. 
iii.  The  higher  the  content  of  accruals,  the  greater  the  asymmetric  persistence 
exhibited  between  earnings-increases  and  earnings-decreases. 
HAix:  i.  Accruals,  overall,  mean-revert. 
ii.  The  rate  of  mean-reversion  is  smaller  for  earnings-increasing  accruals 
than  for  earnings-decreasing  accruals. 
Different  types  of  accruals  exhibit  differential  time-series  behaviour: 
iii.  Working  capital  accruals  mean-revert. 
iv.  The  rate  of  reversal  is  higherfor  earn  ings-decreasing  changes. 
v.  Depreciation  and  amortisation  charge  is  persistent. 
vi.  There  is  no  asymmetry  between  earnings-increasing  and  earnings- 
decreasing  changes  in  the  depreciation  charge. 
vii.  Special  items  mean-revert. 
viii.  The  rate  of  reversal  is  higherfor  earnings-decreasing  changes. 
The  expectations  regarding  hypotheses  H01,,  i.  to  H01,,  viii.  are  that  they  will 
be  rejected  in  favour  of  the  alternative  hypotheses  stated  above.  These  expectations 
are  all  expected  to  be  observed  empirically  under  conservative  accounting.  -  Note  that 
the  operating  cash  flows  do  not,  theoretically,  contain  any  accruals  and,  therefore, 
cannot  be  affected  by  accounting  conservatism.  In  existing  literature,  the  time-series 
properties  of  operating  cash  flow,  earnings  and  accruals  have  been  explored  with 
varying  degrees  of  detail,  but  there  is  no  comparable  UK  literature.  Moreover,  the 
time-series  properties  of  the  depreciation  charge  have  not  been  explored,  and,  if  only 
because  the  definition  is  new,  neither  have  the  properties  of  special  items  in  the  UK 
105 context.  Varying  time-series  properties  of  earnings  with  different  levels  of  accruals 
(and  some  other  components)  have  also  not  been  explored  empirically. 
Next,  regarding  direct  tests  of  ex-post  accounting  conservatism  based  Pope 
and  Walker's  (1999)  tests  of  asymmetric  timeliness  of  accounting  earnings  and  its 
operating  cash  flows  and  accruals  components,  the  direct-test  hypothesis  is  fonned, 
with  four  subsections.  Stated  in  alternative  form,  the  hypothesis  H2  is: 
IT42,  a:  Operating  cashflows  reflect  contemporaneous  good  and  bad  economic  news 
symmetrically. 
H42,  b:  i.  Earnings  reflect  contemporaneous  good  and  bad  economic  news 
as  metrically.  YM 
ii.  The  incorporation  of  bad  news  is  more  timely  than  the  incorporation  of 
good  news. 
HL  The  higher  the  level  of  accruals  in  earnings,  the  higher  the  asymmetric 
timeliness  of  earnings  in  incorporating  bad  news. 
H'12,  c:  i.  Accruals,  overall,  reflect  contemporaneous  good  and  bad  economic  news 
asymmetrically. 
ii.  Vie  incorporation  of  bad  news  is  more  timely  than  the  incorporation  of 
good  news. 
Different  types  of  accruals  exhibit  different  properties  regarding  the  asymmetric 
recognition  of  good  and  bad  news: 
iii.  Working  capital  accruals  are  more  timely  in  reflecting  bad  news. 
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incorporating  bad  news. 
v.  Special  items  are  more  timely  in  rej7ecting  bad  news. 
H42,  d:  As  a  time-series  result,  ex-post  conservatism  is  increasing  through  time. 
The  expectations  regarding  hypotheses  H02,,  i-  to  H02, 
c  v.  are  that  they  will  be 
rejected  in  favour  of  alternative  hypotheses  stated  above.  The  expectations  resulting 
from  the  above  hypotheses  should  all  be  observed  under  conservative  accounting. 
Note  that  the  operating  cash  flows  does  not,  theoretically,  contain  any  accruals  and, 
therefore,  it  cannot  be  affected  by  accounting  conservatism.  In  the  existing  literature, 
the  direct  tests  have  been  made  on  the  operating  cash  flow  figure  and  various 
earnings  figures.  However,  direct  tests  on  various  types  of  accruals  have  not  been 
made  thus  far.  Moreover,  there  is  no  UK  evidence  on  any  of  these  figures  covering 
such  a  long  time  period  and  time  series  properties  have  only  been  shown  for  earnings 
figures.  Evidence  on  increases  (or  otherwise)  of  accounting  conservatism  over  time 
in  the  UK  has  also  not  been  shown. 
Regarding  the  properties  of  loss-firms  in  particular,  the  following  hypotheses 
are  formulated  in  alternative  form: 
H'43:  i.  The  differences  between  profit  and  lossfirms  relate  more  strongly  to  the 
accruals  component  of  earnings  than  to  the  cashflow  component. 
ii.  The  asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings  should  be  higher  in  cases  where 
earnings  reflect  bad  news. 
107 iii.  This  is  particularly  likely  in  cases  where  the  accruals  component  of 
earnings  is  negative. 
The  expectations  regarding  hypotheses  H03  i-  to  H02,  W.  are  that  they  will  be 
rejected  in  favour  of  alternative  hypotheses  stated  above.  None  of  the  hypotheses 
H03  i-  to  H02,  M  has  been  explored  in  the  existing  literature  yet. 
The  effects  of  the  rules  of  ex-ante  recognition  of  assets  (or  news  unrelated 
conservatism,  pervasive  conservatism)  affect  the  relations  hypothesised  in  H2,,,,  H2,  b 
and  H2,  in  particular  and,  indirectly,  the  other  hypotheses  stated,  too.  Combining  the 
decomposition  of  earnings  into  operating  cash  flows  and  accruals'  components  and 
following  Pope  and  Walker  (2003)  produces  the  following  extension  of  their  main 
hypothesis  stated  in  alternative  fonn: 
H44:  The  more  ex-ante  conservative  afirm  is  regarding  the  recognition  of  assets,  the 
smaller  the  probability  of  observing  an  asymmetric  relationship  between 
operating  cash  flows,  earnings  and  accruals  on  the  one  hand  and  returns  on 
the  other  using  both  the  general  measure  of  ex-ante  conservatism  and  asset- 
specific  measures  of  ex-ante  conservatism. 
The  expectation  regarding  this  hypothesis  is  that  the  null  version  of  the 
hypothesis  (HO4)  of  no  difference  in  asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings,  operating 
cash  flows  and  different  types  of  accruals  between  highly  ex-ante  conservative  and 
highly  aggressive  ex-ante  firms  will  be  rejected.  Asset-specific  measures  of  ex-ante 
conservatism  represent  a  refinement  of  the  results  obtained  by  using  an  overall, 
108 general  measure  of  ex-ante  conservatism.  In  the  existing  literature,  the  effect  of  the 
general  ex-ante  conservatism  on  earnings  only  has  been  shown.  This  work  adds  to 
existing  literature  both  by  decomposing  earnings  into  its  main  constituents  and  by 
refining  the  general  measure  of  ex-ante  conservatism. 
3.10  CONCLUDXNG  RFJMKS 
This  chapter  has  presented  the  main  blocks  underpinning  the  empirical  part  of 
this  thesis.  There  are  two  main  types  of  models  of  conservatism  -  the  persistence 
models  and  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)-type  models.  This  study  adds  the 
decomposition  of  earnings  into  its  main  components:  operating  cash  flows  and  three 
main  types  of  accruals  (working  capital  accruals,  depreciation  and  special  items)  into 
both  the  persistence  models  as  well  as  in  the  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  models.  This 
latter  model  is  also  used  to  study  other  aspects  of  accounting  conservatism,  e.  g., 
changes  through  time,  in  the  empirical  part.  The  importance  of  combining  the  Pope 
and  Walker  (1999)  models  with  the  earnings  decomposition  is  particularly  important 
in  studying  the  losses  and  profit  observations.  The  chapter  also  shows  that  certain 
limits  must  be  taken  into  account  when  studying  the  effects  of  ex-post  conservatism 
and  that  the  same  empirical  model  can  result  from  different  theoretical  explanations 
and/or  derivations.  The  specific  hypotheses  regarding  the  persistence  tests,  direct 
tests,  profit.  and  loss  separation  and  ex-ante  limitations  are  also  presented.  These 
hypotheses  are  empirically  tested  in  the  next  chapter. 
109 4  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
4.1  INTRODUCTXON  TO  EMPXRXCAL  ANALYSES 
This  chapter  represents  the  main  part  of  the  thesis.  It  presents  relevant  aspects 
regarding  the  empirical  study  of  accounting  conservatism  and  the  main  empirical 
results.  The  chapter  is  organised  as  follows.  In  section  two,  variables'  definitions  are 
presented  by  main  groups:  earnings,  accruals,  operating  cash  flows,  market  variables 
and  other  variables.  The  sample  selection  procedure  is  also  described  in  detail  in  the 
first  section.  This  is  particularly  important  given  that  the  sample-formation 
procedure  includes  some  aspects  not  generally  used  in  existing  literature.  Moreover, 
the  sign  convention  used  for  variables'  definitions  is  described.  This  is  important,  as 
the  sign  convention  used  in  papers  in  the  area  of  capital  market-based  accounting 
research  is  not  unifonn. 
In  section  three  general  properties  of  the  sample  in  terms  of  distributions  of 
variables'  values  and  correlations  between  pairs  of  variables  are  presented,  and, 
where  appropriate,  formally  tested  for  differences.  A  number  of  properties  of 
distributions,  correlations  and  differences  are  commented  upon  in  term  of  accounting 
conservatism.  Some  of  the  more  important  aspects  include:  skewness  measures  of 
earnings"  variables,  correlations  between  accruals  and  operating  cash  flows, 
correlations  between  returns  and  accruals,  variability  of  returns  and  variabilities  and 
correlations  of  operating  cash  flows  and  accruals. 
110 The  fourth  section  presents  the  results  of  the  first  of  the  two  ways  of 
capturing  the  effects  of  conservative  accounting  -  i.  e.,  the  time-series  properties  of 
operating  cash  flows,  earnings  and  accruals  on  average  and  separately  according  to 
the  sign  of  these  changes.  The  empirical  results  are  formed  in  a  way  that  enhances 
comparability  with  existing  literature  (in  particular  with  Basu,  1997). 
Section  five  presents  the  second  method  of  capturing  the  effects  of 
accounting  conservatism  -  direct  tests  using  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  model.  It 
presents  the  results  as  cross-sectional  averages,  but  also  makes  inferences  regarding 
conservatism  through  time  by  using  different  measures  of  conservatism.  Moreover, 
the  section  provides  a  theoretical  explanation  of  low  observed  R  2S  in  some  of  the 
results  and  shows  that  these  are  in  fact  to  be  expected  if  accounting  is  conservative. 
Section  six  expands  these  results  by  capturing  the  effects  of  previous'  periods 
conservative  accounting.  Complementarily,  section  seven  builds  upon  and  expands 
alternative  measures  of  the  effects  of  previous  periods'  conservative  accounting. 
Section  eight  attempts  to  capture  the  differences  between  profit  and  loss  firms 
regarding  the  differences  in  application  of  conservative  accounting.  The  section  first 
presents  a  motivation  for  studying  profit  and  loss  firms  separately.  This  is  important, 
as  there  is  no  unifonn  "theory  of  losses".  This  is  followed  by  observing  differences 
between  profit  and  loss  firms  in  terms  of  distributional  properties  and  differing 
correlations  between  pairs  of  variables.  In  the  absence  of  a  clear  theory  of  losses,  the 
following  sub-section  expands  the  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  model  by  allowing  for 
(but  not  requiring)  differences  between  good  and  bad  economic  news  as  well as  for 
differences  between  profit  and  loss  observations.  However,  there  are  econometric 
III difficulties  associated  with  estimation  of  such  a  model.  They  are  briefly  presented  at 
the  end  of  the  section. 
Finally,  the  last  section  refines  further  the  results  obtained  by  estimating  the 
Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  model  by  operating  cash  flow,  earnings  and  accruals 
variables  by  placing  a  general  and  an  asset-specific  ex-ante  limit  on  these  relations, 
following  derivations  from  the  Pope  and  Walker  (2003)  modelling  of  ex-ante 
conservatism. 
4.2  DEFXNXTXONS  OF  VARXABLES  AND  SAMPLE 
SELECTXON 
In  this  section,  the  details  of  the  main  empirical  variables  used  in  this  study 
are  provided  by  groups  of  variables:  accounting  variables  (earnings,  accruals, 
operating  cash  flows  and  other  accounting  variables),  market  variables  and 
additional  economic  variables.  For  each  definition  of  a  variable,  the  relevant 
DataStream  codes  are  provided  in  parentheses  to  ensure  full  transparency  and 
maximise  the  external  validity  of  this  research  (Gill  and  Johnson,  1991,  pp.  121- 
122).  Moreover,  a  reference  table,  inclusive  of  definitions  and  Datastream  codes,  is 
provided  in  Appendix  A  given  the  relatively  large  number  of  variables  employed  in 
this  study.  Details  on  sample  selection  and  outliers'  removal  are  also  presented. 
Accounting  variables  -  earnings.  Operating  profit  (OP)  is  adjusted 
operating  profit  (DataStream  item  #137).  Ordinary  earnings  per  share  (ORD)  are 
112 dcfined  as  net  earnings  after  tax,  minority  interest  and  preference  dividend  on  a  fully 
deferred  tax  basis  and  adjusted  for  the  effect  of  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items, 
non-operating  provisions  and  foreign  currency  exchange  profit/losses  (DataStream 
item  #182).  Earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (EARN)  are  ordinary 
earnings  ORD  plus  extraordinary  items  (DataStrearn  item  #193)  plus  exceptional 
items  (DataStrearn  item  #194). 
Given  that  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  constitute  an  important 
component  of  earnings  in  terms  of  reflecting  asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings  to 
bad  economic  news,  the  two  items  must  be  clearly  defined.  The  FRS  3  -Reporting 
Financial  Performance  defines  extraordinary  items  as  (FRS  3,  quoted  in  Davies, 
Paterson  and  Wilson,  1999): 
I- 
46 
...  material  items  possessing  a  high  degree  of  abnormality  which  arise  from  events  or 
transactions  that  fall  outside  the  ordinary  activities  of  the  reporting  entity  and  which  are  not 
expected  to  recur.  They  do  not  include  exceptional  items  nor  do  they  include  prior  period 
items  merely  because  they  relate  to  a  prior  period"  (p.  1506) 
and  exceptional  items  as: 
,  6...  material  items  which  derive  from  events  or  transactions  that  fall  within  ordinary 
activities  of  the  reporting  entity  and  which  individually  or,  if  of  a  similar  type,  in  aggregate, 
need  to  be  disclosed  by  virtue  of  their  size  or  incidence  if  the  financial  statements  are  to  give 
a  true  and  fair  view.  "  (p.  15  07) 
The  definition  of  earnings  EARN  was  chosen  on  the  basis  that  exceptional 
items  appear  to  have  absorbed,  on  average,  most  of  the  items  that  were  classified  as 
extraordinary  in  the  period  before  the  introduction  of  FRS  3-  Reporting  Financial 
Performance  became  effective  for  financial  year  ends  on  or  after  22nd  June  1993. 
Figure  4-1  shows  that  extraordinary  items  have  effectively  disappeared  in  the  post- 
FRS  3  period,  while  exceptional  items  have  become  both  more  frequent  (88.9%  of 
113 firms  report  non-zero  exceptional  items  in  2001  as  compared  to  72.1%  in  1969)  and 
more  negative  on  average  (-1.910%  of  lagged  price  in  2001),  as  compared  with 
positive  values,  on  average,  of  these  items  in  the  years  in  the  pre-FRS  3  period  (for 
example,  +0.044%  in  1969).  In  the  pre-1993  period  the  effect  of  exceptional  items  is 
in  19  out  of  24  years  to  reverse,  on  average  (as  opposed  to  pre-FRS  3  years),  the 
losses  passed  through  extraordinary  items.  After  the  1990  and  especially  after  the 
introduction  of  FRS  3  firms  appear  to  pass  losses  through  exceptional  items.  Also,  in 
none  of  the  FRS  3-years  are  exceptional  items  positive  on  average,  suggesting  that 
firms  include  most  gains  in  ordinary  earnings.  This  finding  is  consistent  also  with 
Strong  and  Walker  (1993),  who  find  that  for  a  sample  of  UK  firms  in  the  period 
1971-1986  (i.  e.,  well  pre-FRS  3),  exceptional  items  have  a  positive  skew  and 
extraordinary  items  have  a  negative  skew.  This  is  consistent  with  passing  large  one- 
time  gains  as  part  of  ordinary  earnings  (through  exceptional  items)  and  large 
negative  items  through  extraordinary  items.  Related  to  this,  Kinney  and  Trezevant 
(1997)  find  that  income-decreasing  special  items  in  the  US  tend  to  be  displayed  as 
separate  line  items  while  income-increasing  special  items  are  included  in  the  main 
figures  in  financial  statements  and  the  effect  of  these  items  noted  only  in  a  footnote. 
Allowing  for  information  inefficiencies,  the  former  presumably  emphasises  the 
transitory  nature  of  these  items,  while  the  latter  leads  investors  to  believe  that 
income-increasing  special  items  are  permanent.  These  tendencies  persist  even  after 
controlling  for  the  average  level  of  special  items  that  might  reflect  different 
economic  conditions  (i.  e.,  in  some  years  it  is  to  be  expected  that  special  items  will  be 
negative  on  average).  Complementary  data  on  the  percentages  of  firms  reporting 
negative  and  positive  special  items  in  sample  years  as  well  as  the  time-trend  analysis 
is  provided  in  Appendix  B  (Elliott  and  Hanna,  1996). 
114 To  surnmarise  this  discussion,  Guntert  (1995)  reports  that  Sir  David  Tweedie, 
the  then-chairman  of  the  Accounting  Standards  Board,  observed  that:  44 
*'...  material  one-off  items  were  exceptional  if  they  were  credits  and  extraordinary  if  they 
were  debits.  " 
The  pattern  of  the  magnitude  of  extraordinary  items  by  year  is  also  similar  to 
the  pattern  in  Figure  3  in  Pope  and  Walker's  (1999)  study,  although  the  two  figures 
are  not  strictly  comparable  due  to  different  deflators  (ending  versus  opening  share 
pnce  used  in  this  study,  following  Easton,  1999). 
Figure  4-1:  Average  magnitudes  and  frequencies  of  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  for  the 
contemporaneous  sample  (1969-2001) 
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Notes  to  Figure  4-1:  Extraordinary  items  (DataStream  item  #193)  and  exceptional  items  (DataStrcam  item  #194)  are  per  share 
and  deflated  by  the  opening  share  price  P,  1.  Magnitudes  and  frequencies  are  for  the  contemporaneous  sample  as  defined  below. 
Several  other  definitions  of  earnings  have  been  formulated  and  tested,  given 
that  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  show  the  comparativel  y-  strong  impact  different 
44  This  article  is  originally  referred  by  Basu  (1999)  in  his  discussion  of  Pope  and  Walker  (1999). 
115 definitions  of  earnings  in  an  UK  context  may  have  on  the  results  and  interpretations 
of  those  results.  In  preliminary  phases  of  this  research,  some  additional  definitions 
have  been  used  and  tested:  45 
-  earnings  after  extraordinary  items,  exceptional  items  (EARN)  and  exchange  rate 
adjustments; 
-  retained  earnings  plus  gross/net  dividends  less  transfers  to/from  reserves; 
-  pre-tax  earnings  less  tax  paid  less  minority  interests  and  other  adjustments  less 
preference  dividends; 
-  retentions  plus  dividends  (gross  or  net,  whichever  is  applicable  in  a  particular 
time  period)  less  transfers  to/from  reserves; 
-  earned  for  ordinary. 
Some  of  these  and  other  adjustments  were  dropped  from  further  analyses 
subsequently  either  because  the  preliminary  results  relative  to  the  EARN  variable 
were  affected  only  very  marginally,  if  at  all,  or  because  some  data  items  used  to 
calculate  these  earnings  figures  are  not  available  throughout  the  entire  period 
covered  in  this  study.  It  is  acknowledged,  however,  that  different  (or  additional) 
earnings  definitions  could  have  been  used. 
Accounting  variables  -  accruals.  Change  in  working  capital  accruals 
(hereafter  working  capital  accruals),  AWCAP,  is  defined  as  the  change  in  accounts 
receivables  (ADebtors,  DataStream  item  #448)  plus  change  in  stock  and  work  in 
45  During  the  initial  phases  of  the  research  the  DataStrearn  help  line  was  contacted  several  times  and 
consulted  as  to  what  earnings  figure  to  use  so  that  it  would  ensure  maximum  comparability  through 
such  a  long  time  span  covered  in  this  study.  Some  of  these  definitions  result  from  such 
discussions/suggestions. 
116 progress  (AStock,  DataStream  item  #445)  minus  change  in  accounts  payables 
(dCreditors,  DataStream  item  #417).  All  components  of  working  capital  accruals  are 
taken  directly  from  the  cash  flow  statement,  if  available,  or  funds  flow  statement  in 
the  pre-original  FRS  I-  Cash  flow  statements  period,  rather  than  calculated  as 
balance  sheet  differences.  However,  before  the  introduction  of  SSAP  10  - 
Statements  of  source  and  application  offunds  in  July  1975,  it  would  appear  that  the 
amounts  shown  are  calculated  as  balance-sheet  differences  (e.  g.,  Cadbury 
Schweppes,  1970,  p.  19  and  p.  25  -  footnote  15).  Using  cash  flow/funds  flow 
statements  helps  avoiding  the  effects  of  the  errors-in-variables  problem  as  described 
by  Hribar  and  Collins  (2001),  although  in  the  main  results  of  this  study  the 
components  of  working  capital  accruals  are  used  as  dependent  (rather  than 
independent)  variables,  which  in  itself  mitigates  the  errors  in  variables  problem  (see 
section  2.3  above).  Depreciation  and  amortisation,  DEP,  is  defined  as  total 
depreciation  (DataStream  item  #402)  plus  amortisation  (DataStrearn  item  #562; 
assumed  to  be  zero  where  missing). 
Special  items,  SPEC,  are  calculated  as  operating  profit  (OP)  less  earnings 
after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (EARN),  adjusted  for  preference  dividends 
from  the  profit  and  loss  statement  (DataStream  item  #181),  net  interest  payable 
(notes  to  the  financial  statements,  DataStream  item  #153  minus  #143)  and  taxation 
(profit  and  loss  statement  and  notes  to  the  financial  statements,  DataStream  item 
#160  minus  #162  plus  #169  plus  #161  plus  #164).  Special  items  thus  defined 
correspond  to  a  greater  extent  to  the  sum  of  exceptional  and  extraordinary  items 
(Pearson's  bivariate  correlation  coefficient  for  available  observations  pooled  within 
the  contemporaneous  sample,  as  defined  in  a  later  section,  is  0.861  and  is  higher  for 
117 non-positive  returns  finns,  0.927,  and  lower  for  positive  returns  firms,  0.804).  The 
single  most  important  potential  problem  that  arises  from  this  definition  of  SPEC  is 
that  the  difference  between  OP  and  EARN  likely  contains  both  a  cash  and  an  accruals 
component.  Ideally,  SPEC  would  only  consist  of  -accruals,  without  any  cash 
components.  An  attempt  has  been  made  to  eliminate  some  of  the  (potentially)  cash 
component  by  deducting  preference  dividends,  net  interest  payable  and  taxation, 
items  that  are  part  of  the  difference  between  OP  and  EARN  but  are  likely  to  be  cash- 
related.  However,  the  adjustments  represent  only  a  partial  solution,  given  that  they 
are  taken  from  the  profit  and  loss  statement  and  not  the  cash  flow  statement.  Given 
the  time  period  covered  in  this  study  and  regulation  regime  changes  in  this  period 
this  measure  of  special  items  this  was  a  feasible  solution.  It  is  acknowledged  that  this 
is  a  discretionary  decision  and  that  other  measures  of  different  types  of  "special" 
accruals  might  have  been  constructed  and  might  have  yielded  different  results.  On 
the  other  hand,  available  data  precludes  the  construction  of  very  detailed  types  of 
special  items  (e.  g.,  Francis,  Hanna  and  Vincent,  1996). 
Accounting  variables  -  cash  flows  and  other  accounting  Items.  Operating 
cash  flows,  OCF,  are  calculated  as  adjusted  operating  profit  (DataStream  item  #137) 
plus  depreciation  and  amortisation  (DEP)  less  working  capital  accruals  (AWCAP) 
plus  an  item  described  by  DataStream  as  "Other  adjustments"  (DataStream  item 
#404).  The  operating  cash  flows  calculated  in  this  way  are  very  similar  to  report6d 
net  cash  inflows  from  operating  activities.  Reported  figures  are  generally  available 
only  for  fiscal  years  ending  in  or  after  1992,  after  the  original  FRS  1-  Cash  flow 
statements  was  adopted.  -Pearson  bivariate  correlation  coefficient  for  available 
observations  within  the  contemporaneous  sample,  as  defined  in  a  later  section,  is 
118 0.948.  Cash  flows  other  than  operating  cash  flows  are  disregarded  in  this  study  as 
they  cannot  be  reliably  approximated  using  available  data  over.  the  time  period 
covered  by  the  sample  in  this  study.  Following  the  procedure  employed  by  Garrod 
and  Hadi  (1998)  and  Hadi  (1995,  p.  72-76)  for  investment,  financing  and  taxation 
cash  flows  produces  estimates  whose  correlations  with  actual  published  post-FRS  I 
figures  are  much  lower  than  those  reported  by  Hadi  (1995,  p.  72-76)  over  the  time 
period  covered  by  my  contemporaneous  sample.  A  measure  of  total  cash  flows, 
defined  as  the  net  change  in  cash,  ACASH,  as  in  Dechow  (1994),  is  however 
available  (DataStream  items  #457  before  or  #1134  after  FRS  I  (Revised  1996) 
become  mandatory  for  fiscal  periods  ending  on  or  after  23d  March  1997).  This 
measure  of  total  cash  flows  is  used  to  shed  more  light  on  some  of  the  issues  explored 
in  this  study. 
For  similar  illustrational  reasons,  a  measure  of  total  accruals,  defined  as  Total 
Accruals  =A  WCAP+DEP+SPEC,  is  also  computed.  Other  accounting  variables  used 
in  this  study  are:  book  value  of  ordinary  (i.  e.,  excluding  preference  capital) 
shareholders'  equity  (BV,  DataStream  item  #305)  and  turnover,  S,  defined  as  total 
sales  (DataStream  item  #104).  The  dummy  variable  Lt  assumes  the  value  of  one  if 
EARNt  is  non-positive  and,  zero,  otherwise  and,  similarly,  the  Lt.,  indicator  variable 
assumes  the  value  of  one  if  EARNp,  is  non-positive  and  zero  otherwise.  46 
46  Note  that  these  definitions  of  dummy  variables  L,  and  L,  j  are  different  from  the  corresponding 
variable  in,  for  example,  Giner  and  Rees  (2001)  that  would  be  analogous  to  L,,  where  dummies  are 
defined  as  taking  the  value  of  one  if  the  value  of  the  underlying  variable  is  strictly  less  than  zero. 
However,  the  difference  between  this  definition  and  definition  used  in  this  study  affects  9  firm-years 
in  the  contemporaneous  sample  after  the  removal  of  outliers. 
119 All  accounting  variables  are  per  share  and  deflated  by  the  opening  price  per 
share  (Pt-1)  in  contemporaneous  (one  fiscal  period)  models  and  (P,  4)  in  lagged  (four 
fiscal  periods)  models.  Exceptions  to  this  general  deflation  rule  are  explicitly  stated 
in  relevant  sections. 
Market  data  -  prices,  indices  and  other  economic  variables.  Share  prices 
and  other  market  values  are  stored  in  different  sections  of  the  DataStream.  database. 
The  share  price,  P,,  is  the  price  at  the  accounting  period-end  adjusted  for  capital 
changes  and  stock  splits/reverse  splits  (DataStream  item  P)  so  that  the  prices  used 
throughout  the  sample  are  comparable  with  the  latest  figure  (Donnelly  and  Walker, 
1995)  as  well  as  that  they  allow  a  consistent  calculation  of  returns.  If  the  accounting 
period  end  does  not  coincide  with  a  trading  day,  the  value  on  the  trading  day 
immediately  preceding  the  respective  balance  sheet  date  is  taken.  Corresponding  to 
the  theoretical  models  presented  in  Chapter  3,  the  return  variable(s)  RETIj-1  is 
defined  as  ex-dividend  fiscal-period  return  (price  relative)  RETl., 
-I= 
(Pr-Pj_j)1Pj_j  in 
the  contemporaneous  sample  and  PET, 
-, 
(P, 
-,  -P,  -,  -, 
)IP, 
-4  where  r=  0 
... 
3,  in 
the  lagged  sample. 
Dummy  variables  Dt-,,  t-,  -l  assume  the  value  of  one  if  PETt-, 
,  t-,  -,  -<O,  and  zero 
otherwise  (in  contemporaneous  versions  only  one  dummy  variable  is  used  and  thus 
denoted  as  D1.1-1).  Note  that  the  choice  of  deflator  does  not  influence  the  value  the 
dummy  variables  take.  This  definition  of  the  negative  returns  dummy  differs  from 
definitions  employed  by,  for  example,  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  and  Basu  (1997), 
where  strict  inequality  is  employed.  This  affects  357  observations  in  the 
contemporaneous  sample  (after  the  removal  of  outliers)  that  have  PETj-, 
, j-,  -  -I= 
0,  a 
120 number  perhaps  unexpectedly  high.  Excluding  these  observations  from  the  sample  in 
the  preliminary  stages  of  research  did  not  alter  any  of  the  conclusions  and  affected 
quantitative  results  only  very  marginally.  For  reasons  of  parsimony,  these  results  are 
not  reported  in  the  thesis. 
There  are  at  least  two  more  important  issues  in  calculating  the  return 
The  first  issue  is  whether  to  use  cum-dividend  or  ex-dividend  variables  PET, 
-, 
returns  (capital  gains).  This  study  evolves  from  the  work  of  Basu,  (1997)  and  Pope 
and  Walker  (1999),  who  argue  that  where  the  dependent  variable  is  accounting 
variables  should  also  include  earnings  that  includes  dividends,  then  the  PET, 
-, 
dividends  (Basu,  2001).  Basu  (2001)  also  provides  a  short  overview  of  differences  in 
using  cum-/ex-dividend  returns  as  the  dividend  variable.  However,  using  cum- 
dividend  rates  of  return  over  the  sample  window  used  in  this  study  is  not  possible 
due  to  the  lack  of  data  on  dividends  (or  total  returns)  data.  Databases  that  would 
allow  using  such  definitions  of  returns  were  not  available.  47  Consequently,  the  data 
sample  employed  in  this  study  does  not  allow  an  empirical  test  that  would  indicate 
whether  this  difference  is  important.  The  assumption  is  made  that  the  results  would 
be  unaffected  by  this  choice.  However,  consistent  with  this,  Giner  and  Rees  (2001) 
report  that  their  results  are  essentially  the  same  regardless  of  whether  cum-  or  ex- 
dividend  returns  are  employed.  Other  related  studies  in  the  UK  context  also  exclude 
dividends  (e.  g.,  Donnelly  and  Walker,  1995),  albeit  the  econometric  consequences 
may  be  different  in  other  contexts. 
47  DataStream  provides  a  cum-dividend  Return  Index  variable  (item  RI),  but  this  is  only  available  for 
years  1988  and  onwards.  Using  this  variable  the  period  1969-1987  would  have  to  be  omitted. 
121 The  second  important  issue  is  whether  to  compound  returns  or  capital  gains 
over  the  fiscal  or  over  the  inter-announcement  period.  Again,  'the  sample  employed 
in  this  study  does  not  allow  constructing  an  empirical  test  that  would  show  whether 
this  difference  is  important  . 
48  Regarding  this  issue  it  is  again  assumed  that  the  results 
would  be  unaffected  by  this  choice.  Consistent  with  this,  Basu,  Hwang  and  Jan 
(2000)  report  that  using  fiscal  year  accumulation  period  produced  "almost  identical" 
results  to  those  of  the  inter-announcement  period  running  from  3  months  after  the 
previous  fiscal  year-end  to  three  months  after  the  current  fiscal  year-end  (differences 
are  not  tabulated  in  their  paper).  Also,  their  sample  covers  a  relatively  long  time- 
period,  from  1975-1998,  which  might  highlight  the  importance  of  their  statement  for 
this  research.  It  appears  that  more  recent  applications  use  fiscal  year-periods  (e.  g., 
Ryan  and  Zarowin,  2003;  Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin,  2000).  In  the  UK,  the  inter- 
announcement  period  would  have  to  be  from  six  months  after  the  prior  fiscal  year- 
end  to  six  months  after  the  current  fiscal  period,  since  UK  fin-ns  have  6  months  to 
prepare  and  publish  annual  accounts  (Stark  and  Thomas,  1998),  although  Donnelly 
and  Walker  (1995)  and  Clubb  (1995)  use  cumulation  through  end  of  April  for  their 
sample  of  December  year-end  firms  (i.  e.,  4  months). 
Lagged  values  of  share  prices,  Pt-1,  are  recorded  at  the  previous  balance  sheet 
date,  if  known.  If  the  previous  balance  sheet  date  is  not  known,  it  is  assumed  to  be  at 
the  current  balance  sheet  date  minus  365  days  (or  366  days  in  leap  years).  This  rule 
is  applied  also  when  share  prices  beyond  one  lag  are  recorded  (e.  g.,  Ps-4).  The  effect 
of  this  rule  is  that  the  number  of  observations  in  the  two  samples  is  maximised.  In 
48  The  difficulty  in  creating  tests  that  would  show  potential  differences  resulting  from  different 
compounding  time  intervals  is  (was)  of  technical  rather  than  substantive  nature.  The  procedure  used 
in  an  attempt  to  calculate  the  exact  limiting  dates  of  the  inter-announcement  interval  yielded  too  many 
missing  or  erratic  values.  If  these  technical  issues  were  solved,  a  direct  comparison  would  indeed  be 
possible. 
122 the  absence  of  this  rule,  a  finn  would  have  to  be  included  in  the  DataStrearn  database 
at  least  for  two  consecutive  financial  years  (so  that  both  opening  and  closing  balance 
sheet  dates  would  be  known)  rather  than  just  one  financial  year  using  this  method.  At 
the  same  time,  this  method  mitigates  potential  effects  of  survivorship  bias.  To  the 
best  of  my  knowledge,  there  are  no  comparable  studies  that  have  employed  this 
method.  It  results  from  a  careful  scrutiny  of  the  structure  of  the  DataStream  database 
(also  see  discussion  on  potential  effects  of  survivorship  bias  below). 
To  control  for  market-wide  effects  three  control  variables  are  also  used:  the 
FTSE  All  share  index  (DataStream  item  FTALLSH),  the  91-day  UK  Treasury  bill 
discount  (DataStream  item  UKTRSBLYo)  and  the  average  gross  redemption  yield  on 
10-year  UK  gilts  (DataStream  item  UKMEDYLD).  The  data  on  the  FTSE  All  share 
index  is  available  for  all  trading  days.  If  the  accounting  period  end  does  not  coincide 
with  a  trading  day  the  last  value  known  on  the  trading  day  immediately  preceding  the 
balance  sheet  date  is  taken.  The  data  on  government  securities  is  available  for  the 
last  day  of  the  month  and  on  the  15'h  in  each  month  for  the  two  types  of  securities 
respectively.  If  the  accounting  period  end  does  not  coincide  with  a  trading  day  the 
value  immediately  preceding  the  balance  sheet  date  is  taken.  The  differences  in 
recording  date  might  affect  the  results  presented  in  this  study.  However,  the  choice 
of  government  securities'  yields  is  conditional  on  the  length  of  time  series  of  interest 
rates'  data  and  the  corresponding  database  coverage.  Yearly  inflation  rates  are  also 
collected  from  DataStream  (DataStream  code  UKRPANNL)  and  used  for 
comparative  purposes. 
123 Data  collection  and  samples  formation.  Financial  statement  data,  share 
price  data  and  other  market  data  used  in  this  study  are  collected  from  Thompson 
Financial  DataStream  as  per  21/01/2002.  Finns  with  double  class  securities  and/or 
quoted  preference  shares  were  eliminated.  Double-class  securities  and  preference 
shares  have  different  rights  attached  to  them  and  the  pricing  of  these  securities  may 
differ.  Using  large  samples  effectively  prevents  the  inclusion  of  these  securities,  as 
their  properties  cannot  be  inferred  automatically  from  the  database.  Even  if  they 
were,  the  nature  of  the  link  between  market  values  of  these  securities  and  accounting 
data  would  be  different  compared  to  ordinary  shares.  Financial  companies  were  also 
excluded.  Both  the  multiple-class  and  financial-companies  restrictions  are  still 
applied  in  recent  research  in  both  finance  (e.  g.,  Gregory,  Harris  and  Michou,  2001) 
and  accounting  literature  (e.  g.,  Rees,  1997),  although  Danbolt  and  Rees  (2002)  show 
that  for  certain  classes  of  financial  firms  the  relationships  between  financial 
statements  and  market  values  are  similar  to  non-financial  firms.  However,  a 
motivation  to  exclude  financial  firms  is  that  one  of  the  central  variables  studied  in 
this  thesis  is  the  working  capital  accruals  (Gore,  Pope  and  Singh,  2001).  The 
downloaded  sample  consisted  of  35,319  non-financial  firm-years  with  financial 
statement  data  from  31/12/1964  to  30/10/2001,  already  excluding  finns  with 
multiple-class  securities  (e.  g.,  firm-years  with  voting  and  non-voting  shares).  This 
sample  was  then  reduced  considerably  due  to  (number  of  observations  deleted  in 
parenthesis):  missing,  negative  or  zero  book  value  (584),  missing  ordinary  earnings 
data  (1,674),  missing  average  number  of  shares  (8  1),  duplicate  firm-years  (1,873) 
and  missing  lagged  price  (1,933).  As  there  were  only  32  observations  with  the 
required  contemporaneous  set  of  data  in  the  period  from  1964  to  1967  these 
124 observations  were  dropped,  leaving  thus  29,142  firm-years  in  the  sample  at  this 
stage. 
The  accounting  period  ends  are  not  restricted  to  December  31"  calendar  year- 
end  date,  as  this  would  reduce  the  sample  considerably.  Only  33.5%  (9,763)  of 
observations  in  the  sample  at  this  stage  had  a  December  3  I't  accounting  period  end. 
A  similar  percentage  of  non-December  year-end  firms  for  the  UK  sample  is  reported 
by  Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin  (2000).  There  are  no  UK  studies  that  would  indicate  any 
systematic  differences  between  December  31"  and  non-December  31"  accounting 
period  ends  firms.  However,  Smith  and  Pourciau  (1994)  show  that  there  are 
systematic  differences  between  December  31"  and  non-December  31"  US  firms  in 
terms  of  size  and  market  risk.  Specifically,  they  find  that  December  31"-year  end 
firms  are  larger  and  have  smaller  systematic  risk.  More  generally,  the  accounting 
year-ends  might  be  set  by  firms  in  low-season  periods.  Firms  within  the  same 
industry  would  thus  tend  to  have  similar  year-ends.  Simth  and  Pourciau  (1994)  find 
that  retail  firms  tend  to  have  non-December  year  ends.  Industry  differences  might 
thus  be  mirrored  by  their  choice  of  accounting  year  end  . 
49  To  the  extent  that  these 
differences  may  exist  in  the  UK,  my  study  produces  more  general  results  relative  to 
studies  that  use  only  December  31't  firms.  On  the  other  hand,  one  consequence  of 
this  decision  is  that  it  is  not  possible  to  control  for  market-wide  effects  in  accounting 
variables  by  deducting  a  market-wide  average  level  of  accounting  earnings  (or 
earnings  components)  from  firm-year  specific  earnings  (or  earnings  component), 
analogously  to  sensitivity  analyses  in  Basu  (1997). 
49  To  check  for  possible  industry  differences,  section  5.3  shows  the  main  results  for  five  different 
industries. 
125 Accounting  period  length  is,  however,  restricted  to  365±92  days  (±3  months). 
This  is  less  restrictive  than  in  recent  research  -  for  example,  Giner  and  Rees  (2001) 
restrict  their  sample  to  within  365±30  days.  However,  a  detailed  inspection  of  the 
data  reveals  that  a  significant  number  of  firms  in  the  initial  sample  that  have 
switched  accounting  year-ends  have  done  so  within  the  period  of  365±92  days.  In 
some  cases,  the  switches  involved  even  longer  periods.  The  method  of  data 
collection  ensures  that  all  switches  are  genuine  and  not  a  result  of  errors  in  data 
downloading.  It  is  assumed,  however,  that  there  are  no  errors  in  the  way  DataStream 
collects  the  data.  In  cases  where  the  accounting  period  exceeds  the  365±92  days 
limits,  the  observations  are  not  deleted,  but  the  method  of  extracting  lagged  share 
prices  changes.  In  these  cases,  the  lagged  price  Pj-j  is  defined  as  the  price  at  the 
balance  sheet  date  minus  365  days  (or  366  days  so  that  leap  years  are  accounted  for). 
An  equivalent  procedure  is  applied  in  recording  lagged  share  prices  beyond  one  lag. 
This  procedure  of  determining  the  date  at  which  the  lagged  price  is  recorded  is  an 
alternative  to  deleting  observations  due  to  too  wide  time  intervals  where  general 
economic  conditions  might  have  changed  significantly  and  confound  the  results 
obtained.  Again,  it  is  acknowledged  that  this  is  a  discretionary  decision  that  results  in 
a  larger  sample.  On  the  other  hand,  this  should  reduce  the  survivorship  bias. 
The  data  was  downloaded  from  the  active  research  list  and  all  dead  UK 
equities'  lists  to  minimise  the  effects  of  survivorship  bias.  Survivorship  bias  may 
play  an  important  part  in  estimations  that  require  lagged  share  price  data  by  up  to 
four  years.  This  effect  is  partially  offset  by  the  way  DataStream.  collects  financial 
statements  and  share  prices  data  (these  are  held  in  separate  parts  of  the  database). 
Historically,  in  the  contemporaneous  sample  used  in  this  study,  DataStream  database 
126 starts  recording  market  values  554.8  days  (or  1.52  years)  (medians:  272  days  or  9 
months)  before  the  first  balance  sheet  date.  This  further  supports  the  decision  not  to 
exclude  observations  with  missing  lagged  balance  sheet  dates  -  these  exclusions 
50 
would  tend  to  increase  any  potential  effects  of  survivorship  bias. 
Outliers  removal.  To  control  for  outliers,  top  and  bottom  one  percent  of 
observations  on  each  of  the  main  accounting  and  market  variables  of  the  pooled 
samples  (i.  e.,  outliers'  removal  is  not  performed  on  an  annual  basis)  are  eliminated. 
The  first  main  sample,  which  termed  the  contemporaneous  sample,  excludes  all 
observations  on  deflated,  per  share  accounting  variables,  OCF,  OP,  ORD,  EARN, 
A  WCAP,  DEP,  SPEC  and  market  variable  RETIj-1  that  are  bigger  (smaller)  than  the 
top  (bottom)  one  percentile  of  each  pooled  distribution  simultaneously.  The 
contemporaneous  sample  covers  the  period  1969-2001  inclusive  and  contains  25,888 
firm-years  after  eliminating  the  outliers.  To  arrive  at  the  second  main  sample,  tenned 
the  lagged  sample,  all  observations  on  deflated,  per  share  accounting  variables  OCF, 
OP,  ORD,  EARN,  AWCAP,  DEP,  SPEC  and  market  variables 
where  r--  0  ... 
3  that  are  bigger  (smaller)  than  the  top  (bottom)  one 
percentile  simultaneously  are  eliminated.  Note  that  the  deflators  are  different  in  the 
contemporaneous  and  lagged  samples  (P, 
-,  and  Pj-4  respectively).  Thus  the 
observations  in  the  lagged  sample  are  not,  strictly  speaking,  a  sub-sample  of  the 
contemporaneous  sample,  although  the  firm  has  to  survive  for  at  least  four  periods  to 
be  included  in  the  lagged  sample  and  would  usually,  but  not  necessarily,  be  included 
in  the  contemporaneous  sample.  There  are  20,536  firm-years  in  the  lagged  sample. 
50  It  is  an  (open)  empirical  question  wheter  these  effects  would  be  significant.  This  question  is  left  to 
further  research. 
127 It  is  acknowledge  that  this  method  of  outliers'  removal  is discretionary.  First, 
outliers  based  on  individual  components  of  working  capital  accruals  are  not 
removed,  but  only  on  the  aggregate  variable  AWCAP.  Second,  outliers  based  on  the 
variable  ACASH  are  also  not  removed.  Third,  some  analyses  are  also  conducted  and 
shown  for  illustrative  purposes  on  total  accruals,  and  again,  outliers  based  on  the 
Accruals  (tot.  )  variable  are  not'removed.  These  decisions  affect  the  sample 
composition,  (some  oo  the  results  presented  and  their  interpretation.  On  the  other 
hand,  both  the  contemporaneous  and  lagged  samples  used  in  this  study  appear  to  be 
more  restrictive  (i.  e.,  including  less  extreme  values  and  exhibiting  less  variability) 
than  samples  used  in  studies  in  the  comparable  literature.  The  issue  of  comparability 
of  samples  with  existing  literature  is  described  in  section  4.3. 
Sign  convention.  Throughout  this  study,  the  sign  convention  employed  by 
most  contemporary  papers  is  used  (e.  g.,  Dechow,  1994;  Dechow,  Kothari  and  Watts, 
1998;  Garrod  and  Hadi,  1998;  Barth,  Cram  and  Nelson,  2001):  a  negative  sign  of  an 
accounting  variable  denotes  an  earnings-decreasing  item  (cash  flow-increasing  item) 
and  a  positive  sip  indicates  an  eamings-increasing  item  (cash  flow-decreasing 
item).  For  example,  positive  AWCAP,  ADebtors  and  AStock  indicate  higher  ending 
values  of  respective  balance  sheet  accounts,  higher  earnings  and,  ceteris  paribus, 
lower  operating  cash  flows.  The  converse  applies  for  the  Wreditors  variable  -  more 
negative  values  indicate  higher  ending  value  of  creditors'  accounts  in  the  balance 
sheet,  lower  earnings  and  higher  operating  cash  flows.  More  negative  values  of  the 
depreciation  and  amortisation  expense  DEP  indicate  a  higher  (i.  e.,  more  earnings- 
reducing)  depreciation  charge. 
11)  5z This  sign  convention  is  often  expressed  conceptually  with  the  decomposition 
of  earnings  into  its  constituent  parts  as  presented  above  in  section  3.7: 
EARNINGS  =  CASH  FLOWS  +  ACCRUALS 
Note  that  the  opposite  convention  is  applied  in,  for  example,  Rayburn  (1986) 
and  McLeay,  Kassab  and  Helan  (1997).  Also,  this  "opposite"  sign  convention  is 
employed  in  the  theoretical  analyses  of  the  Feltharn  and  OhIson  (1996)  framework 
(see  discussion  of  the  clean  surplus  relation,  !  bid.,  p.  215). 
A  note  on  presentational  formats  of  data  and  method  of  Inferences. 
Throughout  this  study,  cross-sectional  averages  following  Fama  and  MacBeth 
(1973)  are  employed  to  present  regression  results  and  make  inferences  except  where 
explicitly  noted  (also  see  Kothari,  2001;  Fama  and  French,  2000;  Campbell,  Lo  and 
MacKinlay,  1995,  pp.  215-217;  Christie,  1987).  This  type  of  estimation  involves  the 
following  procedure.  First,  annual  regressions  are  estimated  and  estimated 
parameters  and  R  2S  collected.  Given  the  sarnple,  there  are  generally  T  individual  year 
regressions  for  each  dependent  variable  (the  actual  number  of  individual-year 
regressions  may  be  lower  in  some  cases  in  this  thesis  due  to  data  requirements). 
Next,  an  equally-weighted  average  of  these  estimated  regression  coefficients  is 
calculated  so  that  a  time-series  of  estimated  parameters  is  studied.  It  is  this  number 
that  is  presented  in  the  tables  and  commented  upon  in  the  text.  For  example, 
denoting  a  general  true  regression  coefficient  for  a  given  year  t  as  yl,  t--l  ...  T,  then, 
first,  the  T  coefficients  j, 
... 
P,.  are  estimated,  and,  second,  the  average  of  these 
coefficients  is  calculated  as: 
129 PY  )IT  T 
The  test  hypothesis  regarding  this  coefficient  stated  inalternative  forM'is: 
114:  The  cross-sectional  average  of  the  P 
... 
P,  does  not  equal  zero  (or, 
equivalently,  P#0). 
The  corresponding  test  statistic  is: 
r 
s.  e.  (P)  /  \rT- 
(4-2) 
distributed  with  (T-1)  degrees  of  freedom.  In  this  study,  the  values  are  7-  33  years 
and  the  corresponding  degrees  of  freedom  (T-I)=  32.  This  number  is  sufficiently 
large  for  the  corresponding  sample  of  cross-sectional  estimates  of  parameters  vt  to  be 
deemed  large  (e.  g.,  Anderson,  Sweeney  and  Williams,  1993,  pp.  308-313).  Critical 
values  of  the  test  statistic  are  ItJ=  2.7385  at  the  1%  significance  level,  It,  J=  2.0369  at 
the  5%  and  it,,  I=  1.6939  at  the  10%  signific  ance  level.  In  this  research,  inferences 
based  on  the  Faina-MacBeth  (1973)  procedure  are  based  on  the  5%  level.  The 
corresponding  t-statistics  are  always  shown  when  applicable.  Based  on  (4-2),  the 
standard  errors  can  be  calculated.  The  t-statistics  are  not  shown  in  cases  where  cross- 
sectional  averages  of  estimated  regression  coefficients  are  summed  or  used  in  ratios, 
as  is  the  case  with  total  and  relative  total  bad  news  coefficients.  The  t-statistics  is 
however  shown  for  the  cross-sectional  average  of  estimated  R2S. 
130 Both  the  sample-selection  procedure  and  the  method  of  estimation  and 
inference  used  minimise  the  effects  of  survivorship  bias.  This  is  particularly 
important  in  terms  of  tests  in  section  4.4.  There,  survivorship  bias  would  imply  more 
earnings-increasing  changes  in  most  of  the  variables  than  expected  by  chance 
(Kothari,  2001),  which  would  work  against  finding  mean-reversion  in  earnings  and 
some  components  (i.  e.,  a  random-walk  process  would  be  more  likely  to  be 
observed). 
All  other  presentations  are  generally  for  various  pooled  samples  and,  where 
applicable,  significance  detennined  at  the  1%  level  (ItJ=  1.960).  In  particular,  all 
descriptive  statistics'  tables  and  correlations  matrices  are  for  the  pooled  sample  (also 
see  the  outliers'  removal  procedure  above).  This  is  a  discretionary  decision  and  the 
effects  of  some  of  these  procedures  are  presented  in  the  sensitivity  analyses  section. 
4.3  GENERAL  PROPERTXES  OF  THE  CONTEMPORANEOUS 
AND  LAGGED  SAMPLES 
Table  4-1  provides  the  contemporaneous  overall  descriptive  statistics  for  the 
contemporaneous  and  lagged  samples  covering  the  period  1969-2001.  The  statistics 
are  for  the  pooled  sample,  rather  than  cross-sectional  averages,  and  correspond  to  the 
applied  method  of  outliers'  removal  (outliers  are  removed  on  a  pooled-sample  basis 
rather  than  on  a  year-by-year  basis). 
131 The  descriptives  show  that  both  the  contemporaneous  and  lagged  samples  are 
generally  comparable  to  UK  samples  used  in  recent  similar  literature  (Pope  and 
Walker,  1996;  Ball  Kothari  and  Robin,  2000;  Giner  and  Rees,  2001),  at  least  to  the 
extent  that  variables'  definitions  may  be  assumed  comparable  and  the  importance  of 
different  time  periods  assumed  away.  One  of  the  important  differences  with  the 
samples  in  these  studies  are  narrower  ranges  of  variables  EARN  and  ORD,  i.  e.,  the 
sample  in  this  study  is  less  extreme  in  respect  to  these  two  variables.  Both  earnings 
measures'  means  and  medians  are,  as  expected,  lower  than  the  OCF  mean  and 
median,  since  OCF  does  not  include  a  charge  for  capital  investments  and  EARN  and 
ORD  include  a  weighted  average  of  past  investment  in  the  form  of  depreciation  and 
amortisation  charge  DEP  (Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin,  2000). 
Third  and  second  moments  of  distributions  of  variables  also  provide  an 
indirect  indication  of  accounting  conservatism.  Consistent  with  conservative 
accounting  is  the  negative  skewness  (median  is  higher  than  the  mean)  of  the  EARN 
variable.  Conservative  accounting  results  in  a  timely  recognition  of  large,  complete, 
capitalised  amounts  of  bad  economic  news.  This  results  in  a  reduction  of  the  mean  of 
the  EARN-distribution,  but  a  lesser  change  in  the  median.  Good  economic  news  is, 
on  the  other  hand,  recognised  only  gradually  in  small,  but  persistent  amounts  as  they 
flow  through  to  financial  statements  (Givoly  and  Hayn,  2000).  Consistent  with  the 
notion  that  accounting  conservatism  is  an  accruals  phenomenon,  any  accounting  item 
that  is  constructed  with  accruals  (i.  e.,  earnings  and  accruals  themselves)  should  be 
negatively  skewed  (Watts,  2003).  In  this  research,  the  variable  EARN  is  the  earnings 
variable  which  includes  the  highest  level  of  accruals.  Those  accounting  items  that  are 
most  likely  to  reflect  the  application  of  ex-post  conservatism  should  exhibit  the 
132 highest  asymmetry.  Special  items  (SPEC)  in  fact  do  exhibit  a-  highly  negatively 
skewed  distribution,  as  do  depreciation  DEP  and  ACreditors.  Against  negative 
skewness  of  the  EARN  variable,  is  the  (unusual  or  unexpected)  positive  skewness  of 
the  ORD  (and  OP)  variable  (the  median  is  lower  than  the  mean).  These  findings  are 
consistent  with  economic  gains  being  incorporated  in  ordinary  income  as  "regular" 
items  and  economic  losses  as  exceptional  or  extraordinary  items  ("special  items"  in 
this  study).  Similar  UK  descriptives  are  also  reported  by  Charitou,  Clubb  and 
Andreou  (2001)  and  Charitou  and  Clubb  (1999)  for  their  equivalent  of  ordinary 
earnings  (the  statistics  differ  slightly  because  they  include  only  the  period  1985-1993 
and  1985-1992  respectively  and  may  differ  because  of  possible  differences  in  the 
databases  employed). 
Similarly,  the  variable  RET  exhibits  a  narrower  range,  a  standard  deviation 
close  to  Pope  and  Walker's  (1999),  and  lower  mean  and  median.  There  are,  however, 
significantly  more  observations  with  non-positive  returns  (44.2%  versus  37.6%  in 
their  study,  but  note  differences  in  definition  of  Dll-l).  Skewness  of  RET  is 
positiveand  since  there  is  no  asymmetry  in  incorporating  expected  economic 
gains/losses  but  firms  in  general  are  expected  to  incur,  on  average,  more  economic 
gains  than  losses.  Since  RET  is  not  bounded  by  any  rules  regarding  the  incorporation 
of  expected  economic  gains/losses,  its  variability  is  predicted  and  found  to  be  the 
highest. 
Similar  conclusions  can  also  be  reached  in  respect  of  comparisons  to  Giner 
and  Rees'  (2001)  and  Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin's  (2000)  UK  samples, 
133 Table  4-1:  Descriptive  statistics  for  the  contemporaneous  and  lagged  samples,  1969-2001 
PANEL  A:  Contempo- 
raneous  sample  (n=25,888)  Mean  St  Dev  Min  Q25  Med.  Q75  Max  Skew 
Cash  flows 
OCF  0.227  0.243  -0.393  0.091  0.174  0.303  1.895  1.820 
Eamings 
Op  0.197  0.188  -0.304  0.095  0.154  0.256  1.439  1.683 
ORD  0.091  0.097  -0.422  0.053  0.084  0.128  0.615  0.220 
EARN  0.083  0.122  -0.740  0.046  0.083  0.131  0.717  -0.783 
Accmals 
, dWCAP  0.043  0.172  -0.780  -0.018  0.021  0.094  1.010  0.545 
-  of  which  ADeblors  0.055  0.178  -3.545  -0.004  0.025  0.093  4.766  2.243 
-  of  whichdStock  0.048  0.171  -3.184  -0.003  0.013  0.079  2.890  1.148 
-  of  whichdCreditors  -0.060  0.206  -5.863  -0.096  -0.024  0.007  3.164  -2.652 
DEP  -0.077  0.076  -0.602  -0.097  -0.054  -0.029  -0.002  -2.572 
SPEC  -0.011  0.074  -0.567  -0.020  0.000  0.010  0.314  -1.824 
Retums 
RETI., 
-, 
0.129  0.466  -0.735  -0.176  0.058  0.347  2.422  1.217 
D 
.,, 
0.442  0.497  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.235 
PANEL  B:  Lagged  sample 
(n=20,536)  Mean  St  Dev  Min  Q25  Med.  Q73  Max  Skew 
Cash  flows 
0CF  0.313  0.328  -0.518  0.122  0.231  0.421  2.771  1.934 
Eamings; 
OP  0.290  0.292  -0.287  0.114  0.211  0.380  2.432  2.104 
ORD  0.141  0.148  -0.355  0.060  0.112  0.190  1.137  1.571 
EARN  0.133  0.172  -0.621  0.051  0.110  0.194  1.270  0.873 
Accruals 
, dWCAP  0.074  0.241  -0.865  -0.022  0.026  0.127  1.737  1.646 
-  of  which  ADebtors  0.086  0.253  -2.734  -0.006  0.032  0.125  4.815  3.326 
-  of  whichdStock  0.078  0.254  -2.570  -0.006  0.017  0.108  4.706  3.169 
-  of  whichdCreditors  -0.090  0.304  -8.000  -0.128  -0.030  0.010  3.548  -5.094 
DEP  -0.102  0.100  -0.830  -0.128  -0.072  -0.041  -0.003  -2.692 
SPEC  -0.013  0.095  -0.626  -0.027  0.000  0.014  0.436  -1.246 
Retums 
PET,., 
-, 
0.172  0.706  -2.283  -0.177  0.066  0.400  4.542  1.621 
PETt-I.  t-2  0.178  0.610  -1.473  -0.161  0.078  0.400  3.950  1.603 
PETt-Zt-3  0.158  0.501  -0.941  -0.162  0.077  0.382  3.028  1.357 
PETf-3, 
"  0.125  0.426  -0.698  -0.159  0.065  0.342  2.259  1.053 
D,,,,  0.431  0.495  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.277 
D  t-I.  t-2  0.420  0.494  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.323 
D 
t-2.  t--3  0.423  0.494  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.313 
Dt-3 
t-4  0.430  0.495  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.283 
Variables  are  defined  as  follows:  OCF  is  operating  cash  flow,  OP  is  adjusted  operating  profit,  ORD  is  earnings  before 
extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (ordinary  earnings),  EARN  is  earnings  after  extraordinary  an  d  exceptional  items, 
AWCAP  is  working  capital  accruals,  ADeblors  is  the  change  in  creditors,  ASIock  is  the  change  in  stock  and  work  in 
progress,  Wreditors  is  the  change  in  creditors,  DEP  is  depreciation  and  amortisation  expense  and  SPEC  is  special  items. 
All  variables  arc  per  share  and  scaled  by  P, 
-I 
in  the  contemporaneous  and  P,  4  in  the  lagged  sample,  RET,.,..,  is  defined  as 
RET,., 
-,  -  (Pr-PIYPI  in  the  contemporaneous  and  PET#.,, 
-,,  -  (P,  4--P,.,,  YP"  in  the  lagged  sample  and  D#.,, 
-,,  are 
dummy  variables  defined  as  D,,,.,,  -  II  if  PET#.,, 
-,  1:  S0;  0  otherwise  ).  Ile  defi  nitions  of  d  ummy  variables  are  independent 
of  deflators. 
134 notwithstanding  the  differences  in  databases  used  and  in  some  of  the  definitions  of 
variables  (in  particular,  Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin,  2000,  use  cum-dividend  returns 
rather  than  price  relatives). 
Overall,  the  two  main  samples  used  in  this  study  are  generally  less  extreme 
than,  but  otherwise  generally  comparable  with,  the  samples  used  in  related  literature. 
On  the  one  hand,  this  might  imply  that  the  results  are  potentially  less  driven  by 
influential  observations,  but  on  the  other  hand  potentially  informative  observations 
that  would  convey  significant  economic  conclusions  (Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin,  2000) 
might  have  been  removed.  To  account  for  these  influences,  Appendix  C,  Appendix 
D  and  section  5.7.3  show  in  full  how  the  inclusion  of  outliers  affects  the  main  results 
and  some  additional  analyses. 
Table  4-2  shows  descriptive  statistics  for  the  contemporaneous  sample  split 
by  good  news  (Panel  A)  and  bad  news  (Panel  B).  Good  news  observations  exhibit 
higher  deflated  operating  cash  flows  and  lower  aggregate  accruals  (-0.036  for  good 
news  versus  -0.056  for  bad  news;  not  shown  in  table).  Average  aggregate  accruals 
represent  30.4%  of  operating  cash  flows  for  bad  news  observations  and  only  13.7% 
for  good  news  firms.  Of  the  accruals  components,  SPEC  for  bad  news  observations 
is  more  than  twice  as  large  as  for  good  news  observations. 
Formal  tests  of  the  differences  in  mean  values  of  earnings  and  earnings 
components  are  summarised  below  in  Table  4-3.  For  each  deflated  accounting  item 
in  the  two  panels  of  Table  4-2,  the  following  hypothesis  in  alternative  form  is  made: 
135 Table  4-2:  Descriptive  statistics  for  the  contemporaneous  sample  split  by  good  news  (positive 
returns)  and  bad  news  (non-positive  returns),  1969-2001 
PANEL  A:  Good  news 
only(n=14,445) 
Mean  St  Dev  Min  Q25  Med  Q75  Max  Skew 
Cash  flows 
OCF  0.261  0.260  -0.391  0.113  0.201  0.347  1.895  1.711 
Earnings 
Op  0.238  0.200  -0.304  0.119  0.184  0.304  1.430  1.689 
ORD  0.117  0.096  -0.420  0.071  0.102  0.153  0.611  0.645 
EARN  0.113  0.114  -0.735  0.067  0.101  0.156  0.673  -0.268 
Accmals 
AWCAP  0.055  0.181  -0.779  -0.015  0.026  0.109  1.010  0.758 
-  of  which  ADebtors  0.070  0.189  -1.877  0.001  0.033  0.111  4.766  3.288 
-  of  which  AStocks  0.061  0.181  -3.184  -0.001  0.017  0.092  2.890  1.362 
-  of  which  ACreditors  -0.076  0.224  -5.863  -0.114  -0.031  0.002  3.164  -3.253 
DEP  -0.082  0.080  -0.602  -0.103  -0.057  -0.031  -0.002  -2.436 
SPEC  -0.009  0.073  -0.562  -0.020  0.000  0.011  0.314  -1.580 
Returns 
RETI., 
-, 
0.425  0.407  0.000  0.136  0.303  0.574  2.422  1.808 
PANEL  B:  Bad  news  only  Mean  St  Dev  Min  Q25  Med.  Q75  Max  Skew  (n=11,433) 
Cash  flows 
OCF  0.184  0.212  -0.393  0.070  0.144  0.250  1.882  1.918 
Earnings 
OP  0.144  0.156  -0.304  0.068  0.120  0.195  1.439  1.521 
ORD  0.058  0.089  -0.422  0.032  0.063  0.095  0.615  -0.538 
EARN  0.044  0.121  -0.740  0.018  0.061  0.097  OJI7  -1.419 
Accruals 
AWCAP  0.028  0.159  -0.780  -0.021  0.016  0.078  1.009  0.062 
-  of  which  ADebtors  0.035  0.161  -3.545  -0.011  0.017  0.071  2.096  -0.006 
-  of  which  AStocks  0.033  0.156  -1.655  -0.007  0.008  0.063  1.509  0.637 
-  of  whichdCreditors  -0.040  0.180  -2.170  -0.075  -0.016  0.014  2.159  -0.989 
DEP  -0.070  0.070  -0.583  -0.089  -0.049  -0.027  -0.002  -2.759 
SPEC  -0.013  0.074  -0.567  -0.021  0.000  0.008  0.314  -2.119 
Returns 
_RETI.  (-,  -0.245  0.181  -0.735  -0.364  -0.209  -0.095  0.000  .  0.669 
Variables  are  defined  as  follows:  OCF  is  operating  cash  flow,  OP  is  adjusted  operating  prof  it,  ORD  is  earnings  before 
extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (ordinary  earnings),  EARN  is  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items, 
AWCAP  is  working  capital  accruals,  Meblors  is  the  change  in  creditors,  &Iock  is  the  change  in  stock  and  work  in 
progress,  Wreditors  is  the  change  in  creditors,  DEP  is  depreciation  and  amortisation  expense  and  SPEC  is  special  items. 
All  variables  are  per  share  and  scaled  by  &I  in  the  contemporaneous  and  P,.  4  in  the  lagged  sample.  RET,.,,,  is  defined  as 
RET4, 
-i=(Pr-A..  IYP,.  I  and  D,.,.,  are  dummy  variables  defined  as  D,.,,  -(I  if  RET,.,.  150;  0  otherwise).  The  definitions  of 
dummy  variables  are  independent  of  deflators. 
HA-  : 
YGN 
- 
YBN  #0 
where  YGN  and  Y,,  represent  mean  values  of  deflated  accounting  variables  listed  in 
the  leftmost  column  of  Table  4-2.  Thus,  the  alternative  form  of  the  hypothesis 
136 indicates  that  differences  in  average  values  of  accounting  variables  between  the  good 
news  and  the  bad  news  sample  are  to  be  expected.  The  independent-samples  version 
of  the  test  of  differences  of  means  that  assumes  the  two  groups  of  observations 
separated  by  good  and  bad  economic  news  are  independent,  but  have  equal 
variances,  is  employed.  The  test  statistic  under  these  assumptions  is  (Anderson, 
Sweeney  and  Williams,  1993,  pp.  347-352): 
(YGN 
-  YRN) 
22  1)(ay,  +  (n,,  -  I)a  YON 
GH 
(4-3) 
distributed  at  (nGA+nBN-  2)  degrees  of  freedom,  where,  additionally,  nGNand  nBNare 
the  numbers  of  observations  affected  by  good  and  bad  news  respectively  and  ay',,, 
and  a'  are  the  variances  of  deflated  accounting  variables  for  the  two  groups.  YDN 
Additionally,  the  Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon  non-parametric  test  is  employed 
(Anderson,  Sweeney,  Williams,  1993,  pp.  721-727;  Stata  Corporation,  2001,  pp. 
213-220).  The  hypothesis  stated  in  alternative  from  is: 
A:  Two  populations  are  not  identical. 
and  the  test  statistics  is: 
T-EfTj 
(4-4)  4v  -ar  (-T) 
137 nr,  v 
where  T 
RGN, 
l 
is  the  sum  of  ranks 
RGN,  I  in  the  good  news  sample,  E[71= 
nGN(nGN  +  nBN  +1)/2  and  var(T)  = 
(nGNnBN  a2)  1(nGN  +  nBm)  and  cý  is  the  variance  of 
nGN+NBM 
the  combined  ranks  ri  of  the  total  contemporaneous  sample  a'  =Z  (r,  -  F), 
n-  1-1 
The  results  of  both  fonnal  tests  are  shown  below  in  Table  4-3.  Using  both 
tests,  the  good  news  and  bad  news  sub-samples  differ.  Compared  to  the  bad  news 
sample,  good  news  firms  have  larger  values  of  deflated  accounting  items  in  the 
ab.  solute  sense.  The  only  difference  is  the  special  items  SPEC,  which  are  on  average 
more  eamings-reducing  in  the  case  of  bad  news  firms.  51  This  is  consistent  with  (an 
important  part  oo  bad  news  being  passed  through  special  items  and  with  accounting 
conservatism. 
Table  4-3:  Formal  tests  of  differences  in  means  and  medians  between  good  and  bad 
economic  news  firms,  pooled  sample,  1969-2001 
Variables  Mean  diff.  (YGN 
- 
YBN)  t-stat  MWW  z-stat. 
-  Cash  flows 
Eamings  , 
Accruals 
OCF  0.078  25.939  29.705 
OP  0.094  41.481  46.550 
ORD  0.059  50.909  58.370 
EARN  0.069  47.189  54.750 
AWCAP  0.028  12.959  11.468 
-  of  which  ADeblors  0.035  15.855  19.737 
-  of  which  ASýocks  0.028  13.294  14.506 
-  of  which  ACreditors  -0.036  -13.879  -18.380 
DEP  -0.012  -12.944  -13.723 
SPEC  0.004  4.752  4.629 
Accruals  (total)  0.020  7.762  6.263 
Notes.  Variables  are  defined  as  follows:  OCF  is  operating  cash  flow,  OP  is  adjusted  operating  profit,  ORD  is 
earnings  before  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (ordinary  earnings),  EARN  is  earnings  after  extraordinary  and 
exceptional  items,  AWCAP  is  working  capital  accruals,  ADeblors  is  the  change  in  creditors,  AStock  is  the  change  in 
stock  .  ACreditors  is  the  change  in  creditors,  DEP  is  depreciation  and  amortisation  expense  and  SPEC  is  special 
items.  All  variables  are  per  share  and  scaled  by  P,.  I.  MWW  z-stat.  is  the  Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxson  z-statistic.  See 
Table  4-2  for  a  full  set  of  descriptives  by  the  sign  of  the  economic  news. 
51  Compare  Table  4-2  and  Table  4-3. 
138 Table  4-4  reports  Pearson's  bivariate  correlation  coefficient  (Spearman's 
rank  correlation  coefficient)  below  (above)  the  diagonal.  Correlations  between  pairs 
of  variables  are  generally  signed  as  expected  given  the  underlying  economic 
relations  between  the  two  variables  in  a  pair.  Current-period  returns  are  positively 
associated  with  operating  cash  flows  and  all  earnings  measures.  The  correlation 
between  returns  and  earnings  is  stronger  than  between  returns  and  operating  cash 
flows  (Charitou,  Clubb  and  Andreou,  2001).  Current-period  returns  are  only  weakly 
positively  correlated  with  aggregate  accruals  (Accruals  (tot.  )).  They  are,  however, 
positively  correlated  with  eamings-increasing  accruals  measures  and  negatively  with 
earnings-decreasing  accruals.  However,  all  individual  accruals'  components  exhibit 
statistically  (and  presumably  economically)  significant  correlations  with  returns, 
which  suggests  that  accruals  have  an  important  role  in  reflecting  economic  news.  An 
exception  to  this  is  the  special  items  (SPEC).  Assuming  that  current  bad  news  is 
written-off  through  special  items  (SPEC)  (constituting  mostly  of 
extraordinary/exceptional  items),  a  weak  positive  correlation  with  current-period 
returns  is  surprising  at  this  stage.  This  suggests  that  bad  news,  reflected  in  returns,  is 
passed  through  other  accruals'  components. 
All  individual  working  capital  accruals'  components  are  strongly  negatively 
correlated  with  operating  cash  flows.  This  is  consistent  with  operating  accruals  being 
used  to  smooth  temporary  changes  in  operating  cash  flows  to  produce  a  less  variable 
time-series  of  earnings  (Dechow,  1994),  or,  in  other  words,  to  remove  negative  serial 
correlation  in  operating  cash  flows  (Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin,  2000). 
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ýK  :., The  accruals  components  ADebtors  and  AStock  on  the  one  hand  and 
ACreditors  on  the  other  are  strongly  negatively  correlated.  This  is  likely  due  to 
growing  firms  where  the  requirements  for  both  the  current  asset  components  and  the 
current  liability  component  are  likely  to  be  increasing  (Sloan,  1996).  By  expanding 
operations,  firms  sell  more  and  have  more  debtors  and  buy  more  from  suppliers  and 
thus  have  more  creditors.  To  support  higher  sales  it  is  likely  that  firms  will  also  have 
higher  stock  and  work  in  progress. 
Splitting  the  correlation  matrix  by  good/bad  news  (Table  4-5)  reveals  some 
additional  interesting  points.  In  the  bad  news  sub-swnple,  current  returns  are 
positively  correlated  with  aggregate  accruals,  but  slightly  negatively  (Pearson's 
correlation  coefficient  is  statistically  significant  at  the  5%  level)  in  the  good  news 
sub-sample.  Therefore,  in  the  good  news  sub-sample,  the  higher  the  returns  (RE7), 
the  more  negative  (i.  e.,  more  earnings-decreasing)  the  aggregate  accruals. 
Conversely,  in  the  bad  news  sub-sample,  the  lower  the  returns  (i.  e.,  more  away  from 
zero),  the  lower  (i.  e.,  more  eamings-decreasing)  the  aggregate  accruals.  This  result  is 
likely  due  to  the  difference  in  special  items  (SPEC).  The  more  positive  the  returns, 
the  lower  (i.  e.,  more  earnings  decreasing)  the  special  items  (SPEC)  in  the  good  news 
sub-sample  and,  similarly,  the  more  negative  the  returns  the  lower  (i.  e.,  again  more 
earnings  decreasing)  the  special  items  (SPEC)  in  the  bad  news  sub-sample.  Such 
behaviour  of  aggregate  accruals  in  general  and  SPEC  in  particular  is  consistent  with 
the  idea  of  earnings  management,  whereby  accruals  show  the  tendency  to  (slightly) 
decrease  earnings  in  the  good  news  sub-sample,  presumably  to  smooth  earnings  over 
the  years. 
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U-1 
c The  difference  in  the  role  accruals  have  in  earnings  formation  for  good/bad 
news  firms  can  also  be  seen  from  the  following  relations:  EARN  is  more  strongly 
correlated  with  OCF  than  with  Accruals  (tot.  )  for  the  good  news  sub-sample.  This 
relation  holds  for  every  component  of  aggregate  accruals.  Conversely,  for  the  bad 
news  sub-sample,  EARN  is  more  strongly  correlated  with  Accruals  (tot.  )  than  with 
OCF.  Again,  this  relation  holds  for  every  component  of  aggregate  accruals  except 
the  depreciation  charge  (DEP).  This  is  consistent  with  bad  news  being  reflected  in 
accruals  and  with  the  notion  that  accounting  conservatism  is  an  accruals 
phenomenon. 
4.4  PERSXSTENCE  OF  EARNXNGS  AND  EARNXNGS 
COMPONENTS 
Under  ex-post  conservative  accounting,  bad  news  must  be  recognised.  in 
earnings  immediately  and  completely  in  capitalised  amounts.  The  particular 
accounting  item  (an  earnings  figure  or  an  earnings  component  item)  that  reflects  a 
given  bad  news  is  expected  to  be  large  and  transitory  -  i.  e.,  less  persistent.  The 
converse  holds  for  good  news.  The  accounting  item  that  reflects  a  given  good  news 
is  expected  to  be  relatively  small  and  permanent  -  i.  e.,  more  persistent.  Since  only  a 
fraction  of  current  good  news  will  be  recognised  in  current  earnings  or  earnings' 
components,  the  rest  will  be  gradually  (and  in  relatively  small  amounts)  recognised 
143 in  future  periods'  earnings  (or  earnings  component),  making  current  earnings  less 
timely.  52 
Due  to  the  problems  related  to  scale  presented  in  section  2.3.2,  the 
persistence  of  earnings  and  main  earnings  components  is  empirically  tested  by 
estimating  the  following  empirical  equivalent  of  the  model  presented  in  section  3.2. 
This  empirical  form  has  been  used,  among  others,  by  Basu  (1997)  and  Penman 
(1992): 
AXI 
Ir  -1  +C  -1  +  17t  1 
+;  r,  C, 
-, 
+  0)1 
AXt 
02Ct-I 
AXI 
PI-I  pt-2  Pt-2  (4-5) 
where  X  is,  generally,  an  undeflated  per  share  accounting  figure  (earnings,  operating 
cash  flows  or  accruals  and  accruals'  components)  and  Cl-I  is  an  indicator  variable 
taking  the  value  of  one  if  AXt_j:!  ý-O  and  zero  otherwise.  If  a  time-series  of  a  deflated, 
per  share  accounting  item  (AXIlPt-1)  follows  a  random  walk,  then  E[6,  ]=  0-a 
positive  change  in  X  is  expected  to  repeat  itself  in  future  periods.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  a  time-series  of  a  deflated,  per  share  accounting  item  (AXIlPt-1)  mean-reverts, 
then  the  expected  value  of  the  estimated  iA  coefficient  is  expected  to  be  in  the 
interval  -0.50:  5E[61]<O.  Expected  values  of  estimated  parameters  ir,  and  ir2  are 
both  zero  E[  ir,  ]=  E[ 
'r2  Iý0.  The  estimated  parameter 
62 
captures  the  differential 
persistence  of  negative  lagged  changes  (AXI-IIPI-2)  and  the  total  persistence  of 
negative  lagged  changes  is  given  by  the  sum  of  the  two  slope  coefficients  (A  +  62). 
52  Recall  that  timeliness  of  earnings  relates  to  the  extent  that  current  earnings  reflect  value-relevant 
information  (e.  g.,  Beekes,  Pope  and  Young,  2003). 
144 Given  the  sign  convention  described  in  section  4.2,  negative  values  of  AXI-I  (or, 
equally,  AXI)  indicate  an  earnings-decreasing  change  and  positive  values  an 
eamings-increasing  change  in  X.  Firm-specific  subscripts  in  equation  (4-5)  are 
omitted  for  parsimony. 
Based  on  Section  3.2.2  and  existing  literature,  the  following  total  and  partial 
coefficient  values  on  empirical  variables  X,  presented  in  Table  4-6  are  expected.  The 
table  shows  a  summary  of  the  predictions  of  the  persistence  hypothesis  (HI).  The 
expected  values  in  Table  4-6  may  also  serve  as  hypothesized  figures  against  which 
the  estimated  coefficients  are  tested.  Given  that  for  each  of  the  main  accounting 
(dependent)  variables  used  in  this  study,  there  are  four  panels  and  for  each  panel 
there  are  33  yearly  cross  sections  and  for  each  of  these  cross  sections  A,  ctý  and  the 
total  coefficient  on  bad  news  ((ý  +  4),  a  large  number  of  estimated  regression 
coefficients  must  be  evaluated  against  the  null  hypothesis  presented  above  in  Table 
4-6.  While  these  test  results  are  omitted  from  the  main  results  table  below  for 
reasons  of  tractability  of  exposition,  they  are  presented  in  full  in  Appendix  E,  Table 
E-1.  The  table  shows  the  number  of  times  (years)  within  each  dependent  variable, 
each  partition  and  each  year  the  estimated  regression  coefficient  or  their  linear 
combination  equals  to  the  expected  value.  53  Some  of  the  more  interesting  results  are 
commented  below  in  appropriate  sections. 
53  Unfortunately,  the  available  test  from  the  econometric  package  used  only  allows  testing  for  strict 
equalities.  Testing  for  inequaltities  would  provide  more  helpful  for  certain  accruals  components,  but 
would  be  very challenging  in  terms  of  collecting  such  a  large  number  of  estimated  regression 
coefficients.  This  also  represents  an  additional  reason  why  the  tests  are  not  presented  in  the  main  body 
of  this  thesis  but  in  the  appendix.  The  weakness  of  such  a  test  or  rather  a  presentation  of  a  large 
number  of  tests  are  acknowledged. 
145 Table  4-6:  Expected  values  of  the  coefficients  based  on  estimated  persistence  models 
Empirical  variable  X, 
LI  A1 
'4621 
44+621 
_ 
OCF  No  Partition  -0.50  (-0.35) 
All  partitions  -0.50  (-0.35)  0.00  -0.50  (-0.35) 
OP.  ORD,  EARN  No  Partition  0.00 
All  partitions  0.00  -0.50  -0.50 
, dWCAP,  ADebtors,  dStock  dCreditors  No  Partition  -0.50 
All  partitions  >  -0.50  <  0.00  -0.50 
DEP  No  Partition  0.00 
All  partitions  0.00  0.00  0.00 
SPEC  No  Partition  -0.50 
All  partitions  >  -0.50  <  0.00  -0.50 
Notes.  OCF  is  operating  cash  flow,  OP  is  adjusted  operating  profit,  ORD  is  earnings  before  extraordinary  and  exceptional 
items  (ordinary  earnings),  EARN  is  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  AWCAP  is  working  capital  accruals. 
ADeblors  is  the  change  in  creditors,  AStock  is  the  change  in  stock,  Wreditors  is  the  change  in  creditors,  DEP  is 
depreciation  and  amortisation  expense,  SPEC  is  special  items. 
Sources:  Dechow,  Kothad  and  Watts,  1998;  Lo  and  Elgers,  1994. 
Each  panel  within  Table  4-7  shows  the  results  of  estimating  regression  in 
equation  (4-5)  using  one  of  the  earnings  or  eamings-component  variables.  Within 
each  panel,  four  partitions  are  shown,  with  the  purpose  of  showing  differential 
behaviour  of  positive  and  negative  changes  in  deflated,  per  share  accounting 
variables.  Moreover,  these  partitions  provide  comparability  with  Basu's  (1997,  Table 
3)  and  other  results.  The  partitions  are  the  following:  54 
no  partition  (restricted  versions  of  (4-5)), 
-  results  partitioned  by  the  sign  of  the  lagged  change  in  each  accounting  item 
AXt-l=  Xt-I-Xt-2and  the  dummy  defined  as  Ct-,  =  11  if  AXt-1:  50;  zero  otherwise), 
54  Other  partitions  are  possible.  For  example,  Freeman  (1987)  separates  good  and  bad  news  firms  by 
the  change  in  the  return  on  equity  (AROE). 
146 results  partitioned  by  the  sign  of  the  lagged  level  of  earnings  after  extraordinary 
and  exceptional  items  (EARN)  and  the  dummy  defined  as  Ct-I=  (I  if  EARN,  -I!  -<O; 
zero  otherwise}  (also  see  Hayn,  1995;  Jan  and  Ou,  1995); 
results  partitioned  by  the  sign  of  lagged  returns  RETf-j,  j-2  and  the  dummy  defined 
as  C, 
-,  =  (I  if  RETI-It-2:  50;  zero  otherwise).  It  must  be  noted  that  the  returns 
variable  is  defined  differently  for  the  use  in  this  section  compared  to  the  rest  of 
the  text  to  maintain  deflator  comparability  with  other  partitions: 
RET, 
-I,  t-2-'2  (Pt-l-Pt-2)lPt-2- 
All  variables  used  are  per  share  and  scaled  by  opening  price  (either  by  Pi-I  or 
by  PI-2).  All  results  are  cross-sectional  averages  of  parameters  estimated  for  year  t, 
t--  1969  ...  2001,  and  associated  t-statistics  are  calculated  according  to  the  Fama  and 
MacBeth  (1973)  procedure:  for  each  year,  each  dependent  variables'  changes  and 
each  partition,  the  regressions  are  estimated  annually  and  inferences  are  made  on  the 
basis  of  the  time  series  of  parameters  resulting  from  the  cross-sectional  regressions 
(Kothari,  2001).  It  is  acknowledged  that  other  deflators  in 
(4-5)  instead  of  the  opening  prices  might  be  used  -  for  example,  Fama  and  French 
(2000)  use  current  period  book  value  of  total  assets,  rather  than  the  lagged  value  and 
the  open  question  remains  as  to  whether  the  entire  regression  equation  should  be 
deflated  by  the  same  variable. 
The  samples  used  in  analyses  in  this  section  are  sub-samples  of  the  main 
contemporaneous  sample.  In  addition  to  restrictions  placed  on  the  data  to  arrive  at 
the  contemporaneous  sample,  two  additional  restrictions  are  placed  on  the  values  the 
two  deflated  variables  (AXt1Pj-j)  and  (A41/P, 
-2)  can  take  by  removing  the  top  and 
147 bottom  one  percentile  on  individual  distributions  of  (AXtIPt-1)  and  (&Xj-j1Pt-2)-  It  was 
decided  to  place  these  additional  restrictions  after  detailed  inspection  of  the  data 
revealed  a  significant  number  of  observations  that  were  clearly  outliers  even  after  the 
restrictions  applied  in  forming  the  contemporaneous  sample  were  used.  These 
additional  restrictions  are,  however,  done  on  a  variable-by-variable  case  and  not 
simultaneously.  While  this  is  a  discretionary  decision,  removing  outliers 
simultaneously  would  mean  excluding  too  many  observations  and  there  was  concern 
about  the  effects  such  restrictions  might  have  on  the  overall  conclusionS.  55  In 
particular,  applying  too  severe  restrictions  might  result  in  significant  survivorship- 
bias  issues. 
The  empirical  results  are  presented  in  Table  4-7.  Each  panel  in  the  table 
corresponds  to  an  accounting  figure  and  within  each  panel  four  partitions  described 
above  are  presented.  The  discussion  is  by  main  groups  of  earnings  and  earnings 
components. 
Operating  cash  flows.  Panel  A  of  shows  that,  on  average,  operating  cash 
flows  (OC.  F)  are  strongly  mean-reverting  -  i.  e.,  cash  outflows  are  followed  by  cash 
inflows  and  vice  versa.  For  example,  increased  sales  increase  the  need  for  additional 
net  working  capital  investment,  thereby  causing  cash  outflows  that  are  followed  in 
the  next  accounting  period  by  cash  inflows  as  receivables  are  collected,  inventories 
liquidated  and  creditors  repaid  (Dechow,  Kothari  and  Watts,  1998).  The  converse 
55  For  example,  in  the  case  of  changes  in  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  AEARN, 
different  outliers-removal  rules  would  mean:  without  individual  top/bottom  one  percentile  filters  on 
(AEARNIP,  j)  and  (AEARN,.  IIP,  -2) 
the  average  number  of  observations  per  year  would  have  been 
784.5;  by  applying  individual  filters  on  AEARN,  and  AEAR&I  as  well  as  the  main  (pooled)  filter 
695.5  (as  is);  by  applying  the  main  (pooled)  as  well  as  all  individual  filters  on  (WP, 
-I)  and 
(A4,  /P,  2)  524.1.  There  would  also  have  been  significant  effects  on  the  descriptives  of  (AX/PI)  and 
(" 
-1/pi-2). 
in  particular  the  dispersion  measures. 
148 holds  for  sales  decreases.  Therefore,  both  OCF  increases  and  decreases  should  not 
persist.  In  the  dOCFt_j  -partition,  s  expected,  the  estimated  parameter  w,  indicates 
that  the  time  series  of  earnings-increasing  AOCF,  >O  is  mean-reverting,  on  average. 
Moreover,  there  is  no  asymmetry  in  operating  cash  flow  reversals  -  the  estimated 
parameter  6  is  statistically  insignificant,  indicating  that  both  positive  and  negative  W2 
AOCFj  mean-revert  equally  quickly.  An  exception  is  a  mild  asymmetric  speed  with 
which  eamings-decreasing  changes  in  AOCF  mean-revert  (lagged  returns  partition) 
when  the  observations  are  partitioned  by  lagged  returns  (economic  news)  (RETt.  jý-2)- 
The  parameter  6),  and,  in  partitioned  results,  the  SUM  (4+  W^  2  ),  is  analogous  to 
Dechow,  Kothari  and  Watts  (1998)  average  of  first-order  autocorrelation  coefficients 
corr(AOCF,,  AOCFI-I).  The  results  presented  here  show  that  they  are  close  to  their 
theoretical  prediction  (-0.350),  given  their  assumptions  and  the  role  the  accruals 
have  in  their  model.  Details  of  the  test  of  this  expectation  presented  in  Table  C-1 
show  that,  on  average,  the  6A  =  -0.350  in  22  out  of  33  individual  years.  When 
partitioning  by  the  sign  of  news,  the  number  falls  to  approximately  half  of  the  years 
(either  15  or  18),  which  is  expected  given  the  magnitudes  of  these  estimated 
regression  coefficients.  However,  when  the  total  persistence  of  negative  OCF  is 
considered,  in  20/33  years  the  estimated  regression  coefficient  (A  +  6ý2  )  equals  - 
0.350.  The  other  two  partitions  give  similar  results. 
To  check  further  the  results  on  (operating)  cash  flows,  Appendix  F  (Table  F- 
2)  shows  the  results  of  estimating  (4-5)  using  an  accounting  variable  that  is 
presumably  least  "affected"  by  accruals  components.  Because  the  net  change  in  cash 
(ACASH)  is  affected  less  by  the  "profit-spread  effecf'  given  that  the  item  is  affected 
149 by  all  other  segments  of  a  firm's  operations  and  finances  (e.  g.,  loan  repayments),  it 
should  revert  even  faster,  as  is  indicated  above  in  Table  4-6.  As  the  table  in  the 
appendices  shows,  using  either  partition  to  separate  good  and  bad  news,  the 
estimated  ctý  coefficient  is  reliably  higher  than  for  the  operating  cash  flows  (OCF). 
Moreover,  there  is  no  asymmetry  in  reversals  for  eamings-increasing  changes  in 
ACASH  compared  to  earnings-decreasing  changes  in  the  variable.  The  exception  is, 
as  with  the  operating  cash  flows,  the  partition  by  RETI.  1,1-2.  which  indicates  that  for 
bad  news  firins,  cash  flows  revert  faster  to  the  nonn  than  for  good  news  firins. 
Perhaps  the  fact  that  the  estimated  incremental  coefficients  OJ2  in  all  three  partitions 
for  both  the  OCF  and  ACASH  regressions  are  negative  (albeit  in  two  out  of  three 
cases  insignificant)  can  be  taken  as  a  mild  indication  bad  news  firms  must  revert 
operations  and  financing  activities  back  to  the  nonn  faster  than  would  otherwise  be 
required  or  expected.  This  might  be  due  to  "loss  factors"  presented  in  sections  2.2.4 
and  4.8.1. 
Table  4-7:  Persistence  of  earnings  and  earnings  components,  1969-2001 
PANEL  A:  Operating  cash  flows  (OCF)  avg.  n  jr,  ;  r,  clý  62  R2 
No  partition  565.2  0.042  -0.345  0.5-3 
3.182  .  12.046  10-819 
, dOCF,,  partition  565.2  0.014  0.075  -0.305  -0.001  0.182 
2.096  1.458  -9.145  -0.013  7.099 
EARN-,  -level  partition  565.2  0.043  0.033  -0-332  .  0.107  0.164 
3.299  1.585  -12.660  -1.074  11.854 
RET, 
-1.1-2  partition  565.2  0.061  -0.230  -0.260  -0.230  0.168 
3.324  -6.353  -11.318  -6.353  10.812 
PANEL  B:  Operating  profit  (OP)  avg.  n 
irl  ir2 
OA  62  R2 
No  partition  695.5  0.021  -0.058  0.025 
4A81  -2.594  2.427 
, dOP,.,  partition  695.5  0.013  -0.013  0.063  -0.503  0.073 
3.619  4.489  2.996  -9.711  5.626 
EARN, 
-,  -level  partition  695.5  0.012  0.064  0.033  -0.271  0.088 
2.602  7.839  1.822  -6.226  7.259 
RETI-1.1-2 
partition  695.5  0.020  0.002  0.009  -0.183  0.042 
4.751  0.341  0.400  -6.139  3.795 
Cont. 
150 PANEL  C:  Ordinarv  earninjzs  (ORD)  avg.  n 
irl  ;  r2  4  62  R2 
No  partition  696.3  0.011  -0.067  0.026 
3.981  -2.925  2S89 
AORA,  partition  696.3  0.005  -0.013  0.101  -0.690  0.103 
2.063  -5.655  4.613  -11.750  8.593 
EARN, 
-,  -level  partition  696.3  0.004  0.054  0.046  -0.312  0.113 
1.409  9.036  2.294  -4.972  9.152 
RET, 
-I,,  -2  partition  696.3  0.010  0.004  0.029  -0.233  0.050 
3.594  0.991  1.347  -7.103  4.146 
PANEL  D:  Earnings  after  extraordinary 
and  exceptional  items  (EARN)  avg.  n 
irl  ir,  eO2  R2 
No  partition  695.5  0.013  -0.234  0.077 
3AO9 
-7.307 
8.571 
AEARNt-i  partition  695.5  0.002  -0.020  -0.054  -0.696  0.177 
0.717  -7.002  .  1.529  -9.681  11.641 
EARN.,  -level  partition  695.5  -0.003  0.094  -0.069  -0.397  0.215 
-0.895 
4.162 
.  2.739  -3.460 
13.474 
RET, 
_U-2  partition  695.5  0.013  0.001  -0.121  -0.300  0.112 
3.977  0.137  4.003  -6.521  9.454 
PANEL  E:  Working  capital  accruals  r  6 
2  R 
(AWCAP)  avg.  n  Irl  ;  2  OA  2 
No  partition  695.3  0.007  -0.407  0.178 
0.833  -20.117  19.800 
A(AWCAP,.,  )-partition  695.3  -0.015  0.027  -0.296  -0.147  0.196 
-2.183  5.790  -6.964  -2.362  20.270 
EARN,.,  -level  partition  695.3  0.002  0.015  -0.390  -0.118  0.194 
0.279  0.814  -19.190  -2.206  19.249 
RET, 
-1.1-2  partition  695.3  0.018  -0.020  -0.337  -0.204  0.205 
2.955  -1.912  .  19.212  -8.873  15.002 
PANEL  E-1:  A  WCAP  component  -  a  ir  'r  c  6  R2 
ADebtors  vg.  n  l  2  lý  2 
No  partition  692.6  0.011  -0.423  0.199 
1.550  -17.369  9.635 
AADebtors,.,  )-partition  692.6  -0.007  0.022  -0.344  -0.117  0.215 
-0.881  4.989  -9.498  .  2.969  10.833 
EARN.,  -level  partition  692.6  0.008  0.003  -0.417  -0-099  0.210 
1.182  0.175  -17.444  .  1.167  10.429 
RET,.  1,1-2  partition  692.6  0.019  -0.007  -0353  -0.220  0.229 
3.502  -0.475  -16.240  -7.081  9.650 
PANEL  E-2:,  dWCAP  component-  AStock  avg.  n 
ir,  ir,  62  R2 
No  partition  693.3  0.010  -0.392  0.174 
1.318  -11.608  6.633 
AAStock,  )-partition  693.3  -0.004  0.003  -0.334  -0.152  0.199 
-0.643  0.222  .  6.986  -1.847  7.293 
EARN-,  -level  partition  693.3  0.008  0.014  --0.380  -0.151  0.187 
1.075  1.184  -10.567  -1.234  7.010 
RET.  1,1-2  partition  693.3  0.021  -0.023  -0.339  -0.181  0.196 
3.630  -2.993  -9.429  -6.403  7A93 
Cont. 
151 PANEL  E-3:  A  WCAP  component  - 
ACreditors  avg.  n 
;  rI  ;  r2  ctý  eO2  2  R 
No  partition  692.5  -0.015  -0.451  0.203 
-2.108  -15.981  14.101 
A(Wreditors.,  )-partition  692.5  -0.036  0.034  -0.415  -0.002  , 
0.222 
-2.626  2.956  -14.515  -0.039  11.812 
EARN-,  -level  partition  692.5  -0.015  0.017  -0.440  -0.061  0.213 
-2.090  1.067  -15.206  -1.211  14.952 
RETI.  I,  t-2  partition  692.5  -0.024  0.009  -0.405  -0.153  0.225 
-3.965  0.743  -14.078  -5.288  12.548 
PANEL  F:  Depreciation  and  amortisation 
(DEP)  avg.  n  x,  ;  r2 
A 
OA  62  2  R 
No  partition  701.8  -0.006  0.001  0.005 
-8.230  0.031  3.406 
ADEP,,  partition  701.8  -0.006  0.000  -0.001  0.490  0.009 
-9.320  0.137  -0.038  0.274  6.146 
EARN, 
_,  -level  partition  701.8  -0.007  0.012  -0.036.  -0.452  0.055 
-11.118  7A85  -1.424  -1.086  8.612 
RET, 
-I,  t-2  partition  701.8  -0.006  0.002  -0.024  -0.080  0.019 
-10.664  2.993  -0.945  -0.344  5.273 
PANEL  G:  Special  items  (SPEC)  avg.  n 
ir, 
2  4  62  R2 
No  partition  690.4  -0.002  -0.413  0.168 
-0.839  -12.246  14.450 
ASPEC,.,  partition  690.4  -0.007  0.001  -0.288  -0.292  0.219 
-3.492  0.733  -7.178  -3.544  13.602 
EARN-,  -level  partition  690.4  -0.008  0.035  -0.271  -0.422  0.251 
4.219  3.336  -9.501  4.536  12.065 
RET, 
-I,,  -2  partition  690.4  -0.003  0.004  -0.256  -0.337  0.200 
-1.475  2.193  -10.310  -6.262  14.450 
Cont. 
Notes.  Estimated  regressions  are:  (AXIPI.,  )-  where  A.  X,  -XrX,.  l  and 
".  1=4-141.2  and  X  is  an  undeflated,  per  share  dependent  variable  listed  at  the  top  of  each  panel.  Dummy  variables  C.,  are 
defined  as  follows:  partitioning  by  AX,.,:  C, 
-,  -(I  if  AX,.,  <-*;  0  otherwise);  partitioning  by  lagged  level  of  earnings  after 
extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  EARN,.,  -  Ci.  1-11  if  EARN,.,  <-O;  0  otherwise);  partitioning  by  lagged  returns 
RET,.  i.,.  2:  C, 
-i-jI 
if  RET, 
-U-2550; 
0  otherwise).  All  variables  are  deflated  either  by  &I  or  by  P,.:.  All  estimates  are  cross- 
sectional  averages  fortheperiod  t=1969-2001  and  associated  t-  statistics  are  calculated  accordingto  the  Fama  and  MacBeth 
(1973)  procedure.  Boldfaced  estimates  are  significant  at  5%  or  better  at  33-1  -  32  d.  f.  Values  are  restricted  to  top/bottom 
1%  of  distribution  of  variables  used  in  the  contemporaneous  sample  as  well  as  to  top/bottom  1%  of  distribution  of  relevant 
deflated  change  variables  AXIP,.,  and  AX,.  IIP,.  2  (i.  e.,  the  samples  used  in  this  table  are  sub-samples  of  the  contemporaneous 
sample). 
Earnings.  Operating  profit  OP  (Panel  B),  ordinary  earnings  ORD  (Panel 
and  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  EARN  (Panel  D)  appear  to 
deviate,  on  average,  from  the  expected  random  walk  (i.  e.,  they  mildly  mean-revert) 
(e.  g.,  Brooks  and  Buckmaster,  1976),  since  in  all  three  cases  the  estimated  regression 
coefficient  6ý  is  below  zero  when  the  regressions  are  not  partitioned  according  to 
different  measures  of  bad  news.  The  coefficient  equals  zero  in  31  out  of  33  years 
(see  Table  E-I  in  appendices).  However,  this  deviation  from  the  expected  random 
152 walk  is  mostly  due  to  negative  changes  in  the  three  earnings  figures,  consistent  with 
negative  earnings  changes  and  levels  being  transitory  and  reversed  in  the  next  (or 
next  few)  accounting  period(s).  Separating  the  change  in  EARN  by  the  sign  of  the 
change,  reveals  that  positive  EARN-changes  follow  the  random  walk  overall  and  that 
the  total  coefficient  on  negative  changes  (^+^)  equals  -0.500  in  27  out  of  33  0ý  OJ2 
years,  i.  e.,  earnings-decreases  fully  mean-revert  within  one  accounting  period  in 
27/33  years,  consistent  with  expectations. 
Changes  in  the  earnings  variables  OP  and  ORD,  show  a  slight  tendency  to 
mean-revert  on  average.  The  estimated  coefficient  in  the  "No  partition"  section  is 
slightly  below  zero  cA  <0.  In  both  cases  the  coefficient  is  statistically  significant. 
However  in  18  and  20  out  of  33  years  in  the  OP  and  ORD  sections  respectively  the 
coefficient  is  insignificantly  different  from  zero.  As  for  the  EARN  figure,  once  the 
changes  in  EARN  are  partitioned  by  the  sign  of  the  change,  OA  becomes  statistically 
insignificantly  different  from  zero  -  the  time-series  of  positive  changes  in  operating 
profit  and  ordinary  earnings  follow  a  random  walk  (albeit  there  are  some  unexpected 
deviations),  while  negative  changes  exhibit,  depending  on  the  partition,  relatively 
high  mean-reverting  rates,  given  the  magnitude  and  high  statistical  significance  of 
the  62coefficients  in  all  three  partitions  within  both  panels.  This  finding  is 
consistent  with  expectations  under  ex-post  conservative  accounting,  where  earnings 
decreases  are  predicted  to  be  (more)  transitory,  while  earnings  increases  are 
predicted  to  be  (more)  permanent. 
Also,  the  more  extraordinary/exceptional  items  earnings  contain,  the  more 
mean-reverting  the  time  series  of  earnings  should  be  by  definition  of  these  items:  on 
153 average  therefore  (i.  e.,  without  partitioning),  EARN  should  reverse  fastest,  given  that 
it  presumably  contains  the  most  transitory  items  of  all  earnings  figures,  followed  by 
ORD  and  by  OP.  The  estimated  coefficients  6ý  are  in  fact  increasing  in  magnitude 
across  the  tbree  earnings  definitions  Ct)1,01  <  W1,  ORD  <  O)LEARIV  *In  particular,  the 
magnitude  of  the  coefficientWI,  EARN  is almost  four  times  theWI,  ORD'Partitions  by  the 
sign  of  the  changes  in  these  variables  again  show  that,  in  absolute  value, 
W2,  OP  `Cý  W2,  ORD  *'ý  W2,  EARM  $which 
is  to  be  expected  if  EARN  contain  most  one-off  items 
of  the  three  earnings  figures.  In  total  terms,  the  coefficients  of  the  three  earnings 
variables  increase  in  the  absolute  sense  from  OP  to  ORD  to  EARN  (-0.440,  -0.589 
and  -0.750  respectively).  Also,  this  is  consistent  with  the  presence  of  transitory 
items  at  both  extremes  of  earnings  figures,  not  just  the  negative  side.  Finally, 
partitioning  by  lagged  EARNt-l-level  or  lagged  RETI.  1.1-2  produces  qualitatively 
similar,  but  weaker  results,  indicating  a  random  walk  behaviour  of  earnings  for  the 
good  news  firms  and  mean-reversion  of  earnings  for  bad  news  firms.  In  terms  of 
differences  regarding  the  three  measures  that  are  used  to  separate  good  and  bad  news 
firms,  it  must  be  noted  that  similar  differences  in  partitions  are  reported  already  by 
Basu  (1997). 
Albeit  these  results  are  somewhat  different,  the  essential  findings  are  very 
similar  to  Fama,  and  French  (2000).  They  find  that  a)  book  profitability  (return  on 
assets)  is  mean-reverting;  b)  the  rate  of  reversal  is  38%  per  year;  c)  the  rate  of 
reversion  is  higher  when  profitability  is  farther  away  from  the  mean;  and  d)  that  the 
reversal  is  faster  when  profitability  is  below  the  mean  rather  than  above  the  mean. 
This  evidence  is  in  major  part  consistent  with  the  findings  presented  in  this  study  in 
Table  4-7  above,  albeit  the  method  differs  somewhat  from  theirs. 
154 Figure  4-2  depicts  a  simplified  version  Of  these  findings,  both  in  the  levels 
specification,  and,  as  presented  above  in  Table  4-7,  in  the  corresponding  changes 
specification.  In  the  figure,  it  is  assumed  that  a  random  walk  series  of  permanent 
earnings  (dark  blue  line)  is  occasionally  interrupted  by  a  purely  mean-reverting 
series  of  "special  items"  (red  line)  to  obtain  the  published  earnings  figure  (green 
line),  which  may  either  be  a  profit  or  a  loss.  56  The  (positive)  permanent  earnings 
itself  may  fluctuate  for  reasons  other  than  "special  items"  -  for  example,  the 
underlying  operating  cash  flows  might  fluctuate.  Accordingly,  the  representation  of 
(positive)  permanent  earnings  is  not  a  straight  line,  but  it  fluctuates  randomly. 
However,  the  line  is  constructed  so  that  it  follows  a  random  walk  over  time  (i.  e.,  the 
parameter  Q=  I  in  the  levels  specification,  and  Q=  0  in  the  changes  specification 
of,  for  example,  equation  (3-4)  from  section  3.2.1).  57 
On  the  contrary,  the  "special  items"  figure  is  constructed  so  that  it  is 
completely  mean-reverting  (i.  e.,  the  parameter  coj=  0  in  the  levels  specification,  and 
o.  ý=  -0.5  in  the  changes  specification).  Note  that,  consistent  with  the  presentation  in 
section  4.3  and  in  particular  Figure  4-1,  the  "special  items"  are  allowed  to  be 
positive,  on  occasion.  In  most  years,  however,  they  equal  zero,  as  would  be  expected 
under  their  theoretical  definition.  Moreover,  the  estimated  parameter  A  for  the 
SPEC  variable  equals  -0.50  in  the  changes  specification  in  22  out  of  33  individual 
years.  The  two  figures  combine  to  obtain  published  accounting  earnings  figure. 
56  The  term  "special  items"  is  in  inverted  quotes  to  distinguish  it  from  the  actual  definiton,  albeit  it 
resembles  closely  the  empirical  findings. 
57  Also,  such  a  graphical  representation  shows  that  earnings-levels  is  clearly  a  non-stationary  series, 
providing  a  motivation  to  empirically  estimate  the  these  processes  in  the  changes  specification  (also 
see  section  3.2.1) 
155 Figure  4-2:  Eamings-levels  and  earnings-changes  in  a  time-series  perspective  -  an  idealised 
representation 
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Notes  to  Figure  4-2:  In  Panel  B,  the  published  accounting  earnings  (corresponding  to  the  green  line  in  Panel  A)  is  not  shown 
for  clarity  of  representation.  Dark  blue  line  represents  (positive)  permanent  earnings,  red  line  the  mean-reverting  "special 
items"  and  the  green  line  the  published  accounting  earnings. 
Also  important  for  the  discussion  on  losses  in  section  4.8,  is  the  observation 
that  extreme  negative  "special  items"  may,  but  not  necessarily  will,  cause  a  firm  to 
report  an  accounting  loss.  Moreover,  reported  losses  can  vary  in  magnitude 
depending  on  the  relative  sizes  of  permanent  earnings  and  "special  items".  Thus,  a 
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rq  r-1  ff) theory  of  losses  that  would  encompass  both  underlying  processes  as  well  as  positive 
and  negative  accounting  earnings  would  be  required. 
Accruals.  The  difference  in  (asymmetric)  persistence  between  operating  cash 
flows  and  earnings  is  attributed  to  accruals.  For  example,  working  capital  accruals 
smooth  changes  in  operating  cash  flows  due  to  net  investment  in  receivables, 
inventory  and  payables.  Since  these  are  expected  to  reverse  within  the  next 
accounting  period,  the  time  series  of  changes  in  working  capital  accruals  should 
reverse  strongly.  The  reversion  of  working  capital  accruals  then  offsets  negative 
serial  correlation  in  operating  cash  flows  to  produce  smoother  earnings.  The  results 
shown  in  Panels  E-G  (with  the  exception  of  Panel  F-  DEP)  are  consistent  with  these 
expectations.  Given  their  assumptions,  these  rates  of  reversals  are  also  very  close  to 
Dechow,  Kothari  and  Watts'  (1998)  theoretical  prediction  for  total  operating 
accruals,  where  the  expected  value  of  the  coefficient  on  earnings-increasing  changes 
in  this  type  of  accruals  is  E[  Oý  ]=  -0.500.  Since  accruals  are  expected  to  fully  mean- 
revert  within  one  period,  the  first-order  correlation  of  the  first  differences  should 
equal  -0.500  (Beaver,  1970). 
On  average,  AWCAP  and  its  three  main  components  reverse  quickly. 
Earnings-decreasing  changes  in  AWCAP  and  dDebtors  reverse  quicker  than 
earnings-increasing  changes  in  these  variables,  i.  e.,  bad  news  finns'  accruals  revert 
faster  to  the  mean.  This  is  consistent  with  conservative  accounting.  It  is  also 
consistent  with  a  result  presented  later  in  section  4.5  -  that  some  of  the  bad  news  is 
capitalised  in  working  capital  accruals  more  timely  than  good  news,  making  them 
less  persistent  than  good  news.  It  is,  however,  inconsistent  with  Basu's  (1997)  notion 
157 that  working  capital  accruals  should  reflect  good  and  bad  news  equally  timely. 
Earnings-increasing  and  eamings-decreasing  changes  AStock  and  ACreditors  reverse 
equally  quickly,  in  statistical  terms,  but  there  is  some  indication  that  in  both  cases 
eamings-decreasing  changes  reverse  quicker:  the  partition  by  the  sign  of  news  (RETj- 
W-2)  is  statistically  significant  and  in  the  case  of  AStock  partitioning  by  the  sign  of 
AýtOck  is  significant  at  the  10%  level.  A  degree  of  asymmetry  in  A(AStock)  is  to  be 
expected,  given  that  assets  should  generally  not  be  shown  at  amounts  higher  than  the 
recoverable  atnount.  In  the  case  of  stock,  SSAP  9  (Revised):  Stocks  and  Long-term 
Contracts  be  shown  at: 
"...  the  total  of  the  lower  of  cost  and  net  realisable  value  of  the  separate  items  of  stock  or  of 
groups  of  similar  items.  "  (quoted  in  Davies,  Patersonand  Wilson,  1999,  p.  978). 
Results  for  depreciation  and  amortisation  expense  (Panel  F)  are  consistent 
with  DEP  following  a  random  walk,  regardless  of  the  sign  of  the  change  in  DEP,  i.  e., 
the  change  is  symmetric  -  both  increases  in  depreciation  charge  and  decreases  are 
permanent.  Assuming  a  firm  in  a  steady  state  with  no  net  growth  in  fixed  assets, 
where  all  investment  are  replacement  investments  financed  by  depreciation  and 
amortisation  funds,  then  E[ADEP]=  0. 
Given  the  scarcity  of  empirical  guidance  to  the  time-series  behaviour  of 
depreciation  and  amortisation  charge  and  the  importance  of  limited  useful  economic 
lives  of  fixed  assets  in  practice,  it  is  useful  to  compare  the  results  obtained  in  this 
research  with  expectations  resulting  from  application  of  accounting  standards. 
Depreciation  is  defined  in  FRS  15:  Tangible  Fixed  Assets  as 
158 11  ...  the  measure  of  the  cost  or  revalued  amount  of  the  economic  benefits  of  the  tangible  fixed 
assets  that  have  been  consumed  during  the  period.  "  (quoted  in  Davies,  Paterson  and  Wilson, 
1999,  p.  747;  and  Robins,  1999,  p.  3) 
Amortisation  is  the  equivalent  term  of  depreciation  for  intangible  assets,  but  it  is  not 
explicitly  defined  in  the  appropriate  standard  -  FRS  10:  Goodwill  and  intangible 
assets  (Davies,  Paterson  and  Wilson,  1999). 
Regarding  the  time-series  properties  of  depreciation,  the  following  points  are 
important.  First,  the  standard  notes  that  the  straight  line  method  should  be  adopted  in 
cases  where  the  pattern  of  consumption  of  economic  benefits  in  uncertain  (Robins, 
1999).  This  indicates  that  over  the  life  of  a  fixed  asset  and  other  things  being  equal, 
the  same  charge  will  be  applied  in  all  accounting  periods  and  the  depreciation  charge 
will  not  change  in  subsequent  periods  so  that  E[ADEP]=  0.  Second,  the  depreciation 
is  calculated  on  the  carrying  value  that  depends  on  three  factors:  cost  (or  re-valued 
amount),  estimated  economic  life  and  residual  value  (Elliott  and  Elliott,  2004).  If  any 
of  these  factors  change,  then  the  depreciation  charge  will  also  change  in  that 
particular  year,  but  it  will  remain  at  the  same  level  in  subsequent  accounting  periods 
so  that  again  E[ADEP]=  0.58  Third,  and  related,  even  before  the  introduction  of 
FRS  11:  Impairment  of  Fixed  Assets  and  Goodwill  companies  were  carrying  fixed 
assets  at  no  more  than  their  recoverable  amounts.  If  an  asset  is  impaired,  its  carrying 
value  is  to  be  written  down  to  net  recoverable  amount,  which  is  the  higher  of  net 
realisable  value  and  the  value  in  use.  Further,  the  impairment  loss  is  to  be  measured 
and  recognised  on  a  consistent  basis  (Davies,  Paterson  and  Wilson,  1999,  pp.  784- 
812).  Therefore,  once  an  impairment  loss  is  recognised,  the  carrying  value  is 
58  The  exact  timing  of  these  effects  showing  up  in  the  accounts  may  differ  from  this  perhaps 
oversimplified,  example.  Robins  (1999,  p.  4)  provides  some  illustrations  of  these  cases. 
159 reduced,  followed  by  a  reduction  in  the  depreciation  charge.  Once  this  reduction  is 
accounted  for,  there  are  no  further  adjustments  and  again  E[ADEP]=  0.  A  final  point 
potentially  important  for  subsequent  sections  of  this  research  is  that  at  least  two 
imPairment  indicators  are  directly  related  to  changes  in  market  values  which  are  used 
as  a  proxy  for  economic  news:  a  significant  decline  in  fixed  asset's  market  value  and 
a  significant  increase  of  market  rates  of  return  (effectively  the  discount  rates)  that  are 
likely  to  affect  the  asset's  recoverable  amount.  Moreover,  the  importance  of  (the 
growth  oo  the  depreciation  charge  has  been  shown  to  be  negatively  correlated  with 
one  period  ahead  earnings  (Ou,  1990).  This  might  be  important  in  that  via  the 
theoretical  links  between  future  earnings  and  future  dividends,  the  depreciation 
charge  may  be  infon-native  about  future  cash  flows. 
While  it  is  difficult  to  form  exact  expectations  about  the  time-series 
behaviour  of  special  items  SPEC  (Panel  G)  nonetheless  because,  as  follows  from  its 
definition,  it  is  a  collection  of  potentially  very  dissimilar  items  (see,  for  example, 
Elliott  and  Shaw,  1988,  p.  94,  possibly  including  some  non-operating  cash  flow 
components),  empirical  literature  (e.  g.,  Das  and  Lev,  1994)  suggest  that  these  items 
should  be  the  most  transitory  type  of  accruals  or  the  most  transitory  earnings 
component  (Burgstahler,  Jiambalvo  and  Shevlin,  2002;  Elliott  and  Hanna,  1996; 
Elliott  and  Shaw,  1988).  Since  the  definition  of  SPEC  used  in  this  study  ensures  that 
any  tax,  interest,  minorities  and  preference  dividends'  accruals  as  well  as  cash  flows 
resu  fing  from  these  items  are  excluded,  to  the  extent  possible,  from  SPEC,  these 
items  should  contain  mostly  one-time  items  like  losses  and  profits  on  disposals, 
losses  and  profits  on  termination  of  operations,  costs  of  restructurings  and 
reorganisations  (e.  g.,  Gore,  Pope  and  Singh,  2001,  endnote  10),  i.  e.,  items  that  are 
160 expected  to  appear  in  financial  statements  only  once  and  in  one  accounting  period. 
Their  effects  should  then  reverse.  Note  that  the  median  of  deflated  special  items  in 
the  contemporaneous  sample  is  exactly  0.000  and  the  mean  -0.011  (also  see  other 
descriptive  data  in  Table  4-1),  suggesting  that  inclusions  of  one-time  gains,  not  only 
one-time  losses,  are  also  relatively  frequent.  Also,  these  results  are  somewhat  in 
contrast  to  Elliott  and  Hanna  (1996)  who  report  that  27%  of  US  firms  reporting  a 
large  write-off  in  one  period  will  report  another  large  write-off  in  the  following 
period,  while  the  results  obtained  here  for  the  eamings-decreasing  changes  in  SPEC 
suggest  almost  a  full  reversal  within  one  period.  The  results  taken  as  a  whole  show 
that  special  items  reverse  quickly,  similar  to  reversals  of  working  capital  accruals. 
The  estimated  coefficient  4  is  reliably  negative  in  22  out  of  33  years.  Partitioning 
by  sign  of  ASPEC  reveals  that  positive  (eamings-increasing)  ASPEC  persist  much 
longer  than  negative  (earnings-decreasing)  ASPEC  and  about  the  same  as  positive 
A(AWCAP).  It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that  eamings-decreasing  ASPEC  reverse 
much  quicker  if  the  firm  has  shown  a  loss  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items 
and/or  has  been  hit  by  bad  economic  news  as  proxied  for  by  returns  in  the  previous 
accounting  period  t-I  . 
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In  additional  analyses  shown  separately  in  Appendix  F  (Table  F-2),  the 
results  for  total  accruals  (Accruals  (tot.  ))  are  presented.  As  the  preceding  analysis 
shows,  the  persistence  behaviour  of  the  three  components  of  Accruals  (tot.  )  is  quite 
different,  especially  in  terms  of  asymmetric  persistence  of  eamings-decreasing 
changes  of  these  components.  Thus,  on  average,  total  accruals  reverse  quickly  to  the 
59  Caution  needs  to  be  exercised  when  studying  the  tests  presented  in  Appendix  C.  The  theoretical 
expectations  are  not  in  terms  of  strict  equalities,  but  inequalities,  in  particular  what  regards  the 
incremental  coefficient  A. 
161 norm  as  evidenced  by  a  highly  negative  4  coefficient.  The  estimated  incremental 
regression  coefficients  ^  in  all  three  partitions  reveal  that  eamings-decreasing 
C02 
changes  mean-revert  quickly.  A  comparison  of  the  behaviour  of  individual 
components  with  the  results  on  aggregate  accruals  (Accruals  (tot.  ))  highlights  the 
need  to  study  the  behaviour  of  these  variables  separately.  Also,  accruals  in  general 
mean-revert  faster  (i.  e.,  are  less  persistent)  than  operating  cash  flows  (Barth  et  aL, 
1999). 
As  a  final  note  to  the  persistence  models,  the  results  presented  above  in  Table 
4-7  might  be  useful  in  forming  expectations  about  contemporaneous  models  of  ex- 
post  accounting  conservatism.  One  way  of  interpreting  the  decomposition  of 
reported  accounting  earnings  into:  a)  different  earnings  measures,  b)  operating  cash 
flows  and  c)  accruals,  is  that  these  variables  all  represent  empirical  measures  of 
permanent  earnings.  Permanent  earnings  are  the  theoretical  construct  modelled  in 
Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  and  are  assumed  to  follow  a  random  walk.  Evidence 
presented  above  -  in  particular,  the  "No  partition"  sections  -  might  be  viewed  as  an 
indicator  of  the  degree  to  which  empirical  measures  of  permanent  earnings  violate 
the  assumption  of  random  walk  within  each  regression  by  a  different  accounting 
variable  presented  in  subsequent  sections. 
To  summarise,  operating  cash  flows  are  strongly,  but  not  completely  mean- 
reverting,  and  there  is  no  asymmetry  in  reversals  of  earnings-increasing  and 
decreasing  changes.  Earnings-decreases  overall  are  strongly  mean-reverting,  while 
eamings-increases  are  permanent.  The  asymmetry  is  more  pronounced  for  earnings 
figures  containing  more  accruals.  While  accruals  on  average  mean-revert,  the  rate  of 
162 reversal  is  stronger  for  eamings-decreasing  accruals.  This  holds  particularly  for 
working  capital  accruals  and  special  items,  while  changes  in  the  depreciation  charge 
are  permanent.  These  results  are  generally  as  expected  under  conservative 
accounting.  There  are,  however,  some  interesting  deviations  from  expectations. 
4.5  CONTEMPORANEOUS  POPE  AND  WALKER  (1999) 
MODELS  OF  EX-POST  ACCOUNTXNG  CONSERVATXSM 
4.5.1  Inferences  from  cross-sectional  averages 
The  results  of  direct  tests  of  the  contemporaneous  Pope  and  Walker  (1999) 
model  of  ex-post  conservatism  by  different  accounting  variables  are  presented  in 
Table  4-8.  The  leftmost  column  in  the  table  lists  the  main  components  of  earnings 
and  different  definitions  of  earnings  used.  All  coefficients'  estimates  are  cross- 
sectional  averages  of  the  estimates  of  33  yearly  regressions.  The  t-statistics  are 
calculated  according  to  the  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  method.  The  second  column 
in  Table  4-8  shows  the  average  number  of  observations.  Given  the  outlier-removal 
criteria  (see  section  4.2)  the  average  number  of  observations  is  always  784.5  firms 
per  year.  The  actual  number  of  observations  ranges  from  a  minimum  of  305  firms  in 
1969  to  a  maximum  of  1,048  firms  in  1998  and  827  firms  in  year  2001. 
The  following  model  is  the  operationalised  version  of  the  general  empirical 
contemporaneous  model  presented  in  section  3.3  above: 
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(4-6) 
The  main  parameters  that  reflect  the  effects  of  accounting  conservatism  in 
equation  (4-6)  are  the  estimated  coefficients  on  good  news  (A)  and,  in  particular, 
the  incremental  response  of  an  accounting  item  to  bad  news  (;  ).  Given  that  the  Y, 
definitions  in  terms  of  the  sign  of  dependent  variables  varies  across  different 
dependent  variables,  the  expected  values  of  the  three  measures  of  accounting 
conservatism  that  can  be  derived  from  the  model  in  equation  (4-6)  must  be 
considered  in  absolute  values  when  comparing  the  magnitudes  of  these  coefficients. 
Thus,  under  conservative  accounting  and  assuming  a  particular  accounting  variable 
(earnings,  operating  cash  flow  or  accruals  components)  reflects  bad  news,  the 
expected  values  of  the  parameters  are  as  follows:  abs(ý  )>O  for  the  incremental  bad  71 
news  coefficient,  abs(A+A)>abs(A)>O  for  the  total  bad  news  coefficient  and 
A 
abs((A+YXA))>I  for  the  relative  total  bad  news  coefficient.  For  each  dependent 
variable,  the  models  where  the  q2  and  yj  coefficients  are  restricted  to  zero  are  also 
presented.  They  represent  a  base-case  scenario  to  which  it  is  then  possible  to 
compare  the  unrestricted  versions  of  the  models  (e.  g.,  Giner  and  Rees,  2001),  i.  e., 
analyse  the  effects  of  the  non-linearity  in  the  accounting  figure-returns  models 
introduced  in  this  relation  by  conservative  accounting.  If  asymmetric  timeliness  is  an 
important  feature  of  a  given  accounting  figure,  then  the  differences  between  the  R  2s 
from  restricted  and  unrestricted  versions  of  the  model  should  be  significant. 
164 Formally,  the  test  hypothesis  of  no  difference  between  the  restricted  and 
unrestricted  versions  of  contemporaneous  models  can  be  stated  in  the  following 
alternative  form  (e.  g.,  Baltagi,  1998,  pp.  78-81;  Gujarati,  pp.  266-273): 
114:  At  least  one  of  the  coejficients  a  and  P  is  differentfrom  zero.  2  ri 
The  test  statistic  is 
(  J?  2  2 
F.  =  .  uR-R,,  )Im 
,  n-k  2  (I  -  Rý.  )  1(n  -  k) 
(4-7) 
where  R2  uR  and  R2  Rdenote  the  R 
2S  from  unrestricted  and  restricted  versions  of  the 
models  respectively,  m  is  the  degrees  of  freedom  in  the  restricted  model  and  equals 
to  the  number  of  linear  restrictions  imposed  on  the  unrestricted  model,  and  (n-k)  is 
the  number  of  degrees  of  freedom  in  the  unrestricted  version  (the  difference  between 
the  number  of  observations  in  each  cross-section  for  each  accounting  variable  n  and 
the  number  of  independent  variables,  including  the  constant,  k).  60  The  tests  for 
lagged  models  are  straightforward  extensions  of  the  above  test. 
The  results  of  estimation  of  contemporaneous  models  are  presented  in  Table 
4-8  and  are  discussed  below  by  groups  of  dependent  variables,  operating  cash  flows, 
earnings  and  accruals.  For  reasons  of  tractability  of  presentation,  the  aggregate 
results  of  the  formal  tests  of  significance  of  differences  between  the  restricted  and 
60  Alternative  test  of  differences  between  restricted  and  unrestricted  versions  of  the  models  include  the 
LR,  Wald  and  LM  tests.  A  summary  is  presented  in,  for  example,  Maddala  (2001,  pp.  116-122  and 
pp.  176-177).  Given  that  these  issues,  while  yielding  important  additional  insights,  are  not  critical  to 
these  tests  are  not  used. 
165 unrestricted  versions  are  presented  separately  in  Appendix  G,  but  are  commented  on 
below  when  deemed  necessary. 
Operating  cash  flows.  The  estimated  coefficient  on  good  news  (ft,  )  in  the 
operating  cash  flows  (OCT)  equation  is  positive  as  expected,  indicating  that  part  of 
the  current-period  good  news  is  settled  (realised)  in  cash  and  captured  by  the 
operating  cash  flows  figure  in  the  current  accounting  period.  Operating  cash  flows 
incorporate  only  current  realised  economic  gains  and  realised  economic  losses.  They 
do  not  incorporate  either  future  (unrealised  or  anticipated)  economic  gains  or  losses. 
Therefore,  asymmetric  timeliness  should  not  be  observed  in  operating  cash  flows  in 
respect  to  bad  news.  As  either  good  or  bad  news  is  gradually  realised  over  time,  its 
effect  is  incorporated  in  operating  cash  flows  on  an  equally  timely  basis.  The  first 
rows  in  Table  4-8  confirm  this  expectation.  The  incremental  coefficient  on  bad  news 
(P,  )  is  not  statistically  different  from  zero.  Also,  there  is  little  difference  between  the 
R  2S  for  the  restricted  and  unrestricted  versions  of  the  models.  In  statistical  terms,  the 
difference  is  significant  in  II  out  of  33  individual  cross-sections,  but  even  where  the 
differences  are  statistically  significant,  they  appear  to  be  economically  marginal. 
This  is  taken  as  yet  another  indication  that  asymmetric  timeliness  does  not  play  an 
important  role  in  the  relation  between  operating  cash  flows  and  returns. 
A  measure  of  total  cash  flows,  defined  as  the  net  change  in  cash  (ACASH) 
was  also  used  as  the  dependent  variable  to  provide  some  comparatives  with  existing 
literature.  For  example,  Dechow  (1994)  uses  a  measure  of  total  cash  flows  and  Basu, 
(1997)  attempts  to  construct  a  measure  of  cash  flow  from  operating  and  investment 
166 Table  4-8:  Contemporaneous  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  models  of  ex-post  accounting  conservatism, 
1969-2001 
Dependent  variables  avg.  n  et, 
et2  R2 
- 
ft, 
+  it  (ft,  +,  v  A 
Operating  cash  flows 
OCF  784.5  0.222  0.108  0.051 
14.811  10.871  6.973 
784.5  0.227  0.002  0.101  0.046  0.057  0.147  1.459 
14.920  0.248  8A33  1.724  8.000 
Earnings 
OP  784.5  0.192  0.135  0.147 
10.921  13.621  11.725 
784.5  0.209  -0.001  0.100  0.139  0.163  0.239  2.381 
11.208  -0.147  8.169  7.157  14.430 
ORD  784.5  0.086  0.086  0.172 
12.329  17.510  13.259 
784.5  0.099  0.002  0.058  0.120  0.199  0.178  3.051 
15.072  0.638  9.637  11.194  16.295 
EARN  784.5  0.078  0.097  0.140 
9.843  17.820  13.048 
784.5  0.095  0.004  0.058  0.174  0.171  0.232  3.980 
13.836  1.370  10.327  11.958  16.426 
Accruals 
, dWCAP  784.5  0.044  0.041  0.012 
4.633  8.177  6.367 
784.5  0.054  -0.001  0.017  0.084  0.018  0.100  6.065 
5.891  -0.233  2.140  4.090  7.642 
AWCAP  components: 
-  of  which  ADebtors  784.5  0.055  0.051  0.018 
7.057  11.629  10.135 
784.5  0.061  0.003  0.034  0.082  0.023  0.117  3.410 
8.172  0.813  6.321  3.214  10.679 
-  of  which  AStock  784.5  0.049  0.044  0.016 
4.671  8.486  6.924 
784.5  0.056  -0.001  0.029  0.056  0.020  0.085  2.937 
5.335  -0.317  4.746  3.281  8.087 
-  of  which  ACreditors  784.5  -0.060  -0.054  0.018 
-6.850  -10.459  8.094 
784.5  -0.063  -0.003  -0.046  -0.055  0.021  -0.101  2.173 
-7.281  -0.813  -7.754  -2.310  9.360 
DEP  784.5  -0.077  -0.015  0.016 
-17.798  -6.231  4.963 
784.5  -0.076  -0.002  -0.017  0.008  0.020  -0-010  0.563 
-17.657  -0.795  -5.548  1.011  5.813 
SPEC  784.5  -0.009  0.004  0.012 
-3.843  1136  4.913 
784.5  -0.004  0.002  -0.007  0.056  0.024  0.049  -6.914 
-1.913  1.853  -2.107  6.957  6.182 
Notes.  Estimated  models  are:  XWP,.  i-  at+a2D,.,.  i+ARET,,.  i+,  *ID,,.  IRET,,,,,  +Q  where  X,  is  an  undefiated,  per  share  dependent 
variable  listed  in  the  leftmost  column  of  the  table:  OCF  is  operating  cash  flow,  OP  is  adjusted  operating  profit,  ORD  is 
earnings  before  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  EARIV  is  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  JWCAP  is 
working  capital  accruals,  ADebtors  is  change  in  debtors  accounts,  AStock  is  change  in  stock,  Xreditors  is  change  in  creditors 
accounts,  DEP  is  depreciation  and  arnortisation  expense  and  SPEC  is  special  items,  RET,.,.,  -  (Pr-P#-iYP,,  i  and  D,,.,  -  It  if 
RET,., 
-i:  50;  0  otherwise),  All  variables  are  deflated  by  opening  share  price  P,.,.  Avg.  n  is  the  average  number  of  observations 
per  year.  All  coefficients'  estimates  and  Jes  are  cross-sectional  averages  for  the  period  1969-2001  and  associated  t-statistics  are 
calculated  according  to  the  Farna  and  MacBeth  (1973)  procedure.  Boldfaced  estimates  are  significant  at  5%  or  better  at  33-1- 
_32 
d.  f.,  i.  e.,  ltl>2.0369. 
167 activities.  Both  of  these  two  cash  flow  measures  provide  a  measure  of  firm 
performance  that  does  not  contain  accruals.  Assuming  possible  empirical 
"contaminations"  of  the  cash  flows  figure  with  accruals  in  constructing  the  OCF 
figure  either  for  the  purposes  of  this  research  or  at,  the  finn  level,  the  ACASH 
variable  should  exhibit  even  less  asymmetry  than  the  OCF  measure.  Results  indicate 
that  the  bad  news  incremental  coefficient  (ý  )  is  in  fact  not  statistically  different  Y, 
from  zero  and  of  the  wrong  sign  (p  =  -0.049)  and  the  total  coefficient  on  bad  news  Y, 
is  +ý=0.037  as  compared  to  0.147  for  the  OCF  measure.  Also,  the  average  R2  71 
from  these  cross-sectional  regressions  is  very  low  (R2=  0.025),  lower  than  the 
average  R2s  in  OCF  regressions  (R  2=  0.057)  and  much  lower  than  for  any  of  the 
earnings  measures  employed  in  this  analysis  (minimum  R  2=  0.163).  Moreover,  as 
expected,  the  differences  between  the  restricted  and  unrestricted  versions  of  the 
models  are  significant  in  only  5  individual  years. 
Earnings.  All  three  earnings'  measures  capture  a  part  of  current-period  good 
news,  as  indicated  by  positive  A,  coefficients  in  regressions  employing  the  three 
earnings  measures  as  dependent  variables.  The  responsiveness  of  earnings  to  good 
news  is  highest  for  the  OP  measure,  which  is  consistent  with  firms'  tendency  to  pass 
as  many  of  what  would  otherwise  be  extraordinary/exceptional  gains  as  possible 
through  "ordinary"  earnings  figures  (i.  e.,  "above  the  line").  Earnings  do  not 
incorporate 
I 
unrealised  (anticipated)  economic  gains,  but  they  do  incorporate 
unrealised  economic  losses,  resulting  thus  in  a  more  timely  performance  measure 
than  cash  flows.  Much  higher  average  R  2S  compared  with  R  2S  from  OCF  (and 
WASH)  regressions  confirm  this.  The  asymmetric  timeliness  in  respect  to  bad  news 
I  leo 00 should  increase  from  OP  to  ORD  to  EARN  as  progressively  more  accruals  are  added 
to  the  operating  cash  flows  to  arrive  at  the  earnings  figures.  Presumably,  the  accruals 
added  from  OP  to  EARN  are  increasingly  of  the  more  non-operating  type  and  are  on 
average  income  reducing,  reflecting  items  like  write-offS.  61  This  is  also  evidenced 
from  Figure  4-1.  This  process  should  also  increase  the  timeliness  of  various  earnings 
figures  and  be  observed  by  increasing  P,  coefficients  across  the  three  earnings 
variables.  Consistent  with  this  expectation,  the  P  coefficient  on  the  EARN  variable  71 
is  highest,  followed,  unexpectedly,  by  the  P,  coefficient  on  OP  and  ORD.  The 
relative  measures  of  accounting  conservatism  (A  +  PI)  /A  do,  however,  increase 
from  OP  to  ORD  to  EARN  as  expected  under  conservative  accounting  (2.381,3.051 
and  3.980  respectively).  Also  consistent  with  expectations  is  the  value  of  the  relative 
conservatism  measure  for  the  OCF  variable  compared  to  the  three  values  on  the 
eamings  measures  (ft,  +P,  )/ft,  =l.  459,  which  is  sizeably  lower  than  the 
corresponding  measures  for  the  three  earnings  variables.  The  average  adjusted  R2s 
drop  from  ORD  to  EARN,  consistent  with  exccptionaVextraordinary  items  being 
transitory  in  nature  (Pope  and  Walker,  1999)  thus  causing  a  less-strong 
contemporaneous  association  between  market  and  accounting  values.  Finally,  to 
confirm  these  observed  relations,  the  importance  of  allowing  differences  between  the 
restricted  and  unrestricted  versions  should  increase  from  OP  to  ORD  to  EARN  as  the 
asymmetric  recognition  becomes  more  and  more  important.  This  appears  in  fact  the 
case  (see  Appendix  G).  The  numbers  of  times  the  differences  in  R2s  between 
rcstnctc  and  unrestricted  versions  are  significant  increase  across  the  three  measures 
(23,27  and  28  of  the  33  years  in  the  sample). 
61  These  accruals  should  be  captured  by  the  special  items  variable  SPEC  by  definition.  See  section  4.2 
for  the  definition  of  special  items  SPEC  and  a  discussion  of  the  components  of  these  items. 
169 Taking  the  ORD  and  EARN  variables  from  this  study,  the  estimates  of  the  ft, 
and  P  coefficients  in  this  study  are  generally  lower  than  in  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  71 
both  overall  and  when  relevant  sub-periods  from  their  sample  are  considered  (1976- 
1996,1976-1992  and  1993-1996)  using  the  sub-sets  of  data  from  present  samples. 
One  of  the  possible  explanations  for  these  differences  is  the  smaller  ranges  of  both 
dependent  and  independent  variables  used  in  this  study  (see  the  descriptives  in 
section  4.3  and  Table  C-1  in  Appendix  Q  reflecting  thus  less  extreme  economic 
events,  but  may  also  be  due  to  the  composition  of  the  sample.  In  particular,  any 
systematic  differences  between  -December  and  non-December  fiscal  year  ends 
(section  5.4  presents  evidence  on  these  differences),  differences  in  some  variable 
definitions  (most  notably  the  earnings  figure  EARN)  and  others.  The  tenor  of  the 
results  and  the  conclusions  remain,  however,  comparable  and  essentially  convey 
equal  conclusions.  Interestingly,  for  both  earnings  measures  and  all  three  sub- 
periods,  the  average  R  2S  for  the  relevant  sub-period  in  this  study  are  marginally 
lower  than  in  Pope  and  Walker's  (1999)  study,  even  though  this  sample  is  less 
extreme  than  theirs. 
Similar  conclusions  can  also  be  made  in  respect  to  Giner  and  Rees  (2001) 
paper  using  EARN  figure  for  earnings  and  the  1990-1998  sup-period  and  the  Ball, 
Kothari  and  Robin  (2000)  study  using  ORD  earnings  figure  and  the  1985-1995  sub- 
period.  Both  good  and  bad  news  coefficients  are  lower,  but  the  average  adjusted  R'  is 
higher  in  this  study.  Again,  this  is  likely  due  to  narrower  ranges  of  data  used  in  this 
study  and  possibly  to  systematic  differences  between  December  and  non-December 
fiscal-year-end  fin-as. 
170 Accruals.  Of  the  three  main  groups  of  accruals  used  in  this  study,  working 
capital  accruals,  A  WCAP,  exhibit  the  highest  -  asymmetric  sensitivity  to  bad  news, 
followed  by  special  items  SPEC  and  the  depreciation  charge  DEP  that  is 
symmetrically  sensitive  to  bad  and  good  news.  Overall,  AWCAP  capture  a  higher 
proportion  of  bad  news  than  SPEC.  This  is  an  interesting  finding,  given  that  SPEC- 
like  variables  would  usually  be  discussed  in  greater  detail  in  related  research. 
The  sign  of  the  bad  news  coefficient  P,  in  the  AWCAP  equation  is  positive 
and  statistically  significant,  indicating  that  bad  news  (negative  returns)  is  partially 
reflected  in  a  reduction  of  net  working  capital  (either  debtors  and  stock  accounts 
decrease  or  creditors  accounts  in  the  balance  sheet  increase  or  a  combination  of  both 
A 
applies).  This  in  turn  reduces  earnings.  The  estimated  good  news  coefficientAin 
the  A  WCAP  equation  is  also  positive  -  good  news  causes  stock  and  debtors  accounts 
to  increase  and/or  creditors'  accounts  in  the  balance  sheet  to  decrease  resulting  in  an 
increase  in  earnings.  This  is  in  contrast  with  Basu  (1997)  who  argues  that 
"...  both  increases  and  decreases  in  gross  accounts  receivable  are  reflected  quickly  in 
earnings"  (p.  16) 
and  that  all  such  accruals  should  attenuate  (bias  towards  zero)  the  asymmetric 
timeliness  observed  in  the  earnings  figure.  Contrary  to  this  expectation,  the  results  in 
Table  4-8  show  that  a  significant  proportion  of  the  asymmetric  sensitivity  of 
earnings  to  contemporaneous  bad  news  is  due  to  working  capital  accruals.  The  high 
value  of  the  relative  measure  of  accounting  conservatism  highlights  the  asymmetric 
timeliness  of  working  capital  accruals  (ftj+,  vP,  )/ft,  =6.065  compared  with  the 
coefficient  from  the  EARN  regression  of  3.980. 
171 To  investigate  this  issue  further,  the  aggregate  net  working  capital  accruals  is 
decomposed  'into  its  main  operating  constituents:  debtors,  stock  and  work  in 
progress,  and  creditors  so  that  AWCAP--  ADebtors+AStock-Wreditors-  62  As 
expected,  all  three  working  capital  components  exhibit  a  strong  asymmetric 
sensitivity  to  contemporaneous  bad  news.  The  change  in  debtors  accounts  Mebtors 
exhibits  the  highest  asymmetry  (both  incrementally  and  in  total),  followed  by  the 
change  in  stock  and  work  in  process  AStock  and  the  change  in  creditors  accounts 
(ACreditors).  Note  that  the  sign  of  the  J  in  the  regression  of  returns  on  dCreditors  Y, 
variable  should  be  inverted  to  interpret  and  compare  the  results  with  the  other  two 
AWCAP  components.  This  relative  "ranking"  of  the  AWCAP  components  is 
somewhat  unexpected  given  that  Thomas  and  Zhang  (2002)  find  that  inventory 
changes  exhibit  a  "consistent  and  substantial  relation  with  future  returne'  (also, 
Bernard  and  Noel,  1991,  find  that  some  components  of  the  aggregate  stock  and  work 
in  process  variable  are  useful  in  predicting  future  sales,  another  possible  measure  of 
perfonnance).  This  finding  does  not  bear  on  the  overall  results  for  these  earnings 
components.  The  results  regarding  working  capital  accruals  thus  indicate  that  both 
aggregate  working  capital  accruals  (AWCAP)  and  its  three  main  individual 
components  have  an  important  role  in  the  observed  asymmetric  timeliness  of 
earnings  between  good  and  bad  economic  news. 
The  depreciation  and  amortisation  charge  (DEP)  exhibits  no  asymmetry  in 
response  to  current  bad  news  and  an  economically  weak,  albeit  statistically 
significant,  response  to  current  period's  good  news.  This  suggests  that  both  increases 
62  A  very  early  discussion  of  the  lower-cost-or-market  inventory  valuation  associated  explicitly  with 
conservatism  is  Scott  (1926). 
172 and  decreases  in  fixed  assets  take  some  time  to  be  realised  and  captured  by  financial 
statements.  Good  news  in  respect  to  fixed  assets  and  depreciation  charge  can  take  on 
two  forms.  On  the  one  hand,  the  negative  sign  of  the  good  news  coefficient 
ft, 
suggests  that  good  news  is  associated  with  increased  asset  base,  which  in  turn 
increases  the  depreciation  expense,  and  not  with  extended  life  of  fixed  assets.  The 
extended  life  of  existing  fixed  assets  would  result  in  a  decrease,  rather  than  an 
increase,  in  the  depreciation  expense  DEP  since  the  remaining  book  value  of  the 
asset  would  be  spread  over  a  larger  number  of  years  (Elliott  and  Elliott,  2004).  New 
net  investment  would,  on  the  other  hand,  increase  the  amount  of  depreciable  assets, 
increase  the  depreciation  expense  and  lower  current  and  future  earnings  more.  That 
asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings  is  not  due  to  the  depreciation  expense  is  also 
evidenced  by  a  very  low  absolute  value  of  the  total  coefficient  on  bad  news 
abs(A+p  )=0.010,  a  very  low  relative  total  coefficient  (A  +P  )/A=  0.563,  and  by  71  Y, 
the  fact  that  the  restricted  and  unrestricted  versions  of  the  regressions  produce  almost 
identical  results  -  the  differences  are  significant  in  only  6  cases,  but  again  these 
differences  appear  to  be  more  in  statistical  rather  than  economic  tenns. 
Special  items  (SPEC)  as  an  accrual  component  should  capture  an  important 
part  of  the  observed  asymmetric  timeliness  in  earnings.  While  the  results  in  Table 
4-8  show  that  SPEC  indeed  captures  a  significant  proportion  of  the  observed 
asymmetric  sensitivity  of  earnings  to  current-period  bad  news,  the  coefficient  is 
lower  than  the  corresponding  coefficient  on  A  WCAP  and  the  ADebtors  component. 
The  sign  of  the  P,  coefficient  in  the  SPEC-equation  is  positive,  indicating  that  more 
bad  news  is  associated  with  higher  (i.  e.,  more  negative)  SPEC  that  in  turn  reduces 
earnings  more.  This  is  consistent  with  bad  news  being  passed  in  a  significant  part 
173 through  extraordinary  and/or  exceptional  items  within  the  current  accounting  period. 
The  sign  of  the  good  news  coefficient  A  is,  on  the  other  hand,  negative.  This  would 
suggest  that  good  news  results  in  an  economically  small,  albeit  statistically 
significant  reduction  of  earnings.  This  conclusion  is  consistent  with  the  results 
presented  in  Table  4-5,  where  differences  in  bivariate  correlations  among  RET  and 
accruals  split  by  good/bad  news  suggested  different  roles  for  accruals  for  good/bad 
news  observations.  Both  the  total  and  the  relative  bad  news  coefficient  are  consistent 
with  predictions  under  conservative  accounting.  High  asymmetric  timeliness  of 
SPEC  is  also  evidenced  by  a  comparison  of  the  restricted  and  unrestricted  versions 
of  regressions.  In  particular,  the  average  R2  almost  doubles  from  one  version  to  the 
other  and  the  increase  is  statistically  significant  in  15  individual  cross-sections.  63 
As  a  final  check  of  the  relations  described  above,  regressions  are  also  run  on 
total  accruals  as  the  dependent  variable  (Accruals  (tot.  ))  (results  are  shown  in 
Appendix  F,  Table  F-3).  The  results  indicate  that  the  asymmetric  timeliness  is 
highest  if  all  accruals  components  are  merged  into  one  variable.  This  is  to  -be 
expected,  given  that  the  aggregate  measure  likely  captures  different  aspects  of 
accounting  conservatism.  This  is  directly  consistent  with  the  differences  between 
cash  flow  and  eamings  measures. 
To  sum  up,  the  results  in  this  sections  show  and  reconfinn  that  accounting 
conservatism  is  an  important  feature  of  the  accounting  earnings  figures.  The  more 
accruals  an  earnings  measure  contains,  the  more  asymmetric  timeliness  with  respect 
to  incorporation  of  bad  news  it  exhibits.  The  results  highlight  the  important  role 
63  See,  however,  section  4.5.2  for  a  discussion  of  the  size  of  R  2S  compared  to  R2  in  earnings 
regressions. 
174 working  capital  accruals  and  special  items  in  this  asymmetric  timeliness.  (Operating) 
cash  flow  measures  are  not  affected  by  this  phenomenon,  as  expected,  given  that  this 
accounting  measure  contains  no  accruals. 
4.5.2  Accruals  and  low 
R2s 
If  accruals  make  earnings  more  timely  in  reflecting  value-relevant 
information,  this  should  be  reflected  in  increasing  R2s  as  more  accruals  are  added  to 
I  operating  cash  flows  to  arrive  at  accounting  earnings  and  the  timeliness  increases. 
64 
For  example,  in  Table  4-8,  the  R  2S  for  the  ordinary  earnings  and  earnings  after 
exceptional  and  extraordinary  items  (EARN)  are  more  than  three  times  higher  than 
2f  2S  in  accruals'  regressions  the  average  R  rom  the  OCF  regression.  However,  the  R 
are  very  low,  too,  ranging  from  0.018  to  a  maximum  of  0.024.  This  appears  to  be 
inconsistent  with  accruals  making  earnings  more  timely  than  cash  flows,  since  more 
timeliness  by  definition  implies  more  economic  news  in  accounting  earnings,  a 
greater  correspondence  between  returns  and  earnings  and  thus  a  higher  R2. 
One  possible  explanation  of  low  observed  R  2S  in  accruals'  regressions  is  the 
measurement  error  in  dependent  variables.  In  this  study,  measurement  error  might  be 
introduced  in  dependent  variables  in  the  case  of  working  capital  accruals  variables 
had  these  variables  been  calculated  as  balance-sheet  differences  (Hribar  and  Collins, 
2002).  This  would  have  the  effect  of  lowering  the  R2s  and  leaving  the  estimated 
64  Counter  to  the  increasing  R  2S  is  the  presence  of  "transitory  items"  which  lower  the  R2  (Pope  and 
Walker,  1999). 
175 ft,  and  P,  coefficients  in  models  in  equation  (4-6)  above  unbiased  (unattenuated). 
However,  balance-sheet  differences  are  not  employed  in  the  regressions  in  this  thesis 
to  calculate  accruals.  The  data  on  accruals  is  taken  directly  from  cash  flow  or  funds 
flow  statements.  Even  in  the  early  sample  years,  there  are  some  weak  indications  that 
the  accruals  data  was  not  simple  balance  sheet  differences  (e.  g.,,  Cadbury 
Schweppes,  1969), 
The  second,  incomplete,  partial  and  only  conceptual  explanation  might  be  the 
following.  The  unrestricted  (piece-wise)  linear  regressions  whose  results  are 
presented  in  Table  4-8  are  derived  from  the  respective  restricted  versions  by 
allowing  the  incremental  response  for  non-positive  returns.  The  restricted  "reverse" 
models  in  Table  4-8  are  derived  by  reversing  what  would  be  the  equivalent  of 
traditional  returns-on-earnings  models  (or,  generally,  returns  on  any  accounting 
performance  measure)  to  arrive  at  these  "reverse"  models  where  accruals  are 
regressed  on  returns,  disregarding  the  sign  of  returns.  65  In  these  reverse  bivariate 
models,  the  R2s  are  functionally  related  to  the  estimated  regression  coefficient  and 
the  variance  ratio  (VR).  66 
To  derive  this  explanation,  assume  the  following  general  simple  (bivariate) 
regression  model,  where  an  accounting  performance  measure  (1)  is  regressed  on 
returns: 
63  Note,  however,  that  these  simple  "unreversed"  bivariate  regressions  can  always  be  estimated 
separately  for  two  sub-samples,  the  good  news  and  bad  news  sub-samples.  The  term  "simple"  relates 
merely  to  the  fact  that  the  models  themselves  do  not  allow  for  this  asymmetry  by  incorporating  a 
dummy  variable  indicating  the  two  (or  more)  sections. 
"These  models  are  then  augmented  to  allow  for  the  asymmetric  responsiveness  of  various  accounting 
measures  to  good/bad  news. 
176 y  VI  +  V2RETj  +  u,  (4-8) 
In  this  regression,  the  R2  is  a  function  of  the  estimated  regression  coefficient  02  and 
the  variance  ratio,  defined  as  the  ratio  between  the  variance  of  the  independent 
variable  (returns,  RET)  and  the  variance  of  the  dependent  variable  (1), 
var(REY)/var(l): 
R2^2  var(RET)  V2  ' 
var(Y) 
(4-9) 
For  a  more  timely  accounting  performance  measure  Y,  the  variance  ratio 
should  be  lower,  which  would  lead,  other  things  being  equal,  to  a  lower,  rather  than 
to  a  higher  R2.  This  is  because  more  timeliness  implies  a  greater  proportion  of 
variability  in  economic  news  (var(RET))  must  be  explained  by  the  variability  of  the 
accounting  measure  (var(l)).  Therefore,  if  the  accounting  system  is  conservative, 
then  the  variability  of  the  accounting  performance  measure  should  increase  towards 
the  variability  of  returns  (var(Y)-war(RE7))  as  the  measure  Y  becomes  more  timely 
and  the  variance  ratio  towards  unity  (VR->I)  as  the  timeliness  property  of  Y 
increases.  Note  that  in  Pope  and  Walker's  (1999)  model  this  would  imply  that  news 
is  recognised  without  a  lag  and  the  02  coefficient  would  equal  (Ilk),  the  cost  of 
capital. 
177 Replacing  the  accounting  measure  Y  with  a  generic  version  of  accounting 
eamings 
(E):  67 
Ei  =  y,  +  y2RET,  +  u,  (4-10) 
the  R2  in  such  a  regression  is  a  function  of  the  estimated  regression  coefficient  PY2 
and  the  variance  ratio,  defined  here  as  the  ratio  between  the  variance  of  returns  and 
the  variance  of  earnings,  var(RED/var(E): 
var(RET) 
var(E) 
(4-11) 
This  variance  ratio  can  be  decomposed  further.  Assuming  accounting 
earnings  has  two  main  components,  the  operating  cash  flow  and  accruals  so  that  E= 
OCF  +  A,  the  variance  of  earnings  var(E)  in  equation  (4-11)  consequently  depends 
on  the  variance  of  the  earnings'  two  constituent  parts,  namely  the  variance  of 
accruals  var(A)  and  the  variance  of  operating  cash  flows  var(OCF),  as  well  as  the 
covariance  between  accruals  and  operating  cash  flow  cov(EOCF).  Thus  the  variance 
ratio  in  equation  (4-11)  can  be  decomposed  into: 
var(RET) 
- 
var(RET)  var(RET)  (4-12) 
var(E)  var(OCF  +  A)  var(OCF)  +  var(A)  + 
2roCF. 
A  CrOCF  6A 
6'  The  terms  accruals,  earnings,  operating  cash  flows  and  returns  are  used  here  in  generic  terms  and 
they  are  not  following  the  empirical  definitions  from  section  4.2.  The  assumption  that  E=A+  OCF  is 
however  maintained. 
178 where  aOcF  and  aA  are  the  standard  deviations  of  OCF  and  A  and  rOCFA  denotes  the 
simple  bivariate  correlation  coefficient  between  OCF  and  A.  Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin 
(2000)  view  OCF  as  a  noisier  measure  of  performance  than  earnings  and  thus 
GOCF>CFE  and  var(OCF)>var(E).  Also,  by  definition,  var(A)>O.  If  the  denominators 
on  the  left-hand  side  (LHS)  and  right-hand  side  (RHS)  of  equation  (4-12)  are  to  be 
equal,  the  variability  of  operating  cash  flows,  var(OCF),  and  the  additional 
variability  of  accruals,  var(A)>O,  must  be  reduced  by  the  strong  negative 
contemporaneous  correlation  between  accruals  and  operating  cash  flows  rocF.  A<O. 
This  requirement  follows  from  the  relation  var(E)<var(OCF).  If  there  were  no  other 
terms  apart  from  those  related  to  OCF,  the  equality  between  the  LHS  and  RHS  of  (4- 
12)  would  have  been  violated.  Since  var(A)  itself  only  further  increases  this 
difference,  the  term 
(2-rOCF.  A'aOCrCTA)must  be  the  component  of  the  denominator  on 
the  RHS  of  (4-12)  that  causes  earnings  to  be  less  variable  than  cash  flows  and  in 
particular  the  correlation  coefficient  roCFA  (the  other  two  tenns  in  the  third  factor  in 
the  denominator  on  the  RHS  of  (4-12)  are  positive).  This  leads  to  a  lower 
denominator,  a  higher  variance  ratio  and  a  higher  R2.  In  other  words,  earnings  are 
more  timely  than  cash  flows,  because  accruals  anticipate  a  part  of  future  cash  flows. 
By  definition,  they  offset  the  negative  autocorrelation  in  operating  cash  flows  and 
I 
this  result  in  a  smoother  time-series  of  earnings.  68 
The  strong  and  negative  correlation  between  operating  cash  flows  and 
accruals  is  well  established  theoretically  and  empirically  (e.  g.,  Dechow,  1994, 
Dechow,  Kothari  and  Watts,  1998).  That  rOCF.  A  <<  0  can  also  be  observed  from  the 
68  The  term  autocorrelation  is  used  to  indicate  lagged  correlation  of  a  variable  with  itself  as  opposed 
to  the  term  serial  correlation  to  indicate  lagged  correlation  between  two  different  time  series  (eg. 
between  variables  At  and  OCF$.,  ).  This  distinction  is  often  not  rnade  (Gujarati,  2003,  p.  443),  but  it 
might  be  useful  to  make  this  distinction  within  this  explanation. 
179 descriptives  of  the  empirical  variables  in  this  study.  Simple  bivariate  correlations  are 
presented  in  Table  4-4  and  standard  deviations  in  Table  4-1  (Panel  A). 
Turning  next  to  the  model  where  accruals  are  regressed  on  returns  and  where 
the  accruals  are  defined  by  the  identity  A=E-  OCF: 
a,  +  a2RET+  w  (4-13) 
Decomposition  of  the  R2  in  this  regression  in  a  way  similar  to  the  decomposition  of 
the  R2  in  the  earnings  regression  above,  rearranging  the  order  of  the  tenns  in  the 
denominator,  yields  the  following  expression  for  the  variance  ratio: 
var(RET)  var(RET) 
= 
var(RET)  (4-14) 
var(A)  var(E-OCF)  var(OCF)+var(E)-2rocF,  EaocFaE 
Comparing  first  the  LHSs  of  (4-14)  and  (4-12),  assume  first  that  var(E)  is 
lower  than  var(A),  leading  to  a  higher  VR  and  a  celeris  paribus  higher  R2.  Next,  note 
that  the  denominators  in  both  equations  start  with  the  variance  of  operating  cash 
flows,  var(OCF).  To  this  variance,  var(A)  is  added  in  (4-12)  and  var(E)  in  (4-14).  If 
there  were  no  further  terms  in  the  denominators  of  both  equations,  the  denominator 
in  (4-14)  would  be  lower  than  the  denominator  in  (4-12),  leading  to  a  higher  VR  and 
a  higher  R2s,  reasonably  assuming  that  var(E)<var(A)  (given  the  observation  that 
earnings  is  a  smoother  performance  measure  due  to  accruals  that  offset  variability  in 
operating  cash-flow  time-series  (Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin,  2000),  it  is  to  be  expected 
that  var(E)<var(A)).  If,  however,  this  is  not  the  case  -  in  fact,  the  observed  empirical 
R2  show  quite  the  opposite  -  this  must  be  a  result  of  the  third  terms  in  both 
180 equations,  and  in  particular  the  respective  correlation  coefficients.  In  (4-12)  the 
correlation  coefficient  rOCF.  A  is  expected  to  be  very  high  in  absolute  terms  and 
negative,  thus  more  than  offsetting  the  sum  var(OCF)+var(A)  to  arrive  finally  at  the 
relatively  low  var(E),  high  VR  and  high  R2  in  eamings-on-returns  regressions.  This  is 
because  accruals  offset  negative  serial  correlation  in  operating  cash  flows  to  produce 
a  smoother  earnings  figure  (Dechow,  Kothari  and  Watts,  1998;  Dechow,  1994).  In 
(4-14),  on  the  other  hand,  while  starting  with  a  comparably  lower  sum  of  variances 
var(OC,  F)+var(E)  due  to  the  assumption  that  var(E)<var(A)  compared  to  (4-12),  the 
third  term  (particularly  due  to  the  correlation  coefficient  rOCFE),  subtracts  relatively 
little  from  the  sum  var(OCF)+var(E),  thus  leaving  the  denominator  relatively  high, 
the  VR  relatively  low  and,  consequently,  leading  ceteris  paribus  to  a  relatively  low 
R2,  too.  Therefore,  because  of  the  nature  of  accounting  numbers,  the  (relatively)  low 
R2S  in  regressions  where  accruals  act  as  dependent  variables  are  to  be  expected  if 
accruals  have  the  role  of  making  earnings  more  timely  than  cash  flows 
The  empirical  observations  in,  this  research  (see  Table  4-4  and  Table  4-1) 
regarding  the  magnitudes  of  the  variabilities  and  correlations  of  (between  pairs  oO 
operating  cash  flow,  earnings  and  accruals  support  the  assumptions  used  above.  For 
example,  the  empirical  values  of  the  correlation  coefficients  among  some  of  the 
vanables  used  in  this  study  are  rOCF.  Accruals  (tot.  ýý  -0.628  and  rocF.,  dwcAp;  --  -0.422 
compared  to  the  rocpEARN=  +0.333  (note  that  only  the  magnitudes  of  these 
coefficients  are  important,  because  the  correlation  terms  in  equations  (4-12)  and 
(4-14)  are  of  opposite  signs).  On  the  other  hand,  aEARN=  +0.122,  and 
aAccruals  (tol.  ýý  +0.205  and  adwcAp=  +0.172. 
181 Finally,  the  empirical  results  in  the  preceding  section  4.5.1  indicate  that  the 
R  2S  in  accruals  regressions  are  only  half  the  R  2S  in  operating  cash  flow  regressions 
and  even  slightly  lower  than  in  the  corresponding  net  change  in  cash  (,  dCASH)- 
regression  shown  in  Appendix  F  (Table  F-3).  Using  the  same  analysis,  an  attempt  to 
explain  this  observation  is  provided  below. 
Starting  with  the  operating  cash  flow  regression  where  operating  cash  flows 
are  defined  by  the  identity  OCF  =E-A: 
OCF,  =A+fl2RET,  +  v,  (4-15) 
and  decomposing  the  R2  resulting  irom  this  regression  similarly  to  the  decomposition 
of  the  earnings  and  accruals  regressions  above,  rearranging  the  order  of  the  tenns  in 
the  denominator,  yields  the  following  expression  for  the  variance  ratio: 
var(RET)  var(RET) 
= 
var(RET)  (4-16) 
var(OCF)  var(E-A)  var(E)+var(A)-2rE.  ACrECrA 
By  comparing  the  accruals-regression's  VR  in  equation  (4-14)  and  the  above 
operating  cash  flow-regression's  VR  in  equation  (4-16),  it  can  bebbserved  that  the 
difference  between  the  two  VRs  depends  on  the  relative  variances  of  accruals  and 
operating  cash  flows,  var(A)  and  var(OCF),  as  well  as  the  relative  sizes  of  the 
correlation  coefficients  rEA  and  rEocF.  While  it  would  be  difficult  to  specify  any 
differences  in  the  variability  of  the  two  earnings  components,  there  is  some  evidence 
in  the  existing  literature  that  var(A)>var(OCF)  (e.  g.,  Dechow,  Kothari  and  Watts, 
182 1998,  Barth  and  Clinch,  1999,  Dechow  and  Dichev,  2002).  69  Other  things  being 
equal,  these  variances  would  imply  a  higher  denominator  on  the  RHS  of  (4-16) 
compared  to  the  denominator  on  the  RHS  in  (4-14).  This  would  lead  to  a  lower  VR 
and  a  lower  R2  in  operating  cash  flow  regression.  Apart  from  the  LHSs  of  respective 
decompositions,  empirical  observations  are  not  consistent  with  this.  The  second 
important  factor  must  thus  be  the  respective  correlation  coefficients.  Existing 
empirical  evidence  shows  that  the  correlation  of  earning  with  its  operating  cash  flow 
component  is  generally  stronger  than  the  correlation  of  earnings  with  its  accruals 
component,  rE,  0CF>r&A  (e.  g.,  Barth,  Cram  and  Nelson,  2001),  leading  to  a  higher 
reduction  of  the  sum  var(E)+var(OC.  F)  in  (4-14)  compared  to  the  reduction  of  the 
sum  var(E)+var(A)  in  (4-16).  Thus,  a  relatively  high  denominator  on  the  RHS  of  (4- 
16)  is  subject  to  a  relatively  lower  reduction  by  the  correlations  term,  which  would 
lead  to  a  higher  denominator,  to  a  lower  VR  and  a  lower  R2  compared  to  the  accruals 
regressions.  Based  on  this  illustration,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  estimation  of  the 
operating  cash  flow  regressions  will  lead  to  lower  (not  higher)  A  relative  to 
accruals'  regressions,  but  because  the  the  differences  between  var  (OCF)  and  var  (A) 
do  not  appear  very  large,  the  net  result  of  the  OCF-regressions  is  questionable. 
The  descriptive  data  in  this  study  (see  Table  4-4  and  Table  4-1)  shows  that 
the  expectations  depend  on  the  specific  type  of  accruals  with  which  to  substitute  the 
generic  accruals  A.  For  example,  rEARN.  OCF=  +0.333,  and  rEARN.  Accruals  +0.405 
69  Caution  needs  to  be  exercised  when  comparing  the  values  of  these  parameters  in  this  study  with 
existing  literature.  The  definitions  of  variables,  deflators,  time  periods  covered  and  methods  of 
calculation  (pooled,  cross-sectional  averages,  time-series  averages)  differ  from  study  to  study,  in 
some  cases  significantly.  Even  within  this  study,  different  types  of  earnings  exhibit  quite  significant 
properties. 
183 while  rEAw.  dwc.  4p=  +0.33  1.70  A  higher  correlation  coefficient  implies  a  smaller 
denominator  on  the  RHS  of  VR  in  (4-16)  and  a  higher  VR,  which  leads,  ceteris 
paribus,  to  a  higher  R2.  This  part  of  the  analysis  thus  does  'not'provide  clear 
predictions  regarding  relative  sizes  of  R  2S  from  accruals  and  operating  cash  flow 
regressions. 
For  completeness,  note  that  the  R2  in  the  operating  cash  flow  regressions, 
given  the  discussion  above,  must  result  in  R  2S  that  are  on  average  lower  than  the  R  2S 
in  earnings'  regressions. 
Regardless  of  the  explanation  provided  in  this  section,  Chambers,  Jennings 
and  Thompson  11,1999)  provide  an  alternative  explanation  that  might  be  related  to 
the  observed  low  R  2S  for  the  equations  using  DEP  as  the  dependent  variable.  They 
state  that  current  depreciation  expense  may  not  be  a  good  predictor  of  future  fixed 
assets  services  for  several  reasons.  Among  them,  they  note  that  the  depreciation 
charge  depends  on  estimates  of  useful  life  and  salvage  value  of  the  fixed  asset  and 
are  therefore  subject  to  considerable  measurement  error.  Assuming  the  error  is 
random  and  noting  that  the  measurement  error  is  in  the  dependent  (not  the 
independent)  variable,  this  would  result  in  higher  error  terms  and  lower  R2S  in  those 
regressions. 
The  relations  presented  above  may  help  to  explain  why  the  R2S  in  the  accruals 
regressions  are  much  lower  than  in  either  operating  cash  flow  regressions  or  earnings 
regressions.  The  property  of  accruals  to  increase  the  timeliness  of  cash  flows  to 
70  It  is  interesting  that  rEA)w.  ocF=  +0.333  and  the  rEARN.  dwcAp=  +0.331  coefficients  are  very  close, 
possibly  suggesting  that  both  components  have  equal  weighting  in  arriving  at  the  earnings  figure. 
184 generate  a  more  timely  earnings  measure  itself  causes  the  accruals  regressions  to 
have  low  explanatory  power.  The  fact  that  a  complete  discussion  of  the  problem  of 
low  R  2S  in  accruals  regressions  would  have  to  deal  with  the  question  of  estimated 
regression  coefficients  629  Y2  and  62,  given  that  these  are  likely  to  differ  from  one 
regression  to  the  other,  is  acknowledged. 
4.5.3  Time  series  of  ex-post  conservatism 
measures 
Several  recent  papers  report  that  conservatism  has  increased  over  time  (e.  g., 
Ryan  and  Zarowin,  2003;  Klein  and  Marquardt,  2002;  Givoly  and  Hayn,  2000).  To 
study  possible  changes  in  accounting  conservatism  over  time  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  the  following  analysis  is  performed.  First,  the  estimated  regression 
coefficients  on  good  news  A,  estimated  incremental  coefficients  on  bad  news  P,,  the 
total  coefficient  on  bad  news  +P)  and  the  R  2S  from  the  33  cross-sectional  Y, 
regressions  on  each  earnings  and  earnings  component  figures  used  to  produce  the 
contemporaneous  set  of  results  are  recovered.  These  parameters  are  then  used  in 
simple  linear  time-trend  regressions  of  the  following  type  (e.  g.,  Brown,  Lo  and  Lys, 
1999): 
est(parameter.  )  =  rig  +  r29  ,+  ýgt  (4-17) 
where  parameterut  is  an  estimated  regression  parameter  from  the  contemporaneous 
model  in  equation  (4-6)  in  section  4.5.1  for  year  t,  i  denotes  one  of  the  ten  dependent 
185 variables  (earnings,  operating  cash  flows  and  accruals)  in  contemporaneous  models 
listed  in  the  leftmost  column  of  the  results'  table  below,  j  denotes  the  parameter 
(good  news,  incremental  bad  news,  total  bad  news  and  R  2S)  used  as  the  dependent 
variable  in  time-trend  regressions  and  T  denotes  technical  time 
T=  (-16,...,  0,...,  +16)  corresponding  to  the  time  interval  1969-2001.  This 
definition  of  technical  time  ensures  that  in  time-trend  regressions  the  parameter  rly 
measures  the  equally-weighted  cross-sectional  average  of  the  estimated  parameter 
est(parametery)  and  the  parameter  r2ij  shows  the  periodical  increases  in  the  value  of 
est(parameteru).  If  conservatism  is  increasing  through  time,  the  estimated  ý2, 
parameters  of  regressions  (4-17)  using  estimated  parameters  from  regressions  on 
dependent  variables  that  reflect  the  asymmetric  timeliness  property  (principally  the 
estimated  P  and  R2  statistics)  should  be  increasing  through  time.  Y, 
The  results  of  estimating  the  model  in  equation  (4-17)  for  all  ten  dependent 
variables  and  all  three  main  conservatism  measures  are  presented  in  Table  4-9.  The 
estimated  time-trend  slope  coefficient  f2  is  increasing  through  time  only  for  the 
time-series  of  incremental  bad  news  coefficients  P,,  from  the  regressions  where 
earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (EARN)  are  employed  as  the 
dependent  variable.  The  time-trend  resulting  from  the  time-series  of  total  coefficients 
on  bad  news  (A+  PI)  in  EARN-regressions  is  not  statistically  significant.  Note  that 
the  EARN  figure  is  the  most  comprehensive  earnings  measure  employed  in  this  study 
and  should  therefore  reflect  all  accruals,  operating  as  well  as  non-operating. 
Consequently,  the  effects  of  increasing  conservatism  through  time  should  be  most 
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F-  0 apparent  when  evaluating  the  time-senes  of  cross-sectional  regression  coefficients 
on  EARN,  followed  by  ORD  and  OP.  Consistent  with  increasing  conservatism 
through  time  as  captured  by  the  movements  in  j,  for  the  EARN  figure,  the 
incremental  and  total  coefficients  on  special  items  (SPEC)  are  also  increasing 
through  time.  The  R  2S  from  aforementioned  time-trend  regressions  are  high  in  value 
and  highly  statistically  significant.  The  time  senes  of  estimated  coefficientsA,  jjý 
(ft,  +  ý,  )  and  the  R2  from  the  33  cross-sectional  regressions  of  EARN  on  returns 
andthe  time  series  of  total  bad  news  coefficient  (ft,  +  ý,  )  of  SPEC  on  returns,  are 
plotted  in  Figure  4-3  to  provide  an  alternative  presentation  of  the  movements  of 
these  parameters  through  time. 
Figure  4-3:  Time-series  of  estimated  good  news,  incremental  bad  news,  total  bad  news  and  R2  from 
earnings  (EARN)  regressions  and  total  bad  news  from  special  items  (SPEO  regressions, 
1969-2001 
0.45 
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0.35 
0.30 
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Notes  to  Figure  4-3:  BN  (EARN,  total)  is  the  time  series  of  estimated  total  parameters  on  good  news,  incremental  parameters 
on  bad  news,  total  parameters  on  bad  news  and  R'  from  cross-sectional  regressions  on  earnings  after  extraordinary  and 
exceptional  items  (EARN)  and  special  items  (SPEC). 
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-------------------------------  r4  (I Figure  4-3  further  emphasises  that  the  sensitivity  of  earnings  (EARN)  to  good 
news  is  declining  over  time  (dark  blue  line).  A  statistically  significant  decline  in 
sensitivity  to  good  news  can  also  be  observed  in  Table  4-9  for  the  operating  cash 
flows  (OCF)  figure,  other  measures  of  earnings  (OP  and,  ORD)  and  some  of  the 
accruals  components  (AStock),  while  for  other  accruals  measures  the  sensitivity  does 
not  change  over  time  (it  does  not  increase,  though).  These  findings  are  consistent 
with  recent  US  literature  concerned  with  declining  value  relevance  of  financial 
statements  and  in  particular  the  profit  and  loss  account  (e.  g.,  Ryan  and  Zarowin, 
2003;  Francis  and  Schipper,  1999;  Lev  and  Zarowin,  1999;  Collins,  Maydew  and 
Weiss,  1997). 
Conservative  accounting  should  result  in  large,  one-time,  transitory  items  that 
lower  the  means  of  earnings  variables,  but  affect  the  medians  only  by  a  very  small 
amount,  thereby  inducing  negative  skewness  of  earnings  variables  (Ball,  Kothari  and 
Robin,  2000;  Givoly  and  Hayn,  2000).  Moreover,  the  capitalisation  of  current  and/or 
expected  economic  losses  under  conservative  accounting  should  result  in  greater 
variability  of  the  earnings  figures.  Therefore,  if  ex-post  conservatism  is  increasing 
through  time,  this  should  result  in  increasing  negative  skewness  of  the  earnings 
figure  relative  to  the  operating  cash  flow  figure  and  increasing  variability  of  earnings 
relative  to  operating  cash  flows  throug  time.  71 
Figure  4-4  and  Figure  4-5  present  the  time-series  of  cross-sectional  skewness 
and  standard  deviation  parameters  respectively  of  operating  cash  flows  (OCF)  and 
earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (EARN).  Given  that  conservatism 
71  The  cross-sectional  characteristics  of  these  accounting  items  are  presented  and  discussed  in  section 
4.3. 
189 is  an  accruals  phenomenon,  the  results  for  the  OCF  figure  should  provide  a  base-case 
scenario  of  the  behaviour  through  time  of  accounting  figures  that  is  not  due  to 
accounting  conservatism  (e.  g.,  varying  general  economic  conditions  over  the  33 
years).  Both  figures  include  a  time-series  of  yearly  relative  measures  for  skewness 
and  standard  deviation  statistics  respectively.  Yearly  relatives  are  defined  as: 
Relative(skew)=  skew(EARN)Iskew(OC.  F)  (4-18a) 
and 
Relative(st.  dev.  )=  crmRNIaocF  (4-18b) 
If  accounting  conservatism  is  increasing  through  time,  the  first  relative  measure 
should  decrease  over  time  (i.  e.,  skew(EARN)  should  become  more  and  more 
negative)  and  the  second  measure  increase  over  time  (i.  e.,  qEARN  should  become 
higher  and  higher,  while  aoushould  not  change  materially).  To  assess  the  statistical 
significance  of  the  time-series  movements  in  cross-sectional  estimates  of  skewness 
and  standard  deviations,  the  time-trend  model  in  equation  (4-17)  above  is  employed 
analogously  by  substituting  estimated  cross-sectional  regression  coefficients  with 
cross-sectional  skewness  and  standard  deviations  and  corresponding  relative 
measures  defined  in  (4-18a)  and  (4-18b). 
Consistent  with  increasing  conservatism  through  time,  the  skewness  of  earnings 
is  ncreasing  in  magnitude  -  i.  e.,  it  is  becoming  more  negative,  both  in  the 
absolute  sense  and  relative  to  the  skewness  of  the  operating  cash  flow  figure.  Both 
190 trends  are  statistically  significant  (see  also  Table  4-10).  The  skewness  of  EARN  is 
negative  on  average  and  is  generally  negative  in  every  year  after  1974  (except  -in 
1979),  consistent  with  the  introduction  of  SSAP  6  Extraordinary  items  and  prior 
year  adjustments  for  fiscal  years  ending  on  or  after  I't  January  1974  that  required 
extraordinary  items  to  be  passed  through  the  profit  and  loss  account  rather  than 
through  reserves  (ASC  ED,  1985,  p.  4)  which  should  induce  negative  skewness  in 
the  earnings  distribution.  The  positive  skewness  of  operating  cash  flows  is  not 
statistically  significantly  increasing  through  time  (t-statistics=  1.399),  as  expected  if 
conservatism  does  not  affect  this  figure 
. 
72 
Figure  4-4:  Time-series  movements  of  cross-sectional  estimates  of  skewness  of  operating  cash  flows 
(OCF)  and  earnings  (EARN)  and  cross-sectional  relative  of  skewness  of  Off  and 
EARN,  1969-2001 
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Notes  to  Figure  44.  OCF  (skew)  is  the  time  series  of  cross-sectional  skewness  measure  of  the  operating  cash  flow,  EARN 
(skew)  is  the  time  series  of  cross-sectional  skewness  measure  of  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  and 
Relative(skew)  is  defined  as  skew(EARN)1skewjOCF)  for  each  cross-section. 
72  For  completeness,  note  that  an  alternative  explanation  of  no  change  through  time  might  be  that  even 
though  conservatism  would  be  reflected  in  the  OCF  figure  it  would  not  increase  through  time.  Under 
conservative  accounting,  this  explanation  is  not  likely. 
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Za  ZE:  ZZ2:  2:  aZ2:  Z  2:  a  2:  aZZ  a&& The  absolute  variability  of  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items 
(CEARN)  does  not,  on  average,  increase  through  time.  Whilst  the  time-trend  coefficient 
is  positive,  it  is  economically  marginal  and  statistically  insignificantly  different  from 
0.  This  finding  is  not  consistent  with  accounting  conservatism  increasing  through 
time.  It  is  in  contrast  with  indications  presented  above  (see  Table  4-9,  Figure  4-3  and 
Figure  4-4).  It  also  contrasts  Givoly  and  Hayn  (2000)  findings  for  the  US.  However, 
strictly  speaking,  Givoly  and  Hayn  (2000,  p.  294)  postulate  that  the  variability  of 
earnings  should  increase  relative  to  the  variability  of  operating  cash  flows  rather  than 
just  increase  in  the  absolute  sense.  The  increases  of  relative  measures  of  variability 
of  earnings  versus  operating  cash  flows  CEARN  1UOCF  is 
consistent  with  increasing 
conservatism  through  time  in  the  UK. 
Figure  4-5:  Time-series  movements  of  cross-sectional  estimates  standard  deviations  of  operating  cash 
flows  OCF  and  earnings  EARN  and  the  cross-sectional  relative  of  standard  deviation  of 
OCF  and  EARN,  1969-2001 
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Notes  to  Figure  4-5:  OCF  (std.  Dev.  )  is  the  time  series  of  cross-sectional  standard  deviations  of  operating  cash  flow  from  the 
cross-sectional  means,  EARN(std.  Dev.  )  is  the  cross-sectional  standard  deviation  of  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional 
items  and  Relalive(std.  Dev)  is defined  as  skeMEARN)  /  skew(Off)  for  each  cross-section. 
192 The  time-series  movements  of  cross-sectional  estimates  of  skewness  and 
standard  deviations  of  other  accounting  variables  used  in  this  study  are  presented  in 
Table  4-10. 
Table  4-10:  Time-series  of  skewness  and  standard  deviations  of  earnings  and  earnings  components, 
1969-2001 
Skewness  Standard  deviation 
Skewness  (std.  dev.  )  of  variable: 
fly  f2y  R2 
fIq  f2U  R2 
t-stat.  t-stat.  F-stat.  t-stat.  t-stat.  F-stat. 
Operating  cash  flows 
OCF  1.495  0.011  0.059  0.223  -0.004  0.287 
20.414  1.399  1.957  22.628  .  3.528  12.448 
Earnings 
OP  1.105  -0.031  0.265  0.152  -0.003  0.342 
12.351  -3.347  11.200  20.740  4.012  16.093 
ORD  -0.015  -0.076  0.563  0.087  0.000  0.056 
-0.131  -6.325  40.007  28.001  .  1.360  1.850 
EARN  -0.771  -0.094  0.626  0.110  0.000  0.014 
-6.213  -7.204  51.900  26.577  0,665  0.443 
Accruals 
. dWCAP  0.134  -0.031  0.261  0.162  -0.004  0.407 
1.530  -3.306  10.932  21.715  4.614  21.289 
AWCUP  components: 
of  which  ADebtors  1.635  -0.028  0.012  0.169  -0.004  0.363 
3.665  -0-607  0.369  19.519  4.206  17.689 
of  whichdStock  0.934  0.018  0.013  0.155  -0.004  0-355 
3.457  0.647  0.419  16.384  4.135  17.097 
of  whichdCreditors  -1.656  0.028  0.018  0.193  -0.004  0.286 
4.677  0.759  0.575  16.756  -3.526  12.434 
DEP  -2.624  -0.030  0.156  0.071  -0.001  0.124 
-21.617  -2.389  5.709  24.208  -2.093  4.391 
SPEC  -1.597  -0.052  0.254  0.069  0.001  0.076 
-IOA74  -3.249  10.553  19.975  1.601  2.563 
Relatives 
ORDIOCF  -0.022  -0.048  0.536  0.404  0.005  0.620 
-0.290  -5.890  35.760  58-870  7.113  50.580 
EARNIOCF  -0.533  -0.054  0.531  0.516  0.011  0.831 
-6-091  -5.921  35.061  62.093  12.327  151.959 
AWCAPIOCF  0.123  -0.020  0.231  0.721  -0.005  0.461 
2.005  -3.055  9.330  78.622  -5.152  26.550 
SPECIOCF  -1.079  -0.025  0.150  0321  0.009  0.808 
-10.771  -2.336  5.460  44.097  IIA17  130.330 
Notes.  The  estimated  regressions  are:  est(statisticu,  )-  TO+t2o  T+ý#t  where  statistiq,  is  either  the  cross-sectional  skewness 
or  the  standard  deviation  statistic  denoted  by  J.  i  is  one  of  the  ten  dependent  variables  and  four  relatives  of  these 
variables  and  T  denotes  technical  time  T-  (-16,...  0,  +16).  Below  each  of  the  rju  and  r2U  coefficients  is  the  time-trend  t- 
statistics  and  below  the  R  2S  is  the  F-statistic.  Boldfaced  estimates  are  significant  at  5%  or  better  (critical  values  are 
k.  -oo5(31  d.  f)=  2.040  and  Faw(l  d.  f.,  31  d.  f.  )=  4.160.  Relatives  are  defined  as  Relative-  statisticy4variableAY 
statisticu,  (variableocF). 
193 The  table  also  includes  some  of  the  more  important  relative  skewness  and  standard 
deviations  measures  discussed  above. 
Overall,  the  time-series  changes  in  cross-sectional  estimates  of  the 
parameters  in  the  contemporaneous  model  and  some  descriptive  statistics  provide 
some  supporting  evidence  consistent  with  increasing  ex-post  accounting 
conservatism  through  time.  In  particular,  the  sensitivity  of  earnings  after 
extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (EARN)  and  of  the  accruals  associated  most  with 
accounting  conservatism  (SPEC)  to  bad  news  is  increasing.  Time-series  changes  in 
some  of  the  descriptive  statistics  of  accounting  variables  'and  in  particular  the 
relatives  of  most  of  the  cum-accruals  accounting  variables  are  also  consistent  with 
increasing  accounting  conservatism  through  time.  Most  notably,  there  is  a  significant 
trend  in  increasing  skewness  of  AWCAP  and  SPEC,  the  two  main  types  of  accruals 
used  in  this  study,  relative  to  skewness  in  OCF  (and  also  in  the  absolute  sense).  This 
is  complemented  by  increasing  variability  of  SPEC,  either  in  the  absolute  or  relative 
sense.  However,  there  is  some  evidence  of  decreasing  variability  (e.  g.,  of  the 
A  WCAP  variable).  Thus,  while  the  evidence  presented  above  supports  the  conclusion 
of  increasing  conservatism  through  time,  the  evidence  is  much  less  persuasive  than 
in  the  comparable  US  research  indicates  (e.  g.,  Klein  and  Marquardt,  2002;  Givoly 
and  Hayn,  2000). 
194 4.6  ,  LAGGED  MODELS  OF  ACCOETNTXNG  CONSERVATXSM 
Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  extend  their  contemporaneous  model  of  accounting 
conservatism  to  study  the  speed  with  which  prior  periods'  news  flow  through  to 
earnings.  The  number  of  previous  periods  is  limited  to  three  lags.  This  is  because 
existing  research  has  shown  that  prices  lead  earnings  by  up  to  three  periods  (e.  g., 
Kothari  and  Sloan,  1992)  and  Donnelly  and  Walker  (1995)  for  the  UK  indicate  that  it 
might  be  shorter.  In  this  section,  accounting  earnings  is  decomposed,  as  in  the 
contemporaneous  models,  into  its  operating  cash  flows  and  accruals  components  and 
use  each  of  these  variables  in  deflated,  per  share  form  as  dependent  variables  in 
lagged  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  models  of  accounting  conservatism.  The  model 
presentpd  in  scction  3.4  is  opcrationaliscd  as  follows: 
33  Xt 
=a,  +a2D, 
-,,  t-,  -, 
+I  j6r+l  PET, 
-,.  t-,  -, 
+E  PET, 
-,,,  -,  -, 
+  e,  (4-19) 
PI-4 
T.  0  r-O 
A  Under  conservative  accounting,  the  estimated  good  news  coefficientsA  to 
ft4  are  expected  to  increase  monotonically  towards  the  cost  of  capital  (Ilk),  while 
the  coefficient  P,  should  immediately  capture  the  effect  of  current-period  bad  news,  IV, 
but  the  estimated  incremental  bad  news  coefficients  P  to  P,  should  all  equal  zero  Y2  Y4 
(or  are  at  least  expected  to  decay  towards  zero  relatively  quickly).  As  with  the 
contemporaneous  versions,  the  total  response  to  bad  news  in  period  (t-r, 
t-r-I)  is  given  by  the  sum  (ftr+l  +P,  +, 
)  and  abs(p,  +,  +P,  +, 
)>abs(ft, 
+, 
)>0. 
195 All  models  are  shown  in  both  restricted  and  unrestricted  versions,  the 
restrictions  referring,  as  earlier,  to  whether  the  models  allow  for  the  incremental 
effects  between  bad  and  good  (lagged)  economic  news.  In  the  restricted  version,  the 
a2and  vj  to  y4are  restricted  to  zero.  If  asymmetric  timeliness  is  an  important  feature 
of  a  particular  accounting  figure,  the  difference  in  R2s  between  the  two  versions  will 
be  significant.  The  significance  is  formally  tested  by  employing,  the  F-test  (see 
section  4.5.1,  equation  (4-7)).  Aggregate  results  for  these  F-tests  are  shown  in 
Appendix  G. 
As  in  previous  tables,  the  leftmost  column  of  Table  4-11  shows  the  main 
components  of  earnings  and  different  definitions  of  earnings.  For  each  of  these 
accounting  variables,  first  the  restricted  version  is  presented  followed  by  the 
73 
unrestricted  versions.  All  coefficients'  estimates  shown  are  cross-sectional 
averages  of  the  estimates  of  33  individual  yearly  regressions.  The  t-statistics  are 
calculated  according  to  the  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  method.  The  second  column 
in  Table  4-11  shows  the  average  number  of  observations.  Given  the  outlier-removal 
criteria  (see  section  4.2),  the  average  number  of  observations  is  in  all  ten  cases  622.3 
firms  per  year,  but  the  actual  number  of  observations  ranges  from  a  minimum  of  276 
firms  in  1969  to  a  maximum  of  777  firms  in  1995  and  663  firms  in  year  2001,  the 
last  year  included  in  the  sample.  The  results  are  discussed  by  groups  of  variables. 
Operating  cash  flows.  The  good  news  coefficients  for  the  operating  cash 
flows  (OCF)  ft,  to  P^,  4  increase  monotonically  through  time,  as  expected.  There  is  no 
asymmetric  timeliness  in  OCF  in  respect  to  bad  news  either  in  the  current  period  or 
73  The  restricted  versions  are  not  commented  separately  and  are  presented  only  to  provide 
comparability  with  other  results  in  this  thesis  and  other  exsiting  literature. 
196 at  any  of  the  three  lags,  consistent  with  conservatism  being  an  accruals  rather  than  a 
cash  flow  phenomenon.  Also  consistent  with  contemporaneous  results  is  the  much 
lower  R2  compared  to  the  earnings'  equations.  Further  confirmation  that  asymmetric 
timeliness  is  not  a  feature  of  operating  cash  flows  is  that  the  F-test  indicates 
statistically  significant  differences  only  in  9  out  of  33  years.  Appendix  F  (Table  F-3) 
also  presents  results  for  the  net  change  in  cash  (ACASH)  variable  with  the 
differences  entirely  in  the  spirit  of  the  contemporaneous  models. 
Earnings.  Starting  with  the  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional 
items  (EARN)  and  good  economic  news,  the  results  show  that  the  estimated  good 
news  coefficients  A  to  ft,  increase  monotonically  towards  the  cost  of  equity  capital 
as  the  lag  increases.  More  and  more  of  the  original  good  news  is  realised  and 
incorporated  into  financial  statements,  the  coefficients  increase  towards  the  cost  of 
capital  and  the  difference  between  reported  and  pennanent  earnings  due  to 
conservative  accounting  gradually  decreases  to  zero.  The  incremental  coefficients  on 
bad  news,  on  the  other  hand,  decay  monotonically  towards  zero  and  by  lag  three  the 
incremental  coefficient  j,  is  statistically  insignificantly  different  from  zero,  as 
expected  -  bad  news  originating  from  previous  periods  has  already  been  fully 
impounded  in  accounting  earnings.  This  is  consistent  with  most  of  the  effects  of  bad 
news  being  incorporated  in  earnings  in  the  period  they  occur.  The  R2  for  the 
unrestricted  model  is  higher  than  for  the  restricted  model  and  the  difference  is 
statistically  significant  in  26  individual  cross-sections,  indicating  the  importance  of 
the  asymmetric-timeliness  effect  in  EARN.  Very  similar  results  are  also  obtained  for 
the  ORD  earnings  measure,  except  that  the  R2  is  higher,  indicating  less  transitory 
elements  are  likely  being  present  in  this  measure  than  in  EARN,  as  in 
197 contemporaneous,  models.  One  important  difference  between  these  results  and  the 
UK  cross-sectional  results  obtained  by  Pope  and  Walker  (1999,  Table  6)  is  that  they 
obtain  statistical  significance  on  the  bad  news  coefficients  only  up  to  and  including 
lag  one  (i.  e.,  two  periods)  for  both  their  ORD  and  EARN  variables,  while  here 
statistical  significance  for  the  current  period  and  two  lags  is  obtained.  Their  results 
are  more  in  line  with  expectations  under  conservative  accounting.  This  might  be  due 
to  different  sample  coverage  in  terms  of  years  covered  and  in  terms  of  sample 
composition  in  terms  of  descriptive  statistic,  but  might  also  be  due  to  a  partial 
overlap  of  sample  years.  It  must  be  reiterated  that  the  length  of  a  particular 
accounting  year  is  allowed  to  differ  from  one  calendar  year  by  up  to  ±3  months,  thus 
causing  partial  overlap  in  adjacent  calendar  years.  Even  without  this  difference, 
another  important  contribution  to  this  difference  might  be  the  fact  that  non- 
December  year-ends  are  allowed  in  the  sample,  thus  automatically  causing  one 
accounting  year  to  extend  over  two  calendar  years. 
Regarding  operating  profit  (OP),  the  results  for  good  news  are  consistent 
with  the  results  for  the  other  two  earnings  measures,  i.  e.,  the  good  news  coefficients 
increase  monotonically  towards  the  cost  of  capital,  while  for  the  bad  news  only  the 
current-period  bad  news  coefficient  ý,  is  statistically  significant,  indicating  that  to  Y, 
the  extent  that  the  accruals'  components  in  this  measure  capture  (some  of)  the  effect 
of  bad  news,  it  is  incorporated  immediately  in  the  period  it  occurs.  This  measure  is 
least  likely  to  include  any  non-operating  accruals.  This  should  be  mirrored  by 
working  capital  accruals  (,  dWCAP)  (see  below).  Also,  of  the  three  earnings 
measures,  the  unrestricted  versions  differ  in  statistical  terms  in  only  17  years,  as 
opposed  to  the  EARN  regressions  (26  years). 
198 Accruals.  The  asymmetric  timeliness  exhibited  by  the  earnings  figures  is 
thus  ascribed  to  the  accruals  components  of  earnings,  given  that  the  cash  flows 
measures  indicate  no  asymmetry  in  recognition  of  good  and  bad  news  in  these 
74  figures.  As  an  aggregate  measure,  working  capital  accruals  (,  dWCAP),  captures  the 
effects  of  current  bad  news  within  the  period  it  occurs  and  no  further  lags  are 
statistically  significant,  consistent  with  predictions  under  conservative  accounting. 
Further  decomposition  of  AWCAP  into  its  constituent  parts  reveals  that  this 
asymmetry  is  in  a  significant  part  due  to  the  AStock  component  (also  see  Thomas  and 
Zhang,  2002).  Inconsistent  with  the  requirement  of  conservatism  that  all  bad  news 
must  be  impounded  immediately  in  the  earnings  figure,  both  the  current  (y^,  )  and  lag 
one  (  ý2)  incremental  bad  news  coefficients  on  this  component  are  statistically 
significant.  Again,  the  caveat  is  that  this  might  be  a  consequence,  at  least  in  part,  of 
sample  construction.  The  incremental  coefficients  on  current  bad  news  (P,  )  on  the  Y, 
other  two  AWCAP  components  are  not  statistically  significant.  For  completeness, 
A 
note  that  the  lag-one  good  news  coefficient  . 
8,  is  the  highest  of  all  four  good  news 
coefficients  in  aggregate  working  capital  accruals  as  well  as  in  its  debtors  and 
creditors  components.  This  finding  is  inconsistent  with  the  expectations  derived  from 
the  model  that  the  coefficients  on  good  news  should  increase  monotonically  towards 
the  cost  of  capital.  Additional  checks  have  been  perfonned  to  ensure  this  is  not  a 
result  of  data  or  programming  irregularities. 
The  good  news  coefficients  in  the  depreciation  and  mnortisation  expense  (DEP) 
equation  increase  monotonically  and  none  of  the  bad  news  coefficients  are 
74  Basu  (1997)  and  Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin  (2000)  do  not  study  these  accruals  explicitly  and  this 
thesis  thus  represents  an  important  extension  of  these  two  studies. 
199 statistically  significant,  consistent  with  expectations  regarding  this  type  of  accruals 
(the  exception  is  the  last  incremental  coefficient  Y^41which  is  marginally  statistically 
significant,  but  this  significance  would  be  hard  to  explain  in  economic  terms).  In  this 
respect  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  current-period  good  news  coefficientAis  not 
statistically  significant,  suggesting  a  delay  in  incorporating  the  effects  of  good  news 
in  earnings  via  depreciation.  This  suggests  that  the  "implementation"  of  good  news 
via  investments  in  the  stock  of  tangible  and  intangible  fixed  assets  takes  some  time 
to  be  realised  -  the  results  obtained  suggest  an  approximately  one-year  delay 
between  the  arrival  of  good  economic  news,  an  increase  in  the  stock  of  fixed  assets 
and  a  consequent  increase  in  the  depreciation  and  amortisation  charge. 
Perhaps  the  most  interesting  result  from  the  lagged  analysis  of  accruals 
components  comes  from  the  special  items  (SPEC).  Only  the  estimated  current-period 
good  news  coefficient  A  is  statistically  significant.  It  is  relatively  small  compared  to 
other  accruals  and  earnings  components  and  of  the  negative  sign,  suggesting  that  a 
unit  of  current-period  good  news  results  in  a  slight  decrease  in  current-period 
earnings,  consistent  with  the  result  obtained  for  the  contemporaneous  model. 
However,  the  effect  does  not  persist  beyond  the  current  period,  indicating  that 
earnings-increasing  SPECs  effect  on  earnings  is  entirely  transitory.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  current-period,  lag-one  and  lag-two  incremental  bad  news  coefficients  are 
statistically  significant,  suggesting  that  firms  exercise  some  discretion  in  recognising 
the  effect  of  bad  news  in  concurrent  financial  statements. 
200 r4 
cý 
0 9 
0 
.  ID 
ce 
0 
10 
JD 
14 
c  >Z 
C>Z 
X>2 
qZ 
cq:  ý 
,N  C-14. 
C< 
,N  ts 
bb t 
iz 
'lýI 
u 
(DN  p 
09  m2 00 
p 
C>  Z 
%0 
e 
VI  e-  e4  Z 
c=, 
%0  §  M3 
m  10  ýc  l  CD  ý  C:  ) 
Z 
C:  )  e4  n  ;1  C:  )  CD  f4  C:  )  e4 
e  ei 
CD  -  9 CD  Ce CD 
rn  e4 
300  00  rq 
00  ý,  0 
c>  V.  )  Vlb 
"ý  1 
9  Cý  m 
19  an  f4 
W)  ý  00  en  r- 
V 
M  9 
4r 
3  CD 
I 
c  cý  6 
rn  c> 
00 
00  2 
NO  vi 
rn  e4 
0  fIlý  CD  "! 
ýc 
(D  8  Ze  f4  2  cý  c;  8  CD 
4 
rn  (> 
en  r- 
9 
"t 
C:  ) 
r-  Z  CD  j;  3  CD 
r-  en  kn  Z 
ri 
(D  ei 
CD 
5  CD 
c 
(D  el  g  " 
"ý  VI  r-  vý  i  vý  en  r-  ý  Ch  U,  ein  rq 
CD 
00  CD  CD  Q  C:  )  CD  ce  ce  C:  )  r.  2 
f4 
ý 
1-4 
rq  rn 
rq  0' 
-  ý 
c)  = 
e' 
c>  m 
r,  ý 
in  %0 
r-  ;ý 
l=  e 
oe 
10  § 
r-  cý  la 
le  v 
le 
M  cý  1  (D  -ý  4  C:  )  -  -:  ci  CD  -  le  ZO  CD  -  9  cl  C:  )  -  vi  Q-  C:  0 
Z  ) 
la  CD 
q  ce  rl  Q 
=  In 
ýe  c  rý  ý 
en  c  CD 
Co  ý 
r-  Z 
Q 
ý,  0  A 
r- 
09  <e 
-,  1  p  m 
- 
>o  ;2 
vý  -  d  c;  -  P  r-)  :  c3  CD  - 
!  00  CD 
9  e-i  CD  cý  ￿,  CD  9  le  CD  9  c"  le  00  le  J  00  =  CD  c;  c; 
Rn  ::  g  rý  f4 
tz 
e4 
c> 
IR 
;2e 
2 
m  r-  CD  00 
er  9  CD  e 
00  .  in  -:  0;  9  rý  =  9  od  c:!  CD  1  9  =  CD 
CD 
rn  7  C>  Z  r-  3  idn  e  "4 
91  9  9  9  9 
v--s  cý  ,  e  en 
r  3  r-  e  cý 
c  V.  4  KA  e  38  0g r-  "-9 
1  V,  A  V)  O  i 
CD  -Qý 
e 
CD  «  Q-  CD  -  CD  -  CD 
ce 
Q 
9 
e 
CD 
>  Ce 
le  0 
fi  ri 
"0  ýo 
0 
r 
rrb  en 
fli  fli  r4  f4 
NO  IZ 
I 
('ei  rrb 
rý  C-i 
m  en 
rý  rli  CN 
r-4 
%0  v 
en  rm 
rg 
clý 
.4 
1111  (11 
r.  4  m 
r-i  r4 
ee 
C14 « 
.0 
l 
ID 
e 
en  r-  r-  "-0  gZ*, 
1::! 
cý 
99  IR 
.  (P 
9 
r4  oa 
le 
-r  CD  CD 
!Q= 
CD  -  C:  )  -  CD  -1 
wl  47,  00 
1ý0  00 ".  4 
C4 
C4  CD  C; 
00  42S  f4  C!  Cý  ci  C;  0 
vl  0 
f.  4  Y,  O  e4  CD 
e4 
c:; 
C:!  _  c:  e  en  9  C:  ) 
ýc  zý 
m  ri 
m 
vý  1 
M)  p! 
M)  ý, 
%0  cr, 
"ý 
, 
cm  0% 
m 
<D  f4 
nr  v' c 
e-i  ;ý 
0  C, 
c>  ýo 
.-  le  le  9  9m  le  rl 
5 
9 
e  9  cý  2  cý  tý -  C)  CD  9  le  ,  ce  -.  9  c>  CD 
ce  9 
9  9 
\O  e 
91  tn 
=I  ýc  -  g 
vý  " 
gn 
00  kA  :Z  000 
c  r-: 
= 
r- 
c;  le  ei 
cý  c; 
ý 
00 
ci 
t-  2  t-  "  42N  0"  00  ý9  ý9  00  -  E  W) 
ý 
kn  # 
00  c. 
C5  c; 
ý  ein  90  e  c> 
91  cz; 
Cý  10N 
ei  el 
C14 
-g  A  -0  41-  ;;  ý 
WE  9 
"4  1r 
10 
ý  .05 
.0  id 
-5  T  T, 
-4 
A  12 
aý  : -ý  ý 
LQ  A  ý, 
ca 
+ 
10 
..  r  ,--  +  t= 
+ 
IL  94 
+ 
!ý69  .0  -Z  f. 
to 
aJ 
-L 
+  co 
x 
U 
cm  *= 
-0  geIýI 
o 
R_  r: 
E 
OV 
=I-  00  m  In  0  vý  t-  '.  4  p 
ki)  "  tý  V 
en 
0 
W, 
ti  ri 
1 
ýo  IV 
-14  tj 
ri  li  r-4  f4 
rq  (14 
ýo  \o 
fi 
ýc  ýo 
01  Q 
0 
N This  is,  strictly  speaking,  inconsistent  with  the  models  of  conservatism  that  "require" 
immediate  and  full  incorporation  of  bad  news  in  the  current  period  (and  allow  for 
possible  over-incorporation).  It  is  also  inconsistent  with  regulatory  calls  for  more 
(earnings)  timeliness,  in  particular  regarding  bad  economic  news  (Levitt,  1998). 
They  would,  however,  fit  with  the  earnings  management  literature.  For  example,  it  is 
not  inconceivable  that  management  would  spread  the  effect  of  a  bad  news  over  two 
adjacent  accounting  periods  to  smooth  earnings  (e.  g.,  Leuz,  Nanda  and  Wysocki, 
2003;  Burgstahler  and  Dichev,  1997;  Elliott  and  Waymire,  1988)  or  they  might 
reflect  some  industry-speciflc  circumstances  or  managers,  auditors  and  legal  advisers 
financial  reporting  preferences  (Francis,  Hanna  and  Vincent,  1996;  Elliott  and 
Hanna,  1996).  Also,  the  significance  of  these  lags  exactly  corresponds  with 
significance  of  the  bad  news  coefficients  in  the  ORD  and  EARN  measures.  Thus, 
while  these  statistical  significances  might  be  due  to  sample  properties,  they  are  also 
consistent  with  other  explanations,  earnings  management  among  them. 
To  sum  up,  lagged  analysis  shows  that  there  is  no  asymmetry  in  operating 
cash  flows  at  any  lag.  The  asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings  in  respect  to  bad  news 
extends  over  more  lags  with  increasing  content  of  accruals.  In  particular,  while 
working  capital  accruals  exhibit  asymmetric  timeliness  in  incorporating  current- 
period  bad  news,  current-period  special  items  reflect  bad  news  from  up  to  two  lags. 
While  the  statistical  significance  of  lagged  coefficients  is,  'strictly  speaking,  not 
consistent  with  conservatism,  the  statistical  insignificance  of  lag-three  bad  news 
coefficients  show  that  any  deviations  are  limited  in  time. 
203 4.7  THE  EFFECTS  OF  PERSXSTENCE  ON  THE 
CONTEMPORANEOUS  MODELS  OF  CONSERVATXSM 
The  effect  of  persistence  on  contemporaneous  models  of  conservative 
accounting  is  studied  empirically  by  estimating  the  following  operationalisation  of 
the  model  presented  in  section  3.8: 
Xt 
=al+a2D,,,  -I+ARET#,  t-i  +  yD,,,  -, 
RET,,, 
-,  Pt-I 
J 
xt-l 
+8 
x 
t-  2  Pt-I  34-1  Pt-I 
(4-20) 
At  least  three  observations  regarding  the  inclusion  of  persistence  tenns  that 
help  model  the  Vrtenn  in  the  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  model  can  be  made.  First,  if 
the  inclusion  of  differential  profit/loss  or  any  positive/negative  accounting  figure 
persistence  represents  an  (imperfect)  attempt  to  model  the  VI-terin  in  equation  (3-9) 
and  this  effect  of  previous  periods'  news  through  conservative  accounting  on  current 
accounting  numbers  is  significant,  the  average  estimated  regression  constants  from 
the  two  models  should  differ  materially  between  the  two  sets  of  results.  In  particular, 
the  estimated  regression  constants  from  augmented  regressions  should  be  lower  on 
average,  as  these  past  effects  are  separated  from  the  cost  of  capital  (and,  potentially, 
other  unaccounted-for  systematic  effects).  Second,  the  estimated  A  and 
P,  coefficients  that  capture  the  incorporation  of  current  period  news  into  current 
period  accounting  numbers  should  not  be  materially  affected.  By  definition,  current- 
period  news  is  not  correlated  with  previous  periods'  news  (all  are  proxied  for  by  ex- 
dividend  returns).  This  also  implies  that  the  interpretations  of  the  conservatism 
204 measures  based  on  the  model  in  equation  (4-20)  are  identical  to  interpretations 
elsewhere  in  this  study.  Third,  the  R  2S  in  these  models  should  increase  either  because 
of  (a  successful)  modelling  of  the  Vt  term  or  because  the  inclusion  of  these  A-83 
terms  captures  factors,  described  by  the  accounting  losses  literature  (e.  g.,  Jan  and 
Ou,  1995;  Hayn,  1995;  Berger,  Ofek  and  Swary,  1996;  Freeman  and  Tse,  "1992; 
Lipe,  Bryant  and  Widener,  1998;  Burgstahler  and  Dichev;  1997;  etc.  ). 
The  results  are  presented  below.  Both  the  variant  where  the  LI.,  variable  is 
defined  by  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (EARN)  for  all 
different  dependent  variables  and  the  variant  where  the  Lt-I  indicator  (as  well  as  the 
persistence  variables)  are  redefined  separately  for  each  of  the  main  variables  used  in 
this  study  are  shown.  Table  4-12  shows  the  results  for  the  first  variant.  The  three 
expectations  presented  above  are  supported.  Regression  constants  appear  to  be 
materially  lower,  on  average,  compared  to  models  that  do  not  allow  for  persistence  - 
i.  e.,  that  do  not  model  the  Vt  term.  The  only  exception  is  the  constant  in  the  SPEC 
regression,  but  even  this  exception  is  an  exception  in  statistical,  rather  than  economic 
terms.  The  coefficients  on  good  and  bad  news  in  all  ten  regressions  are  not 
materially  affected.  On  average,  both  the  estimated  good  news  coefficientsA  and 
the  incremental  bad  news  coefficients  P,  appear  to  be  marginally  lower.  This  might 
be  a  consequence  of  imperfect  modelling  of  the  V,  term  that  would  introduce  the 
errors-in-variables  problem  and  bias  all  regression  coefficients  towards  zero.  The 
average  R2s  are  significantly  higher  (almost  double)  the  size  of  R2s  in  regressions 
without  the  gj-tý  tenns. 
205 Overall,  operating  cash  flows  (OCT)  capture  news  symmetrically.  All  three 
earnings  measures  capture  bad  news  significantly  faster  than  good  news  and  the 
asymmetry  is  highest  for  the  EARN  measure,  followed  by  the  OP  measure  and  by 
ordinary  earnings  (ORD).  The  analysis  of  accruals  shows  that  most  of  the  asymmetry 
exhibited  by  earnings  can  be  attributed  to  working  capital  accruals  (A  WCAP)  and 
special  items  (SPEC).  The  observations  on  the  relative  values  of  the  R  2S  in  accruals 
versus  cash  flows  specifications  apply,  too.  These  results  are  thus  in  line  with  the 
contemporaneous  results  presented  in  section  4.5. 
The  second  variant  (Table  4-13),  where  both  the  Lt-I  indicator  and  the 
(lagged)  persistence  variables  are  defined  separately  for  each  earnings  and  earnings' 
components  variable,  are  quantitatively  and  qualitatively  very  similar  to  the  "bottom- 
line"  variant.  Operating  cash  flows  (OCF)  capture  news  symmetrically,  all  three 
earnings  measures  exhibit  a  significant  asymmetry  in  capturing  bad  news  and  the 
asymmetry  is  highest  for  the  EARN  measure,  followed  by  the  OP  measure  and  by 
ordinary  earnings  (ORD),  as  in  a  number  of  previous  analyses.  The  analysis  of 
accruals  shows  that  most  of  the  asymmetry  in  earnings  can  be  attributed  to  working 
capital  accruals  (AWCAP)  and  special  items  (SPEC).  The  effects  of  deprecation 
accruals  (DEP)  cannot  be  studied  in  this  variant,  but  it  is  unlikely  given  previous 
results  that  it  would  affect  the  asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings  significantly. 
An  alternative  modelling  of  the  Vt  term  is  to  include  past  periods'  economic 
news  (i.  e.,  price-differences  deflated  by  Pt-1)  into  the  contemporaneous  model  of 
conservatism  in  place  of  the  81-83  terms  above.  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  include 
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laz  ö  --.  -Z;  i  ý;  ý  Ig  E news  from  three  lags,  obtaining  a  variant  of  the  lagged  model  presented  in  section 
4.6.  The  principal  expectations  from  this  formulation  is  that  the  estimated  regression 
coefficients  should  not  be  materially  affected  by  this  inclusion  given  that  news 
should  be  uncorrelated  across  time  and  that  the  R  2S  should  increase,  given  that  the 
regression  error  term  contains  the  deflated  Vt  term.  However,  recently,  Ryan  and 
Zarowin  (2003)  ascribe  differences  between  lagged  models  deflated  by  Pt-I 
compared  to  models  deflated  by  Pj-4  to  interest  rates.  This  issue  is  not  studied  here, 
but  some  related  results  are  presented  in  Appendix  D  (Table  D-2).  While  the  results 
are  sensitive  to  the  choice  of  deflators  (in  particular  the  coefficients  on  lagged  good 
A 
news  . 
82  to  P4),  the  principal  conclusions  regarding  contemporaneous  terms 
(represented  by  coefficients  ft,  and  ý,  )  are  the  following. 
IV, 
Operating  cash  flows  (OCF)  does  not  exhibit  asymmetric  timeliness  in 
incorporating  bad  news.  Of  the  earnings  figures,  EARN  exhibits  the  highest 
asymmetric  timeliness,  followed  by  OP  and  by  ORD.  Compared  to  the 
contemporaneous  results  without  the  VI-term.  modelling,  the  P  coefficients  on  the  Y, 
latter  two  figures  are  lower,  while  for  the  EARN  figure  the  estimated  bad  news 
coefficient  is  higher  than  in  the  contemporaneous  versions  (compare  with  Table  4-8). 
This  asymmetry  is  clearly  reflected  in  working  capital  accruals  (AWCAP)  and  its 
three  components.  All  coefficients  are  of  expected  magnitudes  and  signs.  The  other 
important  accruals  component  reflecting  news  in  an  asymmetric  manner  is  the 
special  items  variable  (SPEC).  Results  on  the  total  accruals  variable  reinforce  the 
conclusion  reached  in  earlier  sections.  The  modelling  of  the  V,  term  thus  does  not 
209 affect  qualitatively  the  current-period  coefficients  A  and  y^,  and  the  R  2S  increase 
compared  to  contemporaneous  models.  75 
4.8  A  COMPARISON  OF  LOSS  AND  PROFIT 
OBSERVATIONS 
4.8.1  A  short  introduction 
Empirical  studies  on  earnings  response  coefficients  have  documented  that  the 
relationship  between  accounting  earnings  and  market  values  is  different  for  firms 
with  current-period  positive  earnings  relative  to  finns  with  current-period  negative 
earnings.  Taking  a  somewhat  different  perspective  than  in  section  2.2.4,  the  earnings 
response  coefficients  for  observations  with  positive  earnings  were  found  to  be  much 
higher  than  earnings  response  coefficients  for  observations  with  negative  earnings. 
Jan  and  Ou  (1995)  argue  that  this  difference  is  due  to  losses  being  more  transitory 
than  profits,  since  losses  cannot  persist  indefinitely.  Losses  are  either  reversed  or 
shareholders  exercise  the  put  option  they  implicitly  have  in  the  firm  and  eliminate 
the  firm's  operations  (Hayn,  1995;  Berger,  Ofek  and  Swary,  1996;  Collins,  Pincus 
and  Xie,  1999).  This  put  option  can  take  the  form  of  the  liquidation  of  assets, 
reorganisation  of  the  firm  or  the  assets  might  be  merged  with  or  acquired  by  another 
firm.  These  differences  between  profit  and  loss  observations  cannot  be  explained  by 
firm-specific  factors  or  by  observed  non-linearities  in  extremities  of  earnings,  but 
75  It  is  unclear  whether  lagged  bad  news  coefficients  may  be  interpreteded  in  the  same  way  as  in  the 
lagged  model  of  conservatism,  but  with  a  different  deflator.  If  this  were  the  case,  the  significance  and 
magnitude  of  lagged  bad  news  coefficients  in  earnings  and  SPEC  regressions  are  consistent  with 
findings  from  section  4.5.1  (see  the  effects  of  deflation  by  varying  deflators  in  Appendix  B,  Table  B- 
3). 
210 represent  a  distinct  factor  in  the  returns-earnings  relation  (Freeman  and  Tse,  1992; 
Lipe,  Bryant  and  Widener,  1998)  The  existing  literature  does  not  provide  a  definite 
guidance  towards  whether  the  difference  occurs  at  exactly  zero  earnings  level  or  at 
some  other  level  of  earnings.  This  relates  in  particular  to  contractual  effects  of 
accounting  numbers:  it  is,  for  example,  conceivable  that  pre-managed  negative 
earnings  are  inflated  by  management  adopting  income-increasing  accounting  policies 
or  that  low  levels  of  positive  earnings  are  sufficiently  low  such  that  the  abandomnent 
option  becomes  "in  the  money"  (Burgstahler  and  Dichev,  1997).  Regardless  of  the 
view  taken/explanation  accepted,  these  findings  are  consistent  in  suggesting  that  the 
nature  (and  with  it  the  estimated  regression  slope)  of  the  returns-eamings 
relationship  changes  significantly  around  the  break-even  level  of  earnings.  A  further 
layer  is  added  in  this  analysis  by  Beaver,  McAnally  and  Stinson  (1997)  who  show  in 
a  simultaneous-regression  approach,  that  both  returns  determine  changes  in  earnings 
and  changes  in  earnings  detennine  returns. 
In  an  attempt  to  show  and  capture  possible  differences  between  profit  and 
loss  firms  in  terms  of  accounting  conservatism,  the  main  descriptive  statistics  and 
correlations  separately  for  profit  and  loss  observations  and  test  fonnally  for  the 
differences  between  the  two  groups  are  shown  first.  Next,  the  Pope  and  Walker 
(1999)  model  of  conservatism  is  expanded  by  additional  terms  that  allow  the 
differentiation  between  good  and  bad  economic  news  as  well  as  between  profit  and 
loss  observations.  Third,  the  contemporaneous  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  models  of 
earnings  conservatism  are  estimated  separately  for  profit  and  loss  observations. 
Moreover,  the  EARN-regressions  are  estimated  separately  for  positive  and  negative 
levels  of  operating  cash  flows  and  positive  and  negative  levels  of  accruals.  Fourth, 
211 the  results  of  the  direct  tests  of  the  absolute-value  extension  of  Pope  and  Walker 
(1999)  are  'presented.  The  section  concludes  with  a  condensed  discussion  of 
econometric  problems  associated  with  these  direct  tests  that  partially  help  to  explain 
the  observed  results  and,  more  generally,  that  help  motivate  the  structure  of  and  tests 
taken  in  this  section. 
4.8.2  General  properties  of  loss  and  profit 
observations 
This  section  presents  some  descriptive  statistics  about  observations  with 
negative  and  positive  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (EARN).  It 
also  presents  fonnal  tests  of  the  differences  in  tenns  of  descriptives  for  the  two 
groups.  Table  4-14  shows  the  contemporaneous  incidence  of  both  good/bad 
economic  news  and  profit/loss  obseryations. 
Table  4-14:  Incidence  of  good  and  bad  economic  news  and  positive  and  negative  earnings  (EARN), 
contemporaneous  sample,  1969-2001 
Economic  news 
Good  (RETr--O)  Bad  (RETI-<O)  Total 
Positive 
Reported  (EARNr>O,  Li=O)  13,481  52.07%  9,170  35.42%  22,651  87.50% 
earnings  Negative  974  3.76%  2,263  8.74%  3,237  12.50% 
_(EARN,: 
50,  Li=l) 
- 
Total  14,455  55.84%  11,433  44.16%  25,888  100.00% 
Notes.  EARN is  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  returns  are  defined  as  RET,.,.,  -  (PrP#.  IYP#.,.  Percentages  shown  are  oftotal  number  of  observations.  EARN  and  RET  relate  tothe  same  (current)  period.  i.  e.,  cam  ings 
are  not  lagged. 
212 Overall,  12.5%  of  observations  in  the  contemporaneous  sample  have  negative 
76 
earnings  EARN  and  44.16%  exhibit  negative  returns  RET  A  mere  6.74%  of  firms 
with  positive  RET  exhibit  a  loss  (only  3.76%  of  all  observations).  In  contrast,  almost 
20%  of  firms  with  negative  RET  also  show  a  loss.  These  data  suggest  that  while 
negative  accounting  earnings  (an  alternative  nomenclature  might  be  "accounting  bad 
news")  are  a  distinct  phenomenon  from  negative  economic  earnings,  the  two 
phenomena  overlap  in  a  significant  number  of  cases.  This  is  consistent  with  the 
observation  that  both  "types"  of  earnings  reflect  the  same  underlying  economic 
event.  Indeed,  a  more  general  statement  that  might  be  derived  directly  from 
accounting  conservatism  literature  is  that  bad  news  cause  accounting  losses  in,  that 
they  must  be  recognised  in  the  current  accounting  period  and  in  full  amount  rather 
than  gradually  over  time  and  in  small  amounts. 
Table  4-15  reports  Pearson's  bivariate  correlation  coefficients  separately  for 
the  current-period  profit  observations  and  current-period  accounting  loss 
observations,  the  profit  and  loss  observations  being  separated  according  to  the  sign 
earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (EARN),  i.  e.,  the  figure  that 
resembles  most  closely  the  "bottom-line"  earnings.  Some  of  the  main  points  are  the  - 
following.  First,  the  higher  the  operating  cash  flows  OCF,  the  lower  (possibly  more 
negative)  the  total  accruals  (Accruals  (tot.  )).  The  correlation  coefficient  is  stronger  in 
magnitude  for  loss  observations,  indicating  the  important  role  of  accruals  for  loss 
firms  in  particular.  This  relation  also  holds  for  certain  individual  components  of 
accruals  (A  WCAP,  ADebtors,  AStock  and  SPEC),  except  for  the  depreciation  charge 
76  Section  4.2  presents  details  on  contemporaneous  sample  formation. 
213 (DEP),  where  the  correlation  coefficients  are  similar  between  the  two  groups,  and 
ACreditors. 
Second,  the  relation  between  OCF  and  EARN  appears  to  be  fundamentally 
different  for  the  two  groups  of  observations.  For  the  profit  group,  there  is  a  strong 
and  positive  linear  correlation  between  all  three  earnings  figures  and  operating  cash 
flows  -  the  higher  the  OCF  component,  the  higher  the  earnings.  The  relation 
between  EARN  and  OCF  is  somewhat  weaker  than  the  correlation  between  the 
ordinary  earnings  figure  ORD  and  OCF,  likely  a  consequence  of  the  presence  of 
more  transitory  (accrual)  items  in  EARN  than  in  ORD.  The  relation  is  strongest  for 
the  OP  measure  of  earnings  that  likely  contains  the  least  amount  of  non-operating 
accruals.  For  the  loss  group,  however,  these  relations  are  different.  While  there  is  a 
strong  correlation  between  OCF  and  operating  profit  (OP),  the  correlation  is  much 
weaker  with  ordinary  earnings  (ORD)  and,  finally,  the  sign  of  the  correlation 
changes  when  the  EARN  measure  is  considered.  Thus,  the  higher  the  operating  cash 
flow  component  of  earnings,  the  lower  the  "bottom-line"  earnings  figure.  This 
should  be  reflected  in  a  strong  and  negative  correlation  between  OCF  and  special 
items  (SPEC)  and  other  accruals  that  possibly  contain  items  that  cause  a  lowering  of 
earnings.  The  correlation  coefficients  between  OCF  and  SPEC  as  well  as  other 
accruals  are  all  relatively  strong  and  negative,  particularly  for  the  loss  group. 
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ýr"  i Finally,  the  correlation  between  current-period  returns  (RE7)  and  all  three 
earnings  measures  is  lower  in  magnitude  for  the  loss  group  than  for  the  profit  group, 
albeit  the  correlation  coefficients  are  of  equal  sign  in  both  groups.  This  is  consistent 
with  empirical  observations  that  loss  firms  exhibit  lower  earnings  response 
coefficients  than  profit  firms  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  including  transitory  elements 
and  abandonment  options  (e.  g.,  Jan  and  Ou,  1995;  Hayn,  1995).  Additionally, 
assuming  Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin  (2000)  view  that  operating  cash  flow  is  merely  a 
noisier  measure  of  performance  than  earnings  (see  section  3.5),  the  "operating  cash 
flow"  response  coefficient  as  well  as  the  correlation  between  returns  and  operating 
cash  flows  should  be  lower  for  loss  firms.  Table  4-15  confinns  this  expectation.  The 
correlation  is  relatively  low  for  both  profit  and  loss  finns,  but  the  difference  in 
magnitude  between  the  two  groups  of  firms  appears  to  be  material. 
Table  4-16  shows  the  descriptive  statistics  for  the  two  sub-samples  and 
provides  two  formal  tests  of  the  differences  in  mean  values  of  these  variables.  For 
each  deflated  accounting  figure  for  the  two  sub-samples,  the  following  hypothesis 
stated  in  alternative  form  is  tested: 
H4: 
where  Y4 
-0  and  YL, 
-1  represent  mean  values  of  deflated  accounting  variables  listed  in 
the  leftmost  column  of  Table  4-16.  The  hypothesis  indicates  that  firms  with  non- 
negative  and  firms  with  negative  earnings  exhibit  different  values  of  different 
deflated  accounting  variables.  A  particularly  interesting  question  in  the  conservatism 
framework  is  whether  accounting  profit  and  loss  firms  differ  in  terms  of  the  accruals 
216 and  operating  cash  flow  components.  The  two  sub-samples  split  by  EARNt  are 
assumed  to  be  independent.  The  test  statistics  is  (adapted  from  Anderson,  Sweeney 
and  Williams,  1993,  pp.  347-352;  also  see  section  4.3  above): 
(YL,.  O  -  YLIJ  (4-21) 
(nL, 
-O  -  I)ar2,,..  +  (nL,.  l  -  I)ar2L,.. 
+I  (n,,.  o  +  1)  +  (n,,.,  +  1)  nL,.,,  nL,., 
distributed  with  (nL, 
-O  +  nL,  -l  -  2)  degrees  of  freedom,  where,  additionally,  nL,.,,  and 
nL,  -,  are  the  numbers  of  observations  affected  by  good  and  bad  news  respectively 
and  ay,  and  cr'  are  the  variances  of  deflated  accounting  variables  for  the  two 
4--  Y4 
-1 
sub-samples. 
Additionally,  the  Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon  non-parametric  test  is  employed 
(adapted  from  Anderson,  Sweeney,  Williams,  1993,  pp.  721-727;  Stata  Reference 
Manual,  2001,  pp.  219-220).  The  hypothesis  in  alternative  from  is: 
H'4:  YWo  populations  are  not  identical. 
and  the  test  statistics  is: 
T-E[TI 
(4-22) 
217 R 
where  T  RL, 
-OJ 
is  the  sum  of  ranks  RL, 
-O.  l  for  positive  earnings  observations, 
E[Tl=nL, 
-O,  I(nL,.  OnL,  -,  +1)/2  and  var(T)=(n.,., 
_, 
n,,,.,  a')  I(nL, 
-O  +nL,  -I)  and  cý  is  the 
variance  of  the  full  contemporaneous  sample  ranks  r,  :  a'  =ýI 
-I  Dr,  -F),  1-1 
Both  tests  provide  qualitatively  equal  conclusions  regarding  the  differences  in 
the  two  sub-samples  of  earnings.  Firms  with  positive  accounting  earnings  (EARN) 
have,  on  average,  higher  deflated  operating  cash  flows  (OCF)  and  also  higher 
operating  profit  (OP)  (note  that  both  OCF  and  OP  are  positive  for  both  profit  and 
loss  finns).  However,  ordinary  earnings  (ORD)  are  already  negative,  on  average,  for 
the  "bottom-line"  loss  (Lj=  1)  sub-sample.  This  is  reflected  by  earnings-decreasing 
working  capital  accruals  (AWCAP)  and  its  components  (except  for  Wreditors  that 
are,  on  average,  earnings-decreasing  for  both  sub-samples,  as  is  the  depreciation 
charge  DEP).  However,  in  a  significant  part,  the  difference  between  profit  and  loss 
firms  is  due  to  special  items  (SPEC),  the  component  associated  with  write-offs  and 
similar  one-time  items.  The  mean  (median)  of  these  deflated  special  items  for  the 
loss  sub-sample  is  a  full  -0.087  (-0.049)  and  for  the  profit  sub-sample  0.000  (0.000). 
The  difference  is  highly  statistically  significant  using  either  test.  A  similar 
conclusion  applies  in  terms  of  differences  in  total  accruals  (Accruals  (tot.  )).  While 
overall  and  on  average  total  accruals  should  be  negative  (i.  e.,  earnings-decreasing), 
the  average  level  of  accruals  for  the  loss  firms  is  significantly  more  negative  than 
that  for  the  profit  firms:  -0.232  versus  -0.018  for  the  means  and  -0.175  versus 
-0.017  for  the  medians  of  these  variables. 
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1-4 N Finally,  consistent  with  conclusions  presented  above  in  the  comments  to 
Table  4-14  and  Table  4-15,  the  loss  sub-sample  of  firms  exhibit  significantly  more 
negative  returns  (i.  e.,  bad  news)  on  average  than  the  profit  sub-sample  measured  by 
either  the  mean  or  the  median. 
Taken  together,  the  correlation  matrix  and  descriptive  evidence  presented 
"-b-ove  indicates  that  there  are  important  differences  between  profit  and  loss  firms  in 
terms  of  operating  cash  flow  and  accruals  components  of  earnings  as  well  as  in  terms 
of  market  values  associated  with  the  two  groups  of  firms.  These  differences  appear 
to  relate  much  more  strongly  to  (or,  originate  from)  differences  in  the  accruals 
component(s)  of  earnings  than  to  the  operating  cash  flow  component.  Such  an 
observation  represents  and  indication  that  incidence  of  losses  and  accounting 
conservatism  as  an  accruals  phenomenon  are  related.  Negative  accounting  earnings 
after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (EARNt:  50)  and  negative  economic 
earnings  (RETtt-1:  50)  appear  to  overlap  at  least  partially.  In  the  context  of 
conservatism,  the  regressions  of  EARN  on  RET  run  on  the  loss-observations  sub- 
sample  only  should  exhibit  a  stronger  timeliness  of  earnings  if  only  because  they  are 
more  often  hit  by  bad  economic  news  than  profit  firms.  However,  controlling  for 
good  and  bad  news  within  profit/loss  observations  should  lead  to  similar  coefficients 
on  both  good  and  bad  news.  The  next  two  sections  4.8.3  and  4.8.4  attempt  to  provide 
an  answer  to  this  question. 
220 4.8.3  A  generalised  model  of  losses 
To  allow  for  possible  differences  between  two  different  accounting 
conservatism  regimes  for  profit  and  loss  firms  within  the  contemporaneous  Pope  and 
Walker  (1999)  model,  the  relationship  between  reported  and  permanent  earnings  is 
allowed  to  be  different  for  two  different  "regimee',  separated,  in  this  case,  by  an 
arbitrary  level  of  permanent  eamings.  The  first  regime  is  descriptive  of  firms  with 
permanent  earnings  above  a  certain  threshold  A,  xt>A  and  the  second  regime  for 
firms  where  permanent  earnings  are  below  or  equal  to  the  threshold  level,  xj:  5A: 
,  -O"e,  "+y*e,  -+V,  if  x,  >A 
xt  = 
X,  -0-e,  +y-e,  -+V,  if  xt:  5A 
(4-23) 
where,  analogously  to  the  model  in  equation  (3-5),  the  parameters  0'  and  0- 
measure  the  degree  of  under-recognition  of  current  good  news  e,  *  and  parameters 
and  y-  measure  the  degree  of  over-recognition  of  current  bad  news  e,  -  for  the 
two  different  regimes  of  permanent  earnings  defined  by  the  threshold  level  A. 
Generally,  the  parameters  for  the  two  regimes  are  allowed  to  (but  not  required  to) 
differ:  0"  *  0-  and  y*  #  y-.  The  primary  motivation  for  such  a  differentiation  of 
loss-making  observations  is  that,  on  the  one  hand,  there  are  no  a  priori  reasons  why 
there  should  be  any  differences  between  profit  and  loss  observations  in  tenns  of  cx- 
post  conservatism  as  both  set  of  firms  must  follow  the  same  accounting  conventions, 
while  at  the  same  time  the  body  of  empirical  literature  presented  in  section  4.8.1 
consistently  suggests  that  there  may  be  some  differences  between  the  two  groups  of 
firms.  While  the  model  in  equation  (4-23)  does  not  in  itself  constitute  a  new 
221 theoretical  model,  it  at  least  allows  -  at  least  in  principle  -  for  any  incremental 
effects  of  loss-making  observations.  Within  the  model  it  is  further  assumed  that  the 
nature  of  economic  news  e,  '  and  e,  -  is  equal  for  all  firms.  It  must  be  stressed  that  the 
reported  earnings  Xt  for  each  of  the  two  regimes  may  be  positive,  negative  or  zero 
without  any  reference  to  the  value  of  permanent  earnings  xt. 
Similarly  to  the  steps  taken  in  Pope  and  Walker  (1999),  each  of  the  two 
relations  in  (4-23)  is  deflated  by  the  opening  price  p,  -,  ,  the  dummy  variable  for  bad 
economic  news  D,  reintroduced,  and  the  two  good  and  bad  news  equations  resulting 
for  each  of  the  two  regimes  xj>A  and  xj:  5A  merged.  The  equations  for  both  regimes 
are  straightforward  analogues  to  (3-9): 
x( 
=1+ 
1-o+ 
Rt  +7 
++o+ 
D(Ri  + 
Vf 
pt-,  kkk  Pi-i 
and  for  the  second  regime  equation  (4-23)  becomes 
1 
+l-o-  Rt  +y 
+0-  Di  R,  + 
V' 
kkk  Po-i 
(4-24a) 
(4-24b) 
As  in  the  good/bad  news  contemporaneous  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  model 
presented  in  section  3.3,  the  coefficient  (1-0o)lk  in  either  regime  captures  the 
proportion  of  current  period  good  news  captured  by  current  period  accounting 
earnings  Xj.  Under  conservative  accounting,  this  coefficient  is  expected  to  be  less 
than  the  cost  of  equity  capital  (1-0o)lk<llk  in  either  regime.  The  incremental 
222 coefficient  (7t+6b)/k  captures  the  incremental  -proportion  of  current  period  bad 
economic  news  captured  by  current  period  accounting  earnings.  Under  conservative 
accounting,  the  incremental  coefficient  is  expected  to  be  greater  than  zero  (the  total 
response  to  bad  news  is  given  by  (1-A)lk). 
For  estimation  purposes,  an  exogenous  indicator  variable  that  distinguishes 
between  the  two  regimes  of  pen-nanent  earnings  in  (4-24a)  and  (4-24b)  is  defined 
such  that  the  dummy  variable  A,  =0  if  xt>A  and  At=I  if  x,:  5A.  Multiplying  (4-24a) 
with  (I-A,  )  and  (4-24b)  with  A,,  summing  the  resulting  equations,  collecting  tenns 
and  rearranging  the  following  expansion  of  the  contemporaneous  Pope  and  ýValker 
(1999)  is  obtained: 
xt 
=i+I-o+  Ri+r 
++o+ 
DiR,  + 
pl-,  kkk 
(4-25) 
1-0,  -  1-0-  v 
+-  +L-ýL  AiRt  +-+  DAtRi  +' 
kk)kk  pi-1 
where,  in  addition  to  the  variables  already  defined,  A,  represents  the  identification  of 
the  two  permanent  earnings  regimes.  To  discuss  the  properties  of  the  model  in 
equation  (4-25),  it  is  useful  to  construct  a  hypothetical  empirical  form  of  (4-25)  with 
the  intention  that  this  empirical  form  would  have  a  similar  role  as  Pope  and  Walker's 
(1999)  theoretical  model  when  they  explain  Basu's  (1997)  empirical  equation.  In 
particular,  in  their  empirical  models,  both  Basu  (1997)  and  Pope  and  Walker  (1999) 
include  the  term  with  the  bad  news  indicator  Dt  in  the  regression  equation  (see 
equation  (3-10)  in  section  3.3  -  the  second  term  on  the  right-hand  side  including  the 
223 coefficient  q2),  even  though  this  term  does  not  follow  from  theoretical  derivations  in 
the  paper.  A  similar  approach  to  show  the  properties  of  equation  (4-25)  is  taken:  77 
Xt-=a, 
+a2D,  +a3A,  +a4DA,  +  ARt  +  rDR,  +*  fl2AtR$  +  r2DtAR,  +c$  (4-26) 
ps-I 
While  the  discussion  of  a  possible  operationalisation  of  At  is  deferred  until 
later  in  the  section,  some  explanations  of  (4-26)  can  be  provided.  First,  because  (4- 
26)  incorporates  four  different  states  of  the  world,  the  terms  with  coefflicients  aj  and 
a4  are  introduced  in  addition  to  the  q2  coefficient  that  appears  already  in  the  original 
Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  model.  These  coefficients  appear  in  equation  (4-26)  to 
avoid  the  correlated  omitted  variables  problem  and  the  resulting  biases.  However, 
the  expected  values  of  the  tenns  q2,  q3  and  c4  are  all  zero  -  the  cost  of  capital 
together  with  any  cumulative  effects  of  past  conservative  accounting  should  be,  on 
average,  equal  for  all  firms:  those  that  exhibit  positive  or  negative  economic,  news 
and  those  that  are  in  either  regime  designated  by  the  Ap  In  other  words,  given  the 
cost  of  capital  (Ilk),  the  expectation  is  that  all  finns  confonn  to  the  same  accounting 
rules.  Second,  while  the  fl,  and  yj  terns  in  (4-26)  are  equivalent  to  Pope  and 
Walker's  (1999)  model  and  capture  the  effects  of  under  (over)  recognition  of  good 
(bad)  news,  there  are  now  two  additional  incremental  coefficients  82  and72  that 
would  capture  any  possible  incremental  effects  for  the  (second)  regime  defined  by 
the  At  =I  variable.  Again,  the  expectation  is  that  these  terms  should  all  be  equal  to 
zero,  if  the  same  conservatism  regime  applies  for  the  loss  and  profit  firms. 
77  For  reasons  described  below,  equation  (4-26)  represents  only  a  hypothetical  form  and  is  not 
estimated  in  this  form. 
224 Therefore,  for  the  regime  defined  by  A,  =I  and  given  the  cost  of  capital  (Ilk), 
the  proportion  of  good  news  not  recognised  in  current-period  reported  earnings  can 
be  estimated  as  0-  =I  -  k(,  81+#82)  *If  there  was  no  difference  between  the  two  At 
regimes  regarding  the  incorporation  of  good  economic  news,  then  ft2=0  and 
0-  =  0" 
.  The  parameter  r-  in  equation  (4-9)  reflects  the  (over)incorporation  of 
current-period  bad  news  into  current-period  reported  earnings  X,  for  a  firm  in  the 
At==  1  regime  where  permanent  earnings  are  below  or  equal  to  an  arbitrary  threshold 
level  of  permanent  earnings  xt:  5A.  Given  the  cost  of  ciýital,  the'parameter's  estimate 
equals  y-  k(A+Pl  +P2  +P2)-'*  If  there  was  no  difference  between  the  two  A, 
regimes  regarding  the  incorporation  of  bad  economic  news  thenP2=  0  and  y-  =  y*. 
However,  a  major  drawback  of  the  model  in  equation  (4-25)  and  the  entire 
discussion  in  this  section  is  that  At,  just  as  the  level  of  permanent  earnings  xi,  and, 
consequently,  the  threshold  level  At  are  not  observable  to  the  researcher.  Thus,  the 
threshold  level  and  the  indicator  must  be  operationalised  -  i.  e.,  certain  "sensible" 
reference  points  must  be  chosen  if  (4-2S)  is  to  be  empirically  tractable.  An 
interesting  case  obtains  when  As  is  operationalised  in  the  following  manner:  a  new 
indicator  variable  L,  is  introduced  as  an  empirical  equivalent  of  A,,  defined  so  that 
I  if  reported  (rather  than  permanent)  eamings  Xj:  50  and  L?  =  0  if  reported  earnings 
Xt>O.  However,  in  this  case,  the  indicator  variable  L,  is  not  exogenous  and  thus  the 
linear  correlation  between  the  dependent  variable  and  the  indicator  variable  based  on 
this  same  variable  must  be  broken  (see  below  for  a  discussion).  It  is  thus  attempted 
to  operationalise  (4-26))  by  employing  an  absolute-value  transformation  of  (4-25): 
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D,  +a3L,  +a  +ARET,  +  yDRET,  +  =a,  +a2  4DILI  (4-27) 
+,  82L,  RET,  +  r2DLRET,  +  c, 
The  absolute-value  empirical  version  in  (4-  27)  has  two  important  properties. 
First,  it  removes  the  linear  correlation  between  the  reported  earnings  Xt  and  the 
indicator  variable  L,  based  on  this  same  reported  earnings  figure.  Therefore,  the 
information  on  the  origins  of  an  observation  is  preserved  (i.  e.,  profit/loss 
observation).  A  similar  effect  can  be  achieved  by  other  transformations,  for  example 
a  quadratic  transformation.  Second,  the  transformation  preserves  the  information  on 
the  degree  of  extremity  of  reported  earnings.  These  two  properties  are  important 
features  of  the  model  -  for  example,  it  is  possible  that  an  abandonment  option  is  in 
the  money  when  a  firm  reports  negative  earnings  (Hayn,  1995;  Jan  and  Ou,  1995) 
and  in  particular  when  these  negative  earnings  are  large.  78 
The  interpretation  of  the  four  regimes  in  (4-27)  differs  slightly  from  the 
interpretation  of  (4-26)  because  of  the  absolute  value  transformation.  While  the 
interpretation  of  good  and  bad  news  coefficients  for  the  Li=:  0  segment  remains  the 
same  regardless  of  the  absolute-value  transformation,  the  signs  of  the  coefficients  of 
the  Lj=  I  segment  must  be  inverted.  Geometrically,  this  arises  because  the  absolute 
value  transformation  acts  as  a  mirror  over  the  horizontal  axis  in  the  (RETt.  t.  1,  XWPt.  l)- 
space,  thereby  resetting  the  originally  positive  slope  to  a  negative  slope.  Therefore, 
the  average  cost  of  capital  together  with  any  previous-periods  conservative 
accounting  effect  is  captured  by  the  following  estimated  regression  coefficients:  a) 
78  Tthe  concept  of  abandonment  options  is  not  discussed  in  this  thesis,  although  it  is  acknowledge  that 
different  definitions  may  have  implications  for  this  work. 
226 for  the  reported  profit  observations  and  good  economic  news  (positive  returns)  eq; 
b)  for  the  reported  profit  observations  and  bad  economic  news  (positive  returns) 
a, 
+a2;  C)  for  the  reported  loss  observations  and  good  economic  news 
a,  +a,  +(-a3);  and  for  the  reported  loss  observations  and  bad  economic  news 
A 
a,  +a2 
+(-a3)+(-64) 
.  Again,  the  expected  values  of  estimated  coefficients 
62  to 
A  a,  are  all  zero. 
The  interpretations  of  news-related  total  coefficients  are  surnmarised  below: 
Economic  news 
Good  (RETr>O)  Good  (RETt<-O) 
Reported  earnings 
Positive  (Xr>O,  Li=O)  A4, 
Negative  (X,:  50,  L,  =1) 
ftjq, 
+(-ft2)+(-P) 
Although  the  expected  values  of  the  ý,  and  P,  coefficients  are  ft,  >P,  >O, 
there  is  no  reason  to  expect  any  difference  between  the  two  Lt  regimes  in  terms  of 
A  accounting  conservatism  so  that 
E[P21=0 
and 
E[P2  0'  If,  however,  empirically 
there  is  some  (empirical)  reason  to  believe  that  these  expectations  are  different  so 
that  P'-O  and/or  ^2#  0  then  this  may  indicate  systematic  effects  that  are  present  r 
only  when  a  firm  is  in  the  Lt==  I  regime,  i.  e.,  when  it  is  a  loss  observation.  79 
79  The  term  "may  indicate"  is  used  because  there  are  some  econometric  properties  that  might  seriously 
affect  the  ability  to  make  inferences  using  this  model  (some  are  presented  in  section  4.8.5).  While  this 
is  acknowledged,  it  must  also  be  noted  that  there  are  no  solutions  available  in  the  existing  literature  to 
solve  this  problem. 
227 4.8.4  Direct  signed  tests  and  estimates  of  the 
generalised  losses  model 
This  section  presents  empirical  estimates  of  the  model  presented  in  the 
preceding  section.  Apart  from  the  issues  that  arise  from  the  discussion  in  that 
section,  there  are  at  least  two  empirical  issues  that  must  be  considered  when 
estimating  the  losses  model  in  equation  (4-27)  above.  The  first  issue  is  the  method  of 
estimation.  In  this  thesis,  the  Fama-MacBeth  (1973)  approach  is  generally  followed. 
This  involves  estimating  33  individual-year  regressions.  However,  to  estimate  (4- 
27),  it  must  be  noted  that  there  are  only  3,7,5,1  and  18  observations  in  the  early 
sample  years  1969-1973  respectively  that  have  been  hit  by  bad  economic  news 
(RET1.1-1:  50)  and  have  simultaneously  reported  negative  contemporaneous  earnings 
after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (EARNt5O).  This  effectively  precludes  the 
estimation  of  yearly  regressions  and  the  inclusion  of  these  years'  coefficients  in  the 
calculation  of  cross-sectional  averages.  Consequently,  the  results  presented  below  in 
Table  4-18  are  cross-sectional  averages  for  the  period  1974-2001  only  (28  cross- 
sections).  80 
The  second  issue  relates  to  the  segments  that  define  the  four  groups  of  firms. 
While  the  bad  economic  news  indicator  is  treated  as  being  exogenous  to  the  model, 
given  that  managers  presumably  cannot  influence  the  stock  returns  in  an  efficient 
market,  the  Lt  indicator  is  subject  to  a  number  of  possible  influences  (e.  g.,  timing  of 
asset  sales  (e.  g.,  Bartov,  1993)  and  other  earnings  management  techniques  (e.  g., 
Burgstahler  and  Dichev,  1997).  The  indicator  might  therefore  "bundle"  together 
80  The  differences  between  the  Farna-MacBeth  (1973)  and  pooled  method  are  shown  in  the  sensitivity 
analyses  section. 
228 observations  that  have  reported  negative  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional 
items  for  different  reasons.  If  these  factors  would  have  opposite  directions  with 
respect  to  market  values,  then  the  resulting  coefficients  on  losses  might  be 
attenuated.  Moreover,  the  imprecise  separation  of  two  pennanent  earnings-levels 
regimes  introduces  the  errors-in-variables  problem. 
With  these  caveats,  Table  4-17  first  presents  the  results  of  a  precursor  to  the 
absolute-value  extension  of  the  contemporaneous  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  model  of 
accounting  conservatism  that  differentiates  between  the  two  Le=  0  and  Lt==  I  groups 
developed  in  the  preceding  section.  The  dependent  variable  in  these  two  regressions 
is  the  EARNt  variable,  the  same  variable  in  the  same  time  period  that  is  used  to 
define  the  indicator  Ll.  This  is  followed  by  further  estimations  of  the 
contemporaneous  model  of  accounting  conservatism  using  EARN$  as  the  dependent 
variable,  but  where  for  each  cross-section  the  sample  is  partitioned  and  the 
definitions  of  L,  reformed  by  the  sign  of  one  of  the  following  main  components  of 
earnings:  operating  cash  flows  OCF  and  accruals  AWCAP,  SPEC  and  total  accruals 
Accnials  (tot.  ),  rather  than  the  earnings  itsel  . 
A  formal  test  of  the  statistical  differences  between  each  group  of  partitions  is 
also  provided.  For  each  partition  and  each  independent  variable,  28  pairs  of 
regression  coefficients  are  generated  (one  for  each  partition  within  each  year)  under 
the  same  set  of  GAAP  rules  regardless  of  the  sign  of  any  variable  these  accounting 
rules  produce.  A  similar  approach  to  test  statistics  is  used  by  Mramor  and 
Valentincic  (2003).  They  use  a  similar  matched-pair  approach  to  compare  the 
efficiency  in  classification  of  failing  versus  non-failing  firms  in  terms  of  short-term 
229 liquidity  where  the  common  factor  defining  the  pairs  is  the  industry  firms  belong  to. 
The  efficiency  rates  in  classifications  of  failing  and  non-failing  firins  are  calculated 
with  three  different  methods  of  estimation  and  are  then  compared  in  pairs  by 
industries.  In  the  context  of  the  present  study,  the  pairs  of  estimated  regression 
coefficients  for  each  of  the  28  years  are  treated  as  matched  pairs  and  a  formal  I-test 
of  the  differences  in  cross-sectional  means  is  provided.  The  two-tailed  test 
hypothesis  stated  in  alternative  form  is  (Anderson,  Sweeney  and  Williams,  1993): 
H4:  The  mean  difference  between  the  values  of  coefficients  for  the  two  partitions 
does  not  equal  0. 
and  the  corresponding  test  statistics  is: 
d 
; 
d7-Nfn- 
(4-28) 
where  d  is  the  mean  difference  between  the  values  of  the  two  coefflicients  within  a 
2001  A  2001 
pair:  d  =(I/  28).  4-1  -  06jr 
(Pjf4 
-1  -  PIT 
..  d 
(fil. 
. 4-0)  or  d=  (1/  28)  ad  is  the 
r-1974  r-1974 
standard  deviation  of  the  difference,  and  n  is  the  number  of  observations  (i.  e.,  pairs) 
n=  28.  The  test  statistic  is  t-distributed  with  n=  28-1=  27  degrees  of  freedom.  The 
difference  d  between  the  two  coefficients  constituting  a  pair  is  always  calculated  so 
that  the  "positive"  partition  is  subtracted  from  the  negative  partition. 
230 Table  4-17:  Response  of  earnings  to  good  and  bad  news  by  sign  of  earnings,  operating  cash  flows 
and  accruals,  1974-2001 
Match-  Match- 
Partitioning  variables:  avg.  n  Oil  e12  A  ed-pair  it  ed-pair  avg.  R2 
t-stat.  t-stat. 
Partition  by:  EARN, 
EA  RN,  50  114.1  -0.136  0.027  0.059  0.016  0.056 
-11.139  1.657  0.669 
0  004 
0.169 
-0.259 
5.009 
EARNr>O  728.4  0.110  -0.003  0.059  .  0.040  0.164 
14.760  -1.153  9.898  4A33  11.976 
Partition  by:  OCF, 
OCF,  50  77.2  0.056  -0.007  0.022  0.180  0.149 
5.104  -0.511  1.304 
-2.391 
3.528 
0.665 
9.143 
OCF,  >0  765.4  0.097  0.003  0.059  0.176  0.167 
12.048  1.068  11.498  12.622  14.934 
Partition  by:  A  WCAP, 
AWCAP,:  50  303.4  0.079  -0.001  0.059  0.227  0.191 
10.988  -0.215  7.010 
-0.025 
10.957 
3.884 
12.484 
AWCAP,  >O  539.1  0.101  0.002  0.059  0.127  0.155 
12.208  0.366  5.059  6.798  11.930 
Partition  by:  SPEC, 
SPEC,  50  461.0  0.072  0.002  0.050  0.211  0.175 
8.606  0.608  5.956 
-0.468 
12.772 
4.719 
13.089 
SPECs>O  381.5  0.121  -0.003  0.054  0.116  0.160 
14.496  -1.226  7.056  9.357  11.130 
Partition  by:  Accruals  (tot.  ) 
Accruals  (tol.  ),.  50  539.1  0.080  0.003  0.055  0.209  0.172 
11.293  0.877  8.101 
-0.402 
IIA29 
4.234 
12.794 
Accruals  (tot.  )  >0  303.5  0.117  -0-001  0.061  0.092  0.158 
14.510  -0.290  3.679  4.020  9.071 
Notes.  Estimated  models  are:  EARNIP,.,  -  a,  +a2D,,.,  +ARET,.,,  +,  slDl,,.  IRETi,,,,  +A  and,  for  each  of  the  variables  EARN, 
OCF.  AWCAP,  SPEC  and  Accruals  (lot.  ).  separated  separately  for  negative  and  positive  values  of  these  variables.  These 
variables  are  deflated.  per  share:  EARN  is  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  OCF  is  operating  cash  flow, 
JWCAP  is  working  capital  accruals,  SPEC  is  special  items,  Accruals  (lot.  )  are  Accruals  (tot.  )-,  dWCAP+DEP+SPEC  (DEP 
is  depreciation  and  amortisation  charge),  returns  RET,.,.  i-(PrPjP,.  t  and  D,.,.,  -  (I  if  RET,.  t.  1:  50;  0  otherwise).  All  variables 
are  deflated  by  opening  share  price  Pi.  t.  Avg.  n  is  the  average  number  of  observations  per  year.  All  coefficients'estimates 
and  R  2S  are  cross-sectional  averages  for  the  period  1974-2001  and  associated  t-statistics  are  calculated  according  to  the 
Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  procedure.  Boldfaced  estimates  are  significant  at  5%  or  better  at  29-1-  27  dt,  the  critical  value 
of  the  t-statistic  is  ltd>2.0518.  Boldfaced  matched-pair  $-statistic  indicates  significant  differences  between  cross-sectional 
averages  of  the  corresponding  coefficients  and  partitions.  I'lie  critical  value  of  the  I-statistic  is  ltd>2.051  8. 
Partitionin  g-  by  the  sign  of  contemporaneous  earnings  EARN  reveals  that 
firms  do  not  differ  'in  terms  of  incorporation  of  good  economic  news  in 
contemporaneous  earnings,  i.  e.,  there  is  no  difference  in  the  magnitude  of  the 
estimated  A  coefficient  between  profit  and  loss  observations.  While  the 
coefficient  for  loss  observations  is  not  statistically  significant,  the  magnitude  of  the 
231 coefficient  is  the  same  as  for  profit  observations.  A  possible  explanation  (or  at  least  a 
contributing  factor)  of  the  non-significance  of  theAcoefficient  is  that  the  average 
number  of  observations  used  to  calculate  these  regressions  is  only  114.1  per  year, 
much  lower  than  for  the  profit  observations  (728.4  firms  per  year).  The  response  of 
contemporaneous  earnings  to  bad  news  reveals  that  both  groups  of  observations 
exhibit  an  asymmetric  response  to  bad  news,  but  again  the  coefficient  P,  for  the  loss  Y, 
observations  is  not  statistically  different  from  zero,  although  of  the  expected  sign  and 
economically  reasonable  magnitude.  81  Again,  the  statistical  insignificance  may  be 
due  to  the  low  number  of  observations  used  to  estimate  the  28  yearly  regressions. 
Formal  tests  of  the  average  difference  between  profit  and  loss  observations  for  both 
the  ý,  and  j  coefficients  reveal  that  the  differences  between  the  two  groups  are  not  Y, 
statistically  significant.  Also,  the  R2  is  lower  for  the  losses  partition  -  losses  cannot 
persist  (e.  g.,  shareholders  can  always  liquidate  the  finn),  are  not  a  good  indicator  of 
expected  future  earnings  and  therefore  the  association  between  earnings  and  market 
values  will  be  lower  (Sin  and  Watts,  2000). 
Table  4-17  also  presents  the  results  of  estimating  the  contemporaneous  Pope 
and  Walker  (1999)  model  using  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items 
EARN  as  the  dependent  variable,  but  estimated  separately  for  the  positive  and 
negative  contemporaneous  values  of  some  of  the  main  earnings  components: 
operating  cash  flows  OCF  and  accruals  AWCAP,  SPEC  and  -total  Accruals  (tot.  ). 
Partitioning  by  the  sign  of  contemporaneous  OCF  reveals  that,  overall,  bothAand 
j,  coefficients  are  roughly  of  the  expected  magnitude  and  sign:  there  is  a  partial 
81  Especially  so  because  of  potential  existence  of  the  sample  truncation  bias,  presented  below  in 
section  4.8.5. 
232 delayed  response  of  earnings  to  current-period  good  news  for  both  positive  and 
negative  OCF-partitions  and  there  is  a  strong  asymmetric  response  to  bad  news  for 
both  groups  of  firms.  Formal  tests  indicate  that  the  response  to  good  news  is  on 
average  less  pronounced  for  loss  observations  (I-statistic  -2.391,  statistically 
significant),  but  that  the  difference  in  terms  of  response  to  bad  news  between  the  two 
groups  of  firms  is  not  statistically  significant. 
Partitions  by  the  sign  of  all  three  accruals'  variables  reveal  that  there  is  a 
delayed  response  to  good  news  and,  generally,  a  high  asymmetric  response  to  bad 
news  for  all  accruals'  variables.  Moreira  (2002,  p.  120)  cites  similar  results  for  his 
US  sample.  Strikingly,  the  differences  among  estimated  ft,  coefficients  across 
different  partitioning  variables  and  partitions  are  remarkably  small  and  very  similar 
in  magnitude  to  the  respective  earnings  and  operating  cash  flow  partitions.  However, 
in  all  three  cases  the  estimated  bad  news  coefficients  ý  for  the  negative-accruals  Y, 
partitions  are  statistically  significantly  higher  (almost  double)  than  for  the  positive 
accruals  partition. 
These  results  emphasize  the  role  of  the  accruals  component  in  reflecting  bad 
I 
economic  news.  In  all  partitions  that  might  be  associated  with  reflecting  bad  news 
timely,  the  estimated  P,  coefficient  is  very  high  and  statistically  significant.  The  Y, 
evidence  presented  is  consistent  with  the  notion  that  accounting  conservatism  is  an 
accruals  phenomenon  and  that  it  is  independent  of  the  sign  of  earnings  and  the 
operating  cash  flows  and  accruals  components  -  all  firms  must  obey  the  same  GAAP 
rules.  However,  the  asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings  EARN  is  stronger  for 
partitions  where  accruals  are  negative. 
233 An  alternative  technique  that  explicitly  accounts  for  any  possible  differences 
between  loss  and  profit  observations  as  well  as  helping  to  avoid  the  relatively  low 
number  of  observations  in  some  partitions,  is  to  estimate  the  absolute  value  model  on 
contemporaneous  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  EARN, 
developed  in  the  preceding  section.  The  results  are  presented  in  Table  4-18.  In 
explaining  this  model,  it  must  again  be  noted  that  all  signs  on  the  coefficients  related 
to  loss  observations( 
et3 
,  a4 
I 
ft2andP2 
)must  be  inverted.  For  example,  in  the  case 
of  ft2and  P  the  minus  sign  indicates  more,  not  less,  asymmetry.  Y2 
Table  4-18:  Absolute-value  extension  of  Pope  and  Walker  (1999),  1974-2001 
avg.  al  et2  "3  64  R2 
n 
Profit  obs.  Loss  obs.  (incr.  ) 
842.5  0.110  -0.003  0.025  -0.024  0.059  0.040  -0.118  -0.056  0.150 
15.021  -1.174  1.808  -1.561  10.074  4.512  -1.377  -0.597  12.992 
Notes.  Dependent  variable  is  EARN,  Estimated  models  are:  EARNIP1.1-  ai+a2D,,,  I+a3L,  +a4LD,,,.,  +PIRET,,,  + 
+y,  D 
4,.  iRET,,.,  +ALRET,,.  I+nLD,.,.  IRETI,,.  I+r,  where  EARN  is  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  returns 
are  RET,.,.,  -  (P,  -PIyp,.,,  D,,,.,  -  11  ifRET,. 
j.  j:  50;  0  otherwise),  L,  -j  I  ifEARN, 
_-M; 
0  otherwise).  Avg.  n  is  the  average  number 
Of  Observations  per  year.  All  coefficients'  estimates  and  R's  are  cross-sectional  averages  for  the  period  1974-2001  and 
associated  I-statistics  are  calculated  according  to  the  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  procedure.  Boldfaced  estimates  are 
-significant 
at  5%  or  better  at  28-1-27  d.  f.,  the  critical  value  of  the  I-statistic  is  ltd>2.0518. 
Consistent  with  other  evidence  presented  in  other  parts  of  this  thesis,  Table 
4-18  reveals  that  there  is  a  delayed  response  to  good  news  for  profit  observations,  the 
magnitude  of  the  estimated  coefficient  A=  0.059  being  close  to  magnitudes 
presented  above  in  Table  4-17  as  well  as  in  the  main  results  (see  Table  4-8  above). 
The  estimated  coefficient  on  bad  news  is  positive  and  statistically  significantly 
different  from  zero,  consistent  with  asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings.  Also,  it  is  of 
a  similar  magnitude  to  the  corresponding  coefficient  in  Table  4-17.  Incremental 
results  for  loss  observations  reveal  that  there  is  no  statistically  significant  difference 
234 between  profit  and  loss  observations,  at  least  not  when  using  this  model.  There  are 
some  (slight)  indications  that  loss  observations  tend  to  incorporate  both  good  and 
bad  news  faster  than  profit  observations,  but  they  are  all  statistically  insignificant. 
However,  these  inferences  are  possibly  affected  by  several  biases  that  result  from  the 
construction  of  the  empirical  version  of  the  initial  model  in  equation  (4-27):  the 
attenuation  bias  that  arises  as  the  result  of  imperfect  measurement  of  the  two 
pennanent  earnings-levels  (presented  in  section  2.3.1),  the  effects  of  sample 
truncation  bias  (Hausman  and  Wise,  1977)  that  arises  because  of  the  truncation  by 
the  dependent  variable  (presented  below)  and,  possibly,  the  correlated  omitted 
variable  problems  because  some  possibly  (empirically)  important  variables  are 
excluded  from  the  model,  the  book  value  of  equity  in  particular  (e.  g.,  Collins,  Pincus 
and  Xie,  1999). 
4.8.5  The  effect  of  truncation  by  sign  of 
earnings 
Both  previous  attempts  at  distinguishing  the  incorporation  of  good  and  bad 
news  separately  for  profit  and  loss  firms  are  conceptually  equivalent  in  that  they 
require  partitioning  of  the  sample  by  the  value  (or  the  sign)  of  the  contemporaneous 
dependent  variable.  This  requires  previous  knowledge  of  the  endogenous  variable  by 
the  researcher.  For  example,  estimating  the  loss  partition  of  firms  using  the  Li=  I 
indicator  variable  in  Table  4-17  is  equivalent,  in  practical  terms,  to  eliminating  all 
observations  that  have  EARN,  >O  from  the  sample.  Equivalently,  observations  with 
EARNt>O  may  be  assumed  not  to  be  observable.  This  introduces  the  sample- 
235 truncation  bias  in  the  estimation  process,  first  explained  by  Hausman  and  Wise 
(1977),  presented  in,  for  example,  Baltagi  (1998,  pp.  351-353)  and  more  recently 
discussed  in  the  context  of  this  research  as  a  possible  explanation  of  the  limitations 
of  Basu  (1997)  and  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  results  by  Muller  and  Riedl  (2001). 
Figure  4-1  is  an  illustration  adapted  from  Ahese  sources.  -It  shows  a 
hypothetical  estimated  regression  line  resulting  from  a  simple  bivariate  regression  of 
generic  accounting  earnings  EARN,  on  returns  RET6.  i  for  a  full  sample  (i.  e.,  a 
sample  containing  observations  where  EARNt:  50  and  EARNt>O)  (dark  blue  line)  of 
the  following  form:  82 
.. 
P.  A,,  RNt=  a+PRET,,,  -  I  +rt  (4-29) 
where  8  is  the  estimated  slope  coefficient  of  a  hypothetical  regression  line  of  a  form 
A 
such  as  the  form  described  by  equation  (4-29).  The  figure  also  contains  a 
hypothetical  regression  line  (turquoise-coloured)  resulting  from  the  same  model  as  in 
(4-29),  but  estimated  from  a  sample  containing  only  observations  where  EARN650 
and  thus  Li=  1.  These  points  are  shown  in  green  colour.  The  slope  of  such  a 
regression  is  less  than  the  slope  estimated  from  the  full  sample.  In  other  words, 
estimating  (4-29)  for  loss  firms  only  reduces  the  magnitude  of  the  relationship 
between  earnings  and  returns.  83  This  is  precisely  the  problem  that  precludes  a  clear 
discrimination  between  two  possible  explanations  of  the  results  of  the  absolute-value 
model  above  in  Table  4-17:  a)  that  there  are  in  reality  no  differences  between  profit 
82  For  the  purposes  of  this  presentation,  both  EARN  and  RET  are  be  assumed  to  be  generic  names,  not 
necessarily  defined  as  in  this  study. 
83  Note  that  the  model  in  equation  (4-29)  is  a  restricted  version  of  contemporaneous  models  of 
conservatism. 
236 and  loss  observations  in  terms  of  accounting  conservatism;  and  b)  that  there  are 
differences  between  the  two  groups  of  firms,  but  that  these  cannot  be  inferred 
because  of  the  sample  truncation  bias  (among  other  problems).  Moreover,  the  lower 
the  truncation  level  of  EARN  that  defines  the  L,  indicator,  the  more  severe  the  sample 
truncation  bias  and  the  smaller  the  slope  coefficient.  84  Generally,  the  sample 
truncation  bias  depends  also  on  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  EARN  and 
RET  (if  only  as  a  result  of  the  way  accounting  conservatism  is  modelled  in  Basu, 
1997,  and  Pope  and  Walker,  1999),  the  variance  of  the  error  term  and  values  of  the 
independent  variable  RET  (Hausman  and  Wise,  1977). 
Figure  4-6:  Illustration  of  the  sample  truncation  bias 
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Source:  adapted  from  Hausman  and  Wise,  1977;  Baltagi,  1998;  Muller  and  Riedl,  2003. 
Figure  4-1  might  help  to  provide  an  alternative  explanation  as  to  why  the  bad 
news  coefficient  j,  for  the  EARN,  <-O  partition  in  the  preceding  section  is  lower  than 
84  The  definition  of  the  L,  dummy  variable  need  not  be  exactly  at  EARN,  =  0  level,  but  could  generally 
be  defined  for  any  level  of  EARN. 
237 the  j,  coefficient  for  EARNt>O  partition  (see  Table  4-17  in  section  4.8.4.  ).  However, 
it  must  be  noted  that  the  good  news  coefficients  are  of  similar  magnitudes  in  both 
cases,  thus  suggesting  that  the  effects  of  sample  truncation  bias  might  not  be 
significant.  It  is  not  possible  to  discriminate  formally  between  these  explanations  in 
this  study,  but  a  possible  solution  constitutes  an  area  of  further  research. 
4.9  EFFECTS  OF  ASSET  RECOGNXTXON  RULES  ON  EX- 
POST  CONSERVATXSM 
4.9.1  Book-to-market  ratio  as  a  proxy  for 
pervasive  conservatism 
Pope  and  Walker  (2003)  and  other  empirical  work,  e.  g.,  Giner  and  Rees 
(2001),  presented  in  section  3.6,  predict  that  the  likelihood  of  observing  an 
asymmetric  relation  of  earnings  to  the  arrival  of  bad  news  decreases  with  increasing 
levels  of  ex-ante  conservatism  applied  to  investment  projects  undertaken  in  a  firm.  If 
a  firm  writes  off  the  entire  amount  invested  at  the  time  the  investment  is  made,  future 
bad  economic  news  will  not  have  an  impact  on  financial  statements,  given  that  there 
is  no  asset  recorded  in  the  balance  sheet  to  which  that  bad  news  would  relate.  The 
main  prediction  of  the  ex-ante  conservatism  literature  therefore  is  that  the  more 
unrecognised  assets  a  firm  has,  the  less  likely  it  is  to  observe  asymmetric  timeliness 
of  earnings  with  respect  to  bad  news.  As  in  the  case  of  news-driven  conservatism, 
the  arrival  of  bad  news  should  be  reflected  relatively  quickly  in  the  accruals 
component  of  earnings. 
238 To  test  for  the  effects  of  asset-recognition  rules,  the  contemporaneous 
versions  of  ex-post  conservatism  models  is  estimated  by  tertiles  of  the  opening  value 
of  the  book-to-market  ratio.  The  sub-division  into  tertiles  is  re-calculated  at  the 
beginning  of  every  fiscal  year  from  1969  to  2001  to  mimic  as  closely  as  possible  the 
Pope  and  Walker  (2003)  method.  However,  this  research  is  expected  to  be  less 
44precise"  in  the  sense  that  that  they  use  deciles  rather  than  tertiles  of  opening  value 
of  book-to-market  ratio.  Using  deciles  calculated  within  each  of  the  33  years  is 
unfeasible  using  this  particular  UK  sample  as  the  number  of  firms  within  each  decile 
within  each  year  would  be  (is)  too  small  to  ensure  appropriate  estimations  of 
regressions  and  inferences  based  on  them.  The  dilemma  was  either  to  exclude  some 
(a  significant  number  oo  years  from  the  analysis  or  divide  firms  within  each  year 
into  tertiles  rather  than  deciles.  Representativeness  concerns  lead  me  to  choose  the 
latter  option.  Thus,  the  predictions  regarding  the  influence  of  the  level  of  ex-ante 
conservatism  by  the  main  groups  of  accounting  variables  are  the  following: 
-  Of  the  earnings  components,  the  operating  cash  flows  (0CF)  figure  should  not 
exhibit  asymmetric  timeliness  with  respect  to  bad  news  overall  and  asymmetric 
timeliness  of  OCF  should  not  change  with  the  amount  of  recognised  assets  on  the 
balance  sheet  relative  to  "total"'  (i.  e.,  including  non-recorded)  assets  that  are 
expected  to  generate  future  cash  flows.  OCF  should  be  an  accruals-free 
accounting  figure  and  thus  not  subject  to  effects  of  conservative  accounting 
practices. 
-  Earnings  should  exhibit  asymmetric  timeliness  with  respect  to  bad  news  overall; 
the  asymmetry  should  be  increasing  from  low  book-to-market  firms  (i.  e.,  ex-ante 
relatively  conservative  firms)  to  high  book-to-market  finns  (i.  e.,  ex-ante 
239 relatively  liberal  or  aggressive  firms).  Also,  the  asymmetry  should  increase  from 
operating  profit  (OP)  to  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items 
(EARN),  given  that  the  latter  figure  should  always  contain  more  accruals 
components  that  capture  the  reaction  of  earnings  to  bad  news. 
-  The  accruals  component(s)  of  earnings  should  reflect  the  effects  of  the  arrival  of 
bad  news  on  the  capital  market  and  make  earnings  more  timely  than  cash  flows 
in  reflecting  bad  news.  Of  the  different  accruals  components,  the  type  of  accrual 
most  discussed  or  referred  to  in  the  literature  are  the  special  items  (SPEC). 
Evidence  regarding  the  ex-post  conservatism  presented  mainly  in  section  4.5,  but 
also  in  other  sections  in  this  research,  indicates  that  an  important  role  in  the 
asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings  should  also  be  given  to  A  WCAP.  Therefore,  it 
is  predicted  that  the  higher  the  amount  of  assets  on  the  balance  sheet  as  opposed 
to  unrecognised  assets,  the  higher  the  likelihood  of  observing  an  asymmetric 
reaction  to  bad  news  and  the.  higher  the  coefficient  on  bad  news.  Likewise, 
following  from  the  results  obtained  in  this  research  and  theoretical  expectations, 
the  depreciation  and  amortisation  expense  (DEP)  should  not  exhibit  asymmetric 
timeliness  with  respect  to  bad  news. 
The  results  are  presented  in  Table  4-19.  As  in  other  parts  of  this  research,  the 
statistics  presented  are  Farna-MacBeth  (1973)  cross-sectional  averages  and  the  total 
and  relative  total  coefficients  are  calculated  from  the  estimated  ft,  and  Py, 
coefficients. 
240 Table  4-19:  Contemporaneous  models  of  accounting  conservatism  by  opening  book-to-market 
tertiles,  1969-2001 
Dependent  Opening  j,  R2 
( 
variable  B/M  rank 
avg.  n  a, 
62  A  A+Y^, 
Smallest  237.6  0.161  0.006  0.041  0.084  0.063  0.125  3.072 
14.327  1.302  2-587  3.759  8.320 
OCF  Middle  237.3  0.209  0.007  0.198  -0.091  0.065  0.108  0.542 
8.170  0.342  1  A61  -0.635  6.665 
Highest  236.9  0.293  -0.001  0.130  -0.050  0.061  0.080  0.616 
12.986  -0.076  7.513  -0.884  8.651 
Smallest  237.6  0.167  0.004  0.022  0.157  0.190  0.179  8.138 
10.110  0.800  0.476  3.358  13.063 
OP  Middle  237.3  0.205  0.008  0.142  0.111  0.209  0.254  1.782 
10.132  0.959  2.586  1.819  13.321 
Highest  236.9  0.251  -0.006  0.128  0.141  0.190  0.269  2.099 
11.024  -0.645  9.746  4.219  13.607 
Smallest  237.6  0.085  0.005  0.020  0.110  0.223  0.130  6.414 
13.502  2.480  1.097  5.880  13.394 
ORD  Middle  237.3  0.101  0.007  0.077  0.136  0.268  0.213  2.754 
13.839  1.679  2.953  4.056  IS.  405 
Highest  236.9  0.107  0.000  0.081  0.143  0.236  0.225  2.759 
13.627  -0.045  10.432  7.306  15.608 
Smallest  237.6  0.083  0.009  0.037  0.129  0.202  0.166,  4.470 
13.945  3.057  5.612  10.372  13.422 
EARN  Middle  237.3  0.100  0.012  0.079  0.202  0.237  0.281  3.566 
13.170  2.252  2.738  5.019  14.378 
Highest  236.9  0.099  0.005  0.083  0.224  0.194  0.307  3.697 
11.125  0.633  12.530  9.587  13.611 
Smallest  237.6  0.052  -0.001  -0.026  0.081  0.029  0.054  -2.069 
4.653  -0.209,  -0.544  1.562  6.769 
AWCAP  Middle  237.3  0.061  0.003  0.006  0.110  0.039  0.116  20.032 
4.563  0.423  0.235  2.821  7.260 
Highest  236.9  0.058  -0.004  0.019  0.156  0.034  0.175  9.317 
5.187  -0.347  1.665  3.037  7.803 
Smallest  237.6  0.053  0.006  0.004  0.068  0.052  0.072  18.364 
5.729  0.897  0.086  1.355  7A45 
-  of  which  Middle  237.3  0.070  -0.005  -0.008  0.133  0.043  0.125  .  15.806 
ADebtors  6.047  -0.574  -0.185  2.274  11.168 
Highest  236.9  0.065  0.006  0.029  0.138  0.034  0.167  5.762 
5398  0.408  2A57  1.726  6.038 
Smallest  237.6  0.048  0.000  0.013  0.027  0.039  0.040  3.084 
5.168  -0-062  0.580  1.066  7.155 
-  of  which  Middle  237.3  0.063  -0.006  0.001  0.048  0.034  0.050  42.673 
AStock  4.738  -0.928  0.050  1.242  7.045 
Highest  236.9  0.062  0.008  0.040  0.139  0.034  0.179  4.490 
4.970  0.747  3.737  3.537  7.161 
Smallest  237.6  -0.048  -0.007  -0.043  -0.014  0.043  -0.057  1.326 
-6-317  -1.575  -2.098  -0.556  7.055 
of  which  Middle  237.3  -0.072  0.014  0.013  -0.071  0.031  -0.058  -4.664 
ACreditors  -5.881  1.584  0.296  -1.309  8.339 
Highest  236.9  -0.069  -0.019  -0.050  -0.121  0.033  -0.171  3.419 
-5.606  -1.472  -3.582  -1.692  6.441 
Cont. 
241 Dependent 
variable 
Opening 
B/M  rank  avg.  n  a, 
62  A  it 
2  R  A+ 
A  (A  + 
A 
Smallest  237.6  -0.048  0.000  0.007  -0.004  0.014  0.002  0.349 
-13.775  0.028  0.524  -0.315  6.619 
DEP  Middle  237.3  -0.068  *-0.004  -0.064  0.084  0.028  0.021  -0.330 
-8.906  -0.580  -1.044  1347  4.001 
Highest  236.9  -0.105  -0.001  -0.022  0.038  0.030  0.016  -0.714 
-14.819  -0.327  4.484  2.270  5.603 
Smallest  237.6  -0.005  0.004  0.014  0.015  0.034  0.029  2.062 
-1.948  1.322  0.950  0.900  6.227 
SPEC  Middle  237.3  -0.004  0.007  -0.002  0.070  0.038  0.068  -27.956 
-1.749  3.337  -0.389  4.048  ,  5.381 
Highest  236.9  -0.007  0.004  -0.010  0.080  0.042  0.070  -6.748 
-2.155  0.947  -1.739  5.405  6.673 
Notes.  Estimated  models  are:  XIP,.,  =  at+a2D,.,  -,  +PIRET,.,,  +ýiD,,,.  IRET,,  I+e,  where  X,  is  an  undeflated,  per  share  dependent 
variable  listed  in  the  leftmost  column  of  the  table:  OCF  is  operating  cash  flow,  OP  is  adjusted  operating  profit,  ORD  is 
earnings  before  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  EARN  is  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  itcms,,  dWCAP  is 
working  capital  accruals,  ADebtors  is  change  in  debtors  accounts,  AStock  is  change  in  stock,  Xredilors  is  change  in  creditors 
accounts,  DEP  is  depreciation  and  amortisation  expense  and  SPEC  is  special  items,  RET,.,.,  -  (Pr-P,.  IYP,.,  and 
D,,,,  =  11  if  RET,:  90;  0  otherwise).  All  variables  are  deflated  by  opening  share  price  P1.1.  Avg.  n  is  the  average  number  of 
observations  per  year.  All  coefficients'  estimates  and  R  2s  are  cross-sectional  averages  for  the  period  1969-2001  and  associated 
I-statistics  are  calculated  according  to  the  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  procedure.  Boldfaced  estimates  are  significant  at  5%  or 
better  at  33-1  -  32  U,  i.  e.,  ltl>2.0369.  The  value  of  the  opening  book-to-market  is  re-calculated  every  year  and  tertiles  re- 
formed  accordingly. 
Starting  from  the  EARN  measure  of  earnings  and  the  incremental  bad  news 
coefficient,  the  asymmetric  timeliness  of  EARN  to  bad  news  is  statistically 
significant  in  all  three  book-to-market  tertiles  and  the  asymmetry  in  response  is 
increasing  from  the  low  to  the  high  book-to  market  tertile  as  evidenced  by  increasing 
estimated  P  coefficients  across  the  tertiles.  This  is  consistent  with  expectations;  the  Y, 
likelihood  of  observing  asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings  should  increase  with  the 
book-to-market  ratio.  Given  the  evidence  presented  in  section  4.5.1,  the  asymmetric 
timeliness  should  be  observed  in  all  tertiles  and  generally  for  any  firm  at  any  time 
interval.  The  total.  response  to  bad  news  also  increases  across  the  tertiles.  The 
sensitivity  of  EARN  to  good  news  is  also  increasing  with  the  amount  of  assets 
recorded  on  the  balance  sheet  -low  book-to-market  firms  delay  the  recognition  of 
good  news  in  EARN  by  more  than  the  high  book-to-market  firms  (Pope  and  Walker, 
2003).  Interestingly,  the  R2  is  highest  for  the  middle  tertile.  That  the  R2  in  the  lower 
tertile  is  lower  than  the  R2  in  the  middle  tertile  is  not  surprising  given  previous 
242 results  -  the  lower  R2  indicates  that  accounting  numbers  play  a  lesser  role  in 
valuation  of  the  low  book-to-market  firms,  assuming  the  R2  as  an  indicator  of 
association  between  accounting  numbers  and  market  values  (e.  g.,  Francis  and 
Schipper,  1999).  In  addition,  an  on-average  lower  R2  may  also  be  a  consequence  of  a 
higher  content  of  transitory  items  at  the  extremity  of  the  sample.  While  Pope  and 
Walker  (2003)  do  not  provide  in  their  tables  R  2S  that  would  be  directly  comparable, 
those  reported  from  lagged  versions  by  book-to-market  deciles  (Table  5)  exhibit  an 
inverted  U-shape  pattern,  consistent  with  the  results  presented  in  this  research.  On 
the  other  hand,  Giner  and  Rees  (2001,  Table  7)  show  that  the  R2s  are  decreasing 
monotonically  with  the  increasing  book-to-market  ratio. 
The  results  for  ordinary  earnings  (ORD)  repeat  the  same  pattern  in  terms  of 
asymmetric  timeliness,  total  response  to  bad  news,  response  to  good  news  and  R2s 
across  tertiles.  The  results  for  operating  profit  (OP)  are  more  mixed  and  there  are  no 
clear  patterns  to  movements  of  these  statistics  across  the  tertiles.  Asymmetric 
timeliness  is  only  statistically,  significant  in  the  two  extreme  tertiles  and  even 
ignoring  statistical  significance,  there  is  no  clear  pattern  of  incremental  response  to 
bad  news  across  the  tertiles.  Moreover,  the  asymmetry  is  highest  in  the  lowest  book- 
to-market  tertiles.  However,  the  total  response  to  bad  news  increases  across  tertiles 
as  would  be  expected. 
The  results  for  the  OP  figure  resemble  perhaps  more  the  operating  cash  now 
(OCF)  results  than  the  earnings  results.  This  would  not  be,  empirically,  entirely 
inconceivable  given  that  OP  should  contain  the  least  accruals  components  of  all 
three  earnings  measures  used  in  this  research.  It  is  surprising  and  inconsistent  with 
243 expectations  that  OCF  exhibits  a  significant  asymmetry  in  response  to  bad  news 
(both  in  statistical  and  economic  sense  relative  to  other  results  presented)  in  the 
lowest  book-to-market  tertile.  Another  unexpected  result  is  that  the  total  response  to 
bad  news  is  decreasing  across  tcrtiles,  although  given  the  method  used,  the  statistical 
significance  of  these  total  coefficients  cannot  be  inferred.  A  possible  factor  in 
explaining  these  results  is  that  the  empirical  estimate  of  OCF  is  not  entirely  accruals- 
free.  Even  so,  however,  the  asymmetry  would  be  expected  at  the  other  end  of  the 
tertiles-partitioning  (high  book-to-market). 
Regarding  the  accruals  components,  special  items  SPEC  are  discussed  first. 
Consistent  with  expectations  and  results  presented  for  the  earnings  figures,  SPEC 
exhibits  increasing  asymmetric  timeliness  to  bad  news  across  the  three  book-to- 
market  tertiles,  both  in  incremental  and  total  terms.  Moreover,  the  R2s  are  increasing 
consistently  across  the  tertiles.  The  three  good  news  coefficients  are  generally  not 
statistically  significant,  which  suggests  that  good  news  is  not  passed  through 
extraordinary  and/or  exceptional  items  but  rather  as  a  part  of  the  "ordinary" 
components  of  earnings.  This  result  is  consistent  with  both  the  observations  in  the 
literature  and  the  results  from  this  research  presented  in  earlier  sections  (in  particular 
Figure  4-1).  Also,  in  the  highest  book-to-market  tertile,  the  estimated  values  of  the 
A  and  P  coefficients  are  consistent  with  values  observed  for  the  basic  set  of  results  71 
(compared  with  Table  4-8).  In  particular,  the  asymmetric  timeliness  is  strong  and 
statistically  significant,  and  the  response  to  good  news  indicates  that  good  news 
results  in  an  earnings-decreasing  charge  through  these  special  items.  This  last 
inference  is  not  statistically  significant  at  the  level  usually  employed  in  this  research 
using  the  Fama-MacBeth  (1973),  method  (cc--5%)  but  would  be  significant  assuming 
244 the  exact  level  of  significance  a--  9.165%  (at  t--  -1.739)  would  be  considered 
acceptable.  Very  similar  results,  compared  with  the  basic  set  of  results  in  section 
4.5.1,  are  also  obtained  when  AWCAP  acts  as  the  dependent  variable.  The 
asymmetric  timeliness  of  AWCAP,  as  well  as  the  total  response  to  bad  news, 
increases  as  the  book-to-market  increases.  Note  that  the  net  current  asset  is  a 
85 
component  of  the  book-to-market  ratio.  The  results  on  individual  components  of 
AWCAP  are  generally  not  statistically  significant.  A  clear  exception  is  again  the 
AStOck  component,  which  exhibits  a  strong  asymmetric  response  to  bad  news. 
Ignoring  the  statistical  significance,  however,  asymmetric  timeliness  with  respect  to 
bad  news  increases  across  tertiles  for  all  three  individual  components  studied,  using 
either  the  incremental  or  the  total  coefficient  on  bad  news. 
To  sum  up,  the  results  presented  in  this  section  are  consistent  with  Pope  and 
Walker's  (2003)  prediction  that  the  asymmetry  in  response  to  bad  news  should 
increase  with  the  amount  of  assets  recorded  on  the  balance  sheet.  As  an  extension  to 
their  findings,  the  evidence  presented  shows  that  the  asymmetric  timeliness  is 
reflected  and,  more  importantly,  increases  with  the  two  main  components  of 
accruals,  the  working  capital  accruals  (AWCAP)  and  special  items  (SPEC).  Overall, 
the  results  are  consistent  with  other  results  presented  in  this  thesis. 
85  This  represents  one  of  the  starting  points  for  section  4.9.2,  where  asset-specific  ex-ante  recognition 
rules  are  considered. 
245 4.9.2  Asset-specIfIc  measures  of  pervasive 
conservatism 
Pope  and  Walker  (2003)  extend  their  model  of  ex-post  accounting 
conservatism  to  allow  for  the  differences  in  levels  of  ex-ante  conservatism.  As  an 
extension  of  their  work,  the  preceding  section  shows  regressions  on  cash  flow  and 
accruals  components  of  earnings  as  well  as  various  earnings  figures  by  tertiles  of  the 
book-to-market  ratio.  In  this  section,  previous  results  are  further  extended.  First, 
accounting  earnings  are  again  decomposed  into  its  operating  cash  flows  and  accruals 
components.  Next,  given  the  results  presented  in  section  4.9.1  above,  the 
contemporaneous  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  models  using  each  of  the  accruals 
components  of  earnings  as  dependent  variables  are  re-estimated,  but  the  regressions 
are  conditioned  on  the  values  of  deflated  opening  stock  (balance-sheet)  variable  with 
which  a  particular  earnings  (or  earnings  component)  figure  likely  relates.  Given  the 
extremely  stringent  data  requirements  to  perform  such  an  analysis  and  requirements 
conditional  on  the  method  of  estimation  (Fama  and  MacBeth,  1973),  the 
conditioning  stock  variables  are  divided  in  tertiles  within  each  individual  fiscal  year. 
It  must  be  noted  that  Pope  and  Walker  (2003)  divide  the  observations  in  yearly 
deciles  rather  than  tertiles,  but  their  US  sample  is  much  larger  and  dividing  into 
deciles  would  not  be  feasible  in  the  case  of  the  UK  sample  employed  in  this  study. 
The  partitions  and  the  corresponding  predictions  resulting  from  the 
extensions  of  the  general  -analysis  of  the  effects  of  asset-recognition  rules  are  as 
follows: 
246 -  AWCAP  originates  from  the  net  change  in  current  assets  and  current  liabilities 
(net  current  asset)  from  the  balance  sheet;  the  higher  the  opening  stock  of  net 
current  assets  per  share  relative  to  the  opening  price  per  share,  the  more  likely  it 
is  that  a  particular  bad  news  will  be  reflected  in  working  capital  accruals  during 
the  period  t.  The  asymmetric  timeliness  of  AWCAP  is  expected  to  increase  from 
the  lowest  tertile  to  the  highest  tertile  of  net  current  assets  per  share'  deflated  by 
opening  share  price; 
-  ADebtors  originates  from  the  change  in  the  amount  of  debtors'  accounts  a  firm 
carries  on  the  balance  sheet;  the  higher  the  opening  stock  of  net  debtors  per  share 
relative  to  the  opening  price  per  share,  the  more  likely  it  is  that  a  particular  bad 
news  will  be  reflected  in  the  debtors'  accruals  during  the  period  t.  The 
asymmetric  timeliness  of  ADebtors  is  expected  to  increase  from  the  lowest  tertile 
to  the  highest  tertile; 
-  AStock  originates  from  the  change  in  the  amount  of  stock  and  work  in  progress  a 
firm  carries  on  the  balance  sheet;  the  higher  the  opening  stock  of  stock  and  work 
in  progress  per  share  relative  to  the  opening  price  per  share,  the  more  likely  it  is 
that  a  particular  bad  news  will  be  reflected  in  the  stock  and  work  in  progress 
accruals  during  the  period  t.  The  asymmetric  timeliness  of  AStock  is  expected  to 
increase  from  the  lowest  tertile  to  the  highest  tertile; 
-  Wreditors  originates  from  the  amount  of  creditors'  accounts  a  firm  carries  on 
the  balance  sheet;  the  higher  the  opening  stock  of  net  creditors  per  share  relative 
to  the  opening  price  per  share,  the  more  likely  it  is  that  a  particular  bad  news  will 
be  reflected  in  the  creditors'  accruals  during  the  period  t.  The  asymmetric 
timeliness  of  ACreditors  is  expected  to  increase  from  the  lowest  tertile  to  the 
highest  tertile; 
247 -  The  depreciation  and  amortisation  charge  (DEP)  normally  originates  from  the 
stock  of  tangible  and  intangible  fixed  assets  consumed  within  a  period.  In 
principle,  the  higher  the  opening  stock  of  fixed  tangible  and  intangible  assets  a 
firm  carries  on  the  balance  sheet,  the  more  likely  it  is  that  a  particular  bad  news 
will  be  reflected  in  the  depreciation  charge.  However,  unlike  in  the  previous 
examples  of  accruals,  bad  news  and  the  corresponding  adjustments  of  the 
carrying  value  of  asset  (that  equal  to  the  depreciation  basis)  is  not  expected  to 
change  asymmetricall  Y.  86  Therefore,  regardless  of  the  amount  of  fixed  and 
intangible  assets  per  share  relative  to  the  opening  price  per  share,  bad  news  will 
not  result  in  an  asymmetric  depreciation  charge.  However,  given  that  some  firms 
carry  more  assets  (both  tangible  and  intangible)  on  the  balance  sheet  than  others, 
the  timeliness  of  DEP  with  respect  to  good  news  will  increase. 
-  Special  items  (SPEC)  capture  in  great  majority  the  effect  of  extraordinary  and/or 
exceptional  items.  At  least  some  of  these  items  should  result  from  impairments 
of  assets  and  related  items.  Given  that  it  is  difficult  to  pinpoint  the  exact  source 
of  this  type  of  accruals,  again  the  opening  stock  of  fixed  tangible  and  intangible 
assets  relative  to  share  price  is  used  as  the  stock  variable.  It  is  to  be  expected  that 
at  least  some  of  the  effects  of  bad  news  will  result  in  write-offs  of  fixed  tangible 
and  intangible  assets  that  will  then  be  captured  by  the  SPEC  variable.  Therefore, 
the  higher  the  opening  amount  of  fixed  and  intangible  assets  per  share  relative  to 
the  opening  price  per  share,  the  more  likely  it  is  that  a  particular  bad  news  will 
result  in  some  asset  write-offs  and  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  SPEC  charge. 
86  See  also  the  expectations  regarding  the  time-series  behaviour  of  depreciation  and  amortisation 
charge  (DEP)  presented  in  section  3.2. 
248 The  results  presented  in  Table  4-20  are  generally  consistent  with  these 
predictions.  The  asymmetric  timeliness  of  AWCAP  to  bad  news  is  highest  in  the 
tertile  with  the  highest  opening  net  current  assets  per  share  relative  to  the  opening 
share  price.  This  ratio  represents  an  attempt  to  use  only  the  portion  of  the  book-to- 
market  ratio  that  is  relevant  to  this  particular  type  of  accruals.  While  the  asymmetry 
reflected  by  the  incremental  coefficient  ;  between  the  first  and  second  tertile  71 
decreases,  the  total  response  to  bad  news  increases  monotonically.  Also,  the 
magnitude  of  the  response  to  bad  news  relative  to  good  news  increases 
monotonically  with  the  relative  amount  of  net  assets  on  the  balance  sheet.  The  R2 
also  increases  with  tertiles  of  net  working  capital.  Finally,  the  response  of  A  WCAP  to 
good  news  increases  with  the  relative  amount  of  these  items  on  the  balance  sheet. 
Similar  conclusions  can  also  be  drawn  for  the  individual  components  of 
AWCAP.  In  the  case  of  ADebtors  and  AStock,  the  results  are  qualitatively  identical: 
the  response  to  good  news  measured  byA,  the  incremental  response  to  bad  news 
measured  by  P,  the  total  response  to  bad  news,  the  R2  and  the  total  response  to  bad  Y, 
news  all  increase  monotonically  with  increasing  amounts  of  respective  opening 
values  of  assets  per  share  recorded  in  the  balance  sheet  relative  to  the  opening  price. 
The  results  are  weaker  for  the  ACreditors  variable.  The  asymmetric  and  total 
response  is  only  significant  for  the  highest  tertile  of  the  relevant  balance-sheet  item 
relative  to  the  opening  share  price,  but  the  R2  is  lowest  for  this  tertile,  contrary  to 
expectations.  In  particular,  the  positive  signs  of  the  P  coefficient  in  the  first  two  Y, 
tertiles  of  ACreditors  per  share  relative  to  opening  price  per  share  are  interesting 
(indicating  that  the  more  negative  the  returns,  the  less  creditors  a  firm  has). 
249 In  the  case  of  the  depreciation  and  amortisation  expense  (DEP),  the  response 
to  good  news  measured  by  A,  increase  with  increasing  amount  of  fixed  tangible  and 
intangible  assets  per  share  on  the  balance  sheet  relative  to  the  opening  price,  in  line 
with  expectations.  Given  that  the  definitions  and/or  classifications  of  fixed  assets  in 
the  DataStream  database  differs  somewhat  across  years,  two  other  measures  were 
employed  in  preliminary  analyses  as  a  measure  of  the  conditioning  opening  "stock" 
variable:  the  opening  stock  of  only  fixed  tangible  rather  than  total  fixed  assets  per 
share  (DataStream  item  #339),  deflated  by  the  opening  share  price,  and  an  "indirect" 
measure  of  total  long-term  assets  per  share,  calculated  as  total  opening  assets 
(DataStream  item  #392)  per  share  less  total  opening  current  assets  (DataStream  item 
#376)  per  share.  The  results  and  conclusions  were  quantitatively  and  qualitatively 
almost  identical  to  those  presented  in  Table  4-20  and  are  accordingly  not  presented. 
The  results  for  special  charges  (SPEC)  are  also  generally  in  line  with 
expectations  regarding  asset-specific  rules  of  recognition:  the  asymmetric  timeliness 
of  SPEC  to  bad  news,  the  R2s  and  the  total  response  to  bad  news  all  increase  with  the 
amount  of  fixed  tangible  and  intangible  assets  on  the  balance  sheet  relative  to 
opening  market  value,  which,  it  is  assumed,  most  likely  "create"  this  accruals  item. 
The  results  are  also  consistent  with  the  expectation  that  a  major  part  of  the  construct 
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-ga%2 SPEC  is  in  fact  formed  from  long-lived  assets  write-offs  and/or  adjustments  in 
expected  lives  and/or  residual  values  of  these  assets.  87 
To  conclude,  the  asset-specific  measures  of  pervasive  conservatism  reinforce 
the  basic  results  obtained  by  dividing  firin-year  observations  by  the  opening  book-to- 
market  ratio.  The  higher  the  opening  stock  of  a  particular  asset  relative  to  the  share 
price,  the  more  of  the  specific  asset  the  firm  carries  on  the  balance  sheet  and  the 
more  likely  it  is  that  an  asymmetric  response  to  bad  news  will  be  observed.  The 
results  for  all  six  dependent  variables  are  consistent  with  these  expectations  for  most 
of  ex-post  conservatism  indicators.  Moreover,  the  sensitivity  to  good  news  increases 
with  the  opening  stock  of  these  variables. 
4.10  SEMOMY  OF.  FINDINGS 
I 
This  chapter  presented  the  main  empirical  findings  of  the  thesis.  First,  time- 
series  properties  of  accounting  figures  that  are  consistent  with  predictions  under 
conservative  accounting.  Operating  cash  flows  are  strongly  mean-reverting  and 
respond  symmetrically  to  good  and  bad  news.  Earnings-decreases  are  strongly  mean- 
reverting  and  earnings-increases  are  permanent,  with  the  asymmetry  more 
pronounced  for  earnings  figures  containing  more  accruals.  Accruals  on  average 
mean-revert  and  the  rate  of 
I 
reversal  is  higher  for  earnings-decreasing  accruals, 
particularly  for  working  capital  accruals  and  special  items.  Changes  in  the 
97  The  term  "consistent  with"  must  be  particularly  stressed  at  this  point,  given  that  direct  supporting 
evidence  of  the  statement  cannot  be  shown  due  to  lack  of  data. 
253 depreciation  charge  are  permanent.  Overall,  these  results  are  consistent  with 
predictions  under  conservative  accounting. 
Second,  direct  tests  using  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  model  present 
corroborating  evidence  -  the  more  accruals  an  accounting  figure  contains  (including 
certain  types  of  accruals  themselves),  the  more  pronounced  is  its  asymmetric 
timeliness  in  respect  to  incorporation  of  economic  losses.  Given  that  operating  cash 
flows  do  not  contain  accruals,  they  respond  to  bad  news  symmetrically.  The  low 
observed  R2  in  accruals  regressions  is  consistent  with  accruals  making  cash  flows 
more  timely  in  incorporating  economic  news  to  form  accounting  earnings.  Lagged 
models  show  clearly  that  good  news  is  incorporated  in  earnings  with  a  lag,  while  bad 
news  is  (mostly)  incorporated  within  the  time  period  it  occurs.  There  are  some  slight, 
but  persistent  deviations  from  this  general  finding  in  terms  of  special  items  (and  the 
earnings  figure  containing  special  items)  in  that  some  bad  news  is  incorporated  in 
these  items  over  a  number  of  periods,  rather  than  immediately.  Depreciation  reflects 
news  symmetrically.  Conservatism  also  appears  to  be  increasing  over  time,  albeit 
evidence  is  not  as  strong  as  in  comparable  papers.  In  terms  of  controls  for  previous 
penods'  conservatism,  the  results  are  robust. 
Third,  the  investigation  of  loss  versus  profit  observations  reveal  that 
differences  between  the  two  groups  ý  are  important  when  the  accruals  and,  the 
operating  cash  flow  components  are  considered.  In  particular,  the  earnings  of  the 
group  of  observations  with  negative  accruals  exhibit  significantly  more  asymmetric  CW-  - 
timeliness  than  the  group  with  positive  accruals,  consistent  with  conservatism  being 
254 an  accruals  phenomenon.  Separation  by  the  sign  of  the  cash  flow  component  as  well 
as  earnings  themselves  does  not  produce  differing  results. 
Fourth,  the  ex-ante  application  of  conservatism  principle  limits  the  effects  of 
ex-post  conservatism  on  accounting  figures  that  respond  to  conservatism  (i.  e., 
earnings  figures  and  certain  types  of  accruals).  The  more  ex-ante  conservative  a  firm 
is,  the  less  likely  it  is  to  observe  an  asymmetric  response  of  accounting  measures  to 
good  and  bad  news.  This  is  found  to  hold  both  generally  and  on  an  asset-specific 
basis. 
The  chapter  also  highlights  a  number  of  issues  related  to  the  research 
methods.  In  particular,  variable  construction  and  sample  formation  procedure  are 
influenced  by  the  length  of  time  period  covered  in  this  study.  This  is  important  both 
in  terms  of  empirical  definitions  of  variables  as  well  as  issues  regarding 
survivorship.  The  chapter  also  shows  that  distributional  properties  and  correlations 
are  important  indicators  of  the  effects  of  conservative  accounting. 
Overall,  the  results  are  consistent  with  the  hypotheses  formulated  in  section 
3.9.  While  the  results  appear  robust,  certain  firm  attributes  and  methods  of 
estimation  and  controls  might  have  an  impact  on  the  results  presented.  Therefore,  it 
is  necessary  to  execute  additional  sensitivity  analyses  to  provide  additional  support 
for  the  findings  presented  in  this  chapter.  These  analyses  are  the  subject  of  the  next 
chapter. 
255 SENSITIVITY  ANALYSES 
5.1  XNTORDUCTXON  TO  SENSXTXVXTY  ANALYSES 
The  contemporaneous  and  lagged  samples  employed  in  the  main  analyses  in 
Chapter  4  consist  of  firms  with  different  attributes.  Firms  differ  in  terms  of  size, 
industry  membership,  choice  of  accounting  year-end,  differing  year  ends  both  across 
different  firms,  changing  year  ends  for  some  firms  and  varying  lengths  of  accounting 
period.  While  the  conservatism  principle  should  apply  equally  across  all  firms 
regardless  of  their  differing  attributes,  it  is  possible  that  these  attributes  induce 
systematic  differences  among  certain  groups  of  firms.  For  example,  the  nature  of  the 
link  between  accounting  figures  and  market  values  might  differ  between  smaller 
firms  and  large  firms.  Similarly,  firms  in  a  particular  industry  differ  in  terms  of  the 
underlying  economics  of  the  firms  from  firms  in  a  different  industry.  These 
differences  might  be,  in  part,  reflected  in  the  choice  firms  make  regarding  their 
accounting  year-end.  In  the  analyses  in  Chapter  4  these  differences  are  implicitly 
assumed  not  to  have  an  important  impact  on  particular  ways  the  conservatism 
principle  is  reflected  in  accounting  figures  used  in  these  analyses.  Therefore,  the  first 
purpose  of  the  sensitivity  analyses  is  to  explore  if  there  are  any  indications  that  the 
application  of  conservative  accounting  might  differ  across  firms  with  differing 
attributes. 
The  second  purpose  of  the  sensitivity  analyses  is  to  control  for  issues 
surrounding  the  estimation  methods  used  in  the  main  analyses  in  Chapter  4.  First,  the 
sample  covers  periods  of  differing  economic  environment.  For  example,  the  inflation 
256 rate  varied  from  as  high  as  almost  27%  (monthly  data,  annualised)  in  1975  to  as  low 
as  0.7%  in  2001.  These  differing  conditions  might  affect  the  relations  between 
accounting  and  market  values.  Second,  the  both  the  method  of  estimation  of  the 
models  of  conservatism  and  the  sample  selection  procedures  bear  upon  the  results 
presented  in  Chapter  4.  Third,  because  the  sample  extends  over  a  relatively  long  time 
period  in  which  accounting  regulation  has  been  changing,  the  choice  of  particular 
accounting  figures  published  under  differing  accounting  regimes  might  affect  the 
results. 
The  subsequent  sections  present  additional  analyses  that  show  the  effect  of 
differing  attributes  across'firms  on  the  main  results  as  well  as  specific  methods  of 
estimation.  The  attributes  explored  are:  the  effect  of  firm  size,  possible  industry 
differences  and  systematic  differences  between  December  and  non-Deccmber  year- 
end  firms.  In  terms  of  methods  used  and  sample  selection  procedures,  the  effects  of 
alternative  measures  of  ex-ante  conservatism,  alternative  outliers  removal 
procedures,  alternative  methods  of  estimating  regression  models  and  issues  regarding 
constructed  versus  published  figures  are  shown. 
5.2  FXRM  SXZE  AND  CONSERVATXSM 
Several  studies  in  the  capital  market-based  accounting  research  study  the 
influence  of  size  on  the  relation  between  earnings  and  returns.  For  example,  Collins, 
Kothari  and  Rayburn  (1987)  hypothesize  and  find  that  price-based  forecasts  of  future 
earnings  outperform  univariate  time-series  forecasts  by  a  greater  margin  for  larger 
257 than  for  smaller  firms.  Finn  size  acts  as  a  proxy  for  the  amount  of  information  about 
a  firm  and  the  number  of  analysts  and  traders  that  process  that  information. 
Specifically,  they  find  that  the  R  2S  in  the  relations  between  forecasted  -percentage 
changes  in  earnings  per  share  and  current  period  cumulative  abnormal  returns  at  the 
portfolio  level  increases  (from  0.18  to  0.41),  while  the  earnings  response  coefficient 
decreases  with  size.  Consistent  with  this,  Shores  and  Shevlin  (1993)  find  that  if 
unexpected  earnings  are,  positivethen  the  response  to  unexpected  quarterly  earnings 
is  smaller  for  larger  than  for  smaller  firms  (note  that  the  unexpected  earnings  and 
cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  equally  singed).  On  the  other,  hand,  if  the 
unexpected  earnings  is  negative  the  response  to  unexpected,  earnings  is  larger  for 
larger  firms  than  for  smaller  firms.  Freeman's  (1987)  earlier  study  shows  that  the 
magnitude  of  reaction  to  good  and  bad  news  decreases  with  size  and  that  prices  lead 
eamings  of  large  firms  by  more  than  for  small  firms.  A  related  UK  study  is  Charitou, 
Clubb  and  Andreou  (2001).  - 
In  relating  these  findings  to  the  accounting  conservatism  literature,  at  least 
three  hypotheses  may  be  formulated.  First,  given  that  the  same  accounting  rules 
apply  to  all  firms,  small,  medium  or  large,  the  coefficients  in  contemporaneous  Pope 
and  Walker  (1999)  models  using  any  earnings  or  earnings  component  figure  as  the 
dependent  variable,  should  be  very  similar  in  magnitude,  sign  and  statistical 
significance  within  each  variable  regardless  of  firm  size.  However,  based  on  Collins, 
Kothari  and  Rayburn  (1987),  Freeman  (1987),  Shores  and  Shevlin  (1993)  as  well  as 
Donnelly  and  Walker  (1995),  it  is  possible  that  the  estimated  regression  coefficients 
on  good  news  will  decrease  with  size,  while  the  incremental  coefficient  on  bad  news 
will  increase  with  size.  Second,  if  the  amount  of  information  and  the  number  of 
258 analysts  and  traders  are  important  factors  that  significantly  affect  the  relation 
between  accounting  numbers  and  market  values,  the  A  should  increase  with  firm 
size.  Firm  size  in  this  case  proxies  for-the  number  of  analysts  following  the  firm 
and/or  for  the  liquidity  of  the  share,  i.  e.,  the  infbimation  enviromnent  of  the  firm. 
Presumably,  for  larger  firms  more  information  is  available,  the  lesser  is  the 
uncertainty  surrounding  the  present  value  of  future  cash  flows  leading  to  higher  R  2s 
than  for  smaller  firms.  Third,  based  on  Freeman  (1987),  larger  firms'  share  prices 
should  lead  accounting  figures  by  more.  Thus,  longer  lags  might  be  significant, 
although  opposite  expectations  might  be  formed.  For  example,  smaller  firms  are 
more  likely  to  write-off  assets  (see  a  summary  of  the  relevant  parts  of  Basu,  2001, 
below). 
The  size  of  the  sample  used  in  this  study  and  the  relatively  large  number  of 
different  accounting  models  influences  the  choice  of  (perhaps  only)  three  size 
groups,  consistent  with  similar  analyses  in  the  main  chapter  of  the  thesis.  Size  ranks 
and  tertiles  are  re-formed  at  the  beginning  of  each  accounting  period  ending  in 
sample  years  1969-2001  by  the  opening  value  of  market  capitalisation.  For  each  year 
and  each  size  tertile,  the  contemporaneous  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  cross-sectional 
models  are  estimated,  the  results  averaged,  appropriate  Fama-MacBeth  (1973)  1- 
statistics  calculated  and  all  inferences  are  made  on  this  basis.  The  results  are 
presented  in  Table  5-1.  They  are  thus  directly  comparable  to  the  basic  set  of 
contemporaneous  results  presented  in  Table  4-8. 
Overall,  the  results  show  that  the  coefficients  of  both  good  news  and  bad 
news  do  not  change  monotonically  across  the  three  size  tertiles  and  across  all  the 
259 accounting  variables,  studied.  Similarly,  the  R2s  across'size  tertiles  do  not  change 
monotonically  and  in  some  cases  and  certain  measures  appear  to  follow  an  (inverse) 
U-shaped  pattern  across  tertiles.  A  possible  explanation  consistent  with  this 
observation  is  that  accounting  figures  at  either  end  of  size  distributions  contain  more 
transitory  items  than  firms  in  the  middle  of  size  distributions  (e.  g.,  Freeman  and  Tse, 
1992;  Das  and  Lev,  1994).  This  would  cause  the  observed  results  regarding  the  R  2S 
without  necessarily  affecting  the  regression  coefficients  (albeit  issues  regarding 
persistence  might  be  important). 
Some  of  the  other  more  interesting  findings  are  the  following.  The  sensitivity 
of  all  three  measures  of  earnings  OP,  ORD  and  EARN  to  good  news  measured  by  the 
estimated  regression  coefficient  A  decreases  with  size  tertiles,  as  expected. 
However,  the  asymmetric  timeliness  of  the  three  earnings  m  easures,  measured  by  the 
incremental  regression  coefficient  P'  is  also  highest  for  the  smallest  tertile  and  Y, 
lowest  for  the  largest  size  tertile.  Also,  the  total  sensitivity  of  these  earnings 
measures  to  bad  news  is  higher  for  smaller  firms  than  for  large  firms.  While  contrary 
to  expectations  based  on  Shores  and  Shevlin  (1993),  these  last  results  arc  broadly  in 
line  with  those  reported  by  Basu,  Hwang  and  Jan  (2000). 
A  consistent  pattern  can  be  found  in  working  capital  accruals  AWCAP, 
though  not  unequivocally  in  its  individual  components.  In  the  case  of  AWCAP,  the 
response  to  good  news,  the  incremental  response  to  bad  news  and  the  total  response 
to  bad  news  decrease  monotonically  with  size.  Thus,  the  smaller  the  firm,  the  larger 
the  response  of  AWCAP  to  both  good  and  bad  news.  The  R  2S  exhibit  an  opposite 
pattern  (an  inverted  U-shape)  to  earnings'  regressions.  The  results  on  special  items 
260 (SPEC)  are  less  clear.  While  the  response  to  good  news  is  not  statistically 
significant,  the  lowest  and  the;  highest  tertiles  exhibit  a  high  and  statistically 
significant  asymmetric  timeliness  to  bad  news,  and  the  R  2S  increase  across  the 
tertiles.  Other  results  show  that  operating  cash  flows  (OCF)  in  the  smallest  and 
largest  tertile  are  strongly  related  to  good  news  (more  for  the  smaller  firms),  while 
the  middle  tertile  exhibits  a  strong  and  statistically  significant  asymmetric  timeliness 
with  respect  to  bad  news,  a  result  not  expected  under  conservative  accounting. 
The  equivalent  results  of  lagged  models  are  presented  in  Appendix  H. 
Overall,  the  results  are  weaker,  a  possible  consequence  of  the  relatively  small 
average  number  of  observations,  in  particular  in  the  smallest-firms  tertile.  Two 
results  are  perhaps  worth  stressing.  First,  in  the  ORD  regressions,  the  asymmetric 
timeliness  to  current  and  lag-one  bad  news  is  highest  for  the  smallest  firms  and 
smallest  for  the  largest  firms,  consistent  with  Basu  (2001).  Moreover,  the  lag-two 
cocfficient  on  bad  news  r3  is  significant,  consistent  with  Freeman  (1987).  Also, 
there  is  some  indication  that  large  firms  recognise  bad  news  in  special  items  (SPEC) 
more  smoothly  over  more  time  periods  than  small  firms. 
Another  way  to  study  the  influence  of  size  would  be  by  excluding  the 
smallest  25%  of  observations  by  opening  market  value  and,  additionally,  those 
observations  where  RET,  equals  exactly  zero.  The  results  from  these  direct  tests  are 
quantitatively  affected  very  little  compared  to  the  results  in  Table  4-8  and  are  thus 
not  reported.  Generally,  however,  the  asymmetric  timeliness  of  all  three  earnings 
measures  decreases  slightly;  most  of  the  asymmetry  is  still  captured  by  AWCAP  and 
SPEC. 
261 To  sum  up,  while  size  does  appear  to  be  a  factor  that  introduces  some 
incremental  effects  in  the  relation  between  market  values  and  accounting  figures 
under  conservative  accounting,  the  direction  and  magnitude  are  somewhat 
arnbiguous.  88  Basu  (2001)  provides  some  explanations  that  might  help  explain  the 
results  observed  in  this  research.  First,  smaller  firms  tend  to  be  riskier.  Holding 
future  expected  cash  flows  constant,  this  should  lead  to  smaller  market  values  -  i.  e., 
size  is  a  proxy  for  (or  a  consequence  of)  risk  (Rubinstein,  2001).  Broadly  in  line  with 
this  observation,  the  variability  of  returns  (RE7),  measured  by  O'RET,  increases  from 
the  smallest  to  the  largest  firms:  0.485,0.481  and  0.425  respectively,  albeit  these 
decreases  appear  to  be  very  small.  89  Smaller  firms  are  thus  (very  slightly)  more 
likely  to  be  affected  by  bad  news,  required  to  write  down  assets  more  often,  which 
would  expose  the  firm  to  legal-liability  risk  (Basu,  2001). 
Second,  small  firms  might  be  less  diversified,  which  makes  write-downs 
more  likely  for  these  firms.  Broadly  consistent  with  this  observation,  the  mean 
(average)  values  of  deflated  special  items  (SPEC)  increase  from  -0.073  (-0.041)  for 
the  lowest  tertile,  to  -0-001  (0.000)  for  the  middle  size-tertile  and,  switching  sip,  to 
+0.041  (+0.021)  for  the  largest  finns. 
$a  There  are  studies  that  present  arguments  against  the  "size  effecf'  in  stock  returns  (e.  g.,  Wang, 
2000). 
89  Caution  must  be  exercised,  however,  that  these  descriptivcs  are  calculated  on  a  pooled,  cnd-of- 
period  basis  instead  of  year-by-year,  opening  values  used  to  form  tertiles  by  size  and  are  therefore  not 
the  exact  equivalent  of  size  classifications. 
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IL A  third  and  related  possible  explanation  might  be  the  coexistence  of  "big 
bath"  accounting  (e.  g.,  Elliott  and  Hanna;  Elliott  and  Shaw,  1988;  Waymire,  1988) 
and  earnings  smoothing.  A  very  rough  adaptation/simplification  of  Kirschenheiter 
and  Melumad's  (2002)  theoretical  predictions  might  be  the  following.  The  more 
good  the  news  is,  the  higher  the  degree  of  under-reporting  in  financial  statements. 
For  moderately  bad  news,  they  make  no  clear  predictions  (managers  might  either 
slightly  over-report  or  slightly  under-report).  On  the  other  hand,  if  news  is  very  bad, 
managers  will  choose  "big  batW'  accounting,  while  for  moderately  bad  news,  they 
will  likely  attempt  to  smooth  earnings  (likely  adopt  earnings-increasing  accounting 
policies).  Note  at  this  point  that  size,  measured  as  market  capitalisation,  directly 
affects  these  statements  through  the  definition  of  news  used  in  this  study.  In  a  very 
condensated  approach  to  this  analysis,  it  is  first  assumed  all  such  earnings- 
influencing  activities  are  passed  through  SPEC  While  this  is  likely  for  "big  bath" 
procedures,  managerial  implementations  of  other  activities  are  less  clear.  Second, 
observations  are  separated  into  four  partitions  according  to  the  magnitude  and  sign  of 
returns  RETt.  j.  j:  a)  RETt.  1-1<---0.245  (worst  news,  the  number  being  the  median  return 
of  all  bad  news  firms);  b)  -0.245<RETt,  1.1:  50  (moderate  bad  news);  c)  O>RET,.  t. 
1ý:  0.423  (moderate  good  news)  and  d)  RETt.  1.1>0.423  (very  good  news,  the  number 
being  the  median  return  of  all  good  news  firms).  Third,  for  each  of  these  partitions  a 
simple,  bivariate,  pooled  regression  of  SPEC,  on  RETt.  t.  1  is  run: 
SPEC,,  =  a,  +ARETi,,, 
-, 
+  el,  (5-1) 
While  this  partitioning  as  well as  the  method  of  estimation  are  certainlY  very 
rudimentary,  the  expectations  are  that  for  bad  news,  the  estimated  regression 
266 coefficientAwill  be  very  high  and  positive  for  the  worst  bad  news,  causing  thus  for 
a  given  unit  of  bad  news  the  highest  decrease  of  earnings  via  making  SPEC  most 
negative.  For  moderately  bad  news,  the  estimated  regression  coefficient  will  be 
positive,  but  smaller  than  in  the  case  of  worst-news  group.  Under  conservative 
accounting,  firms  are  required  to  recognise  bad  news  in  current  financial  statements, 
but  under  Kirschenheiter  and  Melumad's  (2002)  they  are  less  likely  to  choose  "big 
bath"  accounting  methods.  Part  of  bad  news  is  thus  still  expected  to  be  recognised 
through  SPEC  and  consequently  decrease  earnings.  On  the  other  hand,  for 
moderately  good  news  and  given  that  there  are  no  clear  theoretical  predictions,  the 
estimated  A  coefficient  will  likely  be  statistically  insignificantly  different  from  zero 
if  the  two  effects  are  mixing,  on  average.  The  degree  of  under-reporting  should  be 
highest  for  the  very  good-news  group.  To  obtain  under-reporting,  such  policies  must 
be  chosen  so  as  to  reduce  slightly  the  earnings  that  would  otherwise  be  reported.  In 
the  simple  context  presented  here,  a  unit  of  very  good  news  should  cause,  in  part,  the 
creation  of  negative  SPEC.  The  estimatedA  coefficient  for  this  partition  is  thus 
expected  to  be  negative  (and  likely  not  very  large  in  magnitude). 
The  results  are  remarkably  supportive  of  all  four  expectations.  In  the  worst 
bad  news-group  the  estimated  regression  coefficient  is  Aý  0-055  (pooled  t-statistics 
t--  6.03),  for  the  moderately  bad  news-group  ft,  =  0.030  (t--  2.49),  for  the  moderately 
A 
-0  1  good  news  A=  -0.008  (t--  -1.25)  and  for  the  very  good  news-grouP  A= 
-0 
0 
(t--  -3.73).  Also  note  that  the  R2,  albeit  comparable  in  magnitude  to  the  main  results 
of  this  research  -  i.  e.,  relatively  small  (also  see  explanation  in  section  4.5.2),  the  R2 
is  highest  in  the  worst  bad  news-group,  as  would  be  expected  (pooled  R  2=  0.007, 
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F1,6,449=  6.220).  There  also  should  not  be  any  difference  in  tenns  of  R2 
between  the  two  bad  news  groups,  yet  in  the  moderate  bad  news  it  is  several  times 
lower  (albeit  still  significant).  These  results  are  also  consistent  with  the  main  results 
(see  Table  4-8)  regarding  the  SPEC  regressions,  where  it  has  been  shown  that  good 
news  result  in  a  slight  earnings-decreasing  change  in  special  items  (SPEC).  These 
results  are  taken  as  indicative  only.  To  provide  a  full  explanation  of  these  relations, 
more  advanced  methods  would  have  to  be  used  as  well  as  a  study  of  possible  biases 
included. 
Overall,  therefore,  while  there  are  some  indications  of  systematic  differences 
in  application  of  the  conservatism  principle  across  size  tertiles,  there  are  no  clear-cut 
results  for  the  overall  sample.  At  least  some  of  the  observed  differences  might  relate 
more  to  transitory  components  of  accounting  numbers  as  evidenced  by  an  inverted 
U-shaped  pattern  in  R2s  across  the  tree  size  tertiles  for  eight  out  of  ten  accounting 
variables  studied  than  to  any  systematic  differences  resulting  from  different 
applications  of  accounting  conservatism,  on  average.  Given  that  all  firms  must 
conform  to  the  same  set  of  accounting  rules  this  is  to  be  expected. 
5.3  XNDUSTRY  DXFFERENCES 
The  contemporaneous  sample  used  in  this  study  includes  85  different 
industries  defined  by  DataStream  industry  codes  (DataStream  item  INDM 
(excluding  financial  services  and  similar  industries),  with  the  number  of  observations 
within  each  industry  in  the  pooled  sample  ranging  from  a  high  of  2,106  for 
268 "Engineering,  general"  to  as  low  as  9  ("Cable+Satellite"  and  "Retailers  e- 
commerce")  and  7  C'Gold  mining").  The  number  of  observations  in  some  industries 
precludes  the  use  of  Fama-MacBeth  (1973)  regressions  within  industries  and  would 
likely  make  pooled  estimates  unreliable  for  some  of  these  industries.  One  alternative 
to  solve  both  these  problems  would  be  to  aggregate  "similar"  industries  together,  as 
for  example  in  Barth,  Cram  and  Nelson  (2001)  for  US  firms  to  obtain  13  aggregate 
industries.  However,  attempts  to  mimic  their  aggregations  for  the  UK  market 
produce  groups  that  again,  as  in  their  study,  differ  greatly  in  number  of  observations 
and  differing  results  that  may  be  due  to  imprecise  aggregation.  90  Even  so, 
aggregation  may  in  some  case  be  infeasible,  as  certain  member  industries  would  still 
be  treated  separately.  An  (early)  example  is  the  oil  and  gas  industry,  characterised  as 
early  as  1958  by  Brock  (1958)  to  be  "ultra-conservative".  An  alternative  approach  is 
taken  here  accordingly.  I 
Absent  any  other  objective  criteria  on  selection  of  industries,  rive  DataStream 
INDM  industries  have  been  selected  that  contain  at  least  1,000  observations  in  the 
entire  pooled  1969-2001  period.  These  industries  are  (number  of  observations  and 
median  opening  book-to-market  ratio  in  parentheses):  "Building  materials"  (1,005; 
0.954).  "Business  support"  (1,485;  0.685),  "Electrical  equipment"  (1,210;  0.637), 
"Engineering,  general"  (2,106;  1.18  1)  and  "Food  processing"  (1,0  11;  1.032).  Other 
industries  contain  less  than  1,000  observations  in  total.  For  these  five  industries, 
pooled  contemporaneous-model  regressions  have  been  estimated  for  the  entire  1969- 
2001  period.  Results  are  presented  graphically  in  Figure  5-1  for  the  main  earnings 
90  In  Barth,  Cram  and  Nelson's  (2001,  notes  to  Table  6)  study,  the  minimum  number  of  observations 
is  47  (agriculture)  for  a  sample  spanning  the  years  1987-1996.  The  maximum  number  in  their 
industry-specific  sub-sample  is  1,365  (retail). 
269 figure  and  the  main  components  for  parsimony.  In  the  figure,  the  estimated  pooled 
good  news  coefficient 
ý,  (blue)  and  the  estimated  incremental  bad  news  coefficient 
(j,  )  are  shown  and  the  sum  of  the  two  coefficients  yields  the  total  response  to  bad 
news. 
Figure  5-1:  Pooled  contemporaneous  models  of  conservatism  by  industry  on  main  accounting 
variables  for  the  largest  five  industries  by  number  of  observations,  1969-2001 
0.30 
0.25 
0.20 
0.15 
0.10 
C-)  O.  Wl 
00(l 
-0.05 
-0.10 
Notes  to  Figure  5-1.  Estimated  models  are:  XIP,  I=  aj+a2D,,  _j+#jRET,,  j+yID_IRl-  ,J,,  I+c,  where  X,  is  an  undellatcd,  per 
share  dependent  variable  listed  in  the  leftmost  column  of'  the  table.  OCE  is  operating  cash  flow,  EARN  is  earnings  ullcr 
extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  JWCAP  is  working  capital  accruals,  SPECis  special  items  and  Accruals  (lot.  )  JW(  , All  + 
DEP  +  SPEC.  RET,, 
_j=  (PP,.,  )IP,.,  and  D,.,.,  =  jI  it'REII,  I:  ýO,  0  othcrwiscý.  All  variables  are  deflated  by  opening  share  price 
P, 
.  Ail  coefficients'  estimates  are  pooled  cross-sectional  time  series  Ior  the  period  1969-2(X)I.  Industries  (as  of'  DataStreani 
item  INDM)  are:  Building  materials,  Business  support,  Electronic  equipment,  Engineering,  general,  and  I-otid  processors. 
The  results  show  that  for  all  five  industries,  operating  cash  flows  (OCF) 
reflect  a  portion  of  current-penod  good  economic  news.  The  A  coefficient  is 
statistically  significant  for  all  five  industries  (pooled  t-statistics  are:  8.709,7.443, 
3.604,9.586  and  4.738  respectively).  There  is  no  asymmetric  timeliness  of  OCF 
with  respect  to  bad  news,  except  for  the  industry  "Food  processing"  where  the  j, 
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LLJ  ýu  LL) coefficient  is  Oust)  statistically  significantly  different  from  zero  (pooled  t-statistic: 
2.049). 
Earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (EARN)  exhibit  clear 
asymmetric  timeliness  with  respect  to  bad  economic  news,  except  for  the  industry 
"Building  materials"  where  the  pooled  t-statistic  on  P  is  not  statistically  different  71 
from  zero.  Also,  the  total  response  to  bad  news  is  highest  for  the  industry  where'the 
median  opening  book-to-market  ratio  is  highest  ("Engineering,  general"),  consistent 
with  ex-ante  conservatism  and  results  obtained  and  presented  in  sections  4.9.1  and 
4.9.2.  The  ft,  coefficient  on  good  economic  news  is  statistically  significant  for  all 
five  industries  shown  (pooled  t-statistics  are:  7.084,5.037,6.973,5.436  and  3.805 
respectively). 
The  asymmetric  timeliness  exhibited  by  EARN  for  the  five  industries  shown 
appears  not  to  originate  from  working  capital  accruals  (AWCAP).  The  bad  news 
coefficient  P,  is  not  statistically  different  from  zero  in  any  of  the  five  cases.  Also, 
the  good  news  coefficient  Ais  not  statistically  different  from  zero  for  the  "Building 
materials"  and  "Business  support"  industries.  However,  special  items  (SPEC)  show 
high  asymmetric  timeliness  of  these  items  in  respect  to  bad  news.  In  four  out  of  five 
industries  (the  exception  being  "Building  materials"),  the  P  coefficient  is  71 
statistically  significant  (pooled  t-statistics  are:  1.245,4.727,2.730o  5.745  and  2.004 
respectively).  Similar  results  are  obtained  if  the  total  accruals  Accruals  (tot.  )  figure  is 
considered,  again  the  exception  being  the  "Food  processing"  industry. 
271 Overall,  the  pooled  results  by  industry  are  consistent  with  the  results  obtained 
by  cross-sectional  estimations  of  the  contemporaneous  model  of  accounting 
conservatism:  there  is  no  asymmetry  in  reflecting  good  and  bad  economic  news  in 
operating  cash  flow,  earnings  exhibit  high  asymmetric  timeliness  in  earnings.  This 
asymmetry  is  clearly  reflected  in  the  accruals  component  of  earnings,  although 
results  presented  in  Figure  5-1  differ  from  the  general  results  regarding  the  source  of 
this  asymmetry  -  AWCAP  appear  not  to  play  a  significant  role  in  these  industries,  as 
opposed  to  the  general  results  (see,  for  example,  Table  4-8)'.  However,  the  results 
reinforce  the  notion  that  accruals  overall  and  special  items  (SPEC)  make  earnings 
more  timely  than  cash  flows  in  reflecting  bad  economic  news. 
Notwithstanding  the  limitations  of  this  industry-specific  analysis  of 
conservatism  (in  particular,  the  industry  selection),  An  analysis  of  industry-specific 
ex-post  conservatism  after  controlling  for  industry-specific  levels  of  cx-ante 
conservatism  is  also  provided.  This  is  achieved  by  separating  observations  within  an 
industry  by  pooled  low/high  opening  book-to-market  ratio.  Such  an  analysis  should 
yield  very  precise  results  in  terms  of  controlling  for  effects  such  as  conditions  on 
input  and  output  markets,  technology  and  business  risk  (Martikainen,  1997). 
As  in  section  4.9.1,  it  is  predicted  that  the  higher  the  book-to-market  ratios 
within  an  industry,  the  more  assets  are  recognised  on  the  balance  sheet,  the  more 
likely  it  is  that  news  relates  to  these  items  and  the  more  asymmetric  the  response  to 
bad  news.  The  results  of  this  analysis  are  shown  in  Table  5-2  for  the  earnings  after 
extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (EARN)  as  the  dependent  variable  only. 
272 Table  5-2:  Industry-specific  asymmetric  response  of  earnings,  controlled  by  the  industry-specific 
levels  of  ex-ante  conservatism,  pooled,  1969-2001 
Opening 
2  Industry  B/M  n  et,  et2  R 
rank  A 
Low  501  0.087  0.004  0.027  0.117  0.129  0.144  5.303 
Building  14.569  0.469  2.067  4.054  24.432 
materials  High  500  0.086  -0.024  0.104  -0.055  0.136  0.049  0.471 
7.550  -1.265  5.583  -0.959  25.922 
Low  733  0.067  0.005  0.027  0.107  0.183  0.134  4.941 
Business  16.471  0.709  3.740  5.727  54.531 
support  High  732  0.086  0.020  0.071  0.128  0.121  0.199  2.798 
10.656  1.396  5.569  2.942  33.410 
Low  598  0.064  0.013  0.019  0.143  0.183  0.162  8.327 
Electronic  11.713  1.597  1.939  6.652  44.471 
equipment  High  598  0.075  0.006  0.058  0.213  0.215  0.271  4.676 
8.329  0.409  4.503  5.107  54.264 
Low  1,046  0.098  -0.001  -0.015  0.193  0.114  0.178  -12.044 
Engineering,  17.425  -0.080  -1.249  8.086  44.575 
general  High  1,045  0.103  -0.009,  0.113  0.160  0.194  0.273  2.409 
11.152  -0.577  7.264  3.468  83.621 
Low  500  0.091  -0.013  0.017  0.110  0.161  0.127  7.511 
Food  15.552  -1.328  1.431  3.949  31.762 
processing  High  499  0.119  0.010  0.104  0.141  0.170  0.244  2.357 
12.235  0.620  5.982  2.416  33.829 
Notes.  Estimated  models  are:  EARNWP, 
-i  -  aj+aýD,.,  j+fljRETj.,.  j+p  D,,.  jRET,,.  j+i;  where  EARN  is  undeflated  per  share 
earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  RET,,,,  -  (Pr-P,.  IYP,.,  and  Dl.,.,  'C  11  if  RET,:  50;  0  otherwise).  All 
variables  are  deflated  by  opening  share  price  AI.  All  coefficients'  estimates  are  pooled  cross-sectional  time  &cries  for  the 
_period 
1969-2001.  Opening  book-to-market  value  is  calculated  within  each  industry  on  a  pooled  basis. 
In  the  industries  "Business  support",  "Electronic  equipment"  and  "Food 
processing"  the  good  news  coefficientft,  the  bad  news  coefficient  P  and  the  total  Y, 
response  to  bad  news  A+j,  is  higher  for  the  high  book-to-market  group  than  for 
the  low  book-to-market  group.  The  response  to  good  news  is  delayed  and  in  all  cases 
the  asymmetric  timeliness  of  EARN  to  bad  news  is  significant. 
Similar  results  also  hold  for  the  other  industries  with  two  exceptions.  First,  in 
the  high  book-to-market  group  within  "Building  materials"  the  bad  news  coefficient 
P,  is  of  the  wrong  sign  and  statistically  insignificant.  Second,  in  the  "Engineering, 
273 general"  industry,  the  low  book-to-market  group  shows  a  smaller  asymmetric 
timeliness  as  evidenced  by  the  size  of  the  incremental  bad  news  coefficient. 
However,  the  total  bad  news  coefficient  A+A  is  higher  for  this  group,  consistent 
with  expectations.  Also,  the  relative  bad  news  coefficients  are  not  higher  for  the  high 
book-to-market  group  within  any  of  the  five  industries,  an  observation  consistent 
with  the  overall  results  in  Table  4-19  and  asset-specific  measures  of  ex-ante 
conservatism  in  Table  4-20. 
There  are  at  least  three  reservations  that  might  be  put  forward  against  such  a 
method  to  study  industry  differences.  First,  in  some  cases  ("Electrical  equipmenf') 
and  some  years,  the  number  of  observations  is  small  (in  particular  in  the  1969-1972 
period).  While  the  pooled  method  of  estimation  should  help  to  reduce  this  problem, 
it  cannot  by  itself  eliminate  it.  Moreover,  it  also  re-introduces  other  problems  in 
interpretation  of  the  regression  results  that  the  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  method 
reduces.  Second,  the  selection  of  industries  is  arbitrary  and  might  not  be  descriptive 
of  the  entire  UK  sample  of  publicly-quoted  companies.  It  is  also  likely  that  a 
selection  of  more  contrasting  industries  in  terms  of  operating  characteristics  and 
levels  of  ex-ante  conservatism  may  yield  a  clearer  picture  of  industry  differences. 
Third,  other  alternatives  might  be  developed  to  study  inter-industry  differences  -  for 
example,  Platt  and  Platt  (1990)  suggest  standardisation  by  dividing  af  inn's  financial 
ratio  with  a  corresponding  mean  of  industry-wide  ratios.  In  the  context  of  this  study, 
this  might  be  done  by  dividing  each  return  and  each  dependent  variable  with  an 
industry  mean.  However,  again,  there  are  issues  regarding  the  dependent  variables  in 
non-December  fiscal  year-end  firms.  While  these  limitations  are  acknowledged,  the 
results  appear  sufficiently  robust  to  provide  an  overview  of  some  of  the  industry 
274 differences  and  the  generality  of  the  asymmetric  timeliness  relations  presented  in  the 
main  part  of  this  thesis. 
5.4  THE  XSSUE  OF  NON-DECEMBER  YEAR-END 
OBSERVATXONS 
The  two  main  samples  used  in  this  study  include  significant  proportions  of 
non-December  fiscal  year-end  firms.  Since  the  ex-dividend  returns  are  cumulated 
over  fiscal  periods  rather  than 
. 
over  periods  designated  to  capture  the  full 
impoundment  of  information  from  the  market  into  accounting  numbers,  this  implies 
that  the  estimated  regression  coefficients  are  not  independent  over  time.  Cross- 
sections  from  adjacent  years  are  likely  to  contain  at  least  some  common  influences 
from  both  the  current  and  the  preceding  calendar  year.  For  example,  for  a  firm  whose 
accounting  year  ends  on  the  31/03/2001  and  has  not  switched  the  year  end  during  the 
last  year,  the  returns  are  cumulated  starting  on  the  31/03/2000,  i.  e.,  the  preceding 
calendar  year.  The  cross-section  for  year  2001  would  therefore  contain  some  general 
effects  that  stem  from  the  year  2000.  To  avoid  this  problem,  both  Basu  (1997)  and 
Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  use  only  December  31"  firms  and,  in  addition,  Basu  (1997) 
corrects  not  only  the  returns,  but  also  the  accounting  earnings  (i.  e.,  dependent) 
variables  for  market-wide  effects. 
In  the  case  of  the  samples  employed  in  this  study,  this  is  not  feasible.  An 
attempt  to  control  for  possible  differences  between  December  and  non-December 
year-end  observations  is  made  by  introducing  incremental  and  interactive  dummy 
275 variables  for  each  independent  variable  (i.  e.,  returns  and  returns  multiplied  by  the 
bad  news  dummy)  in  each  of  the  models  using  different  earnings  and  earnings 
components  as  dependent  variables.  The  contemporaneous  version  of  the  models  can 
therefore  be  augmented  as  follows: 
Xf 
=a,  +a2D,,, 
-, 
+,  81  RET,, 
t-l  +  yD,,,  -, 
RET,,, 
-, 
+  8,  NONDECYE 
Pt-I 
+432NONDECYE-D,,,  -,  +83NONDECYE  -  RETt, 
t-,  +  (5-2) 
+84NONDECYE-D,.,  -,  -RET,,,  -,  +u, 
where  the  dummy  variable  NONDECYE  assumes  the  value  of  one  if  the  accounting 
year-end  is  not  on  the  31"  of  December  and  zero  otherwise.  If  there  are  any 
systematic  effects  that  relate  in  particular  to  non-December  fiscal  year-ends,  some  of 
the  estimated  coefficients  (5,  to  S4  will  be  statistically  significant,  although  it  is  not 
possible  to  fonn  a  priori  expectations  as  to  the  magnitude  and  sign  of  these 
estimated  coefficients.  A  compounding  factor  is  that  NONDECYE  factors  capture 
different  year-ends,  ranging  from  January  up  to  the  30'h  of  December. 
The  results  of  estimating  the  above  equation  (5-2)  are  presented  in  Table  5-3. 
This  table  is  intended  to  be  compared  directly  with  the  unrestricted  results  in  Table 
4-8  and  to  be  indicative  of  the  effects  of  non-December  year-end  firms  on  lagged 
results  presented  in  Table  4-11.  The  main  conclusion  from  this  analysis  is  that  the 
overall  results  are  unaffected  by  controls  for  non-December  fiscal  year-ends.  This  is 
evidenced  by  the  statistical  insignificance  of  the  estimated  regression  coefficients  of 
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cq additive  and  interactive  NONDECYE-dummies  8,  to  54  .  In  particular,  operating 
cash  flows  (OCF)  reflect  news  symmetrically,  bad  news  is  reflected  in  all  three 
earnings  figures  significantly  faster  than  good  news.  The  asymmetric  timeliness  is 
highest  for  the  EARN  figure,  as  expected,  followed  by  the  OP  and  ORD  figures,  as  in 
the  main  results.  Most  of  this  asymmetric  timeliness  is  captured  by  working  capital 
accruals  (AWCAP)  and  special  items  (SPEC).  If  anything,  the  asymmetry  is 
strengthened  with  the  introduction  of  the  NONDECYE  dummy  (e.  g.,  in  the  case  of 
ORD  and  EARN).  The  only  marginally  significant  exception  is  the  Wreditors 
accruals  component,  where  the  statistical  significance  decreases  to  just  below  5%. 
The  average  R  2S  increase  marginally  with  the  introduction  of  these  dummy  variables 
in  the  conservatism  models. 
5.5  MARKET-ADJUSTED  RETURNS,  YXELD  CURVES  AND 
CONSERVATISM 
Basu  (1997)  provides  additional  sensitivity  analyses  in  estimating  the 
contemporaneous  models  on  earnings  by  excluding  market-wide  effects.  He 
subtracts  the  equally-weighted  CRSP  index  from  finn-spccific  ex-dividcnd  returns 
(the  independent  variable)  and  an  equally-weighted  index  of  earnings-to-price  ratios 
from  a  firm's  earnings-to-price  ratio  (the  dependent  variable).  The  second 
adjustment  in  particular  is  possible  because  he  uses  only  December  3  I't  observations 
in  his  sample  and  this  allows  various  market-wide  forms  of  earnings-to-price  ratios 
to  be  formed.  In  the  sample  in  this  study  it  would  be  difficult  to  calculate  a 
representative  average  XtIPI-I  ratio  for  all  firms.  There  are  a  large  number  of  non- 
278 December  year-ends  in  the  sample  and,  in  addition,  the  lengths  and  "positions"  of 
returns-accumulation  periods  vary  significantly  (section  4.2  contains  a  detailed 
description  of  the  sample  in  this  respect).  However,  an  attempt  to  adjust  the  ex- 
dividend  returns  for  market-wide  influences  is  made  on  an  individual-observation 
basis.  From  the  return  RETit, 
-I  each  firm  i  and  each  fiscal  period  (t,  t-1),  the 
percentage  change  in  the  FTSE  All  Share  index  is  subtracted: 
MRET  =RET.  -A%FTSEAllShare,,,  -,  Iti-I  Iti-I  (5-3) 
where  A016FTSE  All  Share  is  the  percentage  change  in  the  FTSE  All  Share  index  over 
the  corresponding  fiscal  period  (t,  t-1).  Given  that  the  lengths  of  accounting  periods 
are  allowed  to  vary  by  365±91  days,  the  percentage  changes  in  the  index  level  are 
calculated  separately  for  every  finn  and  every  fiscal  year-end  (subscripts  in  equation 
(5-3)  are  used  in  full  to  emphasise  this  particular  "individual-treatment"  procedure). 
Similarly,  for  the  lagged  model,  the  marked-adjusted  returns  MRETs  are  defined  as: 
A%FTSE  All  Sharei, 
-,,  -,  -, 
(5-4) 
wherez-  0,...,  3.  All  MRETt-rj-r-,  variables  are  deflated  by  P"  and  each  periodic 
change  of  the  index  is  also  deflated  by  the  level  of  the  index  at  time  t-4  to  maintain 
deflator-period  consistency. 
In  addition  to  market-adjusted  returns,  the  yields  on  91  -day  UK  Treasury  bill 
and  the  average  gross  redemption  yield  on  10-year  UK  gilts  collected  on  the  latest 
date  available  immediately  prior  to  the  balance  sheet  date  are  also  included. 
279 Effectively,  the  inclusion  of  these  two  rates  of  return  is  an  attempt  to  incorporate  a 
proxy  for  the  expected  economic  environment  as  reflected  by  the  (partial)  yield 
curve.  This  concept  has  been  presented  and  used  in  related  literature  by,  for  example, 
Fama  and  French  (1989)  and  McCown  (1999)  and  has  been  found  to  correlate  with 
the  probability  of  an  increasing/decreasing  stock  market  (Resnick  and  Shoesmith, 
2002).  Alternatively,  Lev  and  Thiagarajan  (1993)  use  the  inflation  rate  and  GNP 
growth  (the  former  is  used  in  this  study  for  illustrative  purposes,  although  it  must  be 
noted  that  its  effect  should  also  be  reflected  both  in  returns  and  in  bond  yields).  It  is 
acknowledged  there  are  at  least  two  problems  related  to  this  approach.  First,  there 
are  no  strict  theoretical  derivations  that  would  model  the  incorporation  of  either  the 
index  return  or  the  yield  curve  in  variants  of  the  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  model. 
Second,  it  is  possible  that  noise  is  introduced  due  to  imperfect  measurements  of 
these  economic  constructs  and  in  particular  timing  differences.  This  latter  problem 
results  from  an  imperfect  matching  of  the  balance  sheet  date  and  the  date  on  which 
(or  the  period  for  which)  the  goverriment  securities'  data  is  collected.  This  might 
introduce  the  errors-in-variables  problem  described  in  section  2.3.1  and  introduce  the 
attenuation  bias  in  all  regression  coefficients.  Given  the  data  structure  and  the 
methods  used  in  this  thesis,  however,  these  problems  cannot  be  dealt  with  and  thus 
represent  a  caveat  in  interpreting  the  results  presented  below. 
The  empirical  versions  of  the  contemporaneous  and  lagged  models  are: 
X'- 
=  ao  +  aDM,,,  -, 
+AMRET$,,  -, 
+  yDM,,,  -, 
MRET,,, 
-,  +  V,  UKTRSBL,  +  P$-,  (5-5a) 
V12UKMEDYLD,  +  e, 
280 and,  for  the  lagged  version: 
33 
Xf 
=  ao  +  aDM,  -,.,  -,  -,  +I6,  +, 
MPET, 
-,.  t-,  -,  +Z  yMPET,  -,,,  -,  -, 
DM, 
-,.,  -,  -,  + 
(5-5b)  pt-4 
T.  0  r-O 
ylUKTRSBL,  +  V2  UKMED  YLD,  +,  cs 
where  the  bad-news  indicator  variables  DMI-,., 
-,,  are  defined  according  to  the  sign  of 
the  respective  MPETI-,,  t-,  -,  adjusted  returns.  The  main  difference  between  market- 
adjusted  returns  models  with  MRETIMPET  independent  variables  and  the  unadjusted 
returns  models  with  RETIPET  as  independent  variables  is  that  the  estimated 
regression  constant  a,,  and,  if  significant,  the  incremental  regression  constant  for 
bad  news  a,,  should  be  higher,  but  the  estimated  regression  slopes  should  not  be 
affected  significantly  (the  8  and  y^  coefficients  in  both  versions  of  the  models). 
Geometrically,  this  should  be  the  case,  because  from  the  same  unadjusted  dependent 
variable,  a  "constanf'  is  subtracted  from  the  explanatory  variable,  effectively 
switching  the  regression  line  to  the  left,  causing  it  to  cross  the  y-axis  at  a  higher  level 
than  with  the  unadjusted  explanatory  variables.  91  If  the  yield-curve  variables  capture 
some  of  the  correlated  omitted  factors  from  regressions  (5-5a)  and  (5-5b),  then  the 
ft  and  j  coefficients  should  increase  in  absolute  value.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
yield-curve  variables  capture  some  un-correlated  omitted  factors  from  then  the 
and  j  coefficients  should  remain  un-changed,  but  the  R  2S  should  increase. 
91  The  term  "constant"  is  in  quotes  because  individual  values  of  the  index  are  subtracted  from  firm- 
time-specific  returns.  The  term  would,  however,  be  a  strict  constant  should  all  firms  end  the  fiscal 
year  at  the  same  time  and  all  have  equal  fiscal-period  lengths. 
281 The  results  presented  in  Table  5-4  are  a  mixture  of  these  -effects.  First,  in  all 
ten  regressions,  the  R  2S  increase  compared  to  the  basic  set  of  results  in  Table  4-8, 
which  would  suggest  that  the  combined  effect  of  adjustment  to  capital  market 
movements  and  short-  and  long-term  interest  rates  represent  at  least  to  a  certain 
extent  some  uncorrelated  factors  omitted  from  analyses  in  the  main  part  of  this 
research.  The  contribution  is,  however,  modest,  in  line  with  the  fact  that  only  two 
individual  0  coefficients  are  statistically  significant  out  of  a  total 
10*01+10*02=  20  0  coefficients.  Second,  while  the  iesponse  to  good  news 
increases  for  measures  OCF,  OP,  ORD  and  EARN  the  asymmetry  in  response  to  bad 
news  decreases.  The  relations  among  the  respective  good  and  bad  news  coefficients 
remain  unchanged  from  the  main  analyses.  For  example,  the  asymmetric  timeliness 
is  highest  for  the  EARN  variable,  followed  by  OP  and  ORD,  while  the  expectation  is 
I  ORD first  and  then  OP.  Third,  similar  conclusions  apply  also  to  the  accruals 
components.  For  example,  the  estimated  coefficient  on  good  news  in  the  SPEC 
regression  becomes  higher  in  absolute  value  (i.  e.,  more  eamings-decreasing)  than  in 
the  basic  analyses,  which  re-confinns  and  strengthens  the  result  obtained  previously 
that  the  arrival  of  good  economic  news  coincides  with  firms  employing  some 
earnings-decreasing  methods  to  reduce  reported  earnings  in  the  current  period. 
A  final  note  that  relates  to  the  market-adjusted  contemporaneous  sample 
relates  to  the  average  number  of  firms  per  year.  Compared  to  the  unadjusted 
contemporaneous  sample,  the  average  number  of  observations  is  slightly  higher: 
784.7  compared  to  784.5  for  the  un-adjusted  sample,  the  number  being  higher  in  12 
out  of  33  years.  Thus,  it  would  appear  that  the  adjustments  made  also  have  the  effect 
282 of  reducing  the  "degree  of  extremity"'of  the  sample  that  possibly  arises  also  as  a 
consequence  of  the  sample-construction/outlier-removaI  procedures  employed. 
Table  54:  Contemporaneous  models  of  ex-post  accounting  conservatism  by  earnings  and  earnings 
components,  adjusted  for  general  market  movements  and  short  and  long-term  interest 
rates,  1969-2001 
AAAA2 
Dependent  variable  avg.  n  eti  62  VI  V2  R 
Operating  cash  flows 
OCF  784.7  0333  0.003  0.105  0.008  -0.082  -0.999  0.065 
4368  0.733  6A68  0.313  -0-074  -1.529  8.722 
Ean-dngs 
OP 
ORD 
EARN 
Accruals 
AWCAP 
AWCAP  components: 
-  of  which  ADebtors 
-  of  whichdSlock 
784.7  0.242  0.003  0.119 
4.222  0.920  7.635 
784.7  0.115  0.002  0.063 
3.349  0.919  8.201 
784.7  0.096  0.005  0.061 
2.462  1.493  7.657 
784.7  -0.015  0.003  0.034  0.065  -0.076  0.741  0.032 
-0.356  0.757  4.300  4.019  -0.253  1.638  6.9" 
784.7  -0.050  0.001  0.051  0.051  0.150  0.928  0.041 
-0.970  0.467  6.954  2.774  0.477  2.026  8.304 
784.7  -0.088  -0.003  0.035  0.061  0.088  1.340  0.035 
-2.202  -0.726  4.389  3.619  0.264  3.172  9.369 
0.092  -0.218  -0.173  0.170 
5.588  -0.249  -0.300  16.407 
0.089  -0.150  -0.029  0.206 
8.274  -0.348  -0-084  17.796 
0.135  -0.036  0.057  0.177 
8.669  -0.073  0.136  16.719 
-of  which  Wreditors  784.7  0.123  0.004  -0.052  -0.046  -0.315  -1.527  0.036 
2.029  1.179  -6.389  .  2.190  -0.807  -2.475  9.219 
DEP  784.7  -0.079  -0.003  -0.023  0.021  -0.103  0.125  0.028 
-3.785  -1.962  -5.421  2.997  -0.374  0.636  7.362 
SPEC  784.7  -0.023  0.003  -0.011  0.049  0.164  0.063  0.028 
-1.495  2.037  '  .  3.019  6.578  1.008  0.318  7.085 
Notes.  Estimated  models  are:  XWP,.,  -  ai+a2DMI.  I.  I+AMRET,,.,  +,  siDM,,,.  IMRETt.,.,  +VAUKTRSBL,  +OUKMEDYLDI+e, 
where  X,  is  an  undeflated,  per  share  dependent  variable  listed  in  the  leftmost  column  of  the  table:  OCF is  operating  cash 
flow,  OP  is  adjusted  operating  profit,  ORD  is  earnings  before  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  EARN  Is  earnings  after 
extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,,  dWCAP  is  working  capital  accruals,  ADebtors  is  change  in  debtors  accounts,  ASlock  is 
change  in  stock,  ACreditors  is  change  in  creditors  accounts,  DEP  is  depreciation  and  amortisation  expense  and  SPEC  is 
special  items,  MRET,,,,  -  (Pr-P, 
_1)1P,.  1  -  %AME  All  Share,,.,  and  DM,,,.,  =  (I  if  RET,:  5D;  0  otherwise).  All  variables  are 
deflated  by  opening  share  price  P,.  1.  Avg.  n  is  the  average  number  of  observations  per  year.  All  coefficients'  esti  mates  and 
R's  are  cross-sectional  averages  for  the  period  1969-2001  and  associated  I-statistics  are  calculated  according  to  the  Fama 
and  MacBeth  (1973)  procedure.  Boldfaced  estimates  are  significant  at  5%  or  better  at  33-1  -  32  d.  f.,  i.  e.,  14>2.0369. 
The  results  obtained  from  market-  and  yield-adjusted  lagged  models 
(presented  below  in  Table  5-5)  are  also  consistent  with  the  un-adjusted  results 
presented  in  Table  4-11.  The  good  news  coefficients  on  earnings  increase 
monotonically  for  all  three  earnings  measures,  as  expected.  The  incremental  bad 
283 news  coefficients  decrease  monotonically  toward  zero  and  are  significant  up  to  two 
lags  (three  periods)  for  the  ORD  and  EARN  measures  and  up  to  one  lag  (two  periods) 
for  the  OP  measure.  This  result  is  qualitatively  identical  to  the  unadjusted  results. 
Ilie  estimated  cocfficients  on  good  news  in  the  operating  cash  flows  (OCF)  equation 
also  increase,  albeit  with  a  slight  unexplained  deviation  at  lag  one.  Regarding  the 
working  capital  accruals  dIVCAP,  the  good  news  coefficients  generally  increase  and 
it  exhibits  asymmetric  timeliness  in  respect  to  current-period  bad  news.  There  is  no 
asymmetry  for  further  lags,  consistent  with  current-period  bad  news  being 
impounded  through  A  TVCAP  in  current-period  earnings.  Of  the  individual  A  WCAP 
components,  interestingly,  none  exhibits  asymmetric  timeliness  in  the  current  period 
(the  P,  coefficient).  However,  the  P.  coefficient  at  lag  one  in  the  AStock  equation  is 
statistically  significant,  consistent  with  the  un-adjusted  results  (see  Table  4-11). 
Also,  if  the  exact  significance  level  of  0.079  (corresponding  to  the  test  statistic  of  t-- 
1.813)  were  acceptable,  the  results  for  bad  news  would  be  qualitatively  identical  to 
the  un-adjusted  results. 
Overall  and  bearing  in  mind  the  difficulties  related  to  adjustments  made  in 
this  section,  the  correction  for  the  general  return  on  the  market,  measured  by  the 
percentage  change  in  the  FTSE  All  Share  index  and  the  inclusion  of  short-  and  long- 
tenn  interest  rates  does  not  appear  to  have  a  material  effect  on  the  results  in  the  main 
part  of  this  research.  The  results  thus  appear  to  be  robust  to  changing  general 
economic  conditions  as  proxied.  for  with  the  adjustments  for  index  return  and 
government  bond  yields. 
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"  -r,  .01 5.6  AN  ALTERNATXVE  PROXY  FOR  EX-ANTE 
CONSERVATXSM 
The  book-to-market  ratio  is  used  in  section  4.9.1  to  capture  the  overall  levels 
of  ex-ante  conservatism,  based  on  Pope  and  Walker  (2003).  In  section  4.9.2,  this  is 
developed  further  by  including  asset-specific  measures  of  ex-ante  conservatism.  In 
both  versions,  a  highly  ex-ante  conservative  finn  expenses  a  high  proportion  of 
assets  at  the  time  the  investment  is  made.  Accordingly,  the  proportion  of  recorded 
assets  (i.  e.,  book  value  of  assets)  relative  to  total  economic  assets  (i.  e.,  cash- 
generating  assets,  the  market  value)  should  be  low.  However,  there  are  at  least  two 
additional  observations  that  can  be  made  about  the  book-to-market  ratio  as  a  measure 
of  ex-ante  levels  of  conservatism. 
First,  the  value  of  the  ratio  depends,  among  other  things,  also  on  leverage. 
Kim  and  Ritter  (1999)  show  that  the  effects  of  leverage  are  important  in  certain 
applications  of  valuations  with  relatives.  Second,  in  the  context  of  the  scale  issues 
presented  in  section  2.3.2,  the  market  value  of  a  firrn's,  equity  used  to  calculate  the 
ratio  can  be  viewed  merely  as  one  of  the  many  possible  size  deflators  with  which  to 
deflate  the  book  value  of  equity.  Easton  and  Sommers  (2000,  Figures  5  and  6)  show 
that  deflation  by  lagged  market  value  and  deflation  by  current-period  sales  produce 
very  similar  scale-reduction  effect.  Accordingly,  the  (lagged)  market,  value  of  a 
firm's  equity  used  as  a  deflator  might  be  substituted  with  some  other  measure  of 
286 size.  92  This  represents  a  "technical"  rationale  to  decompose  the  book-to-market  ratio, 
and  other  measure  of  scale  (i.  e.,  other  deflators)  might  be  used. 
Garrod  and  Valentincic  (2001)  present  one  such  generic  decomposition  of  the 
book-to-market  ratio: 
(BVI  P)  =  (S  /  P)  -  (BVI  S)  (5-6) 
where  S  is  the  total  sales  per  share,  BV  is  the  book  value  of  equity  per  share  and  P  is 
the  share  price.  Stock  variables  used  to  capture  the  levels  of  ex-ante  conservatism 
would  generally  refer  to  their  opening  values  at  time  Q-1).  Likely,  the  use  of  any 
flow  variables  in  these  measure  should  include  lagged  values  of  these  flow  variables 
i.  e.,  in  time  interval  (t-1,  t-2).  However,  the  decomposition  is  more  general  and  in 
principle  valid  regardless  of  whether  closing  or  opening  values  are  used. 
Ranking  observations  by  the  book-to-sales  ratio,  BVIS,  should  produce 
similar  results  as  with  the  book-to-market  ranking,  given  that  both  the  B  VIP  ratio  and 
the  BVIS  ratios  represent  measures  of  assets  in  place  that  were  subjected  to  ex-ante 
accounting  practices  at  the  time  the  investment  was  made  and  the  original  cost 
recorded  in  the  balance  sheet.  The  two  ratios  differ,  given  the  "technical" 
background  presented  above,  only  by  the  type  of  size  deflator.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
sales-to-price  ratio  SIP  can  be  viewed  as  a  proxy  measure  of  future  growth  potential 
92  It  must  be  stressed  that  the  book-to-market  ratio  used  in  this  research  is  the  "opening"  book-to- 
rnarket  ratio,  i.  e.,  lagged  book  value  per  share  is  divided  by  the  adjusted  price  per  share  at  the 
previous  balance-sheet  date. 
287 -  dividing  the  inverse  of  the  SIP  ratio,  the  PIS  ratio,  by  the  net  profit  margin  EIS 
yields  the  price-earnings  ratio: 
(P1S)1(E1S)=(P1E)  (5-7) 
A  low  PIS  ratio  (or,  equivalently,  a  high  SIP  ratio)  is  viewed  by  "contrarian" 
investors  as  a  good  investment  opportunity  given  that  future  improvement  in  profit 
margins  improves  earnings  and  increases  future  PIE  ratios  (Siva,  Kumar  and 
Jayaraman,  2001;  Chou  and  Liao,  1996;  Senchack  and  Martin,  1987). 
Literature  also  states  that  an  important  advantage  of  using  the  PIS  ratio 
instead  of  the  PIE  ratio  is  that  the  PIS  ratio  is  less  open  to  manipulation  given  that  it 
can  only  be  managed  by  varying  the  revenue  recognition  methods  (Siva,  Kumar  and 
Jayaraman,  2001).  93  This  implies  that  most  of  the  accounting  effects  should  be 
captured  via  the  other  component  of  book-to-market  ratio,  the  book  value  of  equity 
BV  relative  to  sales  S,  where  the  sales  figure  acts  technically  as  a  deflator.  The 
existence  of  growth  opportunities  should  not  be  timely  incorporated  in  earnings, 
since  these  options  must  first  be  realised  and  only  then  can  they  be  included  in 
financial  statements.  Market  values,  on  the  other  hand,  recognise  the  value  of  these 
options  immediately  and  the  lag  between  market  values  and  financial  statements  may 
be  significant  (Beekes,  Pope  and  Young,  2003). 
To  test  for  possible  effects  of  changing  the  proxy  for  the  level  of  ex-ante 
conservatism  on  the  effects  of  ex-post  conservatism,  the  following  procedure  is 
93  The  actual  term  used  in  the  source  is  ))manipulatedo  rather  than  managed. 
288 applied.  As  in  sections  4.9.1  and  4.9.2  and  following  the  decomposition  in  (5-6),  the 
opening  values  of  book-to-market,  book-to-sales  and  sales-to-price  are  calculated  at 
the  beginning  of  each  sample  year  1969-2001.  Firms  are  then  sorted  for  each  of  the 
three  sorting  variables  into  tertiles  and  the  contemporaneous  versions  of  the  Pope 
and  Walker  (1999)  model  are  run  for  each  accounting  variable  to  avoid  the  errors  in 
variables  problem.  Finally,  the  Fama-MacBeth  (1973)  method  is  applied  to  calculate 
the  average  values  of  the  coefficients,  the  t-statistics  and  determine  the  statistical 
significance  of  results  presented  in  Table  5-6.94 
Starting  from  the  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (EARN), 
the  results  show  that  the  asymmetric  sensitivity  of  EARN  to  bad  news  (and  good 
news)  increases  as  the  book-to-market  ratio  increases,  i.  e.,  as  more  and  more  assets 
are  recognised  on  the  balance  sheet,  the  asymmetry  measured  by  either  the 
incremental  P,  or  the  total  bad  news  coefficient  A+^'  Y,,  increases  also. 
Quantitatively  almost  identical  and  qualitatively  identical  results  are  obtained  by 
sorting  the  observations  by  the  sales-to-price  ratio.  Therefore,  the  BVIP  and  SIP 
ratios  appear  to  capture  the  same  underlying  factor.  The  asymmetry  is  highest  for  the 
high  S/P-ratio  values,  consistent  with  the  ratio  capturing  growth  opportunities  - 
where  the  SIP  is  high,  there  should  be  fewer  opportunities  for  future  growth,  more 
timeliness  and  more  asymmetric  timeliness.  Interestingly,  the  sort  by  the  BVIS  ratio 
does  not  produce  consistent  results  and,  taking  the  total  bad  news  coefficient,  it  can 
be  observed  that  the  response  to  bad  news  is  in  fact  decreasing  across  tertiles. 
94  The  significance  is  not  detennined  for  the  total  bad  news  coefficient  ft,  +  P,  as  these  are  sums  of 
average  coefficients  and  not  averages  of  sums  of  coefficients. 
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-E  u  '12  -.  ----4; Similar  conclusions  apply  also  to  ORD  and  OP  earnings  measures.  Overall,  however, 
the  results  agree  in  that  asynunetric  timelin6ss  in  recognition  of  bad  news  is 
prevalent  in  all  but  one  sub-partitions  where  one  of  the  earnings  measures  is  used  as 
the  dependent  variable. 
The  asymmetric  sensitivity  to  bad  news  for  the  A  WCAP  and  SPEC  accruals 
increases  from  lowest  to  highest  book-to-market  value  and  consistent  results  are  also 
obtained  with  the  S/P-sort.  Again,  the  sort  by  the  BVIS  ratio  does  not  produce 
consistent  results.  In  terms  of  the  difference  between  the  total  and  incremental  bad 
news  coefficients  the  interpretation  is  difficult,  given  that  the  incremental  coefficient 
is  increasing  and  the  total  coefficient  is  decreasing  as  book-to-sales  increases.  The 
partitions  where  the  SIP  ratio  is  high,  serve  to  emphasize  the  results  obtained  in 
earnings.  Where  there  are  a  lot  of  value-relevant  factors  that  are  not  yet  included  in 
financial  statements  (i.  e.,  where  the  SIP  is  low)  there  should  be  more  opportunities 
for  future  growth,  but  because  these  are  not  yet  included  in  financial  statements, 
accruals  as  well  as  earnings  should  exhibit  less  timeliness  and  less  asymmetric 
timeliness  than  in  partitions  with  high  SIP  values. 
The  operating  cash  flow  equation  OCF  does  not  produce  consistent  results, 
but  there  are  indications  of  asymmetric  timeliness  being  present  in  the  lowest  book- 
to-market  and  sales-to-price  tertile,  both  in  contrast  to  expectations  under 
conservative  accounting. 
To  sum  up,  the  asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings  and  its  main  accruals 
component  increases  as  the  level  of  ex-ante  conservatism  decreases,  as  measured  by 
292 the  book-to-market  ratio.  Identical  results  are  also  obtained  by  the  sales-to-price 
ratio,  but  not,  interestingly,  by  the  book-to-sales  ratio,  contrary  to  expectations.  This 
implies  that  the  choice  of  the  measure  of  ex-ante  conservatism  is  important,  but 
whether  the  variation  in  results  is  due  to  underlying  economic  factors  or  simply  to 
bad  proxies  is  a  question  that  requires  further  research  and  is  beyond  the  scope  of 
this  study.  It  must  also  be  noted  that  other  ex-ante  conservatism  measures  are  used  in 
the  literature.  For  example,  Ahmed,  Morton  and  Schaeffer  (2000)  use,  on  a  firm- 
specific  basis  in  the  US,  one  minus  the  depreciation  and  amortisation  over 
(essentially)  fixed  assets  (tangible  and  intangible),  R&D  and  advertising  expenses 
over  total  sales  and  a  LIFO  inventory  valuation  indicator.  Using  the  present  sample 
in  this  study,  only  the  first  of  these  measures  could  have  been  used  due  to  data 
availability. 
5.7  EFFECTS  OF  METHOD  OF  ESTZMATXON  AND  METHOD 
OF  OUTLIER  REMOVAL 
5.7.1  Pooled  regressions 
The  main  advantage  of  the  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  regressions  that  are 
employed  elsewhere  in  this  study  to  make  inferences  is  that  the  standard  errors  of  the 
average  regression  coefficients  include  estimation  errors  due  to  the  correlation  of 
regression  residuals  across  firms,  producing  larger  standard  errors  and  lower  t- 
statistics  as  opposed  to  pooled  cross-section  time-series  regressions  (Fama  and 
French,  2000;  also  Pope  and  Walker,  1999,  Bernard,  1987,  Christie,  1986).  To  show 
explicitly  the  differences  of  using  the  cross-sectional  approach  as  opposed  to  the 
293 pooled  method,  the  contemporaneous  models  are  re-estimated.  by  pooling  all 
observations  across  time  and  space  in  a  single  regression  and  disregard  any 
differences  that  may  be  due  to  these  two  dimensions  (Gujarati,  2003,  p.  64  1). 
The  pooled  results  of  the  contemporaneous  model  are  presented  below  in 
Table  5-7.  It  must  be  stressed  again  that  the  gains  from  using  the  cross-sectional 
Table  5-7:  Pooled  estimates  of  contemporaneous  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  models,  1969-2001 
Dependent 
A 
R2+A  (A  +  " 
a 
Y 
variable  , 
2  , 
Operating  cash  flows 
OCF  0.212  0.003  0.117  0.013  0.051  0.130  1.111 
74.510  0.721  24.092  0.988  461.121  10.590 
Earnings 
OP  0.188  -0.003  0.118  0.049  0.110  0.167  1.415 
88.267  -0.929  32.644  4.979  1.070.973  18.270 
ORD  0.092  -0.002  0.059  0.072  0.151  0.131  2.224 
85.582  -1.161  32.114  14.458  1,534.749  29.250 
EARN  0.089  0.000  0.058  0.125  0.133  0.183  3.157 
64.953  0.167  24.994  19.828  1,321.021  31.210 
Accruals 
AWCAP  0.045  -0-005  0.024  0.030  0.010  0.054  2.285 
22.001  -1.341  6.755  3.192  83.793  6.100 
,d  WCA  P  compon  en  ts: 
-  of  which  ADebtors  0.056  -0.003  0.033  0.039  0.015  0.073  2.186 
26346  -0.949  9.182  4.007  133.388  7.940 
-  of  which  AStock  0.048  -0.007  0.031  0.002  0.010  0.033  1.081 
23.411  -2.135  8.826  0.263  89.825  3.770 
-of  whichdCreditors  -0.059  0.006  -0.040  -0.012  0.012  -0.052  1.286 
-23.749  1  A67  -9.591  -1.011  103.091  4.880 
DEP  -0.072  -0.003  -0.024  0.005  0.017  -0-019  0.812 
-79.433  -1.788  -15.553  1.078  145.359  4.  "0 
SPEC  -0.005  0.003  -0.009  0.054  0.008  0.045  -4.973 
-5.941  1.898  -5.991  13.164  65.845  11.790 
NoteL  Estimated  models  are:  XIP,.  i  =  ai+a2D,.,  I+flRET,,.,  +,  olD,,,.  IRET,,,.,  +A  where  X,  is  an  undeflatcd,  per  share  dependent 
variable  listed  in  the  leftmost  column  of  the  table:  Off  is  operating  cash  flow,  OP  is  adjusted  operating  profit,  ORD  is 
earnings  before  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  EARN  is  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,,  dWCAP  is 
working  capital  accruals,  Mebiors  is  change  in  debtors  accounts,  dStock  is  change  in  stock,  ACreditors  is  change  in 
creditors  accounts,  DEP  is depreciation  and  amortisation  expense  and  SPEC  is  special  items,  RET,,.,  -(Pe-P,.  IYP,,,  and 
Di.  t.  1-  (I  if  RETAO;  0  otherwise).  All  variables  are  deflated  by  opening  share  price  P,.  I.  Ile  total  number  of  observations  in 
the  sample  is  25,888.  All  coefficients'  estimates  and  R's  are  pooled  cross-sectional  time  series  for  the  period  1969-2001  and 
associated  t-statistics  are  White's  (1980).  Boldfaced  estimates  are  significant  at  5%  or  better  It1>1.960. 
294 approach  in  this  study  are  likely  smaller  as  they  would  otherwise  be  due  to  the 
sample  composition  that  includes  non-December  fiscal-year  ends  and  a  degree  of 
overlap  results.  Accordingly,  the  differences  between  Table  5-7  and  the  basic  Table 
4-8  above  are  likely  smaller  than  they  would  otherwise  be. 
Overall,  the  results  agree  with  the  results  from  cross-sectional  regressions. 
There  is  no  asymmetry  in  operating  cash  flows  (OCF),  the  asymmetric  timeliness 
measured  by  the  estimated  incremental  coefficient  J;  is  increasing  from  OP  to  71 
EARN  and  most  asymmetry  is  reflected  in  working  capital  accruals,  in  particular  in 
the  ADebtors  component,  and  in  special  items  (SPEC).  To  a  degree,  the  results 
presented  here  are  surprising,  given  that  they  appear  to  be  weaker  than  the  cross- 
sectional  results.  For  example,  the  t-statistics  on  AWCAP  is  weaker  in  the  pooled 
than  in  the  cross-sectional  regressions.  However,  the  conclusions  are  unaffected  by 
the  choice  of  this  estimation  method. 
5.7.2  LSDV  method  -  incorporating  the  effects 
of  time 
Another  possibility  is  to  estimate  a  pooled  cross-section  time-series  with 
yearly  non-interactive  dununy  variables  (Gujarati,  2003,642-647;  Greene,  2000,  pp. 
560-566;  Johnston  and  DiNardo,  1997,  pp.  389-411):  the  least  squares  dummy 
variable  -'LSDV  method  whereby  the  original  contemporaneous  model  of 
accounting  conservatism  is  expanded  by  the  introduction  of  yearly  additive  dummy 
variables.  These  relax  the  second  part  of  the  assumption  that  the  regression  constant 
oc 
.  If  F is  fixed  both  across  cross-sectional  units  and  in  time.  In  the  case  of  the 
contemporaneous  model,  the  regression  equation  is: 
X, 
2001 
=ao+a,  D,  +PIRETt+y,  DtP,  ET  Zi; 
rTr+--,  Pt-I 
r  1970 
(5-8) 
where,  in  addition  to  variables  already  defined  earlier  in  this  study,  there  are 
r--  33-1=  32  dummy  variables  T,  taking  the  value  of  one  if  a  firm's  accounting 
year-end  is  in  yearr.  Compared  to  the  basic  formulation  of  the  contemporaneous 
model  in  equation  (3-10)  in  section  3.3,  the  latter  can  be  viewed  as  a  restricted 
version  of  the  former,  the  restriction  being  the  assumption  that  the  regression 
constant  is'equal  for  all  firms  and  all  time  periods  (the  regression  constant  reflects 
both  the  cost  of  capital  and  the  Vj-term).  Note  that  equation  (5-8)  is  estimated  for  all 
the  main  earnings  and  earnings  components  variables  and,  accordingly,  the  following 
exposition  applies  to  all  the  different  regressions  using  all  the  different  accounting 
variables  Xt. 
Figure  5-2  compares  the  good  news  coefficients  and  the  incremental  bad 
news  coefficient  estimated  using  the  unrestricted  (LSDV)  method  and  the  two  other 
methods  used  previously  (pooled  and  Farna  and  MacBeth,  1973)  for  the  main 
accounting  variables.  The  main  overall  conclusion  is  that  the  results  shown  in  the 
main  body  of  this  research  are  robust  to  estimation  method:  all  three  yield  very 
similar  y^,  and  A  coefficients  and  significance  levels.  Specifically,  using  either 
method,  the  results  indicate  there  is  no  asymmetry  in  reflecting  bad  economic  news 
in  operating  cash  flows,  the  asymmetry  of  earnings  is  high  and  most  of  this 
296 asymmetry  is  reflected  in  working  capital  (AWCAP)  and  special  items  (SPEC) 
accruals.  The  results  for  variables  that  are  omitted  from  Figure  5-2  are  qualitatively 
very  similar  to  both  pooled  results  and  cross-sectional  averages.  Therefore,  the  main 
conclusions  regarding  accounting  conservatism  presented  in  the  main  body  of  the 
research  are  not  sensitive  to  method  of  estimation. 
Figure  5-2:  A  comparison  of  the  LSDV,  pooled  and  Fama-MacBeth  (1973)  methods  on  the 
contemporaneous  model  of  conservatism,  1969-2001 
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Notes  to  Figure  5-2.  Estimated  models  are:  X/P,  ,=a,  +a2D,,  i+,  8,  RET,,  I+  yD,,,  IRE7;,  1+c,  where  X,  is  an  undellated.  per 
share  dependent  variable  listed  in  the  leftmost  column  of  the  table:  O(Tis  operating  cash  flow.  OP  is  adjusted  operating  prolit, 
ORD  is  earnings  before  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  EARN  is  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items. 
AWCAP  is  working  capital  accruals,  ADebtors  is  change  in  debtors  accounts,  AStock  is  change  in  stock,  Wredilors  is  change  in 
creditors  accounts,  DEP  is depreciation  and  amortisation  expense  and  SPECis  special  items,  RET,,  =(Pf-P,  Y11,  and/),,,  11 
if  RET,.,.  I!  W,  0  otherwise).  All  variables  are  deflated  by  opening  share  price  P,  ý.  "ISM"  is  estimation  using  yearly  dummies. 
"Pooled"  indicates  pooled  regressions  and  -  Fama-Mac  Beth"  indicates  coefficients  calculated  as  cross-sectional  averages 
according  to  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  method. 
Formally,  the  differences  between  the  pooled  estimation  and  the  LSDV 
estimation  with  time  effects  can  be  tested  using  the  F-test  -  the  restricted  least 
squares  (Gujarati,  2003,  pp.  266-273,640-644).  The  restrictions  in  the  pooled  (i.  e., 
restricted)  version  are  that 
ý1970  to  4-2()ol  are  equal  to  0. 
EARN 
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u The  test  hypothesis  stated  in  alternative  form  is: 
H4:  At  least  one  of  the  coefficients  1ý1970  to  1ý2001  is  differentfrom  zero. 
The  test  statistic  is: 
22  (RýR-RR)  m 
lm. 
n-k  (I  -  Ru2R)  1(n  -  k)  (5-9) 
222 
where  R  UR  denotes  the  R  from  the  LSDV  (i.  e.,  unrestricted)  model  and  RR  denotes 
the  R2  from  the  pooled  (i.  e.,  restricted)  regression,  m  is  the  degrees  of  freedom  in  the 
restricted  model  and  equals  to  the  number  of  linear  restrictions  imposed  on  the 
pooled  versions  or,  equivalently,  the  number  of  independent  (dummy)  variables 
omitted  from  the  restricted  version  relative  to  the  unrestricted  model,  and  (n-k)  is  the 
number  of  degrees  of  freedom  in  the  unrestricted  version,  n  is  the  number  of 
observations  and  k  is  the  number  of  independent  variables. 
Table  5-8  shows  the  results  of  formal  tests  of  differences  between  the 
unrestricted  (LSDV)  estimates  and  restricted  (pooled)  estimates  of  the 
contemporaneous  model  of  accounting  conservatism  by  earnings  and  earnings 
components.  For  all  ten  main  variables,  the  R2  UR>R 
2R  and  the  differences  are 
statistically  significant  in  all  ten  cases  as  indicated  by  high  values  of  the  test  statistic 
F.  Also,  the  number  of  times  individual  year-dummies  are  statistically  different  from 
zero  is  approximately  two  thirds  and  does  not  fall  below  twenty.  It  can  be  concluded 
298 from  these  tests  that  time  effects  regarding  the  regression  constant  are  significant 
through  time. 
Table  5-8:  Pooled  versus  LSDV  estimates  of  the  contemporaneous  model  -  formal  tests  of 
differences,  1968-2001 
Dependent  variable  R2  UR  (tiMe  dununies)  R2  It  (pooled)  No.  of  significant  F-statistic 
OCF  0.181  0.051  22  128.059 
OP  0.424  0.110  27  439.401 
ORD  0.326  0.151  28  209.848 
EARN  0.273  0.133  28  155.766 
AWCAP  0.103  0.010  27  84.049 
ADebtors  0.075  0.015  27  52.478 
AStock  0.128  0.010  26  109.520 
Wreditors  0.071  0.012  22  51.163 
DEP  0.116  0.017  20  91.179 
SPEC  0.051  0.008  23  36.993 
NoteL  Estimated  unrestricted  models  are:  XIP, 
-,  -ai+a2D,,,  +,  6,  RETI.,.,  +;  iD,,,.  IREToi+;,  97oT,  +...  +  1;  2ool  T,  +4  where 
X,  is  an  undeflated,  per  share  dependent  variable  listed  in  the  leftmost  column  of  the  table:  OCF  is  operating  cash  flow, 
OP  is  adjusted  operating  profit,  ORD  is  earnings  before  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  EARN  is  earnings  after 
extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  AWCAP  is  working  capital  accruals,  Webtors  is  change  in  debtors  accounts. 
ASIock  is  change  in  stock,  ACreditors  is  change  in  creditors  accounts,  DEP  is  depreciation  and  amortisation  expense  and 
SPEC  is  special  items,  RET,,,  =(Pr-P#.  IYPi  and  D,,.  I-tl  if  RET,,.  1:  50-.  0  otherwise).  All  variables  are  deflated  by 
opening  share  price  PI.  Restricted  models  am  estimated  without  the  Iigo  to  ý,  ooi  terms.  Ile  test  statistic  is  evaluated  at 
. 
F(33-1-32ý  23,898-35-25,953)  degrees  of  freedom,  the  statistic  is  significant  at  the  1%  level  for  all  ten  accounting  variables  X,. 
This  conclusion  is  potentially  particularly  important  within  the  context  of  this 
study  in  that  the  estimated  regression  constant  et,  contains  both  the  term  resulting 
from  the  effects  of  past  economic  news  and  applications  of  conservative  accounting 
Vilpt-1  as  well  as  an  estimate  of  the  cost  of  capital  (Ilk).  The  movements  of  the 
regression  constant  through  time  are  presented  in  Figure  5-3  below  plotted  against 
the  rate  of  inflation  in  the  same  period. 
With  the  base  year  in  1969  and  yearly  dummies  T1970  to  T2ool,  the  conclusions 
presented  above  remain  therefore  essentially  unchanged.  It  is  acknowledged  the 
possibility  that  interacting  yearly  dummies  with  RET,., 
-,  and  Djj.  j-RET,.  j.  j  might 
affect  the  results.  However,  introducing  independent  variables  that  interact  with 
299 yearly  dummies  may  introduce  other  problems  in  estimation  and  interpretation  of  the 
results  (Greene,  2000,  p.  560,  footnote  5),  apart  from  reducing  the  degrees  of 
freedom. 
Figure  5-3:  Regression  constants  from  the  unrestricted  model  and  the  UK  rate  of  inflation,  1969-2001 
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Notes  to  Figure  5-3:  Off.  EARN  and  JWCAP  denote  the  regression  constant  t,  rom  the  LSDV  niodel  plus  yearly  dunimics  lot 
each  year  1969-2001 
5.7.3  The  effect  of  the  method  of  outliers' 
removal 
Given  that  there  are  several  possibilities  to  remove  outliers  From  the  sample 
and  little  empirical  guidance  towards  the  appropriate  procedure  to  remove  outliers  in 
this  type  of  research  exists,  this  section  presents  the  effects  of  the  method  ofouthers' 
removal  from  the  sample.  First,  observations  are  excluded  from  the  sample  it'  the 
300 values  of  deflated,  per  share  accounting  variables  OCF,  OP,  ORD,  EARN,  AWCAP, 
DEP,  SPEC  and  market  variable  RET,,  t.,  are  outside  the  ±3  standard  deviations  from 
the  respective  individual  variables  means  calculated  on  a  pooled  basis,  rather  than 
the  top/bottom  one  percentile  on  these  variables.  In  order  to  enter  the  sample,  an 
observation's  main  variables  must  all  simultaneously  lay  within  the  ±3  standard 
deviations  interval.  Second,  the  main  results  are  re-estimated  on  a  sample  where  the 
only  requirement  is  that  all  required  variables  are  reported  by  the  company  and 
available  in  the  database  -  outliers  are  not  removed.  Implicitly,  this  assumes  that 
extreme  values  are  descriptive  of  the  processes  studied  in  this  thesis  and  that  these 
extreme  values  are  not  due  to  errors  in  the  database  and  manipulation  of  these  data. 
Rees  (1996,  p.  94-95)  discusses  briefly  the  issue  of  negative  numbers  and  small 
divisors  in  particular,  a  problem  that  possibly  results  from  the  aforementioned 
factors. 
The  first  effect  of  the  ±3  standard  deviations  method  of  outliers'  removal  on 
results  presented  in  Table  5-9  compared  with  the  basic  set  of  estimates  of 
contemporaneous  models  presented  in  Table  4-8,  is  the  higher  average  number  of 
observations.  Therefore,  fewer  observations  are  eliminated,  on  average,  using  this 
method  of  outliers'  removal  than  using  the  top/bottom  I  percentile  method  employed 
in  the  main  body  of  this  study.  This  implies  a  sample  with  more  extrcme 
observations.  Given  that  in  order  to  be  entered  in  the  sample  all  observations  must 
simultaneously  have  all  main  variables  within  the  respective  ±3  standard  deviations, 
the  average  number  of  observations  does  not  change  across  the  dependent  variables. 
301 Second,  a  more  extreme  sample  is  likely  to  reduce  the  average  explanatory 
power  of  models  due  to  greater  variability  of  the  dependent  variable.  Ceteris  paribus, 
this  implies  a  reduction  in  the  R2  of  any  regression.  Economically,  more  extreme 
observations  are  consistent  with  more  transitory  items  present  in  each  of  the  main 
variables.  Overall,  the  results  presented  are  in  accordance  with  expectations.  Also,  in 
a  simple  bivariate  regression  context,  there  are  no  a  priori  grounds  that  would 
suggest  the  relation  between  earnings  or  earnings  components  and  returns  is  any 
different  for  extreme  observations.  The  results  show  that  at  least  for  OCF  and  the 
earnings  variables  most  coefficients  in  fact  increase  (which  per  se  would  imply  an 
increase  in  R2  s),  reinforcing  thus  the  validity  of  the  ceteris  paribus  assumption. 
Third,  the  relations  among  the  magnitude  of  the  coefficients  on  different 
measures  of  earnings  are  preserved.  The  response  to  good  news  is  strongest  for 
operating  profit  OP,  followed  by  EARN  and  by  ORD.  These  coefficients  also  do  not 
differ  materially  from  those  presented  in  Table  4-8.  The  asymmetric  response  to  bad 
news  follows  a  similar  pattern,  as  well  as  the  R  2S,  the  total  response  to  bad  news  and 
the  relative  response  to  bad  news. 
Fourth,  regarding  the  results  for  accruals,,  dWCAP  and  its  components  overall 
are  that  the  response  to  good  and  bad  news  increases  marginally.  Perhaps  the  single 
most  important  result  is  that  the  estimated  coefficient  on  good  news  in  the  SPEC 
regression  A  becomes  statistically  insignificant,  while  still  being  negative  -a  sign 
that  would  be  consistent  with  earnings  management  to  decrease  earnings  if  the 
returns  are  positive.  Also,  the  incremental  bad  news  coefficient  in  this  specification 
302 is  higher  than  the  corresponding  coefficient  in  the  basic  contemporaneous  results. 
Table  5-9:  Contemporaneous  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  models  of  ex-post  accounting  conservatism, 
1969-2001,  observations  within  ±3  standard  deviations  from  individual  means  only 
Dependent  variable 
avg'  et, 
"2  R2  A+A  n 
Operating  cash  flows 
OCF 
Earnings 
OP 
ORD 
EARN 
Accruals 
, dWCAP 
, dWCAP  components: 
-  of  which  ADebtors 
819.8  0.228  -0.003  0.089  0.057  0.046  0.146  1.637 
15.301  -0.491  6.514  1.762  7.216 
819.8  0.208  -0.003  0.101  0.152  0.163  0.253  2.510 
10.880  -0.580  7.646  6.749  14.637 
819.8  0.098  0.000  0.057  0.135  0.187  0.193  3.374 
14.311  0.137  8.888  10.467  16.145 
819.8  0.095  0.003  0.059  0.193  0.162  0.252  4.256 
13.036  0.715  9.825  10.723  17.729 
819.8  0.052  0.001  0.028 
5.034  0.350  3.289 
0.087  0.017  0.115  4.129 
3A30  9.381 
819.8  0.059  0.002  0.045 
7.071  0.408  6.234 
0.064  0.025  0.109  2.411 
2.382  10.458 
-  of  which  ASlock  819.8  0.055  0.001  0.039  0.064  0.023  0.103  2.041 
4.846  0.142  5.051  2.509  8.901 
-of  which  ACreditors  819.8  -0.061  -0-001  -0.057  -0.041  0.023  -0.097  1.722 
-6.828  -0.291  -7.963  -1.619  9.535 
DEP  819.8  -0.075  -0.001  -0.017  0.007  0.022  -0.010  0.584 
-17.675  -0.584  -5.144  0.948  S.  930 
SPEC  819.8  -0.003  0.002  -0.005  0.059  0.024  0.054  -10.255 
-1-252  1.282  -1.398  6.414  6.653 
Notes.  Estin-ated  models  are:  XIP,,,  =  al+a2D,.,.,  +ARET,,,,  +,  nD,,.  IRET,.,.,  +CI  where  X,  is  an  undcnatcd,  per  share 
dependent  variable  listed  in  the  leftmost  column  of  the  table:  OCF  is  operating  cash  flow,  OP  is  adjusted  operating  profit, 
ORD  is  earnings  before  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  E4RN  is  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items, 
MCAP  is  working  capital  accruals,  Mebtors  is  change  in  debtors  accounts,  Xwk  is  change  in  stock,  Wreditors  is 
change  in  creditors  accounts,  DEP  is  depreciation  and  amortisation  expense  and  SPEC  is  special  items,  RETOI-(PrP,,.  IYPl 
and  Dt,.,  =  II  if  RET,,  1!  50;  0  otherwise).  All  variables  are  dcflated  by  opening  share  price  P,.,.  A  q.  n  is  the  average  number 
of  observations  per  year.  All  coefficients'  estimates  and  A  are  cross-sectional  averages  for  the  period  1969-2001  and 
associated  t-statistics  are  calculated  according  to  the  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  procedure.  Boldfaced  estimates  are 
-significant 
at  5%  or  better  at  33-1  -  32  d.  f.,  i.  e.,  ltl>2.0369. 
Overall,  the  effect  of  changing  the  outliers'  removal  procedures  does  not 
affect  the  inferences  in  statistically  and  economically  important  ways.  Without 
(over-)stressing  the  result,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  coefficient  on  good  news  in  the 
SPEC  regression  that  becomes  statistically  insignificantly  different  from  zero,  thus  at 
least  statistically  affecting  the  conclusion  that  good  news  result  on  average  in  a  slight 
303 decrease  in  earnings  (specifically,  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items 
EARN).  However,  the  sign  and  magnitude  of  the  ý  coefficient  in  this  regression  Y, 
remain. 
Omitting  completely  the  controls  of  outliers  represents  a  further  step  in 
sensitivity  analyses.  The  main  results  are  presented  below  in  Table  4-1,  but  a 
complete  set  of  results  including  additional  variables  as  well  as  the  lagged  version  of 
the  models  is  presented  in  Appendix  C,  Table  C-1  and  C-2.  The  single  most 
interesting  result  that  emerges  from  this  sensitivity  analysis  is  due  to  working  capital 
accruals.  Both  the  coefficient  on  good  news  and  the  incremental  coefficient  on  bad 
news  become  statistically  insignificantly  different  from  zero,  as  opposed  to  findings 
in  the  basic  set  of  results  that  indicates  an  important  role  of  this  type  of  accruals  in 
reflecting  bad  economic  news.  Moreover,  the  R2  in  the  AWCAP  regression  does  not 
change  from  the  basic  results.  The  role  of  the  component  AStock  now  appears  to  be 
much  more  important  in  reflecting  bad  news.  Consistent  with  the  change  in 
significance  of  the  asymmetric  response  of  AWCAP  to  bad  news  is  the  fact  that  the 
asymmetric  response  of  special  items  (SPEC)  to  bad  news  now  appears  to  be 
economically  much  stronger,  on  average  -  the  estimated  incremental  coefficient  P, 
more  than  doubles  from  0.056  to  0.118,  but  also  more  variable  -  the  Fama-MacBcth 
(1973)  t-statistic  decreases  from  6.957  to  5.208.  Also,  the  incremental  sensitivity  of 
the  depreciation  expense  DEP  becomes  statistically  significant  (albeit  just).  There 
are  no  obvious  explanations  of  this  result. 
Overall,  the  effects  of  controls  for  outliers  employed  do  not  appear  to 
materially  affect  the  results  presented  in  this  thesis,  including  omitting  these  controls 
304 Table  5-10:  Contemporaneous  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  models  of  ex-post  accounting  conservatisni, 
1969-2001,  outliers  not  removed 
Dependent  variable  avg.  n  al  t2  R2+A 
Operating  cash  flows 
OCF  860.1  0.263  0.016  0.103  0.163  0.045  0.266  2.593 
12.714  0.442  4.901  1.503  5.693 
Eamings 
OP  863.8  0.238  -0.018  0.098  0.208  0.089  0.306  3.112 
10.516  -2.314  5.248  7.934  9A97 
ORD  863.8  0.112  -0.008  0.046  0.208  0.086  0.254  5.463 
13.695  -1.449  5.288  8.718  11.111 
EARN  863.8  0.106  -0.001  0.052  0.321  0.069  0.373  7.181 
11.541  -0-158  5.195  8.215  13.327 
Accmals 
, dwclp  861.1  0.057  -0.035  0.022  0.014  0.023  0.037  1.650 
5.052  -1.005  1.750  0.150  4.279 
AWCAP  components: 
-  of  which  ADebtors  861.1  0.070  -0.042  0.045  -0.031  0.030  0.014  0.301 
6.911  -1.087  4.137  -0.300  3.959 
-  of  which  AStock  861.2  0.056  0.002  0.041  0.086  0.021  0.127  3.106 
4.787  0.233  2.871  3.028  5.034 
-of  whichdCreditors  861.2  -0.068  0.005  -0-064  -0.040  0.030  -0.104  1.629 
-6.368  0.453  4.655  -1.713  5.629 
DEP  860.9  -0.085  0.001  -0.028  0.028  0.029  0.000  -0.016 
-14.556  0.282  -5.663  3.079  5.258 
SPEC  859.4  -0.006  0.007  -0.002  0.118  0.017  0.116  -56.171 
-1.609  1.820  -0,405  5.208  6.809 
Notes.  Estimated  models  are:  XVP,.,  -  al+a2D,.,.,  +PIRET,,.  1+7,  D,,,  IRETI.,.  I+r,  where  X,  is  an  undeflated,  per  share  dependent 
variable  listed  in  the  leftmost  column  of  the  table:  OCF is  operating  cash  flow,  OP  is  adjusted  operating  profit,  ORD  is 
earnings  before  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  EARN  is  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  itcms,,  dWCAP  is 
working  capital  accruals,  ADebtors  is  change  in  debtors  accounts,  ARock  is  change  in  stock,  ACreditors  is  change  in 
creditors  accounts,  DEP  is  depreciation  and  amortisation  expense  and  SPEC  is  special  items,  RET,,.  ý  (PrP,.  IYP,,,  and 
Du-i=  V  if  RET,,.,:  50;  0  otherwise).  All  variables  are  deflated  by  opening  share  price  PI.  I.  Avg.  n  is  the  average  number  of 
observations  per  year.  All  coefficients'  estimates  and  A  are  cross-sectional  averages  for  the  period  1969-2001  and 
associated  t-statistics  are  calculated  according  to  the  Farna  and  MacBeth  (1973)  procedure.  Boldfaced  estimates  are 
significant  at  5%  or  better  at  33-1  -  32  d.  f.,  i.  e.,  ltl>2.0369. 
altogether.  Other  methods  might  have  been  employed.  An  overview  of  some  of  these 
alternative  methods  is  presented  for  example  in  Dillon  and  Goldstein  (1984,  p.  252- 
270).  However,  on  the  basis  of  the  results  presented  in  this  section,  it  is  concluded 
that  these  would  not  materially  affect  any  inferences. 
305 5.8  THE  EFFECT  OF  PUBLISHED  OPERATING  CASH 
FLOW  AND  BOTTOM-LXNE  EARNXNGS  FXGURES 
The  sample  used  in  this  study  covers  one  of  the  longest  (if  not  the  longest) 
time-series  of  UK  accounting  data  to  date.  The  content  of  particular  data  items  thus 
covers  different  periods  in  terms  of  regulatory  regimes  that  have  governed  the 
creation  of  these  figures.  While  there  are  many  issues  that  may  be  of  interest 
regarding  the  changes  in  regulatory  regimes  and  their  influence  on  the  accounting 
numbers,  at  least  one  such  change  is  important  in  terms  of  the  results  obtained  in  this 
research  -  the  introduction  of  the  FRS  I-  Cash  flow  statements  in  September  1991 
and  subsequently  revised  in  1996  (valid  for  financial  years  ending  on  or  after  23d 
March,  1997).  FRS  I  superseded  the  previous  SSAP  10  -  Statements  of  source  and 
application  offunds  issued  in  July  1975  (e.  g.,  Lewis  and  Pendrill,  1996,  pp.  315- 
95  318).  The  "net  cash  flow  from  operating  activities"  figure  is  generally  available  for 
financial  years  ending  in  1992  or  later  (828  firms  out  of  a  total  848  in  the 
contemporaneous  sample  in  1992  report  this  figure),  although  some  firms  apparently 
adopted  the  standard  earlier  or  have  published  comparable  figures  for  previous  years 
according  to  this  standard.  While  Table  4-9  shows  that  the  association  between  the 
operating  cash  flow  figure  and  good  economic  news  is  slightly  declining  and  that 
there  is  no  discernible  time  trend  in  terms  of  asymmetric  sensitivity  to  bad  news,  the 
question  regarding  any  possible  effects  of  using  the  published  cash  flow  figure  as 
opposed  to  the  estimated  figure  remains.  The  question  is  particularly  important  given 
that  since  Basu's  (1997,  p.  17,  Table  2)  influential  paper,  a  number  of  papers  have 
"A  historic  perspective  of  funds-statements  developments  up  to  late  1960s  can  be  found  in  Rosen 
and  DeCoster  (1969).  They  state  that  the  Assam  Company  in  England  prepared  a  funds-like  statemet 
already  for  the  financial  year  ending  on  March  31",  1862.  Collins  (1946)  also  provides  illustrations  of 
various  early  funds  statements. 
306 consistently  reported  a  rather  puzzling  result  that  is  not  consistent  with  accounting 
conservatism  being  an  accruals  phenomenon  -  the  asymmetric  timeliness  of 
operating  cash  flows  to  bad  news  for  the  US  sample  (e.  g.,  Ball,  Kothari  and  Robin, 
2000,  pp.  36-37,  Table  6,  and  Garrod,  Pope  and  Valentincic,  2004;  both  for 
respective  US  swnples). 
The  questions  regarding  the  comparability  of  published  and  constructed 
figures  can  also  be  studied  in  the  case  of  the  earnings  figure.  The  constructed 
"bottom-line"  earnings  number  in  this  research  is  earnings  after  extraordinary  and 
exceptional  items  (EARN).  The  issues  surrounding  the  construction  of  a  "bottom- 
line"  earnings  figure  that  Would  be  comparable  through  such  a  long  time  period  has 
been  described  in  section  4.2  (in  particular,  see  Figure  4-1).  DataStrearn  provides  a 
bottom-line  earnings  figure  for  financial  years  ending  in  1987  or  after  (DataStream 
item  #625  -  Earned  for  ordinary),  presumably  to  reflect  the  introduction  of  SSAP  6 
(Revised)  in  1986.  Davies,  Paterson  and  Wilson  (1999,  pp.  1481-1484)  provide  a 
summary  of  historical  developments  of  the  FRS  3  and  its  precedents. 
The  analysis  for  both  figures  is  performed  in  the  following  steps.  In  both 
cases,  the  samples  used  are  a  sub-set  of  the  basic  contemporaneous  sample  with  both 
the  estimated  and  published  figures  available.  This  is  to  ensure  that  the  sampics  are 
comparable  in  terms  of  descriptives.  The  procedure  produces  the  following  two  sub- 
samples.  For  the  operating  cash  flow  figure,  the  sample  includes  9,352  firm-ycars 
with  both  the  estimated  and  published  figures  available  with  year-ends  in  the  period 
1992-2001.  The  descriptives  of  the'published  versus  estimated  figures  sub-sample 
are  comparable,  although  the  range  of  the  deflated  published  figures  is  slightly  wider 
307 (-0.504  to  1.578)  than  the  range  of  the  estimated  figures  sub-sample  (-0.380  to 
1.6867).  The  correlation  coefficient  for  pooled  observations  in  this  sub-sample  is 
very  high,  0.963.  For  the  "bottom-line"  earnings,  the  sample  includes  14,112  firm- 
years  with  year-ends  in  the  period  1987-2001.  The  descriptives  of  the  published 
versus  estimated  figures  are  very  similar,  although  the  range  of  published  figures  is 
slightly  wider  (-0.740  to  0.673)  than  the  range  of  estimated  figures  sub-sample 
(-0.740  to  0.704).  96  The  correlation  coefficient  for  the  pooled  observations  in  this 
sub-sample  is  very  high,  0.955. 
Table  5-11  shows  the  results  of  contemporaneous  models  of  accounting 
conservatism  for  the  two  figures  where  a  published  alternative  is  available.  To 
maintain  comparability,  the  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  method  is  used,  although  a 
Table  5-11:  Estimated  versus  published  operating  cash  flow  figures  (1992-2001)  and  estimated 
versus  published  "bottom-line"  earnings  (1997-2001) 
Dependent  variable  avg.  n  et,  e12  R2  + 
A 
Operating  cash  flows 
Estimated  (OCF)  935.2  0.164  0.005  0.061  0.072  0.071  0.133  2.171 
24.874  0.676  2.597  1.772  4.452 
Published  935.2  0.159  0.006  0.059  0.112  0.082  0.170  2.892 
27.182  0.719  2.629  3.586  5.217 
"Bottom/line"  eamings 
Estimated  (EARN)  940.8  0.073  0.002  0.034  0.192  0.162  0.226  6.701 
16.102  0.648  5.544  14.709  9.752 
Published  940.8  0.075  0.003  0.035  0.182  0.170  0.217  6.216 
16.629  0.831  5.623  14-871  10.329 
Notes.  Estimated  models  are:  XWPI-  al+a2D,.,.,  +,  6,  RET,  &,  +,  *ID,.,.  IRET,,.  I+c,  where  Xj  is  an  undeflatcd,  per  share 
dependent  variable:  OCF  is  operating  cash  flow  and  EARN  is  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  iterm,  both  as 
defined  in  section  4.2.  The  published  figures  are  taken  directly  from Datastrcam:  published  operating  cash  flows  -  data 
item  #1015  and  published  "bottom-line"  earnings  -  data  item  #625.  RET,  &t-  (Pr-P,.  iYP&i  and  D,.,  I-l  I  if  RETO#SO;  0 
otherwise).  All  variables  are  deflated  by  opening  share  price  AI.  Avg.  n  is  the  average  number  of  observations  per  year. 
All  coefficients'  estimates  and  Ies  are  cross-sectional  averages  for  the  period  1992-2001  (operating  cash  flow)  and 
1987-2001  (earnings).  Associated  t-statistics  are  calculated  according  to  the  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  procedure. 
Boldfaced  estimates  are  significLnt  at  5%  or  better  at  10-1  -9M.,  i.  e.,  111>2.2622  and  at  15-1-  14  d.  f.,  i.  e.,  14>2.1448. 
96  The  minimums  of  both  estimated  and  published  deflated  "bottom-line"  earnings  figures  coincide 
exactly  at  -0.7403315. 
308 degree  of  caution  must  be  exercised  in  interpreting  the  results  given  that  the 
inferences  are  made  on  just  9  and  14  degrees  of  freedom  for  operating  cash  flows 
and  eamings  figures  respectively. 
Turning  first  to  the  earnings  figure,  the  results  show  a  delayed  response  of 
both  estimated  and  published  figure  to  good  economic  news.  Both  coefficients  are 
very  similar  in  magnitude  and  significance.  Both  earnings  figures  exhibit  significant 
asymmetric  timeliness  to  bad  economic  news,  measured  by  the  incremental,  the  total 
or  the  relative  total  bad  news  coefficients.  These  results  are  thus  very  similar  to  the 
basic  set  of  results  presented  in  section  4.5. 
In  the  case  of  operating  cash  flows,  however,  the  results  obtained  by  using 
the  published  figure  differ  qualitatively  from  those  using  the  estimated  figure.  While 
both  figures  exhibit  a  delayed  response  to  good  news,  the  published  figure  also 
exhibits  statistically  significant  asymmetric  timeliness  to  bad  economic  news 
measured  by  the  incremental  bad  news  coefficient  and  emphasized  by  the  magnitude 
of  the  total  and  relative  total  bad  news  coefficients.  This  result  is  not  consistent  with 
accounting  conservatism  being  an  accruals  phenomenon.  Further,  Ball,  Kothari  and 
Robin  (2000)  do  not  report  asymmetric  timeliness  of  operating  cash  flows  in  respect 
to  bad  news  for  their  UK  sample,  although  a  direct  comparison  of  the  result  is 
difficult  given  that  they  use  a  cash  flow  figure  constructed  from  data  from  a  different 
database  rather  than  take  the  published  figures  (as  is  the  case  in  this  thesis,  too). 
Additional  analyses  (not  reported)  also  reveal  that  the  asymmetry  in  operating  cash 
flows  cannot  be  ascribed  to  either  tax  or  net  interest  charges,  as  these  adjustments  do 
not  affect  the  results  qualitatively  and  affect  them  quantitatively  only  marginally. 
309 To  sum  up,  the  results  obtained  elsewhere  in  this  work  regarding  the  effects 
of  conservatism  on  the  earnings  figure  are  not  sensitive  to  whether  the  published  or 
the  estimated  figure  is  used.  However,  the  results  obtained  for  the  operating  cash 
flows  change  significantly  if  the  published  figure  is  used  rather  than  the  estimated 
figure  within  the  same  time  period  and  for  the  same  firms.  Published  operating  cash 
flows  exhibit  a  statistically  significant  asymmetric  response  to  bad  news.  This  result 
is  not  consistent  with  accounting  conservatism.  A  comprehensive  explanation  as  to 
why  this  occurs  is  left  for  future  research. 
5.9  SUMMARY  OF  FXNDXNGS  FROM  SENSXTXVXTY 
ANALYSES 
Overall,  the  results  of  various  sensitivity  analyses  show  that  the  main  results 
obtained  in  Chapter  4,  are  generally  robust  both  in  tenns  of  differing  rin-n  attributes 
and  in  terms  of  methods  used  to  estimate  the  models.  While  there  are  some  (minor) 
differences  in  terms  of  firms  of  different  sizes,  industries  and  different  accounting 
year-ends  in  responding  to  good  and  bad  economic  news,  these  differences  do  not 
affect  qualitatively  the  conclusions  from  the  main  analyses. 
Various  adjustments  to  reflect  varying  general  economic  conditions  across 
the  sample  period  also  do  not  affect  the  main  results  qualitatively  and  affect  them 
quantitatively  only  very  marginally.  A  similar  conclusion  applies  to  the  choices  of 
estimation  methods  and  sample  selection  procedures,  too.  The  construction  of 
310 alternative  proxies  of  ex-ante  conservatism  shows  some  deviations  from 
expectations.  However,  because  this  area  is  empirically  relatively  under-researched, 
this  is  viewed  as  an  indication  of  the  need  for  further  research  rather.  Another 
potentially  important  exception  to  expectations  is  the  difference  between  the 
constructed  and  published  cash  flow  figures  in  the  post-FRS  3  period. 
Generally,  however,  a  delayed  response  to  good  economic  news  and  an 
asymmetric  response  to  bad  economic  news  can  be  observed  in  all  groups  of  firms  in 
earnings  figures.  This  asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings  results  from  the  accruals 
component  (more  specifically,  the  working  capital  accruals  and  special  items,  while 
deprecation  does  not  have  an  important  role  in  this  asymmetry).  The  operating  cash 
flow  component  does  not,  generally,  reflect  the  arrival  of  economic  news 
asymmetrically.  The  sensitivity  analyses  thus  suggest  that  the  results  obtained  in  the 
main  analyses  are  robust. 
311 CONCLUSIONS 
Background  and  principal  findings.  This  study  builds  from  and  extends  the 
existing  literature  on  accounting  conservatism,  one  of  the  dominant  explanations  of 
observed  differences  between  market  values  and  accounting  performance  measures, 
on  a  large  sample  of  publicly-quoted  UK  companies  operating  in  the  United 
Kingdom  at  any  point  in  the  1969-2001  period.  The  study  provides  additional,  more 
detailed  and  new  empirical  evidence 
_ 
on  different  aspects  of  accounting 
conservatism.  First,  the  persistence  properties  of  accounting  figures  are  shown  (e.  g., 
Giner  and  Rees,  2001).  Second,  direct  tests  of  conservatism  as  reflected  in 
accounting  earnings,  cash  flows  and,  in  particular,  accruals  (Pope  and  Walker,  1999; 
Basu,  1997)  are  presented,  including  changing  time-series  properties  of  accounting 
numbers  due  to  conservatism  (e.  g.,  Ryan  and  Zarowin,  2003;  Givoly  and  Hayn, 
2000;  Francis  and  Schipper,  1999)  and  the  effects  of  previous  periods  news  and  of 
previous  accounting  practices  (Pope  and  Walker,  1999;  Giner  and  Rees,  2001). 
Third,  influence  of  the  sign  of  "bottom-line"  earnings  (e.  g.,  Berger,  Ofek  and  Swary, 
1996;  Hayn,  1995)  is  studied,  both  directly  by  expanding  the  Pope  and  Walker 
(1999)  model  and  indirectly  through  separate  estimation  of  the  basic  model  by  the 
sign  of  earnings  or  various  earnings  components.  Fourth,  the  effects  of  general  (Pope 
and  Walker,  2003)  and  asset-specific  recognition  rules  are  studied.  Finally,  in  the 
sensitivity  analyses,  other  controls,  some  of  them  sample-spccific  (e.  g.,  adjustments 
for  general  economic  conditions)  and  the  effects  of  other  characteristics  (e.  g.,  firm 
size,  fiscal  year-end)  are  studied.  The  main  findings  are  the  following. 
312 First,  the  study  provides  evidence  on  mean-reversion  and/or  persistence 
properties  of  earnings,  cash  flows  and  accruals  induced  by  accounting  conservatism. 
From  a  time-series  perspective,  a  performance  measure  reflecting  the  realised 
proportion  of  good  economic  news  will  tend  to  be  persistent.  On  the  other  hand, 
accounting  conservatism  requires  immediate  and  complete  recognition  of  economic 
losses  (decreases  in  market  value).  This  will  be  reflected  in  financial  statements  as  a 
large,  one-time  earnings-decreasing  change  in  an  accounting  figure.  This  study 
shows  explicitly  which  accounting  figures  reflect/are  affected  by  accounting 
conservatism  and  in  what  precise  way  to  the  level  of  detail  allowed  by  the  data.  To 
allow  a  detailed  exposition,  accounting  earnings  are  decomposed  in  its  two  main 
components:  operating  cash  flows  and  accruals.  The  latter  is  further  subdivided  into 
three  distinct  categories:  working  capital  accruals  (and  its  three  main  components  - 
changes  in  debtors,  stock  and  creditors),  depreciation  and  amortisation  charge,  and 
64special  iteme'. 
Operating  cash  flows  do  not  contain  any  accruals.  It  is  only  expected  to 
reflect  the  realisation  of  operations.  In  doing  so,  the  operating  cash  flows  arc 
expected  and  found  to  be  strongly,  albeit  not  completely  (Dechow,  Kothari  and 
Watts,  1998),  mean-reverting  -  periods  of  high  cash  outflows  (e.  g.,  to  buy  stock  of 
raw  material)  are  followed  by  periods  of  high  cash  inflows  (e.  g.,  as  sales  arc 
collected).  There  is  no  difference  between  eamings-increasing  and  earnings. 
decreasing  changes  in  the  operating  cash  flows.  The  inclusion  of  the  consequences  of 
financing  and  investment  activities  in  the  cash  flows  measure  yields  similar  results. 
Moreover,  given  that  cash  flows  only  reflect  the  economic  reality  of  the  firm,  there  is 
313 no  difference  between  profit  and  loss  firms  and  finns  that  exhibit  decreases  in  share 
prices. 
Accounting  earnings,  a  performance  measure  that  includes  accruals,  on  the 
other  hand,  exhibits  different  time-series  properties.  The  partial  realisation  of  an 
economic  gain  implies  an  earnings  increase.  This  increase  will  be  followed  in  the 
next  period  by  another  earnings  increase  as  a  consequence  of  a  similar  partial 
realisation  of  an  original  economic  gain.  Therefore,  earnings  increases  are  predicted 
and  found  to  be  persistent.  On  the  other  hand,  economic  losses  under  conservative 
accounting  cause  large,  complete  one-time  adjustments  to  assets  recorded  in  the 
balance  sheet.  This  implies  that  a  corresponding  earnings  decrease  will  appear  only 
once  in  the  profit  and  loss  account.  In  other  words,  earnings  decreases  are  fully 
transitory  (mean-reverting).  The  more  accruals  components  a  particular  measure  of 
earnings  includes,  the  more  mean-reverting  are  the  earnings  decreases. 
Given  that  earnings  is  a  simple  sum  of  operating  cash  flows  and  accruals 
components  and,  as  theory  indicates  and  evidence  shows,  the  cash  flows  are  not  the 
component  affected  by  accounting  conservatism,  the  observed  asymmetric 
persistence  of  earnings  must  be  clearly  reflected  in  various  accruals  components. 
This  study  hypothesises  and  finds  that  working  capital  accruals  and  its  thrcc  main 
components  are  on  average  strongly  mean-reverting,  as  is  expected,  given  that  the 
operating  accruals  are  intended  to  counteract  the  negative  serial  correlation  in 
operating  cash  flow  to  arrive  at  a  more  smooth  performance  measure  (earnings). 
However,  the  results  show  that  eamings-decreasing  changes  in  working  capital 
accruals  reverse  about  50%  faster  than  earnings-increasing  changes  in  working 
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perhaps  the  principal)  accruals  component  that  is  expected  to  reverse  fast  if  it  reflects 
an  economic  loss  under  conservative  accounting,  is  the  "special  items",  a  collection 
of  various  extraordinary,  exceptional  and  other  similar  items.  The  results  confirm 
this  expectation.  Moreover,  both  working  capital  accruals  and  special  items  mean- 
revert  more  if  a  firm  exhibits  a  "bottom-line"  accounting  loss  and/or  it  exhibits  bad 
economic  news.  Interestingly,  the  mean-reversion  rates  in  both  working  capital 
accruals  and  special  items  are  very  similar,  even  though  existing  literature  typically 
explores  in  more  detail  the  effects  of  special  items  on  persistence  of  earnings.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  depreciation  and  amortisation  charge  is  typically  not  associated  with 
accounting  conservatism.  The  results  show  that  both  increases  (i.  e.,  earnings- 
decreasing  changes)  and  decreases  (i.  e.,  eamings-increasing  change)  in  the 
deprecation  charge  are  permanent. 
Second,  the  study  extends  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  empirical  results  by 
providing  tests  of  ex-post  accounting  conservatism  using  their  model.  The  model  is 
built  around  the  asymmetric-timeliness  property  of  earnings  that  results  under 
conservative  accounting.  Good  economic  news  is  reflected  in  earnings  only  partially, 
as  it  meets  the  criteria  of  recognition,  resulting  in  relatively  low  timeliness  of 
earnings.  Bad  economic  news,  on  the  other  hand,  must  be  recognised  in  earnings 
immediately,  resulting  in  strong  timeliness  of  earnings.  Given  that  this  study  uses 
various  earnings  figures  that  differ  chiefly  in  the  amounts  and  types  of  accruals 
components  included  in  them  and  given  that  the  operating  cash  flow  component  is 
also  constructed,  comparing  the  differential  asymmetric  timeliness  between  the  cash 
flow  and  various  earnings  models  allows  indirect  inferences  about  the  role  of 
315 accruals  in  the  observed  asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings.  In,  a  general 
confirniation  of  existing  (US)  empirical  evidence, operating  cash  flows  generally 
exhibit  low  timeliness  and,  given  that  they  contain  no  accruals,  exhibit  no 
asymmetric  timeliness  in  reflecting  bad  news.  Earnings,  on  the  other  hand,  show 
increasingly  more  asymmetry  in  reflecting  bad  news  as  more  and  more  accruals  arc 
added  from  operating  profit  to  ordinary  earnings  to  earnings  after  extraordinary  and 
exceptional  items.  While  these  are  ascribed  to  the  effect  of  accruals  neither  Basu 
(1997)  nor  any  other  existing  similar  study  provides  direct  evidence  on  the 
asymmetric  timeliness  property  of  various  types  of  accruals. 
This  study  provides  direct  tests  of  the  different  roles  various  types  of  accruals 
have  in  the  observed  asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings.  Of  the  total  asymmetric 
timeliness  observed  in  earnings,  an  important  part  results  from  the  asymmetric 
timeliness  of  working  capital  accruals.  Moreover,  the  results  show  that  all  of  its  three 
individual  components  reflect  bad  news  asymmetrically.  Special  items  are  the  other 
important  type  of  accruals  that  reflects  bad  news  asymmetrically.  The  depreciation 
charge,  on  the  other  hand,  does  not  have  an  important  role  in  the  observcd 
asymmetric  timeliness  of  earnings.  This  analysis  also  produces  an  interesting  "side" 
result  -  good  news  results  in  a  small,  but  statistically  significant  eamings-decrcasing 
change  in  special  items,  a  result  consistent  with  earnings  smoothing.  Thus  the  results 
of  this  analysis  also  impinge  upon  other  areas  of  capital  market-based  accounting 
research.  Accruals  results  show  that  even  though  accruals  is  the  component  that 
makes  cash  flows  more  timely  in  reflecting  economic  news,  the  criterion  by  which 
the  overall  timeliness  is  judged  -  the  R2_  is  very  low  in  the  accruals  regressions.  A 
simplified  explanation  is  provided  that  this  is  in  fact  to  be  expected  if  accruals  have 
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measure  -  the  accounting  earnings. 
Regarding  the  changes  in  conservatism  through  time,  this  study  finds  some 
evidence  that  conservatism  is  in  fact  increasing  in  the  UK  as  well,  but  the  evidence  is 
much  less  persuasive  than  the  US  evidence  (e.  g.,  Givoly  and  Hayn,  2000).  The 
evidence,  consistent  with  US  results,  shows  that  the  sensitivity  of  earnings  to  good 
news  has  decreased  from  1969  to  2001.  The  evidence  on  increasing  conservatism 
can  directly  be  inferred  through  slight  increases  over  time  in  the  incremental  bad 
news  coefficient  either  directly  in  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items 
or  in  special  items,  or  indirectly  through  relative  skewness  and  variability  of  earnings 
measures,  standardised  by  respective  operating  cash  flow  measures. 
The  lagged  analysis  provides  corroborating  evidence  to  the  results  from  the 
contemporaneous  models.  Operating  cash  flows  do  not  exhibit  any  asymmetric 
timeliness,  the  three  earnings  figures  exhibit  a  pronounced  contemporaneous 
asymmetry  to  bad  news  and  ordinary  earnings  and  earnings  after  extraordinary  and 
exceptional  items'also  exhibit  decreasing  asymmetry  at  lag  one  and  lag  two.  This 
result  is,  theoretically,  not  entirely  expected  under  conservative  accounting,  but  has 
been  shown  in  Pope  and  Walker  (1999)  up  to  and  including  lag  one  and  is  consistent 
with  prices-lead-earnifigs  phenomenon  in  the  UK  (Donnelly  and  Walker,  1995).  The 
significance  of  lag  two  incremental  bad  news  coefficient  is,  perhaps,  due  to  the 
sample  composition  that  includes  varying  accounting-period  lengths.  However,  lag 
three  asymmetry  is  statistically  insignificantly  different  from  zero.  Direct  lagged 
tests  on  accruals  reveal,,  again,  that  contemporaneous  asymmetric  timeliness  of 
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significant  bad  news  lags  are  likely  due  to  special  items.  This  result  thus  suggests 
that  some  types  of  bad  news  are  not  recognised  in  earnings  immediately,  but  its 
effect  spread  over  up  to  three  years.  Of  the  working  capital  accruals,  only  the  change 
in  stock  and  work  in  process  now  exhibits  asymmetric  timeliness  with  the  current 
and  lag-one  coefficients  being  significant. 
The  levels  and  sign  of  "bottom-line"  earnings  as  well  as  other  accounting 
variables  may  represent  a  control  for  previous  periods'  application  of  conservative 
accounting.  It  thus  helps  in  modelling  the  Vrterm  within  the  Pope  and  Walker  (1999) 
model  (Giner  and  Rees,  2001).  However,  it  might  also  serve  as  a  proxy  for  other, 
perhaps  incremental,  explanations  of  the  differences  between  the  accounting  figures 
and  market  values  (e.  g.,  the  existence  of  abandonment  options  "in  the  money"  -  e.  g., 
Berger,  Ofek  and  Swary,  1996).  The  results  shown  here  are  consistent  with  both 
these  explanations  in  that  the  R  2S  increase  sharply,  while  the  coefficients  on  good 
and  bad  economic  news  remain  essentially  unchanged  relative  to  the  basic  set  of 
results.  These  findings  are  valid  if  lagged  levels  of  the  dependent  variables  are 
included  rather  than  levels  of  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items. 
Third,  the  analysis  of  earnings  components  by  the  sign  of  "bottom-line" 
earnings  shows  that  the  two  groups  of  finns  exhibit  different  average  values  of 
operating  cash  flows  and  accruals  components,  and  that  the  correlations  between 
these  variables  are  fundamentally  different  for  the'two  groups  of  finns,  as  is 
suggested  by  existing  literature  (e.  g.,  Lipe,  Bryant  and  Widener,  1998;  Collins, 
Pincus  and  Xie,  1997;  Jan  and  Ou,  1995;  Hayn,  1995).  However,  differences  in 
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tests  of  ex-post  conservatism  do,  in  fact,  show  no  differences  in  reflecting  good  and 
bad  news  for  the  "bottom-line"  profit  and  loss  firms  and  neither  does  the  developed 
absolute-value  model.  Moreover,  separating  the  observations  by  the  sign  of  the 
operating  cash  flow  component  reveals  that  in  both  groups  earnings  exhibit  levels  of 
asymmetric  timeliness  that  is  statistically  indistinguishably  different  from  one 
another.  In  contrast,  separating  observations  by  the  sign  of  either  working  capital 
accruals,  special  items  or  total  accruals,  reliably  shows  that  the  asymmetric 
timeliness  is  statistically  significantly  higher  in  negative  accruals  groups,  as  expected 
under  conservative  accounting.  Immediate,  timely  and  complete  recognition  of  bad 
news  results  in  large,  eamings-decreasing  changes  in  accruals,  possibly,  but  not 
necessarily  leading  to  a  "bottom-line"  loss.  In  either  case,  the  accruals  components 
determines  this  asymmetric  timeliness,  rather  than  ý  the  operating  cash  flow  (or, 
earnings  itselo. 
Fourth,  the  ex-post  application  of  accounting  conservatism  has  been  shown 
both  theoretically  and  empirically  (Pope  and  Walker,  2003)  to  be  limited  by  the 
application  of  ex-ante  conservatism.  The  higher  the  ex-ante  conservatism,  the  less 
likely  it  is  that  earnings  will  reflect  asymmetric  timeliness  in  reflecting  bad  news 
(and  timeliness  in  reflecting  good  news).  As  earlier,  the  component  of  earnings  that 
should  be  affected  by  these  rules,  is  the  accruals  component.  As  expected  given 
previous  results  and  the  predictions  of  ex-ante  literature,  the  asymmetric  timeliness 
of  earnings  increases  with  decreasing  application  of  ex-ante  conservatism  and  is 
higher  for  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  than  for  ordinary 
earnings  (and,  with  some  deviations,  operating  profit).  This  asymmetry  across 
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capital  accruals  and  special  items.  Newly-developed  asset-specific  measures  of 
"sources"  of  ex-ante  conservatism  -  reinforce  these  findings.  Some  individual 
components  in  some  tertiles  are  of  the  correct  signs  and  consistent  magnitudes  but 
statistically  insignificant  (albeit,  not  at  entirely  prohibitive  levels  to  allow  at  least 
some  comparative  inferences).  The  results  do,  however,  show  one  puzzling  result  - 
operating  cash  flows  reveal  a  statistically  and  economically  significant  asymmetric 
response  to  bad  news  in  the  group  of  observations  where  it  is  least-likely  to  be 
observed  (low  book  to  market).  This  result  is  not  expected  under  conservative 
accounting.  However,  this  puzzle  persists  ever  since  the  influential  Basu  (1997) 
paper. 
Finally,  a  selection  of  other  results  and  respective  conclusions  include  the 
following.  Smaller  firms'  earnings  tend  to  exhibit  higher  asymmetric  timeliness  in 
incorporating  bad  news,  nonetheless  because  their  size  precludes  the  risk-dispersion 
at  the  operating  level  (Basu,  2001).  There  is  some  preliminary  evidence  that 
extremely  bad  news  firms  tend  to  apply  more  conservative  accounting,  while  very 
good  news  firms  apply  earnings-reducing  accounting  reflected  via  special  items.  On 
the  one  hand,  this  is  consistent  with  "big  bath"  accounting,  while  on  the  other  with 
earnings  smoothing  (Kirschenheiter  and  Melumad,  2002).  Accounting  conservatism 
appears  to  be  a  phenomenon  that  governs  the  relation  between  accounting  numbers 
and  financial  statements  regardless  of  the  industry  in  which  a  firm  operates,  albeit 
these  characteristics  are  reflected  in  industry  book-to-market  ratios  that  in  turn  proxy 
for  varying  levels  of  ex-ante  conservatism.  Various  adjustments,  including  market- 
wide  index  returns,  yields  on  short-  and  long-term  government  bonds,  December  31  st 
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only  provide  corroborating  evidence  for  previous  results,  but  in  a  majority  of  cases 
have  the  effect  of  moving  the  results  more  towards  hypothesized  results. 
Some  Innovations  and  specificities  of  this  study.  While  building  on  existing 
literature,  this  study  expands  it.  at  least  in  the  following  important  aspects  (or  groups 
of  aspects).  First,  it  employs  a  UK  sample  that  is  large  both  in  cross-sectional  and  in 
time-series  terms  as  it  includes  both  live  and  dead  companies  and  covers,  to  the  best 
of  my  knowledge,  the  longest  UK  sample  covering  1969-2001.  Notwithstanding 
technical  issues  of  constructing  such  a  sample,  its  properties  lead  to  several 
developments  that  are  both  necessary  in  such  a  context  while  at  the  same  time  being 
complementary  to  existing  studies.  These  include:  construction,  indirect  and  direct 
tests  of  different  earnings,  operating  cash  flow  and  certain  accruals  figurcs  that 
ensure  the  highest-possible  ý  level  of  comparability  through  time  as  well  as 
internationally.  Some  of  these  measures  are  complemented  by  more  detailed 
measures  (e.  g.,  operating  cash  flows  are  complemented  with  the  "total  cash  flow" 
figure  in  appendices).  These  issues  are  particularly  pressing  given  that  the  study 
requires  relatively  detailed  accounting  data  that,  furthen-nore,  originates  from  periods 
with  different  levels  and  types  of  accounting  regulation. 
The  second  extension  of  existing  literature  that  this  study  provides  is  related 
to  issues  of  controls  for  various  market-wide  effects  and  controls  for  fiscal-year  ends 
in  an  UK  context,  while  at  the  same  time  ensuring  maximum  caution  in  inferences 
by  using  consistently  the  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  method  throughout  the  thesis, 
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allow  for  ex-ante  conservatism  (e.  g.,  the  tertiles  versus  deciles  issue). 
Third,  some  particular  innovations  relating  to  methods  used  in  this  study 
include  the  aforementioned  market-wide  controls  that  are  performed  on  an  individual 
observation  basis  (i.  e.,  firm  plus  time)  in  conditions  of  varying  accounting-period 
lengths.  An  attempt  to  form  an  aggregate  test  of  expected  values  of  coefficients  in 
persistence  regressions  estimated  cross-sectionally  is  also  made.  New  time-series 
measures  are  developed  -  in  particular,  some  relative  earnings  and  accruals  skewness 
and  variability  measures  standardised  by  respective  statistics  for  the  operating  cash 
flow  figures.  A  formal  test  between  pairs  of  coefficients  resulting  from  different 
partitions  (e.  g.,  profit  versus  loss  firms)  is  applied  to  issues  studied  in  capital  market- 
based  accounting  research.  To  the  extent  that  issues  surrounding  the  measurement  of 
levels  of  ex-ante  conservatism,  asset-specific  measures  are  developed. 
Fourth,  in  terms  of  modelling,  the  absolute-value  model  developed  hcrc 
incorporates  directly  (allows  for)  the  effects  of  varying  signs  of  the  dependcnt 
variable  C'bottom-line"  earnings),  albeit  with  some  econometric  difficulties. 
Fifth,  within  the  sensitivity  analyses,  comparative  results  are  presented  for 
published  versus  constructed  figures  used  in  this  text.  The  issue  is  potentially 
important  to  investors,  researchers,  and  standard-setters.  Moreover,  it  provides  some 
preliminary  evidence  on  coexistence  of  "big  batlf  '  and  earnings-smoothing 
accoun  ing. 
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appear  in  this  thesis.  These  issues  represent  in  a  great  majority  of  cases  potential 
areas  of  future  research.  Some  of  these  areas  include  the  following.  First,  the  study 
includes  only  certain  types  of  accounting  performance  measures  as  well  as  only 
some  proxies  for  ex-ante  conservatism.  Both  might  be  improved  upon/expanded 
using  the  respective  post-FRS  figures.  One  such  issue  that  might  be  related  more  to 
ex-post  accounting  conservatism  are  the  financing  and  taxation  accruals  and  cash 
flows  (Garrod  and  Hadi,  1998),  the  effects  of  which  could  not  be  removed  entirely 
from  or  study  adequately  in  this  study.  Moreover,  additional  ex-ante  conservatism 
measures  might  be  introduced.  Given  such  a  long  time-series,  the  "bias  and  lags" 
measure  in  Beaver  and  Ryan  (2003)  might  be  feasible.  Other  studies  suggest  one 
minus  depreciation  expense  relative  to  the  appropriate  asset-base,  R&D  and 
advertising  expenses  relative  to  total  assets  (Ahmed,  Morton  and  Schaeffer,  2000).  A 
related  issue  conditioned  by  data  availability  is  that  neither  Basu  (1997)  nor  Pope 
and  Walker  (1999)  include  dividends  in  the  calculation  of  returns.  However,  all  these 
extensions  are  data-intensive  so  they  will  invariably  involve  the  trade-off  between 
the  method  of  inference  (determined  by  the  time-series  length)  and  richness  of  data 
(post-FRS  figures). 
Second,  in  terms  of  methods  used,  an  econometric  resolution  to  the  sample- 
truncation  bias  and  the  need  to  accommodate  the  sign  of  the  dependent  (accounting) 
variable  as  well  as  the  sign  of  the  independent  (market)  variable  following  Hausman 
and  Wise  (1977)  would  be  an  important  addition  to  the  study.  Other  proxies  for  the 
"loss  effect"  might  be  important. 
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research  and  that  these  methods  account  for  two  principal  problems  (scale  and  errors 
in  variables),  relatively  little  emphasis  has  been  given  on  "technical"  (econometric) 
checks.  Existing  literature  also  suggests  further  developments  in  the  real-options  area 
(e.  g.  Berger,  Ofek  and  Swary,  1996)  and  issues  of  simultaneity  (e.  g.,  Beaver, 
McAnally  and  Stinson,  1997)  within  the  conservatism  framework  may  be  important. 
Third,  the  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  cross-sectional  method  of  inferences 
used  in  this  paper  allows  incorporating  other  potential  economic  determinants 
(Kothari,  2001;  Farna  and  French,  2000)  in  the  relations  under  conservative 
accounting.  Some  of  these  include  (Ahmed  et  al.,  2002):  operating  variability  as 
measured  by  the  variability  of  the  return  on  assets,  dividends  (and  dividend-payouts), 
leverage,  potential  growth,  impact  of  R&D  and  advertising  expenses  (in  particular  in 
the  UK  context)  or  controls  for  varying  legal-liability  periods  (e.  g.,  Basu  1997). 
Similar  structural  breaks  are  also  potentially  caused  by  introduction  of  new 
accounting  regulations.  Similarly,  cross-sectional  estimates  might  be  related  to  other 
economic  factors  (e.  g.,  Klein  and  Marquardt,  2002). 
Fourth,  one  particular  issue  affects  additional  insights  that  might  be  obtained 
in  studying  the  models  used  in  this  study  estimated  from  a  constant  sample  of  UK 
firms.  While  this  would  certainly  raise  potentially  serious  survivorship-bias  issues,  it 
might  provide  additional  results  that  would  help  to  reinforce/refute  the  findings  of 
this  study.  However,  the  construction  of  such  a  sample  might  prove  very  difficult  in 
that  both  the  accounting  year-ends  and  the  length  of  accounting  period  are  allowed  to 
vary.  A  related  question  is  the  estimation  assuming  panel  data  structure  (e.  g., 
324 Greene,  2000).  Another  related  question  is  the  firm-specific  estimation  that  might 
yield  additional  benefits  (Lipe,  Bryant  and  Widener,  1998;  Teets  and  Wasley,  1996). 
Fifth,  one  particular  sensitivity  check  that  has  been  omitted  from  this  study  is 
the  aggregation  of  both  the  dependent  and  the  independent  variable  (Easton,  Harris 
and  OhIson,  1992).  The  time-series  aggregation  in  this  study  should  lead  to 
increasingly  smaller  proportions  of  (principally  good)  economic  news  being 
excluded  from  the  accounting  performance  measures.  This  would  result  in  higher 
R2S,  the  coefficient  on  good  news  being  closer  to  the  cost  of  capital  and  the 
incremental  coefficient  on  aggregate  bad  news  being  statistically  insignificantly 
different  from  zero  (Basu,  1997). 
Sixth,  in  the  context  of  interactions  between  persistence  and  conservatism  (as 
in  Giner  and  Rees.,  2001),  a  division  of  this  measure  into  its  cash  flow  and  accruals 
components  might  prove  useful.  However,  this  will  likely  have  to  involve  resolutions 
of  measurement  errors  potentially  involving  some  of  the  techniques  listed  in  the 
introductory  chapter  (e.  g.,  Dagenais  and  Dagenais,  1997;  Lewbell,  1997;  Dagenais; 
1994). 
Seventh,  some  of  the  results  presented  in  this  thesis,  particularly  the  laggcd 
models,  appear  to  be  affected  by  the  choice  of  deflators.  The  selection  of  appropriate 
deflators  in  studies  of  conservative  accounting  might  constitute  an  important  area  of 
future  research  (Ryan  and  Zarowin,  2003;  Akbar  and  Stark,  2003;  Easton  and 
Sommers,  2003;  Easton,  1999). 
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firms,  a  formal  test  of  systematic  differences  would  be  required.  Smith  and  Pourciau 
(1994)  shows  that  December  and  non-December  year  end  firms  differ  systematically 
in  terms  of  size  (see  section  5.2)  and  market  risk.  This  latter  in  particular  represents  a 
formidable  task  using  such  a  large  sample  and  the  database  employed  in  this  study. 
The  list  of  potential  areas  of  future  research  does  not  attempt  to  be 
exhaustive,  but  rather  indicative  of  the  issues  that  are  still  to  be  explored  in  this  area 
of  capital  market-based  accounting  research  (in  particular,  contractual  aspects  have 
not  been  discussed  in  this  thesis).  To  conclude,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  literature 
reviewed  does  not  represent  a  complete  set  of  research  papers  in  this  area.  The 
selection  is  heavily  influenced  by  the  course  of  studies  taken.  Howeveran  attempt  to 
provide  as  complete  a  review  as  possible  of  this  large  area  has  been  made. 
Furthermore,  given  that  accounting  conservatism  is  a  rapidly  expanding  area,  the 
bibliography  likely  does  not  include  all  the  most  recent  developments. 
Some  potential  users  of  the  results  presented  In  this  thesis.  The  results 
from  this  thesis  potentially  affect  several  stakeholders.  Perhaps  the  most  pressing 
issue  at  this  moment  is  defined  by  the  formal  endorsement  of  International  Financial 
RePorting  Standards  by  the  European  Union  (Commission  Regulation  No. 
1727/2003,  Official  Journal  of  the  European  Communities,  29/9/2003,  in  accordance 
with  Commission  Regulation  1606/2002,  Official  Journal  of  The  European 
Communities,  11/9/2002)  to  be  applied  throughout  the  EU  beginning  2005.  Both  in 
the  EU  and  in  the  US  and  other  regions,  is  the  need  for  a  "high  quality"  set  of 
accounting  standards,  providing  timely  value-relevant  inforination  to  (equity) 
326 investors.  Timeliness  and  particularly  asymmetric  timeliness  is  thus  viewed  as  a 
desirable  characteristic  of  financial  statements  (performance  measures).  This  study 
shows  some  detailed  aspects  of  the  timeliness  property  of  accounting  perfon-nance 
measures.  The  findings  might  be  helpful  in  the  standard-convergence  process  on  a 
global  scale,  for  example  by  comparing  the  UK  GAAP/IAS(IFRS)  standards  with 
US  GAAP  (e.  g.  Ashbaugh  and  Olsson,  2002)  and  cross-listings  (e.  g.,  Hujigen  and 
Lubbering,  2001).  In  particular,  the  (asymmetric)  timeliness  of  special  items  would 
likely  play  an  important  role  in  this  debate.  Perhaps  an  issue  immediately  related  is 
the  link  of  conservatism  with  auditors'  incentives  (e.  g.,  Jeong-Bon,  Chung  and  Firth, 
2003;  Basu,  Hwang  and  Jan,  2001). 
Given  that  the  existence  of  accounting  conservatism  induces  differences 
between  accounting  and  market  value,  these  findings  also  affect  investors  and 
financial  analysts,  who  need  to  adjust  their  estimates  for  the  effects  of  both  current 
and  past  conservative  accounting  practices.  Properties  of  conservative  accounting  are 
important  also  in  contractual  terms.  Conservatism  has  been  shown  to  affect  both  the 
dividend  policy  and  debt  covenants  (e.  g.,  Ahmed  el  aL,  2002),  there  are  indications 
also  shown  in  this  study  that  it  varies  according  to  managerial  incentives  (following 
Kirschenheiter  and  Melumad,  2002).  Conservatism  is  also  shown  to  be  affected  by 
board  composition  (Beekes,  Pope  and  Young,  2003)  and  influence  board 
composition  and  incentives  (Bushman  et  A,  2004).  related  to  and  may  have  other 
contractual  uses. 
Finally,  future  researchers  in  the  area  of  capital  market-based  accounting 
research  might  find  some  sections  of  this  thesis  informative.  One  such  topics  might 
327 be  the  variable  definitions  and  sample  construction  sections,  an  area  particularly 
scarce  of  detail  in  existing  literature.  This  research  also  affects  international 
variations  in  applications  of  accounting  conservatism  that  differs  not  in  accounting 
standards,  but  rather  in  tenns  of  legal  incentives  and  infrastructure.  This  has  been 
explored  in  a  number  of  settings  recently,  starting  from  the  Pope  and  Walker  (1999) 
model  (e.  g.,  Basu,  Kothari  and  Robin,  2000;  Basu,  Kothari  and  Wu,  2002;  Raonic, 
McLeay  and  Asimakopoulos,  2004).  Recent  applications  also  include  properties  of 
accounting  earnings  of  private  finns  (Ball  and  Shivakurnar,  2004),  a  particularly 
scarcely  researched  area,  at  least  in  part  due  to  lack  of  appropriate  data  and 
databases. 
328 APPENDICES 
A.  LIST  OF  MAIN  VARXABLES  AND  ASSOCXATHD 
DATASTREAM  CODES 
Table  A-1:  List  of  the  main  variables  used  in  the  empirical  study  and  associated  Datastream  codes 
(deflinitions) 
Variable  label  Name  Datastream  codes  (construction  formula) 
OP  Operating  prof  it  =  #137 
ORD  Ordinary  earnings  =#182 
EARN  Earnings  after  extraordinary  =  #182  +  #193  +  #194 
and  exceptional  items 
AWCAP  Net  change  in  debtors,  stock  =  #448  +  #445  -  #417 
and  work-in-progress  and 
creditors 
ADebtors  Change  in  debtors 
AStock  Change  in  stock  and  work  in 
progress 
ACreditors  Change  in  creditors 
DEP  Depreciation  and  amortisation 
SPEC  Special  items 
OCF  Operating  cash  flow 
ACASH  Net  change  in  cash 
Accruals  (tot.  )  Total  accruals 
BV  Book  value  of  equity 
S  Turnover 
P  Share  price 
RET,.,,  Ex-dividend  return  (deflated  by 
lag  one  price  P, 
-, 
) 
PET,,,, 
-, 
Ex-dividend  return  (deflated  by 
price  four  periods  back  P,  4) 
Current/lagged  loss  indicator 
Current/lagged  bad  news 
indicator 
FTSE  All  Share  FrSE  All  Share  index 
UKTRSBL  91  -day  UK  TB  discount 
UKMEDYLD  10-year  UK  gilt  yield 
Inflation  rate  UK  inflation  rate 
MRETI., 
-, 
Market-adjusted  ex-dividend 
return 
MPE  Tt.  r,,  -  y-  I  Market-adjusted  ex-dividend 
return 
DMt.  l.  1,  DM, 
-,;,  -,, 
Current/lagged  market-adjusted 
bad  news  indicator 
NONDECYEI,  Financial  year-end  indicator 
#448 
#445 
=  #417 
=  #402  +  #562 
=  -(OP-ORD)  +#  181  +  (#  153-#  143)  + 
(#  160-#  162+#  169+#  16  1  -#  164) 
=  OP  +  DEP  -A  WCAP  +  #404 
=  #457  pre-FRS  I  (Rev.  1996)  and#  1134 
post-FRS  I  (Rev.  1996) 
=AWCAP+DEP+SPEC 
=  #305 
=  #104 
=P 
n/a 
n/a 
I  if  EARN,:  5  0  or 
EARM.,  :50  and  zero  otherwise 
I  if  RETI.  t.  1:  5  0  or 
PET,,,, 
-1:  5  0  and  zero  otherwise 
=  FTALLSH 
=  UKTRSBL% 
=  UKUEDYLD 
=  UKRPANNL 
=  RET#.,,  -  A%FTSE  All  Share, 
'j-, 
=  PETt-,:  I-r-l  -  A%FTSE  All  Share 
I  if  MRETII-1:  5  0  or  MPET,.,.,.  1:  5  0  and 
zero  otherwise 
I  if  firm  i's  accounting-year  end  in  year 
is  not  on  the  3  111  December  and  zero 
otherwise 
329 B.  CONTFMPORANEOUS  AND  ZAGGED  POPE  AND  WAZKER 
(1999)  MODEZS  ON  NET  CHANGE  XM  CASH  AND 
TOTAZ  ACCRUAZS 
Table  B-1:  Descriptive  statistics  -  net  change  in  cash  and  total  accruals,  1969-2001 
Variable  Defl.  Mean  St  Dev  Min  Q25  Median  Q75  Max  Skew  n 
ACASH  P',  0.006  0.207  -1.909  -0.067  0.000  0.064  3.228  1.217  25,880 
Accruals  PI.  -I  -0.045  0.205  -1.459  -0.108  -0.026  0.037  1.001  (tot.  )  -0.833  25,888 
ACASH  P14  0.000  0.271  -3.036  -0.082  0.001  0.082  5.021  0.261  20,530 
Accruals 
P14  -0.041  0.260  -1.601  -0.134  -0.036  0.048  1.627  0.132  20,536 
- 
(tot.  ) 
Notes.  Variables  are  defined  as  follows:  ACASH  is  the  net  change  in  cash,  Accruals  (lot.  )  is  total  accruals.  Both  variables  are 
per  share  and  scaled  by  P, 
-, 
in  the  contemporaneous  and  P"  in  the  lagged  sample.  n  is  the  total  number  of  observations.  Note 
that  the  number  of  observations  is  lower  in  the  ACUSH  variable  because  reporting  this  figure  is  not  a  requirement  to  enter  the 
samples.  In  the  case  of  total  accruals,  the  number  of  observations  is  equal  to  the  respective  numbers  in  contemporaneous  and 
lagged  samples. 
Table  B-2:  Persistence  of  net  change  in  cash  and  total  accruals,  1969-2001 
Panel  A:  ACASH  avg.  n 
;  r,  ;  r2  62  R2 
No  partition  693.6  0.013  -0.451  0.216 
1.713  -21A89  18.725 
Mm  partition  693.6  -0.003  0.030  -0.417  -0.008  0.224 
-0.390  6.780  -16.891  -0.201  19.153 
EARNrlevel  partition  693.6  0.005  0.115  -0.439  -0.070  0.237 
0.601  6.805  -20.344  -1.348  19.789 
Lag  RET,  13-2  partition  693.6  -0.007  0.040  -0.387  -0.187  0.236 
.  1.133  4.875  -18.626  -7.876  20.162 
Panel  B:  Mccruals  (tot)  avg.  n  irt  'r2  A  0)2  R2 
No  partition  689.1  -0.004  -0.421  0.200 
-0.526  -14S64  8.166 
Mm  partition  689.1  -0.032  0.027  -0.308  -0.196  0.231 
-4.477  6.136  -6.685  -3.047  9.538 
EARNrlevel  partition  689.1  -0.018  0.077  -0.366  -0.174  0.240 
-2.402  3.046  -IIA31  -3.901  10.020 
Lag  RETt-1.1-2  partition  689.1  0.004  -0.016  -0.337  -0.249  0.223 
0.738  -1.711  -10.967  -10.173  9.026 
Notes.  Estimated  regressions  are:  (AX1P,.  j)-xj  +  jr2,  C, 
_i  +  4h'(AX_i/P,  -2)  +  M'C,  -r(AX#-i1P,  -2)  +  rjj  where 
AX;  =  Xr-X, 
-,  and  AXI-I=  X14-41-2  and  X,  is  an  un-deflated,  per  share  dependent  variable  listed  at  the  top  of 
each  panel.  Dummy  variables  C,.  1  are  defined  as  follows:  partitioning  byA.  X,.,:  C,.,  -(l  if  AX,., 
_<O; 
0 
otherwise);  partitioning  by  lagged  level  of  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  EARN, 
i:  Cti=  II  if  EARN,.,  -_'0;  0  otherwise);  partitioning  by  lagged  returns  RET.  ij.  2:  C,.  I-  (I  if  RETj,  #.  2_<O.  0 
otherwise).  All  estimates  are  cross-sectional  averages  for  the  period  t-1969-2001  and  associated  i. 
statistics  are  calculated  according  to  the  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  procedure.  Boldfaced  estimates  are 
significant  at  5%  or  better  at  33-1=  32  d.  f.  Values  are  restricted  to  top/bottom  1%  of  distribution  or 
variables  used  in  the  contemporaneous  sample  as  well  as  to  toP/bottom  1%  of  distribution  or  relevant 
deflated  change  variables  AXIP,.,  and  AX, 
-IIP,.  2  (i.  e.,  the  samples  used  in  this  table  are  sub-samples  of 
the  contemporaneous  sample). 
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DEFLATORS 
Table  C-1:  Descriptive  statistics  for  lagged  samples  deflated  by  P, 
_1  and  by  opening  price  at  each  lag, 
1969-2001 
Panel  A:  Deflated  by  pl  Mean  St  Dev  Min  Q25  Median  Q75  Max  Skew 
Cash  flows 
ACASH  0.007  0.206  -1.717  -0.066  0.000  0.065  3.228  0.978 
OCF  0.241  0.244  -0.393  0.102  0.185  0.317  1.895  1.832 
Eamings 
OP  0.209  0.189  -0.304  0.101  0.161  0.270  1.439  1.719 
ORD  0.097  0.096  -0.422  0.056  0.087  0.131  0.615  0.341 
EARN  0.088  0.121  -0.740  0.049  0.085  0.134  0.673  -0.755 
Accruals 
, dWC.  4P  0.045  0.176  -0.780  -0.018  0.022  0.099  1.010  0.539 
-  of  which  ADebtors  0.056  0.182  -3.545  -0.004  0.026  0.095  4.766  2.402 
-  of  whichdStock  0.051  0.176  -3.184  -0.004  0.014  0.085  2.890  1.070 
-  of  whichdCreditors  -0.062  0.210  -5.863  -0-099  -0.025  0.008  3.164  -2.761 
DEP  .  0.081  0.077  -0.602  -0.102  -0.058  -0.032  -0.002  -2.520 
SPEC  -0.011  0.076  -0.567  -0.022  0.000  0.011  0.314  -1.736 
, 4ccruals  (tot.  )  -0.047  0.209  -1.459  -0.113  -0.028  0.036  1.001  -0.824 
Retums 
PET,,,,  0.127  0.446  -0.735  -0.164  0.061  0.339  2.422  1.219 
PET, 
-,.,  2  0.027  0.394  -2.389  -0.140  0.093  0.284  0.732  -1.557 
PET#-2.1-3  0.011  0.424  -2.857  -0.133  0.080  0.252  1.034  -1.856 
PET,  3.,  -4  0.008  0.440  -3.036  -0.125  0.060  0.224  1.461  -1.631 
Dij-1  0.435  0.496  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.261 
D,,.,  2  0.391  0.488  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.449 
D 
t--Zt-3  0.392  0.488  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.442 
---Pt-3.  t-4  0.404  0.491  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.393 
Cont. 
332 Panel  B:  Varying 
deflators  Mean  St  Dev  Min  Q25  Median  Q75  Max  Skew 
Cash  flows 
ACASH  0.014  0.247  -4.230  -0.063  0.001  0.068  4.754  2.555 
OCF  0.252  0.296  -2.007  0.104  0.186  0.318  4.216  3.212 
Earnings 
Op  0.209  0.226  -2.566  0.099  0.158  0.264  4.389  3.165 
ORD  0.094  0.119  -2.346  0.055  0.085  0.128  1.829  -0.320 
EARN  0.079  0.164  -2.848  0.048  0.083  0.131  1.836  -3.005 
Accruals 
AWCAP  0.039  0.207  -2.643  -0.020  0.020  0.093  2.813  0.596 
-  of  which  ADebtors  0.053  0.199  -3.545  -0.005  0.024  0.091  4.766  2.098 
-  of  whichdStock  0.045  0.202  4.637  -0.005  0.013  0.078  3.176  0.071 
-  of  whichdCreditors  -0.059  0.229  -5.863  -0.094  -0.023  0.009  3.591  -2.338 
DEP  -0.085  0.093  -1.715  -0.104  -0.059  -0.033  -0.001  4.141 
SPEC  -0.016  0.105  -2.601  -0.022  0.000  0.011  1.419  4.923 
Accruals  (tot.  )  -0.063  0.260  4.171  -0.117  -0.030  0.032  2.587  -2.082 
Rctums 
PETt.,,  0.128  0.450  -0.735  -0.164  0.059  0.337  2.422  1.248 
PET,,.,  2  0.143  0.453  -0.705  -0.152  0.071  0.354  2.467  1.272 
PET141-3  0.143  0.448  -0.703  -0.153  0.074  0.357  2.345  1.179 
PET$-3.1-4  0.137  0.439  -0.698  -0.153  0.070  0.351  2.259  1.147 
D,.,,  0.437  0.496  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.255 
D  t-I.  P-2  0.422  0.494  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.315 
D  Z,  3  0.420  0.494  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.323 
Df-lf-4  0.424  0.494  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  0.307 
Notes.  Variables  are  defined  as  follows:  JC4SH  is  the  net  change  in  cash,  OCF  is  operating  cash  flow,  Op  is  adjusted 
operating  profit,  ORD  is  earnings  before  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (ordinary  earnings),  EARM  is  earnings  aficr 
extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,,  MCAP  is  working  capital  accruals,  ADebtors  is  the  change  in  creditors,  ASIock  is  the 
change  in  stock  and  work  in  progress,  ACredilors  is  the  change  in  creditors,  DEP  is  depreciation  and  amortisation  expense, 
SPEC  is  special  items  and  Accruals  (tot.  )  are  total  accruals  defined  as  Accruals  (tot.  )-  dWCAP+DEP+SPEC.  All  dependent 
variables  are  per  share  and  scaled  by  P#.,,  but  the  definitions  of  independent  variables  change  across  the  two  panels.  in  Panel 
A,  lagged  adjusted  price  differences  are  scaled  by  lag-one  price  P,,,  so  that  PET#.,.,.,  t-  (P, 
-r8-,  -iYA.  I,  but  in  Panel  B  the 
deflators  of  adjusted  price  differences  vary  with  lags  so  that  PET,,  v-,  -i= 
(8.,  -8-.  iYP,.  r+  D,.,,..  i  are  dummy  variables  defined 
as  if  RET,,  150,0  otherwise).  The  definitions  of  dummy  variables  are  independent  of  the  choice  of  dcflators.  The 
number  of  observations  in  sample  in  Panel  A  is  20,993  (20,987  for  the  ACASH  variable)  and  in  Panel  13:  20,137  (20,131  for 
the  WASH  variable).  The  table  includes  descriptive  statistics  of  the  AG4SH  and  Accruals  (tot.  )  variables  for  reason  or 
completeness,  but  samples  are  not  formed  according  to  these  two  variables,  analogously  to  formations  of  the 
-contemporaneous  and  lagged  samples. 
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r  t  iý  vm-- D.  DETAILS  ON  PERSISTENCE  COEFFXCXENT  TESTS 
Table  D-1:  Persistenced  tests  -  number  of  times  coefficients  equal  the  expected  value,  1969-2001 
PANEL  A:  Operating  cash 
flows  (OCF) 
61  62  4+62  61=-0.35  e92 
=  0-00  61  +  62  =  -0.35 
No  partition  -0.345  22 
-12.046 
, d0CF,  j  partition  -0.305  -0.001  -0.306  15  12  20 
-9.145  -0-013 
EARN,.,  -level  partition  -0332  -0.107  -0.438  15  15  20 
.  12.660  -1.074 
RET,,.,  2  partition  -0.260  -0.230  -0.490  18  20  19 
.  11.318  -6.353 
PANEL  B:  Operating  profit 
(OP) 
61  62  +  62  61ý0,00  62ý-0,50  61+62:  2-0,50 
No  partition  -0.058  20 
-2.594 
JOPs.,  partition  0.063  -0.503  -0.441  13  14  18 
2.996  -9.711 
EARN, 
-,  -level  partition  0.033  -0.271  -0.237  11  21  26 
1.822  -6.226 
RET-1,12  partition  0.009  -0.183  -0.174  9  21  26 
0.400  -6.139 
PANEL  C:  Ordinary 
earnings  (ORD) 
61  62  +  62  61  =  0,00  "  62  =  -0*50  ^+  62  :  -,  -0150  (01 
No  partition  -0.067  18 
-2.925 
, dORDt.,  partition  0.101  -0.690  -0.589  18  21  19 
4.613  -11.750 
EARNt.  1-level  partition  0.046  -0.312  -0.266  18  24  25 
2.294  4.972 
RETI.  I.  1-2  partition  0.029  -0.233  -0.204  18  24  27 
1.347  -7.103 
PANEL  D:  Earnings  after 
ex'ord.  and  ex!  nal.  items 
(EARN) 
0),  W2  0ý  +  0)2  61: 
__  0,00  62=-0,50  61+62,2-0*50 
No  partition  -0.234  31 
-7.307 
AEARN,.  1  partition  -0.054  -0.696  -0.750  12  25  27 
-1.529  -9.681 
EARN,.,  -level  partition  -0.069  -0397  -0.467  19  24  22 
-2.739  -3.460 
RET, 
-I.  t-2  partition  -0.121  -0300  -0.422  25  20  23 
4.003  -6.521 
Cont. 
338 PANEL  E:  Working  capital 
accruals  (A  JYCAP) 
61  62  61+62  61  =  -0*50 
62 
=  0'00  61  +  62 
=  -0,50 
No  partition  -0.407  21 
-20.117 
A(AIYCAP, 
-, 
)  partition  -0.296  -0.147  -0.443  23  17  12 
-6.964  -2.362 
E,  4RN,  I-Ievel  partition  -0390  -0.118  -0.508  24  11  18 
-19.190  -2.206 
RET,,,.,  2  partition  -0.337  -0.204  -0.541  25  19  10 
-19.212  -8.873 
PANEL  E-I:,  dWCAP 
component  -  ADebtors 
W,  W2  clý+CO2  61=-0.50  62=0.00  61+62=-0.50 
No  partition  -0.423  24 
.  17.369 
ADebtors,  j  partition  -0344  -0.117  -0.461  20  20  12 
-9.498  -2.969 
EARN, 
_,  -level  partition  -0.417  -0-099  -0.516  23  13  16 
-1  7A44  -1.167 
RET, 
_U-2  partition  -0-353  -0.220  -0.573  25  21  18 
-16.240  -7.081 
PANEL  E-2:,  dWCAP 
component  -  AStock  W,  W2  0ý  +  W2  61  =  -0,50 
61  +  62  =  -0,50 
62  0,00 
No  partition  -0.392  28 
-11.608 
, dStock,.,  partition  -0.334  -0.152  -0.486  26  23  19 
-6.986  -1.847 
EARN.,  -level  partition  -0.380  -0.151  -0.532  28  9  17 
-10.567  -1-234 
RET, 
-,,,  2  partition  -0.339  -0.181  -0.519  26  17  17 
-9.429  -6.403 
PANEL  E-3:  A  WCAP 
component  -,  dCreditors  0),  W2  WI  +  W2  -0*50 
62 
ý  0*00  61  +  62  m  -0,50 
No  partition  -0.451  24 
-15.881 
Wreditors,.,  partition  -0.415  -0.002  -0.417  16  13  25 
-14.515  -0.039 
EARN-,  -level  partition  -0.440  -0.061  -0.501  23  16  15 
-15.206  -1.211 
RET, 
-,,,  2  partition  -0.405  -0.153  -0.558  24  12  16 
-14.078  -5.288 
PANEL  F:  Depreciation 
. 
and  amortisation  (DEP)  W,  W2  ctý  +  W2  61  0,00  Cý2  ý  0*00  61  +  62 
"ý  0,00 
No  partition  0.001  7 
0.031 
ADEP, 
_1  partition  -0.001  0.490  0.489  811 
-0.038  0.274 
EARN,.,  -level  partition  -0.036  -0.452  -0.488  566 
-1.424  -1.086 
RET, 
-I.  t-2  partition  -0.024  -0.080  -0.104  59  12 
-0.945  -0.344 
ConL 
339 PANEL  G:  Special  items 
(SPEC) 
W,  W2  dý+69,  6,  =-0.50  62=0,00  61+62=-0,50 
No  partition  -0.413  22 
-12.246 
ASPEC,  j  partition  -0.288  -0.292  -0.580  27  26  24 
-7.178  -3-U4 
EARN,,  -level  partition  -0.271  -0.422  -0.693  29  26  17 
.  9.501  4.536 
RET, 
-I.,  -2  partition  -0.256  -0.337  -0.594  28  24  17 
-10310  -6.262 
PANEL  H:  Net  change  in 
cash  (ACASM  W, 
A  W2  A  OA+CO2  'ýDl=-0.50  62=0.00  61+62=-0.50 
No  partition  -0.451  19 
-21.489 
A  (.  dCASH,.,  )  partition  -OA17  -0.008  -0.426  17  10  17 
-16.891  -0.201 
EARN, 
-,  -level  partition  -0.439  -0.070  -0.509  20  10  13 
-20.344  -1.349 
RET, 
-1,12  partition  -0.388  -0.025  -0.412  23  21  14 
-20.473  -0.146 
PANEL  1:  Total  accruals 
(Accruals  (tot.  )) 
61 
e92  4+62  e5l  =  -0.50 
62 
=  0.00  61  +  62 
=  -0.50 
No  partition  -0.421  22 
-14.564 
A(Accruals  (tot.  ),,  )  part.  -0308  -0.196  -0.505  25  19  15 
-6.685  -3.047 
EARN, 
-,  -level  partition  -0366  -0.174  -0.540  27  14  15 
-IIA31  -3.901 
RET, 
-I.,  -2  partition  -0337  -0.249  -0.586  29  24  19 
-10.967  -10.173 
Notes.  Estimated  regressions  are:  (AXIP, 
-i)=  m,  +  MCI  +  ah(AX-11PI-2)  +  MCI-KAXIIIPI-2)  +  q,  where  AX,  -Xr-Xl  and 
AXý,  =X,.  r-X,  2  and  X,  is  an  un-deflated,  per  share  dependent  variable  listed  at  the  top  of  each  panel.  Dummy  variables  Cj  are 
defined  as  follows:  partitioning  by  &YýI:  C, 
-i= 
11  if  0  otherwise);  partitioning  by  lagged  level  of  earnings  after 
extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  EARN,.,:  C, 
-,  =  It  if  EARN,.,  50;  0  otherwise);  partitioning  by  lagged  returns 
, RET,  L,  ýz:  C,  j-  II  if  RET,.,.,  24-:  O;  0  otherwise). 
All  estimates  are  cross-sectional  averages  for  the  period  t--1969-2001  and  associated  t-statistics  are  calculated  according  to  the 
Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  procedure.  Boldfaced  estimates  are  significant  at  5%  or  better  at  33-1-  32  d.  f.  Values  are  restricted 
to  top/bottom  1%  of  distribution  of  variables  used  in  the  contemporaneous  sample  as  well  as  to  top/bottom  1%  of  distribution 
of  relevant  deflated  change  variables  AXIPl  and  AXIIP, 
-2 
(i.  e.,  the  samples  used  in  this  table  are  sub-sampics  of  the 
contemporaneous  sample). 
The  test  statistics  of  equality  of  coefficients  to  those  listed  in  Table  3-11  in  section  3.4  are  t-statistics  calculated  for  each  year 
and  for  each  coefficient(linear  combination  of  coefficients.  The  numbers  in  the  table  indicate  the  number  of  times  the 
estimated  coefficient  is  equal  to  the  expected  value  listed  in  the  head  of  each  panel. 
340 E.  FORMAL  TESTS  OF  DXFFERENCES  BETWEEN 
RESTRICTED  AND  UNRESTRICTED  VERXSONS  OF 
CONTEMPORANEOUS  AND  LAGGED  MODELS 
Table  E-1:  Formal  tests  of  differences  between  restricted  and  urestricted  versions 
of  contemporaneous  and  lagged  models,  1969-2001 
Number  of  times  differences  between 
restricted  and  unrestricted  cross-sections 
are  significant 
Dependent  variable  Contemporaneous  Lagged 
Cash  flows 
WASH  58 
OCF  11  9 
Earnings 
OP  23  17 
ORD  27  26 
E,  IRN  28  26 
Accruals 
AWC4P  10  10 
-  of  which  ADeblorrs  59 
-  of  whichdStock  5  12 
-  of  whichdCreditors  36 
DEP  66 
SPEC  15  18 
Accruals  (tot.  )  16  16 
Notes.  Estimated  models  are  either  XýPI=  ai+a2D,,  -,  +,  6,  RET,  #.,  +,  nD,,.  IRET,.,.  I+si 
(contemporaneous  models)  or  XIP,  -,  -  ao+aD,.,,  +,  6,  PET,,.  -,  +APETi-l,  v2+fljPET,  ý.  2.,  -j+  +fl4PET,.,  jj-.  d+?  ID,,  IPET,,  -,  +,  %-D,  -I.  v2PET,.  -i.  #--2+7.  rD,  -z"PETv2.  f-j+y,  (Dt-j,  i-XETvj.  "+&  (lagged 
models)  where  X,  is  a  dcpendendt  variable  defined  as  follows:  ACASH  is  the  net  change  in  cash, 
OCF  is  operating  cash  flow,  OP  is  adjusted  operating  profit,  ORD  is  earnings  before 
extraordinary  and  exceptional  items  (ordinary  earnings),  EARN  is  earnings  after  extraordinary 
and  exceptional  items,,  dWC.  4P  is  working  capital  accruals,  ADeblors  is  the  change  in  creditors, 
ASIock  is  the  change  in  stock  Wreditors  is  the  change  in  creditors,  DEP  is  depreciation  and 
amortisation  expense,  SPEC  is  special  items  and  the  measure  of  total  accruals  is 
AccruaIs=,  dWCAP+DEP+SPEC.  All  variables  are  per  share  and  scaled  by  &I  for  the 
contemporaneous  models  and  by  P,  4for  the  lagged  models,  returns  variable  are  defined  either 
as  RET,,,  ýI=(PrP,.  IYP,,  I  Or  as  PETr-TI-T-Im(PI-rPI-r-IYPf-4  in  the  extended  versions. 
341 CONTEMPORANEOUS  AND  LAGGED  REGRESSIONS 
INCLUDING  OUTLIERS 
Table  F-1:  Contemporaneous  models  of  accounting  conservatism  by  earnings  components,  including 
additional  variables,  and  including  all  outliers,  1969-2001 
2  + 
Dependent  vafiables  avg.  n  eil  a2  R  A  A+A  A 
Cash  flows 
ACASH  861.2  -0.003  0.030  0.096  0.062  0.024  0.158  1.650 
-0.477  0.877  5.387  0.602  5.957 
OCF  860.1  0.263  0.016  0.103  0.163  0.045  0.266  2.593 
12.714  0.442  4.901  1.503  5.693 
Eamings 
OP  863.8  0.238  -0.018  0.098  0.208  0.089  0.306  3.112 
10.516  -2.314  5.248  7.934  9A97 
ORD  863.8  0.112  -0.008  0.046  0.208  0.086  0.254  5.463 
13.695  -1.449  5.288  8.718  11.111 
EA  RN  863.8  0.106  -0.001  0.052  0.321  0.069  0.373  7.181 
11.541  -0.158  5.195  8.215  13.327 
Accruals 
, dWCAP  861.1  0.057  -0.035  0.022  0.014  0.023  0.037,  1.650 
5.052  -1-005  1.750  0.150  4.279 
AWCAP  components: 
of  which  ADebtors  861.1  0.070  -0.042  0.045  -0.031  0.030  0.014  0.301 
6.911  -1.087  4.137  -0.300  3.959 
of  whichdStock  861.2  0.056  0.002  0.041  0.086  0.021  0.127  3.106 
4.787  0.233  2.871  3.028  5.034 
-of  whichdCreditors  861.2  -0.068  0.005  -0.064  -0.040  0.030  -0.104  1.629 
-6.368  0.453  4.655  -1.713  5.629 
DEP  860.9  -0.085  0.001  -0.028  0.028  0.029  0.000  -0.016 
-14.556  0.282  -5.663  3.079  5.258 
SPEC  859.4  -0.006  0.007  -0.002  0.118  0.017  0.116  -56.171 
-1.609  1.820  -0.405  5.208  6.808 
Accruals  (tot.  )  855.8  -0.033  -0.027  -0-008  0.162  0.020  0.154  -19.644 
-2.753  -0.729  -0.639  1.544  5.848 
Notes.  Estimated  models  are:  XIP,.,  =  ai+a2D,.,.,  +ARET,,.  t+ýiD,.  t.  iRETti-i+ci  where  X,  is  an  undeflated,  per  share  dependent 
variable  listed  in  the  leftmost  column  of  the  table:  OCF  is  operating  cash  flow,  OP  is  adjusted  operating  profit,  ORD  is 
earnings  before  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  EARN  is  earnings  after  extraordinary  and  exceptional  items,  JWCAP  is 
working  capital  accruals,  ADebtors  is  change  in  debtors  accounts,  AStock  is  change  in  stock,  ACredifors  is  change  in  creditors 
accounts,  DEP  is depreciation  and  amortisation  expense  and  SPEC  is  special  items,  RET,,.,  -  (Pr-PIypl  and  D,.,.,  -  (I  if 
RET,,..  150;  0  otherwise).  All  variables  are  deflated  by  opening  share  price  P,.,.  Avg.  n  is  the  average  number  of  observations 
per  year.  All  coefficients'  estimates  and  R2s  are  cross-sectional  averages  for  the  period  1969-2001  and  associated  t-statistics 
are  calculated  according  to  the  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973)  procedure.  Boldfaced  estimates  are  significant  at  5%  or  better  at  33. 
1-  32  d.  f.,  i.  e.,  JtJ>2.0369.  Regressions  include  all  observations  that  have  the  non-missing  values  separately  by  each  variable 
(the  average  number  of  observations  changes  accordingly) 
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< G.  ADDITIONAL  INFORMATION  ON  TIME-SERIES 
TRENDS  IN  SPECIAL  ITEMS  (SPEC) 
Figure  G-I:  I'I'CqLICIICICS  of'positive  and  negative  special  items  (SPEC)  per  year,  1969-2001 
80' 
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il 
1000 
00  00  00  00  00  00  cý  CY,  cý  0,  CY,  oý  C>  cl  <71  CD  <D 
0,01  Z,  Z,  01  Z,  01  el  cl  Z,  cl  Z,  all  0,01  0,0,0,0,0,  al  c71  C>  cl  (Y,  0,0,0,0,0,  CPI  CD  ýO 
----------------------------  (14  ri 
Notes.  SPECare  special  iterns.  Shomi  are  percentages  oftotal  number  of  firms  within  each  year.  The  terni  "large"  denotes 
observations  Ahere  ISPEC,,  )12!  I%  of  special  iterns  relative  to  the  opening  book  value  oftotal  assets  A,,  (c.  g  Flliott  and  Shaw, 
19M  Flliott  and  Hanna,  1996). 
'Fable  G-1:  Time-trend  regressions  of  percentages  of  firms  reporting  positve  and  negative  special 
items  (SPEO,  1969-2001 
Percentages  of  firms  reportingu: 
2 
adj.  R 
Negative  SPEC  0.474  0.003  0.022 
20.695  1.307  0.201 
Large  negative  SPEC  0.271  0.004  0.047 
10.174  1.605  0.119 
Positive  SPEC  0.477  -0.003  0.039 
24.488  -1-511  0.141 
Large  posltl\  e  SPh'('  0.253  -0.004  0.367 
30.039  4.421  0.000 
Zero  SPEC  0.049  0.000  -0.032 
11.264  -0.116  0.909 
Notes.  L-stimated  are  T,  +  T2  T+  ýT  denotes 
the  technical  time  1  16,...  0,  +161  . 
Below  each  ofthe  estimated  i,  and 
T2coeti-icients  is  the  time-trend  t-statistics  and  below  the  adjusted  R2s  are  the 
exact  levels  of  significance  based  on  the  F-statistic.  Bold  faced  cstiniates  are 
_significant 
at  5".  or  better  (critical  values  arc  i,  ý  oo5(31  d.  f.  )=  2.040. 
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